










A STUDY
OF *red*
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES

BY
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UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

ELEVENTH EDITION, REVISED



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TO THE
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TO
MY MOTHER



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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

IN this volume, which is the outcome of several years of continuous reflection and teaching in the department of ethics, an effort has been made to re-think the entire subject, and to throw some light upon the real course of ethical thought in ancient and in modern times. The author has been anxious, in particular, to recover, and, in some measure, to re-state the contribution of the Greeks, and especially of Aristotle, to moral science.

The use of two terms calls for a word of explanation. I have distinguished 'Eudæmonism' from 'Hedonism,' and adopted the former term to characterise my own position. Though these two terms are often identified, some writers have been careful to discriminate between them; and it seemed to me most important, for reasons which will appear, to follow their example, and to use 'Eudæmonism' in its original or Aristotelian sense. The second point is the distinction drawn between 'the individual' and 'the person.' This distinction comes, of course, from Hegel; but, in giving it a leading place

in the discussion, I am following the example of Professor Laurie of Edinburgh in his *Ethica, or the Ethics of Reason*, a book to which I probably owe more than to the work of any other living writer on ethics.

My other obligations I have tried to acknowledge in the course of the book, but it is difficult to make such acknowledgments complete. I have to thank my former colleague, Professor Walter G. Everett, of Brown University, for many helpful suggestions made while the work was in manuscript, and my brother, Professor Andrew Seth, of the University of Edinburgh, for his aid and advice while the original edition was passing through the press.

In the present edition several important changes have been made. The new chapter on "The Method of Ethics" explains the more limited view of the science which further reflection has forced upon the writer. The retention of the Third Part, "Metaphysical Implications of Morality," is due to the writer's continued belief in the intimate relation of ethics to metaphysics. The discussion of the place of pleasure, psychological and ethical, has been carried further than in the first and second editions. Use has been made of an article published in *The International Journal of Ethics*, July 1896. A new chapter, on "Moral Progress," has been added to the Second Part. For the assistance of students, a sketch of the literature of the subject has been appended to each chapter, and an index has been added. It is hoped that these and other minor changes

may make the volume more acceptable to those teachers who have done it the honour of adopting it as a text-book.

In the preparation of this edition, and especially of the new chapter on "Moral Progress," the author desires to acknowledge his special obligations to Dr David Irons, of the department of philosophy in this University.

J. S.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
ITHACA, NEW YORK, *December 1897.*

PREFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION.

ADVANTAGE has been taken of this opportunity to revise the entire work once more, and to make many minor corrections. There are, however, only two alterations of real importance. These occur (1) in the statement of Butler's theory in terms of Eudæmonism as well as of Rationalism (Part I. ch. iii. § 14), and (2) in the discussion of Freedom, which is identified no longer with contingency or indetermination, but with self-determination. The latter change of view has led to the alteration of certain statements in Part III. ch. i. §§ 3-5, and to the omission of the criticism of Green's view of the relation of the self to the character (§§ 8, 9).

J. S.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,
August 1902.

PREFACE TO THE NINTH EDITION.

A FURTHER revision has resulted in numerous verbal alterations, but in only one important restatement, that of Mill's position regarding the "proof" of Utilitarianism on pp. 129-130.

J. S.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,
April 1907.

PREFACE TO THE TENTH EDITION.

It has been found necessary to rewrite the account of Butler's theory, in which the Intuitional element no longer seems to me the most characteristic and important feature, and in which I now find a more adequate statement of the Eudæmonistic view than formerly (Part I. ch. iii. § 14). This change has further necessitated the rewriting of the section on Intuitionism (Part I. ch. ii. § 6 = §§ 6-9 in earlier editions). A few other corrections, of minor importance, have also been made.

J. S.

June 1908.

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE ETHICAL PROBLEM.

1. Ethics is the science of morality or conduct. A preliminary notion of what is meant by these terms will serve to bring out the nature of the inquiry on which we are entering.

Morality is described by Locke as "the proper science and business of mankind in general." In the same spirit Aristotle says that the task of ethics is the investigation of the peculiar and characteristic function of man—the activity (ἐνέργεια), with its corresponding excellence (ἀρετή), of man as man. And "can we suppose," he asks, "that, while a carpenter and a cobbler each has a function and a business of his own, man has no business and no function assigned him by nature?"¹ Morality might in this sense be called the universal and characteristic element in human activity, its human element *par excellence*, as distinguished from its particular, technical, and accidental elements. Not that the moral is a smaller and sacred sphere within the wider spheres of secular interests and activities. It is rather the all-inclusive sphere of human life, the universal form which embraces the most varied contents. It is that in presence of which all differences of age and country, rank and occupation, disappear, and the man himself stands forth in all the unique and intense significance of his human nature. Morality

¹ *Nic. Eth.*, i. 7 (11).

is the great leveller ; life, no less than death, makes all men equal. We may be so lost in the minute details and distracting shows of daily life that we cannot see the grand uniformity in outline of our human nature and our human task ; here, as elsewhere, we are apt to lose the wood in the trees. But at times this uniformity is brought home to us with startling clearness, and we discover, beneath the utmost diversity of worldly circumstance and outward calling, our common nature and our common duty. The delineation of this, the proper business of mankind in general, is the endeavour of ethical science.

Conduct, according to Matthew Arnold, is three-fourths of life, the other fourth being the province of the intellectual and æsthetic as distinguished from the moral life. But when truly conceived, as expressive of character, conduct is the whole of life. As there is no action which may not be regarded as, directly or indirectly, an exponent of character, so there is no most secret thought or impulse of the mind but manifests itself in the life of conduct. Nor can the intellectual and emotional life be separated from the volitional or moral. If, indeed, with Spencer, we extend the term 'conduct' so as to cover merely mechanical as well as reflex organic movements, then we must limit the sphere of ethics to "conduct as the expression of character." But, in the sense indicated, the conduct of life may be taken as synonymous with morality. Such conduct embraces the life of intellect and emotion, as well as that which is, in a narrower sense, called practice—the life of overt activity. Man's life is one, in its most diverse phases ; one full moral tide runs through them all.

But we must analyse conduct a little more closely. Spencer defines it as the adjustment of acts to ends ; and we may say it is equivalent to purposive activity, or, more strictly, in conformity with what has just been said, con-

sciously purposive activity. It is the element of purpose, the choice of ends and of the means towards their accomplishment, that constitutes conduct; and it is this inner side of conduct that we are to study. Now, choice is an act of will. Since, however, each choice is not an isolated act of will, but the several choices constitute a continuous and connected series, and all together form, and in turn result from, a certain settled habit or trend of will, a certain type of character, we may say that conduct is the expression of character in activity. Activity which is not thus expressive is not conduct; and since a will that wills nothing is a chimera, and a will which has not acquired some tendency in its choice of activities is no less chimerical, we may add that there is no character without conduct.

Conduct, therefore, points to character, or settled habit of will. But will is here no mere faculty, it is a man's 'proper self.' The will is the self in action; and in order to act, the self must also feel and know. Only thus can it act *as a self*. The question of ethics, accordingly, may be stated in either of two forms: (1) What is man's chief end? or (2) What is the true, normal, or typical form of human selfhood? (1) Man has a choice of ends: what is that end which is so worthy of his choice that all else is to be chosen merely as the means towards its fulfilment? What, among the possible objects of human choice, is, in the last analysis and for its own sake, worth choosing? And (2) since, in the last analysis, the object of his choice is a certain type of selfhood, this question resolves itself into the other: Which, among the possible selves, is the true or ideal self? Into what universal human form shall he mould all the particular activities of his life?

2. The ethical question both practical and theoretical.—To man his own nature, like his world, is at first a chaos, to be reduced to cosmos. As he must

subdue to the order and system of a world of objects the varied mass of sensible presentations that crowd in upon him at every moment of his waking life, so must he subdue to the order and system of a rational life the mass of clamant and conflicting forces that seek to master him—those impulses, passions, appetites, affections that seem each to claim him for itself. The latter question is, like the former, first a practical and then a theoretical question; in the one case, as in the other, “knowledge is power.” The first business of thought about the world—the business of ordinary thought—is to make the world orderly enough to be a world in which we can live. Its second business is to understand the world for the sake of understanding it, and the outcome of this is the deeper scientific and philosophic unity of things. So the first business of thought about the life of man is to establish a certain unity and system in actual human practice. Its second business is to understand that life for the sake of understanding it, and the outcome of this is the deeper ethical theory of life.

Ethics is accordingly often called practical, as opposed to theoretical philosophy, or metaphysics. The description is correct, if it is meant that ethics is the philosophy or theory of practice; it is indeed only another way of saying what we have just said. It suggests, however, the question of the relations of moral theory and practice. Life or practice always precedes its theory or explanation; we are men before we are moralists. The moral life, though it implies an intellectual element from the first, is, in its beginnings, and for long, a matter of instinct, of tradition, of authority. Moral progress, whether in the individual or in the race, may be largely accounted for as a blind struggle of moral ideals, hardly realised to *be* ideals, in which the fittest survive. Human experience is a continuous and keen scrutiny of these ideals; history is a grand contest of moral forces, in which the strongest are the victors. The conceptions of good and evil, virtue

and vice, duty and desert, which guide the life, not merely of the child but of the mass of mankind, are largely accepted, like intellectual notions, in blind and unquestioning faith. But moral, like intellectual, manhood implies emancipation from such a merely instinctive life; moral maturity brings with it reflection upon the meaning of life. The good man, like the wise man, puts away childish things; as a rational being, he must seek to reduce his life, like his world, to system. The words of the oracle inevitably make themselves heard: *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*; man must know himself, come to terms with himself. The contradictions and rivalries of ethical codes, the varying canons of moral criticism, the apparent chaos of moral practice, force upon him the need of a moral theory. This demand for a *rationale* of morality, for principles which shall give his life coherence, marks the transition from the practical to the theoretical standpoint, from life itself to its theoretic understanding.

Just when this transition is made, just when morality passes from the instinctive to the reflective stage, whether in the life of the race or of the individual, it is impossible to say. For, after all, practice implies theory. While a clear and adequate theory can be expected only after long crude practice, yet every life implies a certain plan, some conception, however vague and ill-defined, of what life means.¹ No life is altogether haphazard or 'from hand to mouth.' Only the animal lives from moment to moment; even the child-man and the vicious man "look before and after," if they do not, like the good man, "see life steadily and see it whole." Every action implies a purpose, that is, a thought of something to be done, and therefore worth doing. The individual action does not stand alone, it connects itself with others, and these again with others, in the past and in the future; nor can we stop at any point in the progress or in the

¹ Cf. Professor Dewey's excellent article on "Moral Theory and Practice," in *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. i. p. 186.

regress. In every action there is implied a view, narrower or larger, of life as a whole, some conception of its total scope and meaning for the man. The individual act is never a *res completa*, a separate and independent whole : to complete it, you must always view it in the totality of its relations, in the entire context of the life of which it is a part. A man does not, in general, make up his mind afresh about each particular action, or consider it on its own merits ; he refers it to its place in the general scheme or plan of life which he has adopted at some time in the past. But such a scheme or plan of life is already an implicit theory of life. It is impossible, therefore, to make an absolute distinction between the loose moral reflection of ordinary life, and that deeper and more systematic reflection which is entitled to the name of moral science. An intermediate stage of 'proverbial morality' would, in any case, have to be distinguished—the Book of Wisdom of the race. If every one is a metaphysician, every one is, still more inevitably, a moralist. Ethical science is only a deeper, more strenuous, and more systematic reflection upon life, a thinking of it out to greater clearness and coherence, a more persistent effort to "see life steadily and see it whole." The reflection of the ordinary man, even in the 'proverbial' form, is unsystematic and discontinuous ; the system of man's life, the principles on which it may be reduced to system, remain for the more patient and theoretical inquiry of moral science.

On the other hand, as it is impossible to separate practice from theory, so it is impossible to separate theory from practice. As Aristotle insisted, the abiding interest of the moralist is practical, as well as theoretical. Wisdom has its natural outflow in goodness, as proverbial morality has always declared ; the head guides the hand, the intellect the will. This inseparable connection of theory and practice was profoundly understood by the Greek philosophers, with whom the Socratic maxim that

"virtue is knowledge" was always a guiding idea, as well as by the Hebrews, for whom 'wisdom' and 'goodness,' 'folly' and 'sin,' were synonymous terms. It is also familiar to us from the teachings of Christianity, whose Founder is regarded as at once the Truth and the Life, and for which 'life eternal' is 'to know' the Father and the Son.¹ A larger and deeper conception of the meaning of life inevitably brings with it a larger and deeper life. Intellectual superficiality is a main source of moral evil; folly and vice are largely synonymous. Accordingly, the first step towards moral reformation is to rouse reflection in a man or people; to give them a new insight into the significance of moral alternative. The claims of morality will not be satisfied until the rigour of these claims is understood. All moral awakening is primarily an intellectual awakening, a repentance or change of mind (*μετάνοια*). Moral insight is the necessary condition of moral life, and the philosophy which deepens such insight is at once theoretical and practical, in its interest and in its value. By fixing our attention upon the ideal, ethics tends to raise the level of the actual. The very intellectual effort is itself morally elevating; such a turn of the attention is full of meaning for character. A moral truth does not remain a merely intellectual apprehension; it rouses the emotions, and demands expression, through them, in action or in life.

3. *Moral faith and ethical insight.*—Ethics is the effort to convert into rational insight that faith in a moral ideal or absolute human good which is at the root of all moral life. That such a moral faith is always present in morality, and is the source of all moral inspiration, hardly needs to be proved. Moral, like intellectual, scepticism can only be relative and partial.

¹ St John's central conception of 'Light' similarly emphasises the unity of the intellectual and the moral life.

If absolute intellectual scepticism means 'speechlessness,' or cessation from thought, absolute moral scepticism means death, or cessation from activity. Life, like thought, is the constant refutation of scepticism. As the continued effort to think is the refutation of intellectual scepticism, the continued effort to live is the refutation of moral scepticism. We live by faith. The effort to live, the *perseverare in esse suo*, implies, in a rational or reflective being, the conviction that life is worth living, that there are objects in life, that there is some supreme object or sovereign good for man. Such a faith may be a blind illusion, as pessimism declares; but it is none the less actual and inevitable. The ordinary man, it is true, does not realise that he has this faith, except in so far as he reflects upon his life. His plan of life is largely implicit; he estimates the goods of life by reference to a silently guiding idea of the Good. To press the Socratic question, Good for what? and thus to substitute for a blind unthinking faith the insight of reason, is to pass from ordinary to reflective thought. That life is worth living, is the postulate of life itself; why it is worth living, is the question of ethics as a science.

Now when this ethical question is urged, there is at once revealed a seemingly chaotic variety of goods, which refuse to be reduced to any common denominator. 'One man's meat is another man's poison.' If the metaphysician is tempted to ask despairingly, in view of the conflict of intellectual opinion, What is Truth? the moralist is no less tempted, in face of a similar conflict of moral opinion, to ask, What is Good? What appears good to me is my good, what appears good to you is yours; there is apparently no moral criterion. Here, at any rate, we seem to be reduced to absolute subjectivity. Each man appears to be his own measure of Good, and no common measure seems possible. Yet the scientific thinker cannot, any more than the ordinary man, escape from faith in an absolute Good. Like the ordinary man,

he may have his difficulties in defining it, and may waver between different theories of its form and content. But any and every theory of it implies the faith that there is such a thing. This moral faith is the matter constantly given to the moralist that he may endue it with scientific form. He cannot destroy the matter, he can only seek to form it; his task is the progressive conversion of ordinary moral faith, of the moral common-sense of mankind, into rational insight. It is his to explain, not to explain away, this moral faith or common-sense. That there is an absolute or ideal good is the assumption of every ethical theory—an assumption which simply means that, here as everywhere, the universe is rational. Ethics seeks to verify this assumption or to reduce it to knowledge, by exhibiting its rationality. Variety of opinion as to what the Good is, is always confined within the limits of a perfect unanimity of conviction that there is an absolute Good. Even the utilitarian, insisting though he does on the relativity of all moral distinctions, on the merely consequential and extrinsic nature of goodness, yet recognises in happiness a good which is absolute. Similarly, the evolutionist, with his wellbeing or welfare, sees in life, no less than the perfectionist or the theologian, "one grand far-off divine event." To lose sight of this, to surrender the conviction of an absolute human Good, would be fatal to all ethical inquiry. Its spur and impulse would be gone. But ethics, like metaphysics, is a tree which, though every bough it has ever borne may be cut away, will always spring up afresh; for its roots are deep in the soil of human life. As the faith in a supreme Good must remain as long as life lasts, the scientific effort to convert that faith into the rational insight of ethical theory must also continue.

4. The business of ethics, then, is to scrutinise the various ideals which, in the life of the individual and of the race, are found competing for the mastery. Life

itself is such a scrutiny; human history is one long process of testing, and the fittest or the best ideals survive. But the scrutiny of history is largely, though by no means entirely, unconscious. The scrutiny of science is conscious and explicit. Ethics, as moral reflection, institutes a systematic examination of human ideals, and seeks to correlate them with the true or absolute ideal of humanity. The accidental and the imperfect in them must be gradually eliminated, until, as the reward of long and patient search, the absolute Good at last shines through. As logic or the theory of thought seeks, beneath the apparent unreason and accident of everyday thought and fact, a common reason and a common truth, so does ethics seek, beneath the apparent contradictions of human life, a supreme and universal Good—the norm and criterion of all actual goodness.

Or we may say, with Aristotle, that ethics is the investigation of the final end or purpose of human life. The good ($\tau\omicron\ \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$) is the end ($\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, $\tau\omicron\ \omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$),—that end to which all other so-called ‘ends’ are really means. Such a teleological view is necessary in the case of human life, irrespective of the further question whether we can, with Aristotle, extend it to the universe, and include the human in the divine or universal end. Human life, at any rate, is unintelligible apart from the idea of purpose; the teleological and the ethical views are one. Since moral life is a series of choices, and goodness or virtue is, as Aristotle said, a certain habit or settled tendency of choice, the ethical question may be said to be, What is the true object of choice? What object approves itself to reflective thought as unconditionally worthy of our choice? What ought we to choose? Now the objects of choice fall into two great classes,—ends and means, objects that we choose for their own sake, and objects that we choose for the sake of other objects. Some objects we judge to possess an absolute,

primary, and intrinsic value; other objects we judge to possess only a relative, secondary, and extrinsic value. But, strictly, there can be only one end, one object or type of objects to which we attribute absolute and independent value, one Good that constitutes the several goods. Ethical system and unity imply such an ultimate and unitary Good; and ethical thinkers, when they have understood their task, have always sought for this last term of moral value, this one end to which all other so-called 'ends' are merely means, and which they have therefore called by the proud name of the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν).

It is to be remembered, however, that the moral life is, like the psychical life generally, rather an organic growth than a mechanism or fixed arrangement. Like the organism, it preserves its essential identity through all the variations of its historical development; it evolves continuously in virtue of an inner principle. To discover this constant principle of the evolution of morality is the business of ethics. The task of the ethical thinker is not to construct a system of rules for the conduct of life—we do not live by rule—but to lay bare the nerve of the moral life, the very essence of which is spontaneity and growth away from any fixed form or type. Each age has its own moral type, which the historian of morality studies; and the hero of an earlier age is not the hero of a later. Neither Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος* nor the mediæval saint will serve as our moral type. The search of ethics is for the organising principle of morality, for a principle which shall explain and co-ordinate all the changing forms of its historical development.

Nor are we to commit what we may call the 'moralist's fallacy' of confusing the scientific or reflective moral consciousness with the ordinary or naïve. The principles of the moral life, we must remember, are not to any great extent explicit; its ideals are not clearly realised

in the consciousness of the plain man. To a certain extent, of course, the ethical life is a thinking life—up to a certain point it must understand itself; it is not to be pictured as analogous to the physical life, which proceeds in entire ignorance of its own principles. But its thought need not go far, and the business of ethics is not to substitute *its* explicit theory, *its* rational insight and comprehension, for the implicit and naïve moral intelligence of ordinary life. Nor is the proof of an ethical theory to be sought in the discovery, in the ordinary moral consciousness of any age or community, of such a theory of its life. That life is conducted rather by tact, by a practical insight of which it cannot give the grounds. This was the feeling even of a Socrates, who attributed such unaccountable promptings to the unerring voice of the divinity that guided his destiny. The moral life precipitates itself in these unformulated principles of action; we acquire a faculty of quick and sure moral judgment, as we acquire a similar faculty of technical or artistic judgment. This ability comes with “the years that bring the philosophic mind,” it is the ripe fruit of the good life.

5. Ancient and modern conceptions of the moral ideal compared: (*a*) Duty and the Chief Good.—Modern moralists, it is true, prefer to raise the question in another form, and to ask, not “What is man’s chief end?” but “What is man’s duty; what is the supreme law of his life?” The right is the favourite category of modern ethics, as the good is that of ancient. But this is, truly understood, only another form of the same question. For the good or chief end of man does not fulfil itself, as the divine purpose in nature does; man is not, or at least cannot regard himself as, a mere instrument or vehicle of the realisation of the purpose in his life. His good presents itself to him as an ideal, which he may or may not realise in practice: this is what dis-

tinguishes the moral from the natural life. The law of man's life is not, like nature's, inevitable—it may be broken as well as kept: this is why we call it a moral law. While a physical law or a law of nature is simply a statement of what always happens, a moral law is that which ought to be, but perhaps never strictly is. So that, while the ethical category has changed from the *summum bonum* of the ancients to the duty and law of the moderns, the underlying conception is the same, and the logic of the transition from the one category to the other is easily understood. Perhaps the conception of a Moral Ideal may be taken as combining the classical idea of Chief Good or End and the modern idea of Law, with its antithesis of duty and attainment, of the Ought-to-be and the Is.

For both the ancient and the modern conceptions of the moral ideal have a tendency to imperfection; the former is apt to be an external, the latter a mechanical, view. The ancients were inclined to regard the end as something to be acquired or got, rather than as an ideal to be attained,—as something to be *possessed*, rather than as something to *become*. The ancient view tends to emphasise the material side, or the content, of morality, where the modern view emphasises its ideal and formal side. Accordingly it is the attractiveness, rather than the imperativeness, of morality that chiefly impresses the Greek mind. But, as Aristotle and Kant have both insisted, man must be his own end; he cannot subordinate himself as a means to any further end. The moral ideal is an ideal of character. In ancient philosophy we can trace a gradual progress towards this more adequate view. As the conception of 'happiness' is deepened, it is seen to consist in an inner rather than an outer well-being, in a life of activity rather than in a state of dependence on external goods, in a settled condition or habit of will rather than in any outward circumstances or fortune. The true fortune of the soul, it is felt, is in

its own hands, both to attain and to keep. The modern or Christian view is more spiritual and idealistic. 'Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you;' 'take no thought for the morrow.' The claims of righteousness become paramount—'do the right, though the heavens fall.' The danger for this view is the tendency so to exaggerate the notion of law as to conceive of life as mere obedience to a code of rules or precepts—to think of morality as something to *do* (or *not* to do) rather than as something to *be* or to *become*. Such a view of morality is mechanical. Life according to rule is as inadequate as the pursuit of an external good; and it is only gradually that we have regained the classical conception of ethical good, and have learned once more to think of the moral life as a fulfilment rather than a negation and restraint, and to place law in its true position as a means rather than an end.

The ancient and the modern views of the moral ideal are thus alike inadequate and mutually complementary; they must be harmonised in a deeper view. The end of life is an ideal of character, to be realised by the individual; and his attitude to it is one of obligation or duty to realise it. It is not something to be got or to be done, but to be or to become. It is to be sought not without, but within; it is the man himself, in that true or essential nature, in the realisation of which is fulfilled his duty alike to others and to God.

6. (b) **Ancient ideal political, modern individualistic.**—A second characteristic difference between the standpoint of ancient and that of modern moral reflection brings out still more clearly the necessity of such a personal view of morality. The moral ideal of the classical world was a political or social ideal, that of the modern world is individualistic. To the Greek, whether he was philosopher or not, all the in-

terests of life were summed up in those of citizenship; he had no sphere of 'private morality.' The conception of the State was so impressive, absorbing even, to the Greek mind, that it seemed adequate to the interpretation of the entire ethical life; and when confidence in its adequacy was shaken by the break-up of the State itself, and recourse was had of sheer necessity to the conception of a life of the individual apart from the State,—when the notion of Greek citizenship was abandoned, as in Cynicism and Stoicism, for that of citizenship of the world,—the ethics of the ancient world had already, like its life and thought in general, entered upon its period of decay.

The inadequacy of the classical standpoint has become a commonplace to us; we detect it in even the best products of the moral reflection of Greece, in the ethics of Plato and Aristotle. If modern theory and practice are defective, it is in the opposite extreme. The modern ethical standpoint has been that of the individual life. This change of standpoint is mainly the result of the acceptance of the Christian principle of the infinite value of the individual as a moral person, of what we might almost call the Christian discovery of the significance of personality. The isolation of the moral individual has been made only too absolute; the principle of mere individualism is as inadequate as the principle of mere citizenship. Hence the difficulty of reconciling the claims of self with the claims of society—a difficulty which can hardly be said to have existed for the ancients, who had not yet separated the individual from his society, and to whom, accordingly, the two interests were one and the same. Hence, too, the fantastic and impossible conception of a purely selfish life, which has caused modern moralists such trouble. Hence the ignoring of the importance of ethical institutions, especially that of the State, resulting in the view of the State as having a merely negative or

'police' function, and the 'Natural Rights' theory of society itself as a secondary product, the result of contract between individuals who, like mutually exclusive atoms, are naturally antagonists.

For, in reality, these two spheres of life are inseparable. The interests and claims of the social and of the individual life overlap, and are reciprocally inclusive. These are not two lives, but two sides or aspects of one undivided life. You cannot isolate the moral individual; to do so would be to de-moralise him, to annihilate his moral nature. His very life as a moral being consists in a network of relations which link his individual life with the wider life of his fellows. It is literally true that no man liveth to himself—there is no retiring into the privacy and solitude of a merely individual life; man is a social or political being. On the other hand, the individual is more than a mere instrument of society, a mere organ of the body politic. He too is an organism, and has a life and ends of his own. The Good is, for every individual, a social or common good, a good in which he cannot claim such private property as to exclude his fellows; their good is his, and his theirs. Yet the Good—the only good we know as absolute—is always a personal, not an impersonal, good, a good of moral persons. The person, not society, is the ultimate ethical unit and reality.

7. Aspects of the ethical problem.—The ethical problem has assumed various aspects, according to the various points of view from which it has been approached. It may be well to indicate here the chief of these aspects, and their relation to one another.

(a) The first is also, as I have tried to show, the most fundamental—viz.: What is the Good or the Moral Ideal? or, as it was frequently put in ancient ethics, What is the *summum bonum*, or the Chief Good? What is *the* good in all good acts, *the* bad or evil in all bad or evil acts?

(b) The second aspect of the problem is closely connected with the first, as I have also tried to show above (§ 5)—viz.: What is the right? What makes all right acts right, and all wrong acts wrong? The answer must be that the good is the source of the right, that the right is the claim of the good upon the agent. The rightness of an act can only lie in its worth or worthiness. The rightness of justice, for example, lies in the goodness of justice, in its essential value. The ordinary man is content with the conviction of the rightness of the individual act or set of actions,—with the knowledge of *what* is right. The problem of ethics is, *Why* is the individual act or set of actions right? And the *why* of the right is found in the *what* of the good.

(c) Modern moralists have, however, been apt to rest in the notion of right, and it has been part of their ethical theory that the right is irreducible to the good. Accordingly, the right has been regarded, by the Intuitional or Common Sense School, as the expression of final and absolute moral law. This unconditional imperativeness of morality has been regarded sometimes as having its source merely in the *fiat* of the divine will, but more frequently as emanating from the 'nature of things'—the divine or universal reason. The ethical problem has therefore taken the form of an inventory or, better, a codification of the moral laws. The differentiation of moral laws from the positive laws of any political society has also been undertaken, the *differentia* being found in the universality and necessity of the former, as contrasted with the particularity and contingency of the latter. But again it will be found that the only clue to the unique nature of moral law, as well as to the system which the several moral laws together constitute, lies in the moral ideal,—the supreme good or chief end of human activity.

(d) What may be called the legalistic view of morality has given rise to a question which is much more pro-

minent in modern than in ancient ethics—viz.: What is the source of moral knowledge? How are the laws of moral life communicated to us? How, and when, do we become conscious of the distinction between right and wrong? This is the question of Conscience, sometimes called the ‘moral faculty’ or the ‘moral sense.’ One school of modern ethics derives its name from the answer it has given to this question—the ‘Intuitionist’ school, which holds that the knowledge of moral laws is intuitive or *a priori*, in opposition to the view that such knowledge is *a posteriori*, or the result of moral experience. The contemporary representatives of the latter view are the evolutionary moralists, who insist upon tracing the evolution of the most complex and refined moral ideas from their earliest and simplest elements. The same question arises in a new form if, instead of speaking of ‘conscience’ as a special faculty or sense, we speak of the ‘moral consciousness,’ or the consciousness of a moral ideal. The changing forms of this consciousness, the successive stages of man’s moral experience, the reflection of his growing appreciation of the Good in his conception of individual activities as good,—the *rationale* of all this is the problem of ethics.

(e) One of the main problems of ancient ethics was the inquiry into the nature of virtue and of the several virtues. To the Greeks ‘virtue’ meant ‘excellence’ (*ἀρετή*). The question, What is human virtue? was therefore for them equivalent to the question, What is the characteristic human quality or excellence? What is the true type or ideal of human activity, which, according to his approximation to it, is the measure of the individual’s excellence? But again the measure of excellent activity can be found only in some supreme end of activity—some chief good, in obedience to which the several excellences are reduced to the unity of its all-containing excellence. A subordinate phase of the problem of virtue has been the differentiation of the ‘cardinal’ or root-virtues from the

secondary or derivative; and the relative importance attached to the several virtues is highly significant of the level of moral attainment. The Greek appreciation of the intellectual life, for example, is reflected in the Aristotelian subordination of 'practical' or 'moral' virtue to 'intellectual' or 'speculative,' while the tendency of the modern Christian mind to depreciate the scientific and philosophic, as well as the artistic life, has led to the omission of excellence in these fields from its scheme of the virtues. The clue to the change of emphasis is again the changed conception of the Good, —the changed view of the meaning of life itself.

(*f*) In modern ethics the problem has assumed more generally the form of an inquiry into the nature and basis of duty or moral obligation; and the attempt has been made to construct a scheme of duties rather than a system of virtues. While virtue is a form or quality of character, duty is a form or quality of conduct; the one refers to the agent, the other to the activity. But we have seen (§ 1) that conduct and character are inseparable, the one being the expression of the other. Their unifying principle must therefore be the same—some central and all-containing end or Good, the unconditional imperativeness of whose claim upon the agent constitutes his duty, and loyal obedience to which is the essential human excellence or virtue. The idea of duty or obligation is the idea of imperativeness or ought-ness, of the 'Thou shalt' as supplanting in the moral life the 'Thou must' of the life of nature. But even Kant, with all his insistence upon the 'categorical imperativeness' of the moral life, traces the absoluteness of its obligation to the absoluteness or finality of the end of moral activity, to the unconditional value of man as an end-in-himself.

(*g*) In both ancient and modern ethics the problem has always been apt to centre in the question of the place of pleasure in the moral life. This question has

divided moralists of both periods into two opposing schools, the one of which has accorded to pleasure the supreme place and recognised in it the only final Good, while the other has either given it a secondary place or found in it no ethical value at all. The advocates of pleasure may be called the Hedonists (*ἡδονή*, pleasure); while the opposing school may be called the Rationalists, since it is in the life of reason that they find the absolute Good which they miss in the life of pleasure.

(h) While the ethical thought of the ancient world is, in spite of its political character, prevailingly egoistic or individualistic, modern moralists have found a new problem (or rather a new aspect of the old problem) in the relation of the individual to society, of the individual self to other individuals. The question has arisen whether the individual or society is the true ethical unit, whether one's own good or the good of all is *the* Good. In the earlier British moralists this question takes the form of the relation of 'self-love' to 'benevolence,' and resolves itself into the problem of the true moral ratio of 'self-interest' to 'disinterestedness.' In the ethics of the more recent hedonistic school, the problem has received much prominence; for if the Good is pleasure, the further question arises, *Whose* pleasure? The most recent answer is that the general happiness is alone to be regarded as absolutely good, and the happiness of the individual as of subordinate and relative value. In opposition to the older egoistic Hedonism, the new Hedonism—that of J. S. Mill and his successors—has signalised its altruistic character by the new name of 'Utilitarianism.'

(i) The problem of altruism is also the problem of self-sacrifice. In the conflict of interests, self-interest must be sacrificed to the general interest, if the general happiness is to be attained. But even within the circle of egoistic or individualistic thought the problem of the ethical value of self-sacrifice arises. The real issue

between the hedonistic and rationalistic schools is the question, Which self is worth realising? Which self ought to be sacrificed to the other—the sentient or the rational self? And a further question arises as to the reality or unreality, and the absoluteness or the relativity, of the self-sacrifice. The extreme hedonistic school (the early Cyrenaics) advocated the real and absolute sacrifice of the rational or reflective to the sentient or unreflective self; the life of the one implied the death of the other. The extreme rationalistic view (that of Kant) is that the sentient self ought to be absolutely sacrificed to the rational, that the one must die if the other is to live. A more moderate form of egoistic Hedonism (the Epicurean), holding that the virtuous life is the calculating life which makes the most of its opportunities, has maintained the relativity of self-sacrifice; the less pleasure is sacrificed, it is said, to the greater. A more moderate Rationalism has also refused to see anything absolute or permanent in the sacrifice of the sentient to the rational self. The problem of self-sacrifice is indissolubly bound up with that of self-realisation. And the ultimate problem of the Good is, at the same time, as we have seen, the problem of the self.

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CHAPTER II.

THE METHOD OF ETHICS.

1. **Ethics a normative science.**—Is the true method of ethics the method of science or that of philosophy? Our answer to this question must determine our general view of the ethical problem, and cannot fail to affect the solution which we reach. The characteristic tendency of our time to reduce all thought to the scientific form, and to draw the line sharply between natural or positive science, on the one hand, and metaphysical or philosophical speculation, on the other, has made itself felt in ethics, which is now defined as ‘moral science’ rather than as ‘moral philosophy,’ its older designation. Nor is this usage of terms a complete novelty in ethical literature. Aristotle, the father of the science, clearly distinguished ethics as the science of the Good (for man) from metaphysics or ‘first philosophy,’ whose task was the investigation of the ultimate nature of things, the absolute good, or the Good of the universe itself. In the older English ethics we find the same limitation of the inquiry, and a frequent adoption of the psychological method. It is to Kant and his successors, in Germany and in England, that the encroachment of metaphysics upon ethics is chiefly due. Kant does not separate the science of ethics from the metaphysic of ethics, which is, for him, the only legitimate metaphysic. The influence of Kant in this respect is evident in the intuitional

ethics of the later Scottish school, hardly less than in the idealistic ethics of the Neo-Hegelians. It is this general acceptance of the metaphysical method in ethical inquiry that has led to the protest on the part of the scientific mind of our time, and to the proclamation, by the evolutionary school, that ethics must accept the common method of exact knowledge, and, like psychology (which was also wont, within recent memory, to claim near kinship with metaphysics, if not even to play the rôle of the latter), become a 'natural science.'

Yet, while we must recognise, in the view that the true method of ethics is scientific rather than philosophic, a return to the older and sounder tradition of ethical thought, it is necessary, in order to determine more precisely the place of ethics among the sciences, to distinguish carefully between two types or groups of sciences, both alike distinguishable from metaphysics or philosophy. The common task of all science is the rationalisation of our judgments, through their organisation into a system of thought: when thus systematised, our judgments are scientifically 'explained.' But these judgments are of two kinds: judgments of *fact* and judgments of *worth*, or judgments of what *is* and judgments of what *ought to be*. There are, accordingly, two types of science: first, the type which seeks to organise into a rational system the chaotic mass of our *Is*-judgments; secondly, the type which seeks to organise into a rational system the no less chaotic mass of our *Ought*-judgments. The former type of science we may call natural or descriptive; the latter, normative or appreciative. The purpose of the natural or descriptive sciences is the discovery, by reason, of the actual or phenomenal order—the order that characterises 'matters of fact'; the purpose of the normative or appreciative sciences is the discovery, by the same reason, of the ideal order which always transcends and rebukes the actual order. The natural sciences seek to penetrate to the universal

law or the principle of order, in terms of which we can alone consistently and completely *describe* the facts of the universe; the normative sciences seek the universal standard, in terms of which we can alone consistently *appreciate* the facts of the universe—their common measure of value. The natural sciences have to do with processes, or with events; the normative sciences have to do with products, and their quality. The function of the one set of sciences is measurement, that of the other is evaluation. The one finds rational order *in* the facts of the world and human life; the other judges the facts of the world and life by reference to a rational order which always transcends the facts themselves. The result of the common effort of the one group is what Professor Royce has called the ‘world of description’; that of the other, the ‘world of appreciation.’¹

To the former class—that of the natural or descriptive sciences—belong all the sciences of nature and of man as a natural being. Psychology has recently taken its place in this group of sciences, reasserting the Aristotelian view of its vocation and method as a ‘natural science’ dealing with the process of human experience.² Ethics, on the other hand, is, like logic and æsthetics, a normative or appreciative science—a science of value. These three sciences deal with our *critical* judgments, as distinguished from our *factual* judgments; they endeavour to systematise these judgments by deducing them from a common standard of value, a final criterion of appreciation. As it is the business of logic and of æsthetics respectively to interpret and explain our judgments of intellectual and of æsthetic value, so it is the business

¹ *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, Lect. xii.

² Economics, on the contrary, shows some signs of resuming its affiliation to the normative sciences, through its dissatisfaction with the extreme abstractness of the conception of the ‘economic man.’

of ethics to interpret and explain our judgments of moral value. The question of logic is: What is the true? or, What is the ultimate standard of intellectual judgment? The question of æsthetics is: What is the beautiful? or, What is the ultimate standard in judgments of taste? The question of ethics is: What is the good? or, What is the ultimate standard of practical judgment or judgment about conduct? Our several judgments, so far as they are consistent with one another, about the value of thoughts, of feelings, and of actions, are reducible to a common denominator of truth, of beauty, and of goodness. The discovery of this common denominator of intellectual, of æsthetic, and of moral judgment, and the construction of the system of principles which these judgments, when made coherent and self-consistent, constitute, is the task of the three normative sciences, — logic, æsthetics, and ethics.

So long as the distinction between a natural and a normative science is clearly realised, there is no reason why we should not recognise both a natural science and a normative science of ethics. Indeed, it must be admitted that the former is the propædæutic to the latter. What we may call the 'natural history' of morality, the genetic study of the moral life (and the moral consciousness), is the presupposition of an intelligent interpretation of its significance, the indispensable preliminary to its reduction to ethical system. The business of such a preliminary investigation is simply to discover the causation of morality, the uniformities of sequence which characterise moral antecedents and consequents as they characterise all other phenomena. But such an investigation of the moral facts, though it is well entitled to the name of science, is only the handmaid of ethics as a normative science, as the effort to determine the ethical meaning or content of the facts. The results of such

a natural science of ethics are the 'data of ethics' as a normative science.¹

The failure to distinguish these two inquiries has led to the greatest confusion in ethical thought. The answer to the question of causal 'origins' has been offered (especially in English, and lately in German ethics) as the answer to the question of ethical content and meaning. This is true of the 'psychological' theories of Hume and Mill, and also of the evolutionary theory which professes, by its substitution of the historical and genetic method for the statical view of the earlier moralists, to have raised ethics to the rank of a science. Take, for example, the solution offered by this school of the problem of egoism and altruism. The problem is: Why ought I to regard the interests of others as well as my own? and especially, Why should I sacrifice my own interests to those of others? The solution offered is an account of the causation of altruistic conduct, the discovery of the psychological fact of sympathy,—the internal 'sanction,' as well as of other facts of minor importance—the external 'sanctions,' of altruism, and of the factors in the evolution of these sanctions. But these sanctions are merely the constant antecedents—the causes, not the reasons—of altruistic morality. The fact of self-sacrifice is thus explained, by being related to other facts; the ethical value of the fact is not explained. The might of the altruistic impulse is exhibited, and accounted for; its right is not vindicated. The question of ethics as a

¹ Cf. Mr Balfour's statement (*A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, Appendix, "On the Idea of a Philosophy of Ethics," p. 336): "An ethical proposition, though, like every other proposition, it states a relation, does not state a relation of space or time. 'I ought to speak the truth,' for instance, does not imply that I have spoken, do speak, or shall speak the truth; it asserts no bond of causation between subject and predicate, nor any coexistence, nor any sequence. It does not announce an event; and if some people would say that it stated a fact, it is not certainly a fact either of the 'external' or of the 'internal' world." Later (p. 348), he says that ethics "is concerned not with the causes, but with the grounds or reasons, for action."

normative science is not: How has a certain type of conduct or character come to be approved? but, What is the basis or *rationale* of such approval? The only answer to this question is a substantiation of the claim of the conduct or character in question as the claim of some ultimate ideal or good. Or, take the closely related problem of moral obligation. The solution offered by the 'psychological' and evolutionary moralists is an account of how man's consciousness of obligation has varied with the varying conditions of human life, how the police force of the external sanctions has gradually given place to the gentler yet more persuasive influence of a growing insight into the necessary consequences of his actions, and how even this coercion is destined ultimately to disappear in the spontaneity of a perfect moral life. But again, the question of ethics as a normative science is not: What is the actual nature and genesis of the consciousness of obligation? but, What is the content of this consciousness? What does it, fairly interpreted, tell us about man's true attitude toward himself, his fellow-men, and God?¹ Take, finally, the psychological and evolutionary—the genetic—account of the moral ideal itself. The plausibility of Hedonism is chiefly due, in my opinion, to the confusion of the scientific description of the motivation of conduct with its appreciation in terms of an ideal, its evaluation in terms of some standard of value. [The function of pleasure in the process of conduct, as an efficient cause in all human activity, is unquestionable; and it was useless for the advocates of the life 'according to right reason' to attempt the disproof of its presence and decisive operation at every point. But the fact that every choice is pleasant does not prove that it is a choice of pleasure, still less that pleasure is the only thing worthy of choice.] The moral ideal must appeal to feeling, it must *please* its devotee;

¹ Cf. President Schurman's article on "The Consciousness of Moral Obligation," *Philosophical Review*, vol. iii. pp. 650-652.

and the various forms of this pleasure have been well described by the 'psychological' and evolutionary moralists. But, after all this descriptive explanation of the motivation of choice, the problem of the content of the moral ideal itself remains unsolved and even untouched.¹

It is not to be denied that the standard of ethical appreciation has itself evolved. With the gradual evolution of morality there is being gradually evolved a reflective formulation of its content and significance. The evolving moral being is always judging the moral evolution, and there is an evolution of moral judgment as well as of the conduct which is judged. We must distinguish, however, between the subjective or psychological fact of moral judgment, on the one hand, and the objective content of such judgment, on the other. Just as logic distinguishes between the psychological fact and the logical content of intellectual judgment, so must ethics, as a normative science, distinguish between the psychological fact and the ethical content of moral judgment. The history of the causation of the psychological fact is one question; the content of its testimony is another question. Ethics has to do with man's ends (in respect of their content), and not with the process or mechanism of their accomplishment.² And for ethics as a normative science, the objective validity of moral judgment (whether crude and early, or ripe and late) is a necessary assumption, just as, for logic, the objective validity of intellectual judgment is a necessary assumption. The reality of the Good, and our ability, by

¹ Such an exposure of the fallacy of ethical 'Naturalism,' 'Evolutionism,' or 'Empiricism,' is, of course, at the same time an exposure of ethical 'Supernaturalism,' 'Intuitionism,' or 'A priorism.' The question of ethics is a question not of origin, but of content; not of psychological causation, but of ethical meaning. The truth in Intuitionism is, in my opinion, simply its assertion of the ultimateness for ethics of the ethical point of view.

² Strangely enough, Professor S. Alexander states the distinction between the methods of ethics and psychology in just these terms, and yet adopts the latter method in his own investigation. Cf. *Moral Order and Progress*, pp. 62-70

reflection, to discover it (more or less fully), are the postulates of ethics, as the reality of Truth, and our ability, by reflection, to discover it, are the postulates of logic. It is for metaphysics to deal with both assumptions alike.

Yet we must never forget the dependence of ethics as a normative science upon the natural science of ethics. As we have just seen, the reflective formulation of morality is, like morality itself, progressive. It follows that the complete ethical formula at any stage must include all preceding formulæ, and that the final ethical formula would be the last word of evolution itself. The true ethical interpretation of human life must be plastic as Aristotle's 'Lesbian rule,'—the living expression of the changing life of man; the moral life does not, any more than the physical life, commit itself to any expression as final and exhaustive.

2. **Ethical method scientific, not metaphysical.**—The normative sciences, however, are to be distinguished, no less than the natural sciences, from metaphysics or philosophy, whose problem is the determination of the ultimate or absolute validity of all our judgments, whether they are judgments of fact or judgments of value. Neither the natural nor the normative sciences deal with the question of their own ultimate validity. It is the function of metaphysics to act as critic of the sciences; the sciences do not criticise themselves. Each assumes the validity of its own standpoint, and of its own system of judgments. The normative sciences deal with our judgments of worth just as the natural sciences deal with our judgments of fact; neither the one group of sciences nor the other investigates the final validity of the judgments which, in their original chaotic condition, are the datum, and, in their systematic order, the result of the sciences in question. Whether natural or normative, science is

content with the discovery of the unifying principle which organises the several judgments of ordinary unscientific thought into a scientific system. The determination of the grounds of our right to judge at all, whether about facts or values, and of the comparative validity of our judgments of fact and our judgments of value, science leaves to metaphysics, which, in considering the epistemological question of the possibility of an ultimate vindication of human knowledge in general, is compelled to face the ontological question of the ultimate nature of Reality itself. As the natural sciences leave to metaphysics the problem of the ultimate validity of our judgments of fact, and, with that problem, the determination of the ultimate nature of Reality, the normative sciences leave to metaphysics the inquiry into the ultimate validity of our judgments of value, or the real significance of our ideals. As the natural sciences are content with the discovery of the actual order, or the order of reality as it exists *for us*, the normative sciences are content with the discovery of the ideal order as it demands the obedience of *our* thought and feeling and activity. Both the normative and the natural sciences alike have to be criticised and correlated by metaphysics, whose question of questions is that of the comparative validity of the Is-judgments and the Ought-judgments as expressions of ultimate Reality, the respective merits of Realism and Idealism, of Naturalism and Transcendentalism, as interpretations of the universe.

To take the case of ethics in particular, we must carefully distinguish the science from the metaphysic of ethics. The science of ethics has nothing to do with the question of the freedom of the will, for example. As the science of morality, ethics has a right to assume that man is a moral being, since his judgments about conduct imply the idea of morality. But whether this scientific assumption is finally valid or invalid, whether the moral judgments are trustworthy

or illusory, and whether or not their validity implies the freedom of man as a moral being,—are problems for metaphysics to solve. Again, ethics does not base its view of human life, its system of moral judgments, upon any metaphysical interpretation of Reality, whether idealistic or naturalistic; although here, as elsewhere, the scientific result must form an all-important datum for metaphysics. Similarly the problem of God, or the ultimate reality of the moral order, and the nature of this ethical reality—the relation of man's moral ideal to the universe of which he is a part—is a question not for ethics, but for metaphysics. Ethics, as a science, abstracts human life from the rest of the universe; it is as frankly anthropocentric as the natural sciences are cosmocentric. Whether or not, in our ultimate interpretation of Reality, we must shift our centre, is a question which metaphysics must answer.¹

The fact that it is the genius and function of the normative sciences to transcend the actual, and to judge its value in terms of the ideal, doubtless brings these sciences nearer than the natural sciences to metaphysics or ultimate philosophy. For while the natural sciences are content with the discovery of the actual order,—

¹ Cf. Mr Balfour (*loc. cit.*, pp. 337, 338): "The general propositions which really lie at the root of any ethical system must themselves be ethical, and can never be either scientific or metaphysical. In other words, if a proposition announcing obligation require proof at all, one term of that proof must always be a proposition announcing obligation, which itself requires no proof. . . . There is no artifice by which an ethical statement can be evolved from a scientific or metaphysical proposition, or from any combination of such; and whenever the reverse appears to be the fact, it will always be found that the assertion which seems to be the basis of the ethical superstructure is in reality merely the 'minor' of a syllogism, of which the 'major' is the desired ethical principle." It should be noted that Mr Balfour uses the term 'science' to designate natural science exclusively. What I have called a 'normative science,' he would apparently include in philosophy. T. H. Green, and recently Mr C. F. D'Arcy (*A Short Study of Ethics*), have insisted upon a metaphysical derivation of ethics. Cf. Professor Dewey's discussion of "The Metaphysical Study of Ethics" (*Psychological Review*, vol. iii. pp 181-188).

the order of the facts themselves, even a naturalistic or utilitarian ethics, for example, is an evaluation of human life in terms of a standard or ideal, viz., pleasure. A judgment of value is speculative—we might almost say metaphysical—in a sense in which a judgment of fact is not speculative or metaphysical. Its point of view is transcendental, not empirical. It follows that the science which organises such judgments into a system is also transcendental, and, in that sense, metaphysical. Yet such a science is not strictly to be identified with metaphysics, for three reasons. First, it agrees with common-sense in assuming the validity of the judgments of value, whose system it is seeking to construct. Secondly, it abstracts one set of judgments of value—the logical, or the æsthetic, or the ethical—from the rest of the judgments of value. Thirdly, it abstracts the judgments of value from the judgments of fact. Now it is the business of metaphysics to investigate the ultimate validity of the judgments of value, as well as of the judgments of fact; and, in order to determine this, it must study these judgments in their relations both to one another and to the judgments of fact. The final term of metaphysical judgment may be normative, rather than naturalistic. The question of the value of existence is probably more important than the question of the *nature* of existence: meaning is probably rather a matter of value than a matter of fact. And the ultimate term of metaphysical value may be ethical, rather than logical or æsthetic; moral value is probably the supreme value, and the true metaphysic is probably a metaphysic of ethics. But the metaphysical ultimateness of that term—whatever it be—will not have been demonstrated until all the other terms have been reduced to it, explained, and not explained away, by means of it.¹

¹ For a further and more positive statement of the relation of metaphysics to ethics, see *infra*, Part III., pp. 355-361.

3. **Misunderstandings of 'normative science.'** Two misunderstandings must be guarded against. First, the distinction between normative and natural, or appreciative and descriptive, sciences is not intended to imply that the method of the one group of sciences is in any respect different from the method of the other. The method of science is always the same, namely, the systematisation of our ordinary judgments through their reduction to a common unifying principle, or through their purification from inconsistency with one another. Whether these judgments are judgments of fact or judgments of value, makes no difference in the method. There is nothing mysterious, or superior, or 'metaphysical' in the procedure of the normative sciences; it is the plain, unmetaphysical, strictly scientific method, only applied in a different field—to a different subject-matter. It is merely this difference in the subject-matter that I have desired to assert and to emphasise. The business of ethics, for example, is, like the business of physics, simply to organise the judgments of common-sense or ordinary thought. There is a 'common-sense' of value, as there is a 'common-sense' of fact; and there is a science of value, as there is a science of fact. The function of the former science, as of the latter, is simply to make common-sense coherent and consistent with itself. The true method of ethics is the Socratic method of a thorough-going and exhaustive cross-examination of men's actual moral judgments, with a view to their systematisation. And though the mere summation of these judgments does not constitute their system, the system can be constructed only on the basis of a catholic study of the actual moral judgments. We must, as Professor Sharp has urged, get rid of 'the baneful influence of the personal equation'; we must add to the 'introspective' method the 'objective' method. "The student of ethics has not finished his work until he has made an exhaustive study of the moral judgments of

examples of all types of human nature.”¹ “How to evolve from this multiplicity of apparently incompatible principles a consistent and universally valid system of moral judgments . . . is a question for what may be termed logical or systematic, as opposed to psychological, ethics.”² And, in Mr Balfour’s words, “all that a moralist can do with regard to ethical first principles is not to prove them or deduce them, but to render them explicit if they are implicit, clear if they are obscure.”³ That there is a universal element in these as in all other classes of judgments, whether of value or of fact,—or, in other words, that experience is rational,—is the common assumption of science and philosophy alike.

This leads to the second misunderstanding, namely, that it is possible, in the normative sciences, to transcend the sphere of common-sense or ordinary judgment, and to discover, beyond that sphere, an absolute norm or standard with which we can then compare, and, according to the result of our comparison, establish or invalidate the findings of common-sense. That is, of course, impossible, and contradicts the idea of science in general, if not also of philosophy. All science is, it is true, a criticism of common-sense; but it is an immanent criticism, a self-criticism. There is no transcending common-sense, no leaving it behind. If common-sense were not itself rational—in a measure actually so, and *in posse* perfectly so—no science (and no philosophy) would be possible. It is only through the comparison of the ordinary judgments of value with one another, that ethics and the other normative sciences come into existence. It is never possible to compare our ordinary judgments of value with an external and extraordinary standard of value. The criticism of common-sense is always immanent, never transcendent. The problem is to find the centre of the circle of judgment—moral,

¹ *Philosophical Review*, vol. v. p. 287.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 288.

³ *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, Appendix, p. 353.

æsthetic, or logical, and from that centre to describe the circle; and this centre must lie within, not without, the circle whose centre it is! The ethical thinker must always, with Aristotle, come back to common-sense, and, leaving it to the metaphysician to investigate the possibility of any more ambitious explanation of its judgments, content himself with the Aristotelian, which is also the Socratic, effort to interrogate the moral common-sense of mankind, and, by interrogating it, to make it coherent and self-consistent. Common-sense, thus made coherent and self-consistent, is science.

To sum up: Ethics is the science of the Good. As distinguished from the natural sciences, or the sciences of the actual, it is a normative or regulative science, a science of the ideal. The question of ethical science is not, What is? but, What ought to be? As the science of the Good, it is the science *par excellence* of the ideal and the ought. Its problem is the interpretation and explanation of our judgments of ethical value, as the problems of æsthetics and of logic are respectively the interpretation and explanation of our judgments of æsthetic and of logical or intellectual value. This task ethics seeks to accomplish by investigating the ultimate criterion or common measure of moral value, the true norm or standard of ethical appreciation. What, it asks, is the ultimate Good in human life? To what common denominator can the many so-called 'goods' of life be reduced? Why, in the last analysis, is life judged to be worth living?

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CHAPTER III.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS.

1. **Necessity of psychological basis.**—Ethics, as the normative science of conduct and character, must be based upon a psychology, or natural science, of the moral life. Inadequacies in ethical theory will be found to be largely traceable to inadequacy in the underlying psychology. Kant, indeed, seeks to separate ethics from psychology, and to establish it as a metaphysic of the pure reason. But even Kant's ethical theory is based upon a psychology. Abstracting from all the other elements of man's nature, Kant conceives him as a purely rational being, a reason energising; and it is to this abstractness and inadequacy in his psychology that we must trace the abstractness and inadequacy of the Kantian ethics. So impossible is it for ethics to escape psychology. As Aristotle maintained in ancient times, and Butler in modern, the question, What is the characteristic excellence or proper life of man? raises the previous question, What is the nature and constitution of man, whose characteristic life and excellence we seek to determine?

Let us look a little more closely at the connection between ethics and psychology, as we can trace it in the history of ethical thought. In both ancient and modern thought we find two main types of ethical theory, which affiliate themselves to two main psychological doctrines.

This affiliation is even more explicit in ancient than in modern ethics. Plato and Aristotle have each a double representation of the virtuous life, corresponding to the dualism which they discover in man's nature—a lower and a higher life, according as the lower or the higher nature finds play. Man's nature consists, they hold, of a rational and an irrational or sentient part; and while the ordinary life of virtue is represented by Plato as a harmonious life of all the parts in obedience to reason—the city of Mansoul being like a well-ordered State in which due subordination is enforced, and by Aristotle as a life of all the parts (irrational included) in accordance with right reason, yet both conceive the highest or ideal life as a life of pure reason, or intellectual contemplation. Thus both resolving human nature into a rational and an irrational element, both give two representations of virtue or goodness. The life may be good in form, but bad in content—a content of unreason moulded by reason; or it may be entirely good—its content as well as its form may be rational.

This psychological and ethical dualism is further emphasised by the Stoics and Epicureans, who had been anticipated by the Cynics and the Cyrenaics respectively. The one school, making reason supreme, either condemns or entirely subordinates the life of sensibility; the other, making sensibility supreme, either excludes or entirely subordinates the life of reason. The same two types may be traced in modern ethical theory—the ethics of reason in Kant and the Intuitionists, the ethics of sensibility in the Utilitarian and Evolutionary schools.

The abstractness of both ethical theories is traceable to the abstractness of the underlying psychology. The half-view of human life rests upon a half-view of human nature. The true ethical life must be the life of the whole man, of the moral *person*. Conduct is the exponent of character, and character is the exponent of personality. If we would discover the life of man in its unity and

entirety, we must see the nature of man in its unity and entirety. We must penetrate beneath the dualism of reason and sensibility—of reason and unreason—to their underlying unity. The ethical point of view is neither reason nor sensibility, but will, as the expression of the true and total self. Plato had a glimpse of this unity when he spoke of *θυμός* as carrying out the behests of reason in the government of the passions and appetites. Aristotle spoke more explicitly of will. But both, like their modern successors, insisted on construing man's life in terms either of reason or of sensibility, giving us an account of the intellectual or of the sentient life, but not of the moral life—not of the total life of man as man. In will we find the sought-for unity, the focal point of all man's complex being, the characteristic and distinguishing feature of his nature, which gives us the clue to his characteristic life. Man is not a merely sentient being, nor is he pure reason energising. He is will; and his life is that activity of will in which both reason and sensibility are, as elements, contained, and by whose most subtle action they are inextricably interfused.

2. Involuntary activity: its various forms.—The moral life being the life of will, we must endeavour to reach a psychology of will. But we must approach volition gradually and from the outside. Voluntary presupposes involuntary activity. Volition implies a conception of an end, purpose, or intention. But we must execute movements before we can plan or intend them. The original stock of movements with which the will starts on its life must be acquired before the appearance of will on the stage of human life. "The involuntary activity forms the basis and the content of the voluntary. The will is in no way creative, but only modifying and selective."¹

¹ Höfding, *Psychology*, p. 330 (Eng. tr.)

These primary and involuntary acts are of various kinds: some are the results of the constitution of the physical organism, others imply a mental reaction. The most important are the following: (1) Reflex and automatic, like the beating of the heart or the moving of the eyelids. These are purely physiological and unconscious. (2) Spontaneous or random movements,—the involuntary and partly unconscious, partly conscious, discharge of superfluous energy, like the movements of the infant. (3) Sensori-motor or semi-reflex,—the conscious but non-voluntary adaptation to environment,—the automatic response to external stimuli. (4) Instinctive,—not, like (3), the mere momentary response to a particular stimulus, but complex activities, implying previous organisation, thus having their source within, in the motor centres, rather than in the external stimulus, and being guided by reference to a 'silent' or unconscious end.

Now, all these movements are, or may be, accompanied by sensations, which may accordingly be called 'motor-sensations.' Further, of these psychical correlates of the physical movements,—their 'feels'—we preserve a memory-image, which has been called a 'kinaesthetic idea.' We may, therefore, add to the sensori-motor (5) ideo-motor activities, which embrace the great mass of the higher actions of our life. The movement here ensues directly upon the idea or representation of it, or rather of the sensation attending it, as in the former case it follows from the sensation itself. There is still no volition. "We are aware of nothing between the conception and the execution. . . . We think the act, and it is done."¹ An extreme case of ideo-motor action is found in the hypnotic trance, but the phenomenon is of constant occurrence in ordinary life. To remember an engagement at the hour appointed is, in general, to execute it. The business of life could never go on, if we deliberated and decided about each of its several actions. Instead of

¹ James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 522

this, we surrender ourselves to the train of ideas, and let them bear us on our way. For ideas are essentially impulsive—*idées-forces*. When an idea fills the mind, the corresponding movement follows immediately. Even when two such ideas occupy the mind, when we are attracted in two different directions, the one movement may be inhibited through the idea of the other. There may be a block, and a clearing of the way, without the interference of any *fiat* of will,—a knot which unties itself, a struggle of ideas in which the strongest survives, and results in its appropriate movement.

3. Voluntary activity : how distinguished from involuntary.—All this provision there is for movement—partly in the nervous system, partly in the mind itself—without any interposition of volition. This last is rather of the nature of inhibition of the natural tendency to movement—the regulation and organisation of movements—than origination. The beginnings are given by nature. But these primary movements and their sensational correlates are vague and diffuse; they constitute a ‘motor-*continuum*,’ which is gradually made discrete and definite.¹ This occurs largely, as we have seen, involuntarily. A movement is determined by the idea of the movement, that is, by the anticipation of the movement’s sensible effects, without the explicit intervention of will. Now if there be such a thing as voluntary activity, its source must be found in the manipulation of the ideas of movements already made. In this sense all action is ideo-motor; its source is in an idea which at the moment fills the consciousness. The question of the nature of volition, therefore, resolves itself into this: What is the mind’s power over its ideas? What is the genesis of the moving idea in the highest and most complex activities?

The function of will is obviously the regulation and

¹ Cf. Ward. Art. “Psychology.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed.

organisation of activity, through the regulation and organisation of those impulsive tendencies to action of which man is naturally the subject. We shall perhaps obtain the best idea of what the life of mere impulse without volition would be, by considering the case of a volitional life in which the will is most in abeyance. The life of the habitual drunkard, for example, is a life whose notorious defect is the absence of self-control; the man is the slave of the idea of the moment, the vivid representation of the pleasures of gratified appetite or of social excitement. This idea moves him to act in the line of its guidance, and its continual recurrence carries with it, as its natural and immediate consequence, a life of debauchery. Such a life is the nearest approach, in human experience, to that of the animal; such a man, we say, 'makes a beast of himself.' The tragedy of it consists in the fact of the abdication of the will, in the enslavement by impulse of him who should have been its master. The case of the 'fixed idea' in insanity or in hypnotism would illustrate even better a life of impulse without will. Here will seems to be simply eliminated, and the man becomes the prey of the idea of the moment or the hour. Whatever is suggested in the line of the dominant idea, he does forthwith; his life is a series of simple reactions to such ideational stimulation.

A life guided by will, on the contrary, is a life in which each impelling idea, as it presents itself, is dealt with, and subdued to a larger ideal or conception of life's total meaning and purpose; in which for action of the reflex type there is substituted action which is the result of deliberate choice; in which, instead of the coercive guidance of the immediately dominant idea, we have the guidance that comes from a reflective consideration of the comparative claims of the several ideas which now appear on the field of consciousness and compete for the mastery. Here is the unique and characteristic element of human activity, in virtue of which we attribute will to man, and

call his life a moral life. Even voluntary activity, in the last analysis, belongs to the reflex type, or is ideo-motor; but such is the new complexity of the process that it deserves a new name. A man does not, or at any rate need not, react as the mere animal reacts. The action of the animal is a mere immediate reaction, and can therefore be predicted, the stimulus being given. But man is not, like the animal, simply the creature of impulse, even of that organised impulse which we call instinct. He is an animal, a creature of impulse, played upon by the varied influences of his environment. But he is also, or may be, 'the master of impulse as the rider is master of his horse'; his life may be the product of a single central purpose which governs its every act; it is his to live not in the immediate present or in the immediate future, but to 'look before and after,' to forecast the remote as well as the near future, and to act in the light and under the guidance of such a far-reaching survey of his life.

Volition, then, consists in the direction or guidance of given impulsive tendencies or propensities to act. The function of will is not to create, but to direct and control. The impulsive basis of volition, like the sensational basis of knowledge, is *given*; the former is the datum of the moral life, as the latter is the datum of the intellectual life. Man is, to begin with and always, a sentient being, a creature of animal sensibility. Such sensibility is the matter of which will is the form, the manifold of which will is the unity. That organisation of impulse which is already accomplished for the animal in the shape of instinct, has to be accomplished by man himself. The animal, in following its impulses, fulfils entirely its life's purpose; its impulses are just the paths that bring it securely to that end. We do not criticise its life, impulsive though it is; it is as perfect and true to its intention as the growth of the plant or the revolutions of the spheres. It looks not before or after: it 'does not ask

to see the distant goal,' the 'whither' of the forces that master it—'one step enough' for it. Its life is blind, or, at any rate, near-sighted, but unerring. Its path is narrow, but straight to the goal. But to man is given an eye to see his life's path stretching before him into the far spaces of the future, and to look back along all the way he has come. His moral life is, like his intellectual life, self-conducted. The animal is born into the world fully equipped for its life's journey, everything arranged for it, each step of the path marked out. Man has to do almost everything for himself—to learn the intellectual and the moral meaning of his life, to put himself to school, and above all, from the beginning even to the end, to school himself. As out of the vague, confused, presentational *continuum* he has to constitute, by his own intellectual activity, a world of objects, so, out of the motor-*continuum* of vague desire he has to constitute, by his own moral activity, a system of ends. Each sphere is a kind of chaos until he reads into it, or recognises in it, the cosmos of intelligence and of will. The complete determination and definition of the one would be the Truth, of the other the Good. Where the animal acts blindly or from immediate and uncriticised impulse, man can act with reflection and from deliberate choice. Where the animal's life is the outcome of forces or tendencies of which it is merely 'aware,' man 'knows' or discerns the meaning of the tendencies he experiences, and acts, or may act, in the light and by the force of such rational insight. Where the cause of the animal's activity is to be found without itself, in the appeal made to it by its circumstances or environment, in the 'push and pull' of impulsive forces, the true cause of human activities must be sought within the man himself, in his critical consideration of the outward appeal, in the superior strength of his rational spirit.

4. The process of volition.—We must note more

closely the nature of the process of volition. We may distinguish three stages. (a) There is the temporary inhibition of all the impulsive tendencies,—the pause or interval during which the alternative activities are suspended. We can hardly exaggerate the psychological importance of the interval. It is this arrest of activity that breaks the immediacy and continuity of the merely reflex or ideo-motor life. If the drunkard only paused, and did not immediately proceed to realise his idea of gratification, he would probably not be a drunkard; but he rushes on his fate. He who hesitates, he who can effect the pause, in such a case, is *not* lost, but almost saved. The first step towards the control of animal impulse, towards the subjection of a master-idea, is to postpone its realisation. The pause does not prejudice the question of our ultimate attitude to the impulse in question; all that it implies is that we shall not follow the impulse in the meantime, or until we have considered its merits, and compared them with those of other alternative impulses. (b) There is deliberation, reflection upon the various courses possible in the circumstances, comparison and criticism of the results of following each competing impulse, a study of the entire situation, a self-recollection, a 'gathering oneself together,' a 'trying of our ways,' a comparison of this and that possible future with our present and our past, a testing of the course proposed by the touchstone of our prevailing aspirations, of our dominant aims in life, of our permanent and larger and deeper as well as our fleeting, momentary, superficial, though clamant, self, a swerving from one side to the other, a weighing of impulse in the scales of reflection; and, sooner or later, (c) a decision or choice, the acceptance of one or other of the conflicting ideal futures, the surrender to it in all the strength of its now increased impulsive force, the identification of the self with it, and its realisation. The ideal future thus chosen is called the 'end' or 'motive' of the resulting activity. For, once grasped,

it becomes the constraining stimulus to action, the *idea* which *moves* us. In it is now focussed the energy of the entire man; it and he are, in a real sense, one. It is thus that ends are the exponents of character, that life attains to unity and system; it is thus that we conceive of the perfect life as one guided by a single comprehensive purpose, which runs through its entire course, and, gathering up within itself all its varied activities, imparts to each its own significance.

The entire process is one of selective attention. In a sense, even the animal selects: only certain stimuli excite it—those, namely, which find in it a corresponding susceptibility. And, in man's case, the original force of the momentarily clamant idea is a result of what may be called 'natural selection.' It is because he is the man he is, that this particular idea has for him such impulsive force; for another man the same idea might have no impulsive force at all. This, too, is a case of attention, but it is only its rudimentary or involuntary form. The animal, or the man who does not pause to deliberate and choose, acts from a kind of fascination or charm. He has no eyes to see other paths, no ears to hear other guides; he seems to himself to be shut up to this one course. But there is another kind of selection, as there is another kind of attention; and the voluntary is distinguished from the involuntary by the element of deliberation. The process of volition is the process of the variation and oscillation of attention from one aspect of the practical situation to another. It is thus that, as the perspective changes, and ideas now in the foreground of consciousness retreat into the background, impulsive force is transferred from one idea to another, and the resulting activity is the outcome of a 'conjunct view of the whole case.' The function of will, therefore, is, by such a distribution of attention, to constitute the end or motive of activity. This end may at first be the weakest

idea of all, the least fascinating, the one which, of its own original resource, would be least likely to move us; yet through the medium of deliberation, through the strong intrinsic appeal it makes to the whole self, it may gather strength while the others as gradually and surely lose their early force, until, in the end of the day, in the final deliberate choice, we find that the last is first, and the first last.

Further, since our several acts of choice are not isolated but organically connected with one another, the process may be described finally as an activity of moral 'apperception' or integration. The activity of will is essentially an adjustment of the new to the old, and of the old to the new. Just as, in the case of any real addition to our intellectual life, the process is not one of mere addition of new to old material, but means rather the grafting of the new upon the old tree of knowledge, in such wise that the old is itself renewed with the fresh blood of the new conception; so, in the case of any real moral advance, any fresh act of choice, the new must be assimilated to the old, and the old to the new. For it is the entire man—the self—that makes the choice, and, in doing so, he takes up a new moral attitude; the entire moral being undergoes a subtle but real change. The house, whether of our intellectual or of our moral nature, must be swept and garnished, and made ready for its new guest; and if that guest be unworthy, the stain of his presence will be felt throughout the secret chambers of the soul. Or, to drop metaphor, and to state the matter more accurately, we must 'apperceive' the contemplated act, place it in the context of our life's purposes, and, directly or indirectly, with more or with less explicit consciousness, correlate it with the master-purpose of our life. It is thus that an originally weak impulse may be strengthened by being brought into the main stream of our life's total purpose. A choice is therefore an organisation, which is at the same time an integration or assimilation, of impulse.

5. *Nature and character.*—This analysis of the process of volition prepares us to understand the distinction between nature, disposition, or temperament, on the one hand, and character on the other. The former is our original endowment or equipment, the given raw material of moral life,—the natural, undisciplined, unformed, unmoralised man. The latter is acquired, the fruit of effort and toil,—the spiritual, disciplined, formed, moralised man.

From the first, the true spring of activity is within rather than without, in the unformed self of the man rather than in his external circumstances or environment. It is because the man is what he is, that any particular stimulus is a stimulus to him. The 'environment' is his environment; to another it would be none. Susceptibility determines and constitutes environment, rather than environment susceptibility. Given a certain type of susceptibility, however, a great deal depends upon the presence or absence of the corresponding environment, to stimulate that susceptibility. In the case of a merely natural or animal being, a being without a character or the possibility of its formation, everything depends upon the presence or absence of such a stimulating environment; the life of such a being is the product of this action and reaction. Man himself is, at first, such a merely natural being, a creature of impulse and instinct, an animal rather than a man. He, too, is nature's offspring, a veritable "part of nature, which moves in him and sways him hither and thither";¹ and were there not in him a higher strength than nature's, he would remain to the end "the slave of nature." If his nature remained as it originally is, his would be a merely natural or animal life. If he remained in this 'state of nature,' his life would either have no unity or order at all, and be swayed by each and every impulse as it came; or it would attain merely

¹ S. S. Laurie. *Ethica*, p. 22 (2nd ed.)

to the unity of the animal life, where the organisation of impulse is the work of instinct. But for man there is the higher possibility of attaining to an ethical unity, to the organisation of natural impulse through self-control. The unity of moral selfhood is of a different order from the natural unity of force or instinct. As Professor Laurie puts it, man, as a will or self, "has to do for his own organism what nature through necessary laws does for all else." The 'natural man,' as such, the animal nature in man, is neither good nor bad, neither moral nor immoral, but simply non-moral. It is in the possibility of transfiguring this natural animal life, and making it the instrument and expression of spiritual purpose, that morality consists. Morality is the formation, out of this raw material of nature, of a character. The seething and tumultuous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and desire, must be reduced to some common human measure. Man may not continue to live the animal life of unchecked impulse, borne ever on the full tide of natural sensibility. That life of nature which he too feels surging up within him has to be directed and controlled; it must be subjected to the moulding influence of reflective purpose. For man is not, like the animal, merely 'aware' of tendencies that sway him; he 'knows' them, and whither they lead. His is a life of reflection and judgment, as well as of immediate impulse; and just because he can reflect upon and judge his impulses, he can regulate and master them. Where the animal is guided by primary feeling, man is guided by feeling so moralised or rationalised that we call it 'sentiment' or 'moral idea.' It is only thus, by taking in hand his original nature or disposition, and gathering up its manifold elements into the unity of a consistent character, that man becomes truly man. He must thus 'come to himself,' however long and laborious be the way.

The way from nature to character is laborious, and

full of effort. "Before virtue the gods have put toil and effort." χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά. "Strait is the gate, and narrow the way" of the life of virtue. For the voluntary or moral life is, in its essence, we have seen, the inhibition of natural, or impulsive and instinctive, tendencies. It is a turning of attention in another than its natural direction, an effort, by distributing over a wider field the consciousness originally focussed on a narrow area, to change its focus from one restricted area to another. This substitution of voluntary for involuntary attention is difficult, and most difficult at first. The present and immediate, the natural or 'attuent,'¹ life is engrossing, clamant, fascinating. The lines of impulse and instinct, the lines of nature, are the lines of least resistance; the lines of thought and 'cool' self-recollection, of character and virtue, are at first the lines of greatest resistance. The child has to be helped over the first steps of its moral life, just as it has to be helped to walk alone both physically and intellectually; its weak will, so soon wearied with the strange effort, has to be propped up by appeals to the well-rooted instincts of its childish nature. Long afterwards, the struggle still continues, and the weariness returns, and still often 'old Adam is too strong for young Melanthon,' and the wretched combatant cries out for deliverance from the body of this death.

But gradually, and in due time, the deliverance comes. These pains and agonies are, in reality, the birth-pangs of a new nature in the man. Gradually he experiences 'the expulsive power of new affections.' Character is itself a habit of will, and habit is always easy. Virtue is not virtue until it has become pleasant.² It is the formation of character that is difficult; the difficulty thereafter is to unform or to reform it. For character does not consist in single choices, made with difficulty,

¹ We owe this term to Professor Laurie, who uses it throughout his *Metaphysica* and *Ethica*.

² Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.*, ii. 3 (1).

and after much deliberation and weighing of the *pros* and *cons*; it consists in the formation of grooves along which the activity naturally and habitually runs. He is not, in the highest sense, an honest man who does an honest act with difficulty, and who would rather act dishonestly. The honest man is the man to whom it would be difficult and unnatural to act dishonestly, the man in whom honesty is a 'second nature.' Thus we see how, since character is itself a habit—a new and acquired tendency which has supplanted the primary tendencies of the mere animal nature—the difference between nature and character must be a fleeting one. What was at first, and perhaps for long, the hard-won fruit of moral effort, becomes later the spontaneous expression of the new nature which has thus been born within us. Effort becomes less characteristic of the life of virtue, self-control becomes less difficult, as virtue becomes a second nature. The storm and stress of its earlier struggles is followed by the great calm of settled and established virtue. The main stream of our life, the current of our habitual activity and interest, carries us with it. There is no longer the inhibition, the painful suspense of deliberation, and the anxious choice, but the even flow of the great main stream. The energies of the will, which were formerly so dissipated, are now found in splendid integration, and the whole man seems to live in each individual act. If it were not that the way of virtue is long, as well as difficult, we should be apt to say that the element of effort which characterises its beginning is destined in the end to disappear; if it were not that there are always new degrees of virtue for even the most virtuous to attain, we should be inclined to say that the path of virtue is steep and difficult only at the first. But the ascent reveals ever new heights of virtue yet unattained; and the effort of virtue is measured by the height of the moral ideal, as well as by the level of moral attainment. Thus, what at a

lower level was character becomes, at the higher, again mere nature, to be in turn transcended and overcome. "We rise on stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things." There is no resting in the life of virtue,—it is a constant growth; to stereotype it, or to arrest it at any stage, however advanced, would be to kill it. There is always an 'old' man and a 'new': the very new becomes old, and has to die, and be surmounted.

6. Limitations of volition.—Certain limitations of the volitional life are suggested by what has already been said.

(a) The principle of economy of will-power implies the surrender of large tracts of our life to mechanism. Such a surrender is made not only in the case of purely physical activities, but also generally in the case of the routine of daily life. To deliberate and choose about such things as which boot we shall put on first, or which side of the garden-walk we shall take, is an entirely gratuitous assertion of our power of volition: it is the mark of a weak or diseased, rather than of a strong and healthy will. Decision and strength of character are shown in the choice of certain fixed lines of conduct in such particulars, and in the abiding by the choice once made. Further, a great economy of effort is secured by the choice of ends rather than of means. The means may require deliberation and choice, but, to a very large extent, they are already chosen in the end. And in general we may say that the details of an act which, taken as a whole, is strictly voluntary, may be cases of merely ideo-motor activity; the operation may proceed with perfect smoothness, each step of it suggesting the next in turn, without any intervention of will.

(b) The continuity of our moral life also implies a large surrender of its several acts to mechanism or habit. The moral life is not a series of isolated choices, it is a continuous and growing whole. As it proceeds, the sur-

vey becomes more and more extended, to use a convenient technical term, the individual act is more and more completely 'apperceived.' The mature moral man does not fight his battles always over again—he brings the individual act under a conception. His life, instead of being a constant succession of fresh choices, becomes a more or less complete system of ends, centring, implicitly or explicitly, in one which is supreme. The deliberation is chiefly about the placing of the individual action in its true relations to the context of this system, about the interpretation of it as a part of this whole. In general, we choose sections of life, rather than the individual details which fill these sections. In other words, all men, even those whom we call 'unprincipled,' have certain principles, of which their life is the expression.

Choices are not, I have said, independent; they inevitably crystallise, or rather, they are seeds which develop and bear fruit in the days and years that follow. The moments of our life have not all an equal moral significance. Rather, the significance of our lives, for good or evil, seems to be determined by moments of choice in days and years of even tenor. There are great moments when large and critical alternatives are set before us, and we deliberately choose the higher good, or, with no less deliberate consciousness, reject it for a lower and less worthy. Every act is implicitly a case of such moral choice. But, in such moments as those of which I now speak, the will gives large commissions to habit, and leaves to it their execution. The commission is quickly given, its execution takes long. The moral crises of our lives are few, and soon over; but it seems as if all the strength of our spirit gathered itself up for such supreme decisions, and as if what follows in the long-drawn years were but their consequence.

(c) What is generally called 'fixity' of character suggests a third important limitation of the will's activity.

The course of moral life, as it proceeds, seems to result in the establishment of certain fixed lines of conduct and character, whether good or evil. Its course becomes more and more settled; law and system, of one kind or another, are more and more visible in it. The formation of character means, as we have seen, the constant handing over to habit of actions which were at first done with deliberation and effort. Association performs the work of intelligence, impulse regains its sway over us, character becomes second nature. We are always forging, by our acts of deliberate choice, the iron chains of habit. Otherwise, there would be no ground gained, no fruit harvested from daily toil of will, no store of moral acquisition laid up for future years. Our life would be a Sisyphus-like task, never any nearer its execution. But, as we roll it up, the stone does remain, nay, tends still upwards. Of such gradual and almost imperceptible fixation in evil ways, the characters of Tito in George Eliot's *Romola*, and of Markheim in R. L. Stevenson's little story of that name, are impressive illustrations. What is exemplified in such cases is not, I think, loss of will-power so much as fixity of character—itsself the creation of will—degradation of the will, a choice, apparently final and irrevocable, of the lower and the evil. This is the tragedy of the story in either case. Is not this, again, the meaning of the weird Faust legend which has so impressed the imagination of Europe? Faust's selling his soul to Mephistopheles, and signing the contract with his life's blood, is no single transaction, done deliberately, on one occasion; rather, this is the lurid meaning of a life which consists of innumerable individual acts,—the life of evil means this. And, at the other extreme of the moral scale, does not holiness mean a great and final exaltation of will, its perfect and established union with the higher and the good, fixity of character once more? These infinite possibilities of evil and of goodness seem to be the implicate of an infinite

moral ideal; they are the moral equivalents of the heaven and hell of the religious imagination. What is will itself but just this power or possibility, infinite as our nature, for each of us in the direction either of goodness or of evil? Between these extremes moves the ordinary average life of the comfortable citizen. The strongest and deepest natures are the saints and the sinners; the weaker and more superficial fluctuate irresolute between the poles of good and evil.

On the side of goodness, at any rate, we readily admit the reality of that moral experience of which 'fixity of character' is the natural interpretation. We have no interest in proving that the saint is potentially a sinner. The condition and attribute of the highest life, we readily admit, is not to hold oneself aloof from good and evil, and free to choose between them. Far rather it is found in the 'single mind,' in the resolute identification of the whole man or self with the good, in the will of the higher self to live. For, as Aristotle truly said, virtue is not virtue until it has become a habit of the soul, and easy and spontaneous as a habit. Moral progress is a progress from nature and its bondage, through freedom and duty, to that love or second nature which alone is the 'fulfilling of the law.' So that, "after all, free-will is not the highest freedom." Free-will implies antagonism and resistance. "But the action of the perfect, so far as they are perfect, is natural. . . . Only it proceeds from a higher nature, in which experience has passed through reason into insight, in which impulse and desire have passed through free-will into love."¹ This is freedom made perfect, the liberty of the children of God.

Whether the identification of the will with evil can ever become, in the strict sense, fixed, is a hard and perhaps unanswerable question. The Faust legend seems to express such a belief, and for Tito, as for Esau, there is no place left for repentance. In the impressive little

¹ G. A. Simcox, in *Mind*, O.S., vol. iv. p. 481.

story of *Markheim* I think I see a gleam of hope, a suggestion and no more, of the final possibility, even for the most debased, of moral recovery. Markheim's last act of deliberate self-surrender seems like the first step away from the evil past towards a better future. It was the last possibility of good for the man; but even for him it was a possibility still. And does it not seem as if an evil character, however evil, being the formation of will, might be unformed and reformed by the same power? Is not character, after all, but a garment in which the spirit clothes itself—a garment which clings tightly to it, but which it need not wear eternally?

The tendency is towards such settlement or gradual fixation, whether in goodness or in evil. But absolute fixity of character is disproved by that indubitable fact of moral experience which Plato, equally with the Christian theologian, calls 'conversion'—such a complete change of bent as amounts not merely to a reformation but to a revolution of character—"the turning round of the eye of the soul and with it the whole soul, from darkness to light, from the perishing to the eternal." It seems as if the past and the present life were never an exhaustive expression of the possibilities of will. The man is always more than the sum of his past and present experience; and often he surprises us by creating a future which, while it stands in relation to the past, yet does so only, or chiefly, by antithesis. It is as if the catastrophe which comes with the culmination of his evil career, by its revelation of the full meaning of the life he has been living, shocked him into the resolve to live a different and a better life. It is as if Markheim said to himself, after the tragedy of that fateful day, when he had connected it with himself, and confessed that the seeds of even that evil were thickly sown in the soil of his evil past: "That is not the man I choose to be;" and as if, in the strength of that decision, accepting the full consequences of his deed, and surrendering himself deliberately to its retribu-

tion, he forthwith took the first step away from his past self and towards a future self entirely different. Might not even Tito, even Faust, even Esau, so choose at last the better part? Christianity calls it a 'new birth,' so different is the new man from the old. Yet, however different, it is the same man through the two lives; the same will, only it has changed its course; the same player, but in a new rôle.

We must recognise, therefore, a very considerable range of variation in the adequacy of conduct as the exponent of character. In some actions we see the stirring of the deeps of personality, the revelation of the very self; in others only the waves on the surface of the moral life. There is a great difference in this respect even between individuals. Some men are reserved, and their character is a closed book to their fellow-men. Others are open, and readily reveal their inner being. In some there is less depth of soil than in others—superficial natures, who have not much either to hide or to reveal, the volume of whose character is quickly read and mastered by their fellows. In some, perhaps in all, there is a double life, an outer and an inner, never quite harmonised, and often directly opposed. This 'double-faced unity' in the moral world, this co-existence and antagonism of 'two men' in one, of a Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, is not necessarily duplicity or hypocrisy. Rather it seems to mean that there is always a residuum of moral possibility, whatever the actual character may have become: the man never *is* either Dr Jekyll or Mr Hyde, the saint or the sinner; but he is potentially either, though actually partly the one and partly the other, more the one and less the other. And out of the furthest retreats of the unconscious or sub-conscious sphere there may emerge any day the buried, forgotten, yet truest and most real self. The man may have wandered into the far country, and may even seem to have lost all trace of former goodness, and yet he may in the end 'come to himself,' may recover those possibilities

which had till then seemed possibilities no longer. 'So long as there is life there is hope.' Character may seem to have entirely lost its plasticity, and to have become quite fixed and rigid. But it is not so. Character is a living thing, and life is never fixed or rigid. After all, the ordinary average character is better fitted to suggest the true state of the case than either of the extremes. These extremes are instability or absence of character on the one hand, and what we have called fixity or finality of character on the other. The latter would be fossilisation, or the cessation of growth, which is death. Character is essentially, from first to last, plastic. It implies open-mindedness, freshness or ingenuousness, receptivity for the new. The change is not, indeed, capricious or at random: the new must be linked to the old; the old must itself be renewed, recreated in every part. Yet the relation of the new to the old may be that of antithesis and revolt, as well as of synthesis and continuity. The development of character is not always in a straight line; it is ever returning upon and reconstituting itself.

7. *Intellectual elements in volition.*—It is necessary, before leaving the psychology of the moral life, to consider the relation of intellect and feeling to will. (a) The first intellectual element in volition is conception. The natural or animal life is unthinking, the voluntary or moral life is a thoughtful life. The Greeks understood this well; we find Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all alike identifying virtue with knowledge or rational insight. It is not, however, true that the moral and the intellectual life are one, or that, in the ordinary sense of the term, 'virtue is knowledge.' It is truer to say that virtue is attention, or the steady entertaining of a certain conception of life or of its several activities. This is what distinguishes the voluntary form of activity from both the instinctive and the impulsive forms. Instinct ex-

cutes certain ends unconsciously; it is the unconscious organisation of impulse, nature's own control of natural tendency. Mere impulse, on the other hand, is momentary, and takes in but a single object; the creature of impulse is touched at only one point of his nature, and follows the tendency of the moment. Since, therefore, man has the organisation of his impulsive tendencies in his own hands, his first and essential act must be one of thought or conception. To think or conceive the proposed action aright, is the condition of right action; and it is because the vicious man thinks or conceives his action wrongly, and under false colours, that he does it. "To sustain a representation, to think," says Professor James, "is, in short, the only moral act." It is because the drunkard 'lets himself go,' and will not conceive or name his act aright, because he will not acknowledge to himself that 'this is being a drunkard,' that he *is* a drunkard. So soon as he brings himself to this, he is on the way to being saved; if he keeps his mind on this idea, it will gradually be strengthened, until it is predominant, and issues in the inhibition of the tendency to drink. For thus to conceive the act is to apperceive it, to see it in all its relations to the total self; and then how differently it looks, how its fascination pales in that larger light! The true centre of influence has now been found, in the deeper rational self which assimilates and rejects according to its discrimination.

Undue reflectiveness means, of course, weakness of will or indecision of character; it is fatal to that promptitude which is essential to effective activity. Plato has drawn a delightful picture of the dire practical effects of undue deliberation, in his contrast of the awkward, ineffective philosopher and the shrewd, quick, business-like, little lawyer-soul.¹ In his parable of the Cave, also, he has given expression to the popular idea of the man of thought as little fitted to be, at the same time, a man of

¹ *Theætetus*, 172-176.

action; he represents the philosopher or true thinker as withdrawn from human affairs, and, by his want of interest in the concerns of ordinary life, in a sense unfitted for the conduct of life's business. Shakespeare, too, has created for us a Hamlet, a thinker but a dreamer, disabled by undue reflection for the part he is called to play on this world's stage, his will so puzzled by the *pros* and *cons* of a restless intellect that it can accomplish nothing, a man in whom "the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." And our own age has furnished a sad living commentary on the familiar text. Amiel's *Journal* is the record of how the springs of all practical energy were sapped by a continual, brooding, Hamlet-like reflection which never found vent in action: it is one long bitter plaint of a soul praying for deliverance from the misery of such a living death, the story of a life endowed with such clearness of intellectual vision, united to such sad impotence of will, that it could trace its own failure to this single source. So true is it that we all have 'the defects of our qualities,' and that these defects must be our ruin if we guard not against them. Yet life is not all tragedy; and such dire consequences are not inevitable, or even normal. Even in these cases, it is not that the man thinks too much, but that his activity is not up to the measure of his thought; unless thought finds its constant and adequate expression in action, it weakens, where it ought to strengthen, the power to act. The result is what Professor James calls 'the obstructed will,' the will hindered by thought, which is just at the opposite extreme from the 'explosive' or impulsive will—the will that does not think, but reacts with 'hair-trigger' rapidity and certainty. The true function of thought is to mediate between these extremes of character; not to sap the force of impulse, but to guide that force to more effective issues. The grey light of reason need not quench all the bright sunshine of enthusiasm; the ruddy

life of natural impulse need not be sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. Rather it is the function of reason to convert unthinking impulses into great enthusiasms, to inform the practical energies with far-reaching purposes, and thus to be the will's best helpmate in its proper task. The most effective man is he who, knowing best and thinking most profoundly about life's meaning, feels also most intensely, and acts most promptly and consistently in accordance with his thought and feeling.

(b) It is obvious that memory of the past is necessary for the representation of future possibilities. We can conceive the future only in terms of the past: experience is our sole instructor in the conduct of life. And only a vivid and accurate memory of the past, the power to reproduce it as it was, can deliver us from the bondage of the engrossing present. The ability to look forward is largely an ability to look backward. Experience is our common teacher here, but we are not all apt pupils. Some gain from experience far more than others,—in retentive memory they garner its golden grain, and draw from it in all the exigencies of the present; the years bring to them their own peculiar gift—the wisdom of life. To others the years do not bring the philosophic mind; they seem to pass through the same experience untouched by its lessons. Their life is in the fleeting present; they are like children who amuse themselves with life's changing show. They are the creatures of present impulse, passive and receptive, taking no thought for the morrow, because they take no heed of yesterday; for “purpose is but the slave to memory.”¹ Such lives are without perspective, without appreciation of the far and near; they have no future, because they have no past. The wise man's life is richly ‘fringed’ on either side, and the fringe of the future is of the same pattern as that of the past. Memory is the true ‘measuring art.’

¹ *Hamlet*, Act iii. sc. 2, quoted by Höffding, *Psychology*, p. 327 (Eng. tr.) Cf. his account of this entire subject.

A truthful representation of the future depends upon a truthful representation of the past, and will go far to determine the present.

(c) The power to look vividly forward is no less necessary than the power to look vividly backward. It is a defect of imagination that is largely to blame for the unworthy and sensual lives we see. It is because the horizon is bounded by the day's needs and the day's capacities of enjoyment, that the life is so narrow and so mean. Could but the horizon lift, could but the man look into the far-distant future, and discern there all the consequences of the act he is about to do, could he but see its waves breaking on those distant shores against which some day they must break, how different his life would be. And if we would lift the horizon of time itself, and see our life in time *sub quâdam specie æternitatis*, we must stretch our imagination to the utmost. Seen in that light, in the light of 'the immensities and eternities,' nothing is common or unclean, nothing is trivial or commonplace; the simplest and meanest acts become transfigured with a strange dignity and significance. Surely, then, the moral imagination, which discovers to us the true perspective of life, is no less important for practice than is the scientific imagination for theory.

8. Will and feeling. Is pleasure the object of choice?—Two opposed views have been long maintained as to the place of feeling in the moral life. On the one hand, it has been contended that pleasure is the constant and exclusive object of choice; on the other hand, that pleasure is never the object of choice. On the one hand, it has been said that our life is one continuous pursuit of pleasure; on the other hand, that the pursuit of pleasure is impossible and suicidal. The one view sees in pleasure the sole actual end of life; the other sees in it the concomitant and result, but not the end or object of pursuit. The former

view was held in ancient times by the Cyrenaics, and in modern by Hume and J. S. Mill, among others. The latter is the view of Aristotle among the ancients, of Butler, Sidgwick, and Green among modern moralists, and of James, Baldwin, and Höffding among contemporary psychologists. Both theories admit that feeling is an element in human life; the problem is to determine its psychological place and function.

A glance at the *rôle* of feeling in the lower and non-voluntary activities of instinct and impulse may help us to understand the part it plays in the higher life of will. We have seen that neither in the case of impulse, nor in that of instinct, is there consciousness of an end. Both are blind, unenlightened tendencies to act in a certain way. In impulsive activities there is no operation of an end at all; in those which we call instinctive its operation is unconscious. But both these types of activity are accompanied by feeling. There is not merely the tendency to act; the consciousness has a passive as well as an active side, a certain 'tone'—it is pleasant or painful. Nor is this primarily passive side merely passive, merely concomitant; it is also influential in determining the activity of the sentient being. It is the single ray of light let into the darkness of the animal life of instinct and impulse. There is no further vision of the whither; there is no consciousness of purpose, no choice of ends. But there is a feeling for pleasure and pain, of want and the satisfaction of it; and this feeling guides the being towards the objects that will satisfy it, that will quench its pain and yield it pleasure. This feeling for pleasure and pain has helped materially to guide the evolution of animal life. Pleasure-giving and life-preserving activities are, in the main, identical; and the importance of the addition of the internal to the external pressure, of the conscious pressure of feeling to the unconscious pressure of environment and circumstances, can hardly be overestimated.

That which distinguishes voluntary from involuntary activity is, we have seen, the conscious operation of ends as motives of choice. The guidance has now passed into the hands of intellect; we act in the light of rational insight into the issues of our activity, we have a reason for what we do. To the lower guidance of immediate near-sighted feeling there is now added the higher and farther-seeing guidance of ideas. But, even here, the guidance has not entirely passed from the hands of feeling. For, not only are there, interfused with ends, what Professor Baldwin calls 'affects,' or activities immediately determined by feeling; but ends themselves have an 'affective' side, or contain an element of feeling without which they would possess no motive-force. "The simple presence of an idea in consciousness is itself a feeling, and only in as far as it affects us does it move us."¹ Feeling thus mediates between intellect and will, converting the cold intellectual conception into a constraining motive of activity. In ends, then, there is always an element of feeling as well as of thought; it is the fusion of these two that constitutes the 'interests' of the voluntary life. We are now delivered from the immediate dominion of feeling; we see or foresee what course will yield us satisfaction, and we act under the guidance of this intellectual sight or foresight. But are we not still, indirectly if not directly, controlled by feeling? The psychological hedonist answers in the affirmative: he insists that the ultimate factor in the determination of our choice is feeling, rather than thought; that thought is after all the minister of feeling, informing it how a desirable state of feeling may be attained and an undesirable state of feeling escaped. The dominion of feeling still persists, only it is an indirect dominion; feeling has not abdicated, it has only delegated its authority to intellect, and become a constitutional sovereign. The anti-hedonistic answer is that pleasure, or an agreeable state

¹ Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology*, vol. ii. pp. 313, 314.

of feeling, is never the end or object of desire and choice; that while pleasure accompanies both the pursuit and the attainment of our ends, it never constitutes these ends. We never act, it is contended, *for the sake of* pleasure, but for the sake of objects, or interests, in which we 'rest,' and from which we do not return to a consideration of our own subjective feeling of pleasure, either in their pursuit or in their attainment. Let us follow the argument on both sides, if we can, to the end.

The primary direction of thought, the anti-hedonist maintains, is towards the object, not towards the pleasure which it is expected to yield. We do not, it is argued, look so far ahead as the pleasure: that is not what moves us. To say that the anticipated pleasure is the motive of activity is to commit the 'psychologist's fallacy'; to read your own introspective and analytic consciousness of the conditions of consciousness into that original and natural consciousness which is the object of your introspective investigation, but is not itself troubled with introspection or analysis. Even the voluntary life is, to this extent, blind; even it is not endowed with the minute vision of the psychologist, still less with the microscopic eye of the logician. The question is: What do we desire? not, What are the conditions of desire? or, Why do we desire what we desire? It is a question of fact, not of the conditions or the *rationale* of the fact. Now, "a pleasant act, and an act pursuing pleasure, are, in themselves, two perfectly distinct conceptions. . . . It is the confusion of pursued pleasure with mere pleasure of achievement, which makes the pleasure-theory so plausible to the ordinary mind."¹ In short, the 'pleasure of pursuit' is psychologically different from the 'pursuit of pleasure.'

Even the psychological hedonist seems to yield this point, and to admit the 'paradox of hedonism'—namely, that "to get pleasure you must forget it." Mill makes

¹ James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. pp. 556, 557.

this concession, both in his *Utilitarianism* and in his *Autobiography*. He admits that the direct pursuit of pleasure is suicidal, that we must lose sight of the end in the means, and, adopting a kind of 'miser's consciousness,' affect a disinterested or objective interest, forget ourselves, and pursue objects *as if* for their own sake, and not for the sake of the pleasure which we expect them to yield. 'Something accomplished, something done,' yields pleasure; but if it is to yield the pleasure, at least the maximum of pleasure, we must not do it for the sake of the pleasure. The life of pleasure-seeking is, in other words, by the very nature of the case, a life of illusion and make-believe.

But, replies the anti-hedonist, such an interpretation of human life is in the highest degree artificial and un-psychological. "The real order of things is just the reverse of the hedonistic interpretation of it. Instead of beginning with the pursuit of pleasure, and ending by pursuing what was earlier the means to pleasure, we begin by pursuing an object, and end by degrading this primary object to an artificial means to pleasure, or as a competitor with pleasure for the dignity of being pursued."¹ The passage is "from simple desire for an object which satisfies to desire for the satisfaction itself." Here, once more, the hedonist seems forced to concede the point to his antagonist. He is compelled to admit, with Hume, that "it has been proved beyond all controversy that even the passions commonly esteemed selfish may carry the mind beyond self directly to the object; that though the satisfaction gives us enjoyment, yet the prospect of this enjoyment is not the cause of the passion, but, on the contrary, the passion is antecedent to the enjoyment, and without the former the latter could never possibly exist."²

The case now seems to be decided against the hedonist.

¹ Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 327.

² *Essay on Different Species of Philosophy*, § 1, note.

The latter's interpretation of life seems to have been proved unnatural and forced. The voluptuary may, on reflection, adopt his scheme of life as the only logically defensible scheme; but his practice will always contradict the logic of his theory. The 'hedonistic calculus' must be abandoned, and another measure found for practical use. But the hedonist is not yet silenced. There is a previous question, he still insists, which his opponent has not answered—namely, What is the object of desire, if it is not pleasure? Are we not brought back to hedonism whenever we investigate the constitution of the object? Does not that pleasure, which we had just put out at the door, come back through the window? For what is the object *apart from you*? It exists through its relation to you—nay, it *is* yourself. What you desire is not a mere object, but an object as satisfying yourself, and what moves you to act is the idea of yourself as satisfied in the attainment of the object. Not the object, but the attainment of the object by you—or, more strictly still, your self-satisfaction in its attainment, is the end that moves you to strive after it. And in what can the satisfaction of the self consist but in a feeling of pleasure?

Moreover, the 'paradox of hedonism' turns out to be more seeming than real. The distinction between the end and the means towards its attainment is not a real but an artificial distinction. The end and the means are really the same, you can analyse the one into the other; the end is the whole, of which the means are the parts or elements, and you can no more lose the end in the means than the whole in the parts. The means to pleasure are just the details of the pleasant life, and in pursuing them you are in truth pursuing, in the only rational manner, step by step, or bit by bit, that totality of satisfaction which can be constituted in no other way. The life of pleasure is not an abstract universal; it is a concrete whole, and consists of real particulars. Pleasure.

it is true, is derived from pleasant things; to divorce it from these is to destroy it. But such a divorce is entirely gratuitous; no matter how it is reached, the pleasure itself is our real end. We have not 'forgotten' the pleasure after all. In the words of J. S. Mill: "In these cases the means have become a part of the end, and a more important part of it than any of the things which they are means to. What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness, has come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession; and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it. The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness, any more than the love of music, or the desire of health. They are included in happiness; they are some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole; and these are some of its parts. . . . Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in permanency, in the space of human existence that they are capable of covering, and even in intensity."¹

The question finally resolves itself, therefore, into the following form: Choice being the realisation of an idea, is the idea which we choose to realise; or the moving idea, in all cases the idea of pleasure, *i.e.*, the anticipation of the pleased feeling which will result from the proposed course of action? Is this the only possible content of the idea selected for realisation? Is this, in the last analysis, the only possible object of thought, and, there-

¹ *Utilitarianism*, ch. iv.

fore, of choice? The obvious answer is that, so far from this being the case, the ideal object may be anything, objective or subjective. The mind may, in Butler's phrase, 'rest in the external things themselves,' and not return to the consideration of its own pleasure in their attainment. And, even if the content of the idea be subjective, that content need not be merely the represented state of feeling. I may choose to *do* something, or to *be* something, as well as to *feel* somehow. As Mr Bradley says, "there never was any one who did not desire many things for their own sake; there never was a typical voluptuary."¹

Whence, then, the illusion of 'psychological hedonism'? It arises, I am convinced, from a confusion between the content or constitution of the moving idea, on the one hand, and the impulsive strength by virtue of which the idea moves us to its own realisation, on the other hand; from the confusion between an *idea of pleasure* and a *pleasant idea*.² The idea must please or attract me; else it will remain unrealised. To move me, it must please me. Pleasure is the mechanism or dynamic of choice. The energy or moving power of an idea lies in the feeling which it arouses. The law of its operation is the law of attraction or fascination: it moves, 'as one that is loved moves,' by drawing us to itself. There is pleasure in every act of choice. Without this pleasure, the choice would be impossible; and the pleasure must, therefore, be accepted as part of the explanation of the choice. It is what Aristotle calls the 'efficient cause,' the *moving power* or agency. It is more than the concomitant of

¹ *Ethical Studies*, p. 237.

² Cf. Bradley (*op. cit.*, p. 235): "A pleasant thought" is "not the same thing with the thought of pleasure"; and C. M. Williams (*A Review of Evolutional Ethics*, p. 399): "In the imagination of action and its results, or the thought of it, reflection may linger especially on any one of its elements,—on any part of the action and its results as inferred from the analogy of past experience. The pleasure to self is not necessarily the element on which the mind lays stress."

the act of choice, which Aristotle acknowledged it to be, it is the dynamic of choice. Even when the choice is a choice of pain (in preference to pleasure) or of something quite different from either pleasure or pain (as in the choice of the scholar or of the man of science), the choice itself is pleasant, or it would be impossible. The idea thrills us, fascinates us, claims us as its own; and it is in this appeal to our feeling that its power to move us lies. *Otherwise*, the idea (whatever it is an idea *of*) were impotent; so, it is omnipotent. And, to leave no doubt as to the importance of the function of pleasure in the process of choice, let us add that the law of that process is that the idea which is most attractive, or gives most pleasure, is always the victorious and moving idea. In this sense Mill's words are true, that "desiring a thing and finding it pleasant . . . are . . . in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact."¹ Mr Sidgwick's statement is also true, that "if by 'pleasant' we mean that which influences choice, exercises a certain attractive force on the will, it is an assertion incontrovertible because tautological, to say that we desire what is pleasant, or even that we desire a thing in proportion as it appears pleasant."²

But there is another, and no less essential, element in the process of choice; and therefore another, and no less essential, factor in its explanation. In Mr Bradley's words, "to choose what pleases me most . . . merely means *that* I choose, and says nothing whatever about *what* I choose."³ Pleasure is that which enables me to choose; but it is not therefore also that which I choose—the content or object of my choice. A *pleasant choice* is not necessarily a *choice of pleasure*. The idea which moves me to its realisation does so because its content (that which it is an idea *of*) appeals to me more strongly, attracts, interests, or pleases me more than the

¹ *Utilitarianism*, ch. iv.

² *Methods of Ethics*, book i. ch. iv. § 2.

³ *Ethical Studies*, p. 234.

content of the other competing ideas. The attractive power of the idea is the explanation of its realisation in the act of choice. But the secret of this attractive power is found in the correspondence between the content of the idea and myself. That content raises or degrades me to itself, makes me its own; it, therefore, is the object of my choice—is *what* I choose. It is what Aristotle would call the 'final cause,' that for the sake of which I act, the end which I choose as my good. We cannot too carefully distinguish this teleological explanation of choice from the mechanical or dynamical explanation already referred to,—the *ratio* from the *causa*, the οὐ ἕνεκα from the ἐξ οὐ. It does not follow that, because an action is pleasant, it is performed for the sake of the pleasure; that because the martyr's, and many another's, self-sacrificing devotion thrills him, and the thrill of strange delight carries him through an act which had otherwise been impossible, the act is therefore done for the sake of the thrill, or that this is the object of his devotion. That would be an explanation which does not explain, a distortion and negation of the essential fact in the case. On the contrary, it is the very perfection of his devotion to the object that accounts for the thrill: the thrill is the thrill of devotion, and is not felt save by the devotee.

This distinction between the dynamical and the teleological aspects of choice was well expressed by the older English writers in the two terms 'motive' and 'intention' (or 'end'). The former term was used to designate the sentient 'spring' or source of the action, the latter to designate its aim, object, or end. This is the usage of Bentham, who defines a "motive to the will" as "anything whatsoever, which, by influencing the will of a sensitive being, is supposed to serve as a means of determining him to act, or voluntarily to forbear to act, upon any occasion."¹ "A motive," he adds, "is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain

¹ *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. x. § 3.

manner.”¹ It is also the usage of J. S. Mill, who defines the intention as “what the agent wills to do,” and the motive as “the feeling which makes him so will to do.”² In view of this distinction, these writers hold, quite consistently, that ethical quality belongs primarily and strictly to the intention alone, and only secondarily and indirectly to the motive. Bentham says explicitly that all motives are morally colourless, since they are all the same in kind,—all pleasure-seeking and pain-shunning. “There is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one. Let a man’s motive be ill-will; call it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive: the pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself, is good; it may be faint; it may be short: it must at any rate be impure: yet, while it lasts, and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any other that is not more intense.”³ Similarly J. S. Mill writes: “The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention, that is, upon what the agent *wills to do*. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality.”⁴ The distinction has, however, been obscured, if not ignored, by later and especially by contemporary writers. ‘Motive’ is now generally used as the synonym of ‘end’ or ‘intention’; and the inseparability of the dynamical from the teleological aspect of the act of choice affords good reason for the application of the same term to both. T. H. Green has, with especial persuasiveness, insisted upon the indissoluble unity of motive and end; and his influence is chiefly responsible for the change in terminology. But

¹ *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. x. § 9.

² *Utilitarianism*, ch. ii.

³ *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. x. § 10, and Note.

⁴ *Utilitarianism*, ch. ii.

though inseparable, these two aspects of choice are not indistinguishable; and it is as necessary as ever, for clear thinking, to distinguish them.¹

Yet, as Professor Dewey remarks,² the very psychological confusion of pleasure as object of choice with pleasure as motive "testifies to a right psychological instinct: that which is an aim of action must also move to action. There must be an identification of the real concrete ideal with the impelling spring to action. Unless the aim or ideal itself becomes a moving force, it is barren and helpless. Unless the moving force becomes itself idealised, unless it is permeated with the object aimed at, it remains mere impulse, blind and irrational." Perhaps the best term by which to express that concrete unity of the ideal content and the impulsive force which makes possible its realisation in the act of choice, is Butler's term 'interest.' The word suggests both the objective and the subjective, both the ideational and the sentient, elements in choice. On the one hand, the object must interest me—that is, must appeal, not merely to thought, but to feeling. If it is to become the end or motive of my activity, the object of my choice, it must attract or please me. On the other hand, it is no less true that I must be interested in it, that my feeling must gather round the idea of the object as its centre. As Butler says, "the very idea of interest . . . consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object." Moreover, the object which interests me, while it may be my own subjective condition or state of feeling, may also be some thing or person or state of affairs—some 'condition of things'—quite other than myself. The object in which I am interested, or in which I find satisfaction, may be pleasure itself—my own or another's; or it may

¹ It might perhaps be questioned whether, while all ends are motives, we ought not to admit the existence of motives which are not ends. See the discussion on the meaning of 'motive' in the *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1893, and January, 1894.

² *The Study of Ethics*, p. 50.

be something quite different from pleasure. But an object there must be: if you cannot divorce it from me, neither can you divorce me from it. Choice is always the expression of interest. It is neither the expression of 'self-interest,' nor is it strictly 'disinterested.' It has always both an objective and a subjective side; and according as we lay the stress upon the objective or upon the subjective aspect of it, we shall call the choice 'disinterested,' because I am interested in an object, or 'interested,' because the object interests me. Within this omnipresent 'interest' of choice, room is found for all the 'disinterested' enthusiasms of life.

We have now determined, as precisely as we can, the function of feeling in the life of will. First, in that animal life of instinct and impulse which, though involuntary, yet contains the groundwork of volition, we saw that the otherwise blind activity is guided by the illumination of feeling. Those animal tendencies are dark enough, they make for a goal by the animal unseen, along a path of which only the next step can be discerned; the path of animal life is a brief straight road, travelled step by step. Gradually, as we rise in the scale of human striving and achievement, the vision grows and strengthens, and further reaches of the road are seen, and at last the goal itself to which it leads. But the guidance of feeling is not even now given up; it is only illuminated by the fuller light of intellectual insight. The goal itself is seized by feeling as well as by thought, and the several steps towards it are felt as well as known. But to detach feeling from thought, and to say that we pursue pleasure only, is as unscientific as to detach thought from feeling, and to say that our active life contains no element of feeling at all. Life means 'interests' or focal points of attention, apperceptive centres; and we can neither have interests without a self to feel them, nor evolve them out of a merely sentient self. To attempt either explanation is to attempt an unscientific

and contradictory *tour de force*. The entrance of will upon the field of activity does not mean deliverance from the guidance of feeling; what it does mean is such a transfiguration of the old guide that it is hard to recognise the familiar face and voice.

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PART I

THE MORAL IDEAL

THE MORAL IDEAL

Types of ethical theory : Hedonism, Rationalism, Eudæmonism.—We are now prepared to attempt the solution of the ethical problem, the nature of the moral ideal or of the ethical end. We are led to state the problem in this way, whether we approach it from the ancient standpoint of good, or from the modern standpoint of duty and law. In the former case, we find that conduct, being the organisation of impulses into rational ends, implies, as its unifying or organising principle, the constant presence and operation, implicit or explicit, of some single central end, of some comprehensive ideal of the total meaning of life, to be realised in the details of its several activities. The logic of the life of a rational being implies the guidance of a supreme end as its central and organising principle. The question of ethics in this aspect of it is : What is the chief end of man ? What may he, being such as he is, worthily set before him as the *summum bonum* of his life ? Which of the alternative and conflicting types of selfhood may he take as his ideal ? If, on the other hand, we approach the problem from the more modern standpoint of law and duty, we are led to substantially the same statement of it. A rational being cannot, as such, be content to live a life of mere obedience to rule, even to the rule of conscience. Mere authority, human or divine, does not

permanently satisfy him. The conflicts, or at least the difficulties, which arise in the application of the several moral laws or principles to the details of practice, lead to the attempt to codify these laws, and such codification implies once more a unifying principle—the discovery of the common ‘spirit of the laws.’ For their absoluteness pertains to the spirit and not to the letter. They are the several paths towards some absolute good. Why is it right to speak the truth, to be just, and temperate, and benevolent? What is the common ideal of which these are the several manifestations—the ideal which abides even in their change? The law of the several moral laws can be found only in the claim of an absolute ideal; their authority must find its seat and explanation in the persistent and rightful dominion of some one end over all the other possible or actual ends of human life.

Now, when we look at the history of ethical thought, we find that, from the beginning of reflection down to our own time, two opposed types of theory have maintained themselves, and each type has based itself, more or less explicitly, upon a corresponding view of human nature. On the one hand, man has been regarded as, either exclusively or fundamentally, a sentient being; and upon this psychology there has been built up a hedonistic theory of the moral ideal. If man is essentially a sentient being, his good must be a sentient good, or pleasure; this type of theory we may call Hedonism, or the Ethics of Sensibility. It is the theory of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans amongst the ancients, and of the Utilitarians, whether empirical, rational, or evolutionary, in modern times. On the other hand, it has been held with no less confidence that man is, either exclusively or essentially, a rational being; and that his good is, therefore, not a sentient but a rational good. This type of theory we may call Rationalism, or the Ethics of Reason. It is the theory of the ancient Cynics and Stoics, and, in modern times, of the Intuitionists and of Kant. Either

theory might claim for itself the vague term 'self-realisation.' The one finds in feeling, the other in reason, the deeper and truer self; to the one the claims of the sentient, to the other the claims of the rational self, seem paramount.

A closer study of the course of moral reflection reveals two forms—an extreme and a moderate, of either type of ethical theory. Extreme Hedonism, excluding reason altogether, or resolving it into sensibility, would exhibit the ideal life as a life of pure sentiency, undisturbed by reason, or into which reason has been absorbed. Extreme Rationalism, on the other hand, denying the place of feeling in the good of a rational being, would exhibit the ideal life as a life of pure thought, undisturbed by any intrusion of sensibility. But neither of these extremes is able to maintain itself. Neither element can be absolutely excluded, without manifestly deducting from the total efficiency of the resulting life. Accordingly we find that, while the logic of their positions would separate the theories as widely as possible, the necessities of the moral life itself tend to bring them nearer to each other. Hedonism is unable to avoid the reference to reason, Rationalism the reference to sensibility. Hence result a moderate version of the Ethics of Sensibility, which, instead of excluding reason, subordinates it to feeling, and a moderate version of the Ethics of Reason, which, instead of excluding feeling, subordinates it to reason. Moderate Hedonism recognises the function of reason, first in devising the means towards an end which is constituted by sensibility, and later even in the constitution of the end itself. Moderate Rationalism recognises the place of sensibility, at first as the mere accompaniment of the good life, and later as entering into the very texture of goodness itself. Such an approach of the one theory to the other, such a tendency to compromise between them, suggests the more excellent way of a theory which shall base itself on the

total nature of man, and correlate its various elements of thought and feeling in the unity of a truly personal life. This theory we may call, after Aristotle, Eudæmonism, or the Ethics of Personality; and we shall endeavour to demonstrate its necessity and value by a critical consideration, first, of Hedonism, the Ethics of Sensibility; and secondly, of Rationalism, the Ethics of Reason.

CHAPTER I.

HEDONISM, OR THE ETHICS OF SENSIBILITY.

I.—*Development of the Theory.*

1. (A) Pure Hedonism, or Cyrenaicism.—The earliest statement of the hedonistic view of life is also the most extreme. We owe it to Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school. He had learned from Socrates that the true wisdom of life lies in foresight or insight into the significance of our actions, in an accurate calculation of their results, pleasurable and painful, in the distant as well as in the immediate future. The chief and only good of life, then, seems to be pleasure. And all pleasures are alike in kind; they differ only in intensity or degree. Socrates had taught that the pleasures of the soul are preferable to those of the body; Aristippus finds the latter to be better, that is, more intense, than the former. He had also learned from Protagoras, the Sophist, that the sensation of the moment is the only object of knowledge; and his scepticism of the future, in comparison with the certainty of the present, led him to reject the Socratic principle of calculation. If the momentary experience is the only certain reality, then the calculating wisdom of Socrates, with its measuring-line laid to the fleeting moments, is not the true method of life. Rather ought we to make the most of each moment ere it passes; for, even while we have been calculating its value, it has escaped us,

and the moments do not return. Ought we not, then, with miser-like jealousy, to guard the interest of the moment, and take no thought for the morrow? Is not this the true economy of life? To sacrifice the present to the future, is unwarranted and perilous; the present is ours, the future may never be. The very fact that we are the children of time, and not of eternity, makes the claim of the present, even of the momentary present, imperious and supreme. To look before and after were to defeat the end of life, to miss that pleasure which is essentially a thing of the present. Not the Socratic prudence, therefore, but a careless surrender to present joys, is the true rule of life. We live only from moment to moment; let us live, then, in the moments, packing them full, ere yet they pass, with intensest gratification. A life of feeling, pure and simple, heedless and unthinking, undisturbed by reason,—such is the Cyrenaic ideal. It is a product of the sunny Pagan spirit, which has not yet felt 'the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world.' If such a creed is indeed founded in a deep scepticism, there is in this scepticism no pain or despair, but rather a calm and glad acceptance of the ethical limitations which it implies. Aristippus is glad to be rid of the Socratic concern for an eternal and ideal welfare in which he has ceased to believe. His is, indeed, a life without a horizon, a life which has shrunk within the compass of the momentary present, a life of pure sensibility, with no end to satisfy the reason. Yet it is a life that satisfies him. For is not the horizon apt to be dark and threatening, and to sadden with its lowering clouds the sunshine of the present? And what is reason but sensation after all?

Cyrenaicism could hardly be the creed of the modern Christian world. For us its counsels would be at best the counsels of despair rather than of hope. Reason could hardly in us be so utterly subjected to sensibility; such

scepticism would, at any rate, make us so 'sick and sorry' that we should lose that very joy in the present which the Cyrenaic reaped from his unconcern for the morrow. And yet the nineteenth century has witnessed several attempted revivals of the Cyrenaic ideal. Did not Byron and Heine, out of their sceptical doubt of any other meaning in life, use words like these? Was not their message to their fellows that to live is to feel, and that the measure of life's fulness is the intensity of its passion? And what else does 'æstheticism' mean than a recoil from an intellectual to a sentient ideal; is it fanciful to see in Pater's *Marius the Epicurean* a splendid attempt to rehabilitate the Cyrenaic view of life? Its closing words tell how perfectly its author has caught the echo of that ancient creed: "How goodly had the vision been! one long unfolding of beauty and energy in things, upon the closing of which he might gratefully utter his *Vixi*. . . . For still, in a shadowy world, his deeper wisdom had ever been, with a sense of economy, with a jealous estimate of gain and loss, to use life, not as a means to some problematic end, but, as far as might be, from dying hour to dying hour, an end in itself, a kind of music, all sufficing to the duly trained ear, even as it died out on the air."

And although it is only in the school of Aristippus that this pure form of the hedonistic creed has found its philosophic expression, it is a judgment of life which has again and again gained utterance for itself in literature. It is a mood of the human mind which must recur with every lapse into moral scepticism. Whenever life loses its meaning, or when that meaning shrinks to the experience of the present, when no enduring purpose or permanent value is found in this fleeting earthly life, when in it is discerned no whence or whither, but only a brief blind process, then the conclusion is drawn, with a fine logical perception, that the interests of the present

have a paramount claim, and that present enjoyment and unconcern is the only good in life. If, indeed,

“We are no other than a moving row
Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go
Round with the Sun-illumin'd Lantern held
In Midnight by the Master of the Show;”

if the movement of our life is from Nothing to Nothing, if, truly seen, that life is but

“A Moment's Halt—a momentary taste
Of Being from the Well amid the Waste—
And lo! the phantom caravan has reach'd
The Nothing it set out from,”—

then surely Omar's logic is irresistible :

“Some for the Glories of This World ; and some
Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come ;
Ah ! take the Cash, and let the Credit go,
Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum.

Come, fill the Cup, and in the fire of Spring
Your Winter-garment of Repentance fling :
The Bird of Time has but a little way
To fly—and lo ! the bird is on the wing.

I must abjure the Balm of life, I must,
Scared by some After-reckoning ta'en on trust,
Or lured with hope of some Diviner Drink,
To fill the Cup—when crumbled into Dust !

Oh threats of Hell and hopes of Paradise !
One thing at least is certain—*This* life flies ;
One thing is certain, and the rest is Lies :
The Flower that once has blown for ever dies.”¹

E

It is the logic of Horace as well as of Omar ; for though the Roman poet is rather an Epicurean than a Cyrenaic, yet he strikes the true Cyrenaic note again and again. Man is a creature of time ; why should he toil for an eternal life ? “Spring flowers keep not always the same

¹ *Rubáiyát*, of Omar Khayyám. Fitzgerald's trans.

charm, nor beams the ruddy moon with face unchanged; why harass with eternal designs a mind too weak to compass them?" "God in his providence shrouds in the darkness of night the issue of future time, and smiles if a mortal flutter to pierce further than he may. Be careful to regulate serenely what is present with you; all else is swept along in the fashion of the stream, which at one time, within the heart of its channel, peacefully glides down to the Tuscan sea; at another, whirls along worn stones and uprooted trees and flocks and houses all together, amid the roaring of the hills and neighbouring wood, whene'er a furious deluge chafes the quiet rills. He will live master of himself, and cheerful, who has the power to say from day to day, 'I have lived! to-morrow let the Sire overspread the sky either with cloudy gloom or with unsullied light; yet He will not render of no effect aught that lies behind, nor shape anew and make a thing not done, what once the flying hour has borne away.'"¹ All things change and pass away, nor has man himself any abiding destiny; his best wisdom is to clutch from the hands of Fate the flowers she offers, for they perish even as he thinks to gather them. This logic of Omar and of Horace is also the logic of Ecclesiastes. "Too much wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. . . . For what hath man of all his labour, and of all the vexation of his heart, wherein he hath laboured under the sun? . . . Then I commended mirth, because a man hath no better thing than to eat, and to drink, and to be merry; for that shall abide with him of his labour the days of his life which God giveth him under the sun."

When we compare the Eastern with the Western, the Persian and Hebraic with the Greek and Roman, expressions of the Cyrenaic principle, we cannot help feeling that, while the common basis of both is a profound moral scepticism, the loss of faith in any enduring end or sub-

¹ Horace, *Odes*, iii. 29 (Lonsdale and Lee's trans.)

stantial good in life, this scepticism has engendered in the one case a pessimistic mood which is hardly perceptible in the other. Omar and Ecclesiastes clutch at the delights of sense and time, the pleasure of the moment, as the only refuge from the moral despair which reflection breeds. The only cure for the ills of thought is a careless and unthinking *abandon* to the pleasures of the present. But always in the background of the mind, and, whenever reflection is reawakened, in the foreground too, is the sad and irresistible conviction that, for a rational being, such a merely sentient good is in strictness no good at all; that for a being whose very nature it is to look before and after, and to consider the total meaning of his life, such a preoccupation with the experience of the moment, as the only moral reality, must render life essentially unmeaning and not worth living. It is little wonder, therefore, that this moral scepticism soon became philosophically speechless. Even the Cyrenaics were unable to maintain their self-consistency in the statement of it. An ethic of pure sensibility, an absolute Hedonism, is impossible. A merely sentient good cannot be the good of a being who is rational as well as sentient; the true life of a reflective being cannot be unreflective. In order to construct an ideal, some reference to reason is necessary; even a successful sentient life implies the guidance and operation of thought. Accordingly we find even Aristippus admitting, in spite of himself, that prudence is essential to the attainment of happiness. A man must be master of himself, as a rider is master of his horse; he must be able to say of his pleasures that he is their possessor, not they his—*ἔχω, οὐκ ἔχονται*. Such self-mastery and self-possession is the work of reason, and a life which is not thus rationally ordered must soon be wrecked on the shoals of appetite and passion.

2. (B) **Modified Hedonism**: (a) **Ancient, or Epicureanism**.—This rehabilitation of the Socratic master-

virtue of prudence, suggested by the later Cyrenaics, is completed by the Epicureans, who, after the Platonic and Aristotelian insistence on the supreme claims of reason in the conduct of human life, find it impossible to conceive a good from which reason has been eliminated, or to which reason does not point the way. The end of life, they hold, is not the pleasure of the moment, but happiness, or a pleasant life. All that was necessary, to effect the transition from the Cyrenaic extreme to this moderate type of Hedonism, was to press to its logical development the Socratic principle that a truly happy, or consistently pleasant, life must be also a rational, reflective, and well-considered life. Even within the Cyrenaic school, we find an approach towards the moderate or Epicurean position. Theodorus, a later member of the school, holds that the end is not momentary pleasure, but a permanent state of gladness (*χαρά*); and Hegesias, still later, maintains that painlessness, reached through indifference to pain, rather than positive pleasure or enjoyment, is the attainable end of life. These suggestions were developed, through the reassertion of the Socratic principle of prudence, strengthened by the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine of the guiding function of reason in the life of a rational being, into the Epicurean system.

Epicurus fully recognises the indispensableness of reason in the conduct of life. The end is pleasure, but this end cannot be attained except under the guidance of reason; feeling would be but a blind and perilous guide to its own satisfaction. Reason is the handmaid of sensibility, and without the aid of the former the latter would be reduced to impotency. The task of life is discovered, and its accomplishment is tested, by sensibility; but the execution of the task is the work of reason. For it is reason alone that makes possible the most perfect gratification of feeling, eliminating the pain as far as possible, reducing the shocks and jars to

a minimum, and, where the pain is unavoidable, showing how it is the way to a larger and more enduring, a deeper and intenser, pleasure. The happiness of man is a subtler and more enduring satisfaction than that of which the animal, preoccupied with the feeling of the moment, is capable. Man's susceptibilities to pleasure and pain are so much keener and more varied, his horizon, as a rational being, is so much larger than the animal's, that the same interpretation will not serve for both lives. He cannot shut out the past and the future, and surrender himself, with careless limitation, to the momentary 'now.' It is the outlook, the horizon, the prospect and the retrospect, that give the tone to his present experience. He abides, though his experience changes; and his happiness must, just because it is his, be permanent and abiding as the self whose happiness it is. Atomic moments of pleasure cannot, therefore, be the good of man; that good must be a *life* of pleasure. An unorganised or chaotic life, at the beck and call of every stray desire, must be, to such a being as man, a life not of happiness but of misery; in virtue of his rational nature, he must organise his life, must build up its moments into the hours and days and years of a total experience. (While, therefore, the end or fundamental conception under which he must bring all his separate activities, the ultimate unifying principle of his life, is sentient satisfaction; while the ultimate term of human experience is not reason, but sensibility, and man's good is essentially identical with the animal's, —yet so different are the means to their accomplishment, so different is the conduct of the two lives, that the interests of clear thinking demand the emphatic assertion of the difference, no less than of the identity. "Wherefore," says Epicurus, "we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. From it is the commencement of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come back, and make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good

thing. And since pleasure is our first and native good for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but oftentimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And oftentimes we consider pains superior to pleasures, and submit to the pain for a long time, when it is attended for us with a greater pleasure. All pleasure, therefore, because of its kinship with our nature, is a good, but it is not in all cases our choice; even as every pain is an evil, though pain is not always, and in every case, to be shunned. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these things must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good." "It is not an unbroken succession of drinking feasts and of revelry, not the pleasures of sexual love, nor the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a splendid table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the reasons for every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which greatest tumults take possession of the soul. Of all this, the beginning, and the greatest good, is prudence. Wherefore, prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: from it grow all the other virtues,—for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice, nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them."¹

Deeper reflection upon the course of human affairs led the Epicureans, as it had led the Cyrenaics, to pessimism. The good, in the sense of positive pleasure, is not, they find, the lot of man; all that he may hope for is the negative pleasure that comes with the release from pain. "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain from the body and of trouble from the soul." And even this is not

¹ Letter of Epicurus (Wallace's *Epicureanism*, pp. 129-131).

always to be attained. If we would escape the pain of unsatisfied desire, we must reduce our desires. Fortune is to be feared, even when bringing gifts; for she is capricious, and may at any moment withhold her gifts. Let us give as few hostages to Fortune, then, as we can; let us assert our independence of her, and, in our own self-sufficiency, become indifferent to her fickle moods. Let us return, as far as may be, to the 'state of nature,' since nature's wants are few. "Of desires some are natural, and some are groundless; and of the natural, some are necessary as well as natural, and some are natural only. And of the necessary desires, some are necessary if we are to be happy, and some if the body is to remain unperturbed, and some if we are even to live. By the clear and certain understanding of these things we learn to make every preference and aversion, so that the body may have health and the soul tranquillity, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear; and when once we have attained this, all the tempest of the soul is laid, seeing that the living creature has not to go to find something that is wanting, or to seek something else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we need pleasure, is when we are grieved because of the absence of pleasure; but when we feel no pain, then we no longer stand in need of pleasure."¹

—The great maxim of the Epicurean life is, therefore, like that of the Stoic, that we cultivate a temper of indifference to pleasure and pain, such a tranquillity of soul (*ἀραπαξία*) as no assault of Fortune can avail to disturb, such an inner peace of spirit as shall make us independent of Fortune's freaks. For the Epicureans have lost the Socratic faith in a divine Providence, the counterpart of human prudence, which secures that a well-planned life shall be successful in attaining its goal of pleasure. Their gods have retired from the world, and become careless of

¹ Letter of Epicurus, *loc. cit.*

human affairs. The true wisdom, then, is to break the bonds that link our destiny with the world's, and to assert our independence of Fate. Through moderation of desire and tranquillity of soul, we become masters of our own destiny, and learn that our true good is to be sought within rather than without. It is our fear of external evil or calamity, not calamity itself, that is the chief source of pain. Let us cease to fear that which in itself is not terrible. Even death, the greatest of so-called evils, the worst of all the blows which Fortune can inflict upon us, is an evil only to him who fears it; even to it we can become indifferent. "Accustom thyself in the belief that death is nothing to us; for good and evil are only where they are felt, and death is the absence of all feeling; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes enjoyable the mortality of life, not by adding to years an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. For in life there can be nothing to fear to him who has thoroughly apprehended that there is nothing to cause fear in what time we are not alive. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present causes only a groundless pain by the expectation thereof. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us; seeing that when we are, death is not yet, and when death comes, then we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or the dead; for it is not found with the living, and the dead exist no longer."¹

Of this Epicurean ideal we could not have a better picture than that which Horace gives in the Seventh Satire of the Second Book: "Who, then, is free? He who is wise, over himself true lord, unterrified by want and death and bonds, who can his passions stem, and glory scorn: in himself complete, like a sphere, perfectly

¹ Letter of Epicurus, *loc. cit.*

round; so that no external object can rest on the polished surface: against such a one Fortune's assault is broken." It is an ideal of rational self-control, of deliverance from the storms of passion through the peace-speaking voice of reason. The state of sensibility is still the ethical end and criterion; but all the attention is directed to the means by which that end may be compassed, and the means are not sentient but rational. Nay, the end itself, as we have just seen, is rather a state of indifference, of neutral feeling, of insensibility, than a positive state of feeling at all.

3. (b) **Modern Hedonism** differs widely from ancient, English from Greek. If we take Mill as the representative of the modern doctrine, perhaps the differences may be said to resolve themselves, in the last analysis, into three.

(1) Ancient Hedonism, whether of the Cyrenaic or of the Epicurean type, was apt to be pessimistic; modern Hedonism is, on the whole, optimistic.¹ While the Greek moralists found themselves forced to conceive the end rather as escape from pain than as positive pleasure, their successors in England (as well as recently in Germany) have no hesitation in returning to the original Cyrenaic conception of the end as real enjoyment, as not merely the absence of pain, but the presence of pleasure. Mill, it is true, in a significant admission, made almost incidentally, in the course of his main argument, seems on the point of striking once more the old pessimistic note. "Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet, so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue to be found in man. I will add, that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be,

¹ The pessimistic tendency has of late, to a certain extent, reasserted itself.

the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realising such happiness as is attainable. For nothing except that consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue him; which, once felt, frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life, and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquillity the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their inevitable end."¹ But Mill is delivered from pessimism by his firm conviction that the condition of the world is changing for the better, and that in the end the course of virtue must 'run smooth.' The source of this confidence, in Mill and his successors, is not the rehabilitation of the old Socratic faith in a divine Providence; another ground of confidence is found in the new insight into the course of things, which science has brought to man. Knowledge is power, and the might of virtue lies in the fact that it has nature on its side. The principle of evolution, it is maintained, shows us that goodness does not work against nature, but rather assists nature in her work. Hedonism, therefore, finds a new basis in Evolutionism, and puts forward the new claim of being the only scientific interpretation of morality. Yet we find the most brilliant Evolutionist of our time maintaining that the ethical process and the cosmical process are fundamentally antagonistic,² and one of the ablest of living Evolutionary Hedonists admitting that "the attempt to establish an absolute coincidence between virtue and happiness is in ethics what the attempting to square the circle or to discover perpetual motion is in geometry and mechanics."³

¹ *Utilitarianism*, ch. ii.

² Huxley, Romanes Lecture, *Evolution and Ethics*.

³ Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 430.

(2) The standpoint of ancient Hedonism was that of the individual, the standpoint of modern is that of society or mankind in general, or even, as with Mill, of the entire sentient creation. While ancient Hedonism was egoistic, the modern is altruistic or universalistic. 'The greatest happiness of the greatest number' has taken the place of the greatest happiness of the individual; the scope of the end has been extended beyond the conception of its ancient advocates. The 'wise man' of the Epicurean school was wise for his own interests; his chief virtues were self-sufficiency and self-dependence. It is true that the Epicurean society was held together by the practice, on a fine scale, of the virtue of friendship, and that its members lived, in many respects, a common life; but the theoretic ground of such altruistic conduct was found in its conduciveness to the happiness of the individual. The modern Hedonist, realising this defect, and the necessity of differentiating his expanded theory of the end from the narrow conception of the elder school, has invented a new name to express this difference—namely, 'Utilitarianism.' The new conception has been only gradually reached, however; there is an interesting bridge between the old egoistic form of Hedonism and the new altruistic or utilitarian version of it, in the philosophy of Paley. To this 'lawyer-like mind' it seemed that we ought to seek "the happiness of mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." The happiness of mankind, he holds, is the 'subject' or content of morality, but 'everlasting happiness'—our own, of course—is the 'motive.' The ultimate end is our own individual happiness, and the happiness of others is to be sought merely as a means to that end. It is to Hume, Bentham, and Mill that we owe the substitution of the general happiness for that of the individual, as

the end of life. According to each of these writers the true standpoint is that of society, not that of the individual: from the social standpoint alone can we estimate aright the claims either of our own happiness or of the happiness of others. Mill's statement is the most adequate on this important point. "The utilitarian standard," he says, is "not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether." The end, thus conceived, yields the true principle of the distribution of happiness. "As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality."¹

But a new question is thus raised for the Hedonist—namely, how to reconcile the happiness of all with the happiness of each, or altruism with egoism. "Why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?" Mill answers that there are two kinds of sanction for altruistic conduct, external and internal. Both had been recognised by his predecessors. Bentham mentions four sanctions, all external—viz., the physical, the political, the moral or popular, and the religious. All four are forces brought to bear upon the individual from without; and their common object is to produce an identity, or at least a community, of interest between the individual and society, in such wise that he shall 'find his account' in living conformably to the claims of the general happiness. But such external sanctions, alone, would provide only a secondary and indirect vindication of altruistic conduct. The individual whose life was governed by such con-

¹ *Utilitarianism*, ch. ii.

straints, would still be, in character and inner motive, if not in outward act, an egoist: his end would still be egoistic, though it was attained by altruistic means. To the external sanctions must, therefore, be added the internal sanction which Hume and Mill alike describe as a "feeling for the happiness of mankind," a "basis of powerful natural sentiment for utilitarian morality," a feeling of "regard to the pleasures and pains of others," which, if not "innate" or fully developed from the first, is none the less "natural." "This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilisation."¹

(3) The third characteristic feature of modern Hedonism, as contrasted with ancient, is the new interpretation which it offers of the gradation of pleasures. It is Mill's chief innovation that he introduces a distinction of quality, in addition to the old distinction of quantity. The end thus receives, in addition to its new extension, a new refinement. The Epicureans had emphasised the distinction between the pleasures of the body and those of the mind, and had unhesitatingly awarded the superiority to the latter, on the ground of their greater durability and their comparative freedom from painful consequences; but they had not maintained the intrinsic preferableness of the mental pleasures. To Paley and Bentham, as well as to the Epicureans, all pleasures are still essentially, or in kind, the same. "I hold," says Paley, "that pleasures differ in nothing, but in continuance and intensity."² Bentham holds that, besides intensity and duration, the elements of 'certainty,' 'propinquity,' 'fecundity' (the likelihood of their being followed by other pleasures), and 'purity' (the unlikelihood of their being followed by

¹ Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ch. iii.

² *Moral and Political Philosophy*, bk. i. ch. vi.

pain), must enter as elements into the 'hedonistic calculus.'¹ Such were the interpretations of the distinction prior to Mill: the distinction was emphasised, but it was explained in the end as a distinction of quantity, not of quality. Mill holds that the distinction of quality is independent of that of quantity, and that the qualitative distinction is as real and legitimate as the quantitative. "There is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanence, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former—that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact that some *kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone."²

X As to the criterion of quality in pleasures, or "what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer." That answer is the one which Plato gave long ago, the answer of the wisest and most competent experience. "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both, give a decided preference, irrespective of any feel-

¹ Bentham adds 'extent,' or "the number of persons to whom it extends."—*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. iv. § 4.

² *Utilitarianism*, ch. ii.

ing of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any amount of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, or the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. . . . We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness, . . . but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them."¹ This higher nature, with its higher demand of happiness, carries with it inevitably a certain discontent. Yet "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied

¹ Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ch. ii.

than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." ¹

4. (c) Evolutional Utilitarianism.—Not the least important modern modification of the hedonistic theory is its affiliation to an evolutionary view of morality. The current form of Hedonism is Evolutional Utilitarianism. The reform in ethical method which the evolutionary moralists seek to introduce is, in words, the same as Kant's reform of metaphysics, namely, to make it 'scientific.' Apply the principle of evolution to the phenomena of moral life, as it has already been applied to the phenomena of physical life, and the former, equally with the latter, will fall into order and system. Morality, like nature, has evolved; and neither can be understood except in the light of its evolution. Nay, the evolution of morality is part and parcel of the general evolution of nature, its crowning achievement, but of the same essential nature. In the successful application of his theory to moral life, therefore, the Evolutionist sees the satisfaction of his highest ambition; for it is here that the critical point is reached which shall decide whether or not his conception is potent to reduce all knowledge to unity. If morality offers no resistance to its application, its adequacy is once for all completely vindicated. Thus we are offered by the Evolutionists what Green called a 'natural science of morals': the ethical process is resolved into the cosmical process.

According to Herbert Spencer, morality is "that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution." Conduct is "the adjustment of acts to ends," and in the growing complexity and completeness of this adjustment consists its evolution. Things and actions are "good or bad according as they are well

Am. Soc. cit.

or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends," or "according as the adjustments of acts to ends are or are not efficient." And, ultimately, their goodness or badness is determined by the measure in which all minor ends are merged in the grand end of self and race-preservation. Thus "the ideal goal to the natural evolution of conduct" is at the same time "the ideal standard of conduct ethically considered." The universal end of conduct, therefore, is life—its preservation and development. But "in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a blessing and not a curse; we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful."

Looking at the inner side of morality, and seeking to trace "the genesis of the moral consciousness," Spencer finds its "essential trait" to be "the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings"; and "the general truth disclosed by the study of evolving conduct, sub-human and human," is that "for the better preservation of life, the primitive, simple, presentative feelings must be controlled by the later-evolved, compound, and representative feelings." Spencer mentions three controls of this kind—the political, the religious, and the social. These do not, however, severally or together, "constitute the moral control, but are only preparatory to it—are controls within which the moral control evolves." "The restraints properly distinguished as moral are unlike those restraints out of which they evolve, and with which they are long confounded, in this—they refer not to the extrinsic effects of actions, but to their intrinsic effects. The truly moral deterrent is . . . constituted . . . by a representation of the necessary natural results." Thus arises "the feeling of moral obligation," "the sentiment of duty." "It is an abstract sentiment generated in a manner analogous to that in which abstract ideas are generated." On reflection, we

observe that the common characteristic of the feelings which prompt to 'good' conduct is that "they are all complex, re-representative feelings, occupied with the future rather than the present. The idea of authoritativeness has, therefore, come to be connected with feelings having these traits."

There is, however, another element in the "abstract consciousness of duty"—viz., "the element of coerciveness." This Mr Spencer derives from the various forms of pre-moral restraint just mentioned. But, since the constant tendency of conduct is to free itself from these restraints, and to become self-dependent and truly moral, "the sense of duty or moral obligation [*i.e.*, as coercive] is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralisation increases. . . . While at first the motive contains an element of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform it." Thus "the doing of work, originally under the consciousness that it *ought* to be done, may eventually cease to have any such accompanying consciousness," and the right action will be done "with a simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it." Since the consciousness of obligation arises from the incomplete adaptation of the individual to the social conditions of his life, "with complete adaptation to the social state, that element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation will disappear. The higher actions required for the harmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course as are those lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations."¹

For the conflict between the interests of society and those of the individual, which is the source of the feeling of obligation as coercive, is not absolute and permanent.

¹ *Principles of Ethics*, vol. i. pp. 127-129.

A "conciliation" of these interests is possible. Egoism and altruism both have their rights. When we study the history of evolving life, we find that "self-sacrifice is no less primordial than self-preservation," and that, throughout, "altruism has been evolving simultaneously with egoism." "From the dawn of life egoism has been dependent upon altruism, as altruism has been dependent upon egoism; and in the course of evolution the reciprocal services of the two have been increasing." Thus "pure egoism and pure altruism are both illegitimate"; and "in the progressing ideas and usages of mankind a compromise between egoism and altruism has been slowly establishing itself." Nay, a "conciliation has been, and is, taking place between the interests of each citizen and the interests of citizens at large; tending ever towards a state in which the two become merged in one, and in which the feelings answering to them respectively fall into complete concord." Thus "altruism of a social kind . . . may be expected to attain a level at which it will be like parental altruism in spontaneity—a level such that ministration to others' happiness will become a daily need." This consummation will be brought about by the same agency which has effected the present partial conciliation, namely, sympathy, "which must advance as fast as conditions permit." During the earlier stages of the evolution sympathy is largely painful, on account of the existence of "much non-adaptation and much consequent unhappiness." "Gradually, then, and only gradually, as these various causes of unhappiness become less, can sympathy become greater. . . . But as the moulding and remoulding of man and society into mutual fitness progresses, and as the pains caused by unfitness decrease, sympathy can increase in presence of the pleasures that come from fitness. The two changes are, indeed, so related that each furthers the other." And the goal of evolution can only be perfect identity of interests, and the consciousness of that identity.

One favourite conception of the evolutionary school is not found in Spencer's statement of the theory, that of the 'social organism.' Leslie Stephen has used this idea with special skill in his *Science of Ethics*. Scientific utilitarianism, he insists, must rest upon a deeper view of society and of its relation to the individual. The old utilitarianism conceived society as a mere aggregate of individuals. The utilitarian was still an individualist; though he spoke of 'the greatest number' of individuals, the individual was still his unit. Now, according to Stephen, the true unit is not the individual, but society, which is not a mere aggregate of individuals, but an organism, of which the individual is a member. "Society may be regarded as an organism, implying . . . a social tissue, modified in various ways so as to form the organs adapted to various specific purposes." Further, the social organism and the underlying social tissue are to be regarded as evolving. The social tissue is being gradually modified so as to form organs ever more perfectly adapted to fulfil the various functions of the organism as a whole; and the goal of the movement is the evolution of the social "type"—that is, of that form of society which represents maximum efficiency of the given means to the given end of social life. In short, we may say that the problem which is receiving its gradual solution in the evolution of society is the production of a "social tissue," or fundamental structure, the most "vitally efficient."

In describing the ethical end, therefore, we must substitute for "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" of individuals, the "health" of the social organism, or, still more accurately, of the social tissue. The true utility is not the external utility of consequences. Life is not "a series of detached acts, in each of which a man can calculate the sum of happiness or misery attainable by different courses." It is an organic growth; and the results of any given action are fully appreciated, only when

the action is regarded, not as affecting its temporary 'state,' but as entering into and modifying the very substance of its fundamental structure. The scientific criterion, therefore, is not happiness, but health. "We obtain unity of principle when we consider, not the various external relations, but the internal condition of the organism. . . . We only get a tenable and simple law when we start from the structure, which is itself a unit." Nor are the two criteria—health and happiness—"really divergent; on the contrary, they necessarily tend to coincide." The general correlation of the painful and the pernicious, the pleasurable and the beneficial, is obvious. "The 'useful,' in the sense of pleasure-giving, must approximately coincide with the 'useful' in the sense of life-preserving. . . . We must suppose that pain and pleasure are the correlatives of certain states which may be roughly regarded as the smooth and the distracted working of the physical machinery, and that, given those states, the sensations must always be present." And in the evolution of society we can trace the gradual approximation to coincidence of these two senses of utility.

Objectively considered, then, moral laws may be identified with the conditions of social vitality, and morality may be called "the sum of the preservative instincts of a society." That these laws should be perceived with increasing clearness as the evolution proceeds, is a corollary of the theory of evolution; as the social type is gradually elaborated, the conditions of its realisation will be more clearly perceived. Thus we reach the true interpretation of the subjective side of morality. Corresponding to social welfare or health, the objective end, there is, in the member of society, a social instinct, or sympathy with that welfare or health. This, it is insisted, is the true account of conscience. "Moral approval is the name of the sentiment developed through the social medium, which modifies a man's character in such a way as to fit him to be an efficient member of the social

tissue. It is the spiritual pressure which generates and maintains morality," the representative and spokesman of morality in the individual consciousness. "The conscience is the utterance of the public spirit of the race, ordering us to fulfil the primary conditions of its welfare." The old opposition between the individual and society is fundamentally erroneous, depending as it does upon the inadequate mechanical conception of society already referred to. "The difference between the sympathetic and the non-sympathetic feelings is a difference in their law or in the fundamental axiom which they embody." "The sympathetic being becomes, in virtue of his sympathies, a constituent part of a larger organisation. He is no more intelligible by himself alone than the limb is in all its properties intelligible without reference to the body." Just as "we can only obtain the law of the action of the several limbs" when we take the whole body into account, so with the feelings of "the being who has become part of the social organism. . . . Though feelings of the individual, their law can only be determined by reference to the general social conditions." As a member of society, and not a mere individual, man cannot but be sympathetic. The growth of society implies, as its correlate, the growth of the social sentiment in its members; and, in accordance with the law of Natural Selection, this sentiment, as pre-eminently useful to the social organism, will be developed—at once extended and enlightened. "Every extension of reasoning power implies a wider and closer identification of self with others, and therefore a greater tendency to merge the prudential in the social axiom as a first principle of conduct." Thus what is generated in the course of evolution is not merely a type of conduct, but a type of character;² not merely altruistic conduct, but "the elaboration and regulation of the sympathetic character which takes place through the social factor." We can trace the gradual progress from the external to the internal form of mor-

ality, from the law 'Do this,' to the law 'Be this.' We see how approval of a certain type of conduct develops into "approval of a certain type of character, the existence of which fits the individual for membership of a thoroughly efficient and healthy social tissue."

5. (d) **Rational Utilitarianism.**—Hedonism is the Ethics of Sensibility, and we have traced how thinker after thinker of this school, each availing himself of the new insight unavailable to his predecessors, has striven to solve the ethical problem in terms of feeling; to interpret the good, whether our own or that of others, as, in the last analysis, a sentient rather than a rational or intellectual good. In particular, we have watched the gradual solution of the problem of the relation of the good of the individual to the good of others, the problem of egoism and altruism. We have seen Mill reconciling these two goods, or rather resolving them into one, through the 'feeling of unity with our fellow-men,' a sympathy which identifies their good with our own, and which all the influences of advancing civilisation and moral education are tending to foster and develop. We have seen the Evolutionists relying upon the same agency of sympathetic feeling for the accomplishment of the desired reconciliation, and invoking the law of evolution and the conception of the social organism in behalf of their prediction of an ultimate harmony of the interests of all with the interests of each. Now Henry Sidgwick, coming to the solution of the problem as it is thus handed to him, or rather as it is handed to him by Mill (for he does not attach any importance to the evolutionary solution of it), concludes that, as a problem of mere feeling, it is insoluble, and that the only possible solution of it is a rational solution. His endeavour, therefore, is to establish the rationality of Utilitarianism, and thus to provide its needed 'proof.' That proof is not, as had been held, psychological, but logical; and he sets

himself, as he says, to discover "the rational basis that I had long perceived to be wanting to the Utilitarianism of Bentham [and of Mill] regarded as an ethical doctrine." The resulting theory he calls 'rational Utilitarianism.'

Agreeing with the hedonistic interpretation of the end as a sentient good or a good of feeling, Sidgwick finds it necessary to appeal to reason for the *regulative* principles—the principles of the *distribution* of this good. (1) Without passing beyond the circle of the individual life, we find it necessary to employ a rational principle in the choice of sentient satisfaction. The bridge on which we pass from pure to modified Hedonism, from Cyrenaicism to Epicureanism, from the irresponsible enjoyment of the moment to a well-planned and successful life of pleasure, from pleasure to happiness, is a bridge of reason, not of feeling. To feeling, the present moment's claim to satisfaction is paramount—its claim is *felt* more imperatively than that of any other; it is to the eye of thought alone that the true perspective of the moments and of their capacities of pleasure is revealed. When we reflect or think, we see that the good is not a thing of the passing moments, but of the total life;] reason carries us, as feeling never could, past a regard for our "momentary good" to a regard for our "good on the whole." Feeling needs the instruction of reason—our self-love has to become a rational, as distinguished from a merely sentient love of self. Reason dictates an "impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life," an equal regard for the rights of all the moments, the future as well as the present, the remote as well as the near; teaches short-sighted feeling, with its eye filled with the present, that "Hereafter is to be regarded as much as Now," and that "a smaller present good is not to be preferred to a greater future good." When the Good is enjoyed—now or then, to-morrow or next year—is, or may be, to reason a matter of indifference, while to feeling it is almost everything; it is for reason to educate feeling, until feeling shares her

own perspective. This rational principle which guides us in the choice of our own good is Prudence.

But (2) the path of Prudence is not itself alone the path of duty. Even our own "good on the whole" is not, *ipso facto*, the same as the general good. Whence shall we derive the principle of the distribution of good when the good is the good of all, and not merely that of the individual? How construct the bridge that will span the interval between our own good and that of others, and correlate altruistic with egoistic conduct? For, once more, mere feeling does not constitute the bridge between egoism and altruism. The dualism of prudence and virtue, regard for our own good and regard for the good of others or the general good, remains for feeling irresolvable. Society never entirely annexes the individual; his good never absolutely coincides, in the sphere of sensibility, with its good. But reason solves the problem which is for feeling insoluble. The true proof of Utilitarianism, or altruistic Hedonism, is not psychological, but logical. When "the egoist offers the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is good, not only *for him*, but *absolutely*," he gives the ground needed for such a proof. For we can then point out to him, as a rational, if not as a sentient being, that *his* happiness cannot be a more important part of good, taken universally, than the equal happiness of any other person. And thus, starting with his own principle, he must accept the wider notion of universal happiness or pleasure, as representing the real end of reason, the absolutely good or desirable." To feeling it makes all the difference in the world, whether it is our own happiness or that of some one else that is in question; to reason this distinction also is, like the distinction of time, a matter of indifference. As, to the eye of reason, there is no essential difference between the near and the remote, but every moment of the individual life has its equal right to satisfaction, so is there no essential difference between *meum* and *tuum*, but each individual, as

equally a sentient being, has an equal right to consideration. "Here again, just as in the former case, by considering the relation of the integrant parts to the whole and to each other, we may obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any individual is of no more importance, as a part of universal good, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realised in the one case than in the other. And as rational beings, we are manifestly bound to aim at good generally, not merely at this or that part of it." That 'impartiality' which Bentham and Mill declared essential to utilitarian morality, in which 'each is to count for one, and no one for more than one,' is the impartiality of reason, to which mere feeling could never attain. This rational principle, which alone can guide us in the distribution of happiness between ourselves and others, is "the abstract principle of the duty of Benevolence." To Prudence must be added Benevolence.

And (3) in order to a perfectly rational distribution of happiness, whether among the competing moments of the individual life or among competing individuals, yet a third principle of reason must be invoked. Whether we are considering the sum-total of our own happiness or of the general happiness, we find that the constituent parts have *not* all an equal importance. Some moments in the individual life are more important than others, because they have a larger or a peculiar capacity for pleasure; and some individuals are more important than others, because they too have a larger or a peculiar capacity for pleasure. Neither in the individual nor in the social sphere is there a dead level of absolute equality; there are rational grounds for recognising inequality in both. Accordingly, if the maximum of happiness is to be realised, the strict literal 'impartiality' of the principles of Prudence and Benevolence must be enlightened by the better insight of a higher Justice which, with its

yet stricter scrutiny and more perfect impartiality, shall recognise the true claim and the varying importance of each moment and of each individual. It is, indeed, rather a principle of equity than of justice, a 'Lesbian rule' which adapts itself to the inequalities and variations of that living experience which it measures. As such, it is the true and ultimate economic principle of Hedonism. Instead of depressing the maximum to a rigid average, by distributing the 'greatest happiness' equally among the 'greatest number' of moments or of individuals, the principle of Justice directs us to aim at the greatest total happiness, or the greatest happiness 'on the whole,' whether in our own experience or in that of the race.

II.—*Critical Estimate of Hedonism.*

6. (a) Its psychological inadequacy.—The formal merits of Hedonism as a scientific theory of morals are of the highest order. It is a bold and skilfully executed effort to satisfy the scientific demand for unity. It offers a clear and definite conception of the end of life, a unifying principle under which its most diverse elements are capable of being brought, and under which they receive at least a very plausible interpretation. It connects duty with the Good, and sees in the several moral laws the means to the realisation of one supreme end. It acknowledges the growth and change which have characterised the course of moral life and thought. It recognises the fact that morality is an evolution, and has a history; and it offers a *rationale* of this history, a theory of this evolution. Nor does it fall into the fallacy of reading its own scientific theory into the ordinary naïve moral consciousness of mankind. The dominating tendency of the entire ethical movement, it insists, is utilitarian and hedonistic; but this tendency is present unconsciously and implicitly more often than

consciously and explicitly. Until we reflect, we may not realise that the end which we seek in all our actions is pleasure; but let us once reflect, and we cannot fail to detect its constant presence and operation. And when we follow the history of the theory, from its ancient beginnings in Cyrenaicism to its classical development in Epicureanism, from the indirect egoism of Paley to the essential altruism of Bentham and Mill, and the Evolutionism of Spencer and his school, we must admire not only the strenuous perseverance with which the old formula has been stretched again and again so as to accommodate higher, and hitherto unconsidered, aspects of the ethical problem, but also the skill and open-mindedness, the sense of moral reality, the vitality of thought, which have enabled the theory to adapt itself so readily and so naturally to new moral and intellectual conditions.

A peculiar and, to a certain extent, an unwarranted plausibility has, however, accrued to the theory from its appropriation of the term 'happiness' to express its conception of the ethical end. We hear the theory as often called 'Eudæmonism' as 'Hedonism,'—the happiness-theory as the pleasure-theory. It would conduce to clearness of thought if these terms were kept apart. For, as Aristotle says, we are all agreed in describing the end as happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), but we differ as to the definition of happiness. Pleasure (*ἡδονή*) is one among other interpretations of happiness; and, though it may be the most usual, its justice and adequacy must be considered and vindicated, like those of any other interpretation. Happiness is, in itself, merely equivalent to well-being or welfare; and the nature of this may be described in other terms, as well as in those of pleasure. Pleasure is sentient welfare, welfare of sensibility; but there is also intellectual welfare, and that welfare of the will or total active self which is rather well-doing than well-being (*εἰς ζῆν καὶ εἰς πράττειν*). The welfare or happiness may be that of the sentient, or of the intellectual,

or of the total self, sentient and intellectual, in action. No doubt, pleasure, or the happiness of the sentient self, is the only term we have to describe the content of happiness. It is also true that all welfare has a sentient side, or that the Good is pleasant, even though pleasure may not be the Good. But to exclude the possibility of any other interpretation by identifying happiness and pleasure at the outset, and using these terms interchangeably throughout the discussion, is, it seems to me, to employ a 'question-begging epithet.' The thesis, of which Hedonism ought to be the demonstration, is that happiness, or the Good, consists in sentient satisfaction. Realising this to be the true state of the argument, we may now proceed to consider the legitimacy and adequacy of the hedonistic interpretation of happiness. There need be the less hesitation in styling the theory in question the 'pleasure-theory,' rather than, more vaguely if more plausibly, the 'happiness-theory,' since the Epicureans of old, almost as eagerly as Mill and his successors in our own time, have maintained the claims of the term 'pleasure' to the highest sentient connotation. The real question at issue, let us understand, is the legitimacy of the limitation of the conception of happiness or the Good to the sphere of sensibility.

Now, the fundamental inadequacy of Hedonism, already suggested in the above remarks, is a psychological one. The hedonistic theory of life is based upon a one-sided theory of human nature. Man is regarded as, fundamentally and essentially, a sentient being, a creature of sensibility; and therefore the end of his life is conceived in terms of sensibility, or as sentient satisfaction. Now, there is no doubt that sensibility is a large and important element in human life; the question is, whether it is the ultimate and characteristic element. This question must, I think, be answered in the negative. Man is so constituted as to be susceptible to pleasure and pain, and he might conceivably make this susceptibility the sole guide

of his life. That he cannot do so consistently with his nature, is due to the fact that he is also so constituted as to regulate his feelings by reference not only to one another, but to the rational nature which belongs to his humanity and differentiates him from the animal creation. In the animal life, pleasure and pain are the 'sovereign masters'; in man's, they are subjected to the higher sovereignty of reason. If pleasure is the supreme good, it must be the expression, not merely of feeling, but of all the elements of human nature; it must satisfy the nature which these elements, in their unity and totality, constitute, and must satisfy that nature in its unity and totality. But pleasure, or sentient satisfaction, is not a category adequate to the interpretation of the life of such a being as man. The hedonistic theory of life purchases its simplicity and lucidity at the expense of depth and comprehensiveness of view. Its formula is too simple. Its end is abstract and one-sided, the exponent of the life of feeling merely; the true end must be the exponent of the rational, as well as of the sentient self. It may be difficult to describe such an end; but the difficulty of the ethical task is the inevitable result of the complexity of man's nature. The very clearness and simplicity of Hedonism is, in this sense, its condemnation. It is doubtless gratifying to the logical sense to see the whole of our complex human life reduced to the simple terms of sensibility. But the true principle of unity must take fuller account of the complexity of the problem; insight must not be sacrificed to system—the true system will be the result of the deepest insight. *Festina lente* is the watchword in ethics as in metaphysics; the true thinker, in either sphere, will not make haste. And if Plato was right when he said that the good life is a harmony of diverse elements, he was also right when he said that the key to this harmony is to be found rather in reason than in sensibility. To a psychologist who, like Mill and Bain, or like the ancient Cyrenaics, resolves

our entire experience into feeling or sensibility, such a criticism would not, of course, appeal. He would disallow the distinction between reason and sensibility, and maintain that the former differs from the latter only in respect of its greater complexity, that reason, so-called, is but the complex product of associated feelings. Hedonism in ethics is the logical correlate of Sensationalism in psychology. But, short of such a psychological demonstration, the Aristotelian argument holds, that the end of any being must be in accordance with its peculiar nature; and, since sensibility assimilates man to the animals, and reason differentiates him from them, his true well-being must be found in a rationally guided life, rather than in a life whose sole guide and sovereign master is sensibility.

Hedonism rests upon the psychological confusion, already considered,¹ between the dynamical and the teleological aspects of choice. The good choice, or the choice of the Good, is, like all choices (including the choice of the bad), pleasant; nay, it is the most pleasant choice. In other words, the Good is pleasant. But it does not follow that it is pleasure. The question of ethics is not: What pleases? but, What ought to please? In what activities may I, as a human being, rightly take pleasure?

Hedonism, looking only at the sentient subject, fails to reach the objective content of the Good. To reach the objective side of choice, it is not necessary to deny that pleasure enters into our choice of the Good. Pleasure is its inevitable subjective side; to choose is to find our pleasure in that which we choose. A pleasureless or passionless choice is a contradiction in terms. But the question of the objective content or the 'What' of choice, remains open for discussion, unprejudiced by the fact of the pleasantness of the act of choice itself. The ethical question is: What is the true or rightful place of pleasure in choice?

Sidgwick, however, after denying that pleasure is

¹ Introd., ch. iii. pp. 70 ff.

the actual object of choice, affirms that it is the only reasonable ground of choice. His 'ethical Hedonism' rests upon the denial of 'psychological Hedonism.' We do not choose pleasure; our choice is of objects, and 'terminates' in them. Yet the only rational vindication of such objective choices is to be found, he holds, in the pleasure which the pursuit or attainment of the object yields. The only criterion of ethical value is pleasure. Pleasure is the only thing desirable, though it is not the only object of desire; it is the only thing worth choosing, though it is not the only thing chosen. Although he is perfectly aware of the objective as well as of the subjective side of choice, he maintains that the objective side has no value in itself, but only in relation to the subjective; that the value of objects consists in their 'felicific' possibilities. "Admitting that we have actual experience of such preferences as have just been described, of which the ultimate object is something that is not merely consciousness, it still seems to me that when . . . we 'sit down in a cool hour,' we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of sentient beings."¹ It is true that "several cultivated people do habitually judge that knowledge, art, etc., . . . are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them." Yet, even "these elements of 'ideal good'"—these objects of enthusiastic pursuit—derive their real value from the pleasure to which they minister. The pursuit of such ideal objects as truth, freedom, beauty, &c., *for their own sakes*, "is indirectly and secondarily, though not primarily and absolutely, rational; on account not only of the happiness that will result from their attainment, but also of that which springs from their disinterested pursuit. While yet, if we ask for a final criterion of the comparative value of the different objects of men's

¹ *Methods of Ethics*, bk. iii. ch. xiv. § 5 (6th ed.)

enthusiastic pursuit, . . . we shall none the less conceive it to depend upon the degree in which they respectively conduce to happiness.”¹

Is this a fair and satisfactory interpretation of such appreciations? Is pleasure the only thing that we regard as having value in itself, as, in itself, worth attaining? Sidgwick finds the argument for Hedonism in “the results of a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgments of mankind:” his method is always the interrogation of the uncorrupted moral common-sense. Moreover, he clearly states the idealistic alternative. Take the case of culture. “If the Hedonistic view of culture, as consisting in the development of susceptibilities for refined pleasure of various kinds, be rejected, it must be in favour of what I have called the Idealistic view: in which we regard the ideal objects on the realisation of which our most refined pleasures depend,—knowledge, or beauty in its different forms, or a certain ideal of human relations (whether thought of as freedom or otherwise)—as constituting in themselves ultimate Good, apart from the pleasures which depend upon their pursuit and attainment.”² His decision between these alternative views is that our interest in culture is ultimately an interest in pleasure; such ‘ideal goods’ “seem to obtain the commendation of common sense, roughly speaking, in proportion to the degree” of their hedonistic productiveness. Is it not strange to find such a thinker as Sidgwick agreeing with the practical man’s utilitarian and practical estimate of knowledge? It is not the practical man, but the student, who is the rightful judge of the value of knowledge. It is true that “the meed of honour commonly paid to science seems to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale,” and that “the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific inquiry is seriously disputed, as in the recent

¹ *Op. cit.* bk. iii. ch. xiv. § 5 (6th.ed.) ² *Mind*, O.S., vol. ii. p. 34.

case of vivisection, the controversy on both sides is generally conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis.' ¹ But this popular and practical estimate of knowledge is not to be confused with the theoretical estimate of it by the intellectual man, who has surely more right to be heard on the question than the practical man whose interest and business lie elsewhere. The 'things of the mind' can be estimated aright only by men of mind, not by men of affairs; and the moral common-sense of the former class is no less entitled to a hearing than that of the latter. Similarly it is not the uncultured man and the Philistine who may rightfully adjudge the value of artistic products. As Plato would say, such men have not the experience which alone fits a man to judge of Good: these forms of good are not *their* good,—they may even be their 'bad.' One cannot help thinking that Sidgwick has fallen into the old fallacy which he has done so much to refute, namely, that because the good is *pleasant*, therefore it is *pleasure*; that because an object is not chosen, or regarded as good, unless it attracts or pleases, therefore it must be chosen for the sake of the pleasure, and its goodness must be identical with its pleasantness. But we have seen that the interests of life imply objects in which we are interested, as well as our interest or pleasure in such objects. The ethical question—the question of the criterion of Good or value—has to do with the content of the ideas which move us to action, of the purposes and intentions of which our actions are the execution. The question of ethics is: What are the

¹ *Methods of Ethics*, bk. iii. ch. xiv. § 5. Professor Bain's estimate of knowledge is no less frankly utilitarian, and is even more surprising as the judgment of a student. The value of knowledge is, like the value of money, merely instrumental; but, by association of ideas, it comes to be mistaken for an end in itself. "Like money, knowledge is liable to become an end in itself. Principally valuable as guidance in the various operations of life, as removing the stumbling-blocks, and the terrors of ignorance, it contracts in some minds an independent charm, and gathers round it so many pleasing associations as to be a satisfying end of pursuit." —*Mental and Moral Science*, bk. iv. ch. iv. § 3.

true interests? In what objects ought we to take pleasure? What is the Good?

Ethical value is essentially objective as well as subjective. The ethical universe is a scale of values, in which the possible interests are ranked as higher or lower, according to the objects in which they centre. The final aim of ethical reflection is the discovery of the true objective centre of interest, as the effort of the moral life itself is to make that centre our own. Morality is not the mere getting of pleasure. To be pleased is easy, is inevitable; but to be pleased "to the right extent and at the right time, and with the right objects, and in the right way, this is not what every one can do, and is by no means easy; and that is the reason why right doing is rare, and praiseworthy, and noble."¹ The objectivity of Good is no less essential than the objectivity of Truth. To make Truth subjective, to resolve the object of knowledge into the experience or consciousness of the knowing subject, were to destroy truth and knowledge. Knowledge implies the reality of its object: the criterion of truth is found in the object which I know, not in me, the knower. Intellectual subjectivity means intellectual scepticism, or the decentralisation of knowledge. And to make the Good subjective, to resolve the ethical object into the experience or consciousness of its subject, is, no less inevitably, to destroy the Good. Morality implies the reality of its object; the criterion of good must be found in some object not merely supremely interesting, but supremely worthy of interest. If we are to avoid moral scepticism, we must avoid ethical subjectivity, or the decentralisation of the Good.

To make the ethical centre objective and absolute, rather than subjective and relative, is not, of course, to divorce the Good from consciousness, as Sidgwick seems to think. It does not follow that, because nothing is good, as nothing is true, out of relation to conscious-

¹ Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.*, ii. 9 (2).

ness, therefore its goodness, or its truth, lies in the mere state of consciousness itself. Consciousness, whether intellectual or moral, is objective, as well as subjective, in its reference: it is essentially an attitude of the subject towards the object, of the ego towards the non-ego, of man towards the universe. And to know the Truth, and to attain the Good,—what is either but the taking of the right attitude towards Reality, the attitude dictated by Reality itself?

Sidgwick, it is true, reaches a certain objectivity of view by invoking the aid of reason as the guide to sentient or subjective satisfaction. But the function of reason is still merely regulative: it provides the distributive principles of a Good which is wholly constituted by feeling. Reason is still, in Hume's phrase, 'the slave of passion'; for it only discovers the path to the goal of sentient satisfaction, plans the execution of an end which is already determined by sensibility. To be truly objective, the Good must be rationally constituted, as well as rationally regulated: the content of the end must be the expression and exponent of reason. The essential inadequacy of Rational Hedonism is seen in the absence from its scheme of the distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures. After all, it provides merely a *maximum bonum*, 'the greatest amount of pleasure on the whole'; not a *summum bonum*, a system or hierarchy of goods, ranged according to their several degrees, according to the order of their excellence. Hedonism cannot interpret the qualitative, but only the quantitative, aspect of the Good. The only distinction it can establish is that between the 'greater' and the 'less'; it has no place for the 'higher' and the 'lower.' It points to the *greatest*, but not to the *highest* good. Even the Rational Hedonism of Sidgwick exhibits this inherent deficiency. Its regulative principles are prudence, benevolence, and justice,—all quantitative or 'economic' principles. But the true ethical alternative is always, as

Martineau insists, between the higher and the lower, not between the greater and the less. The ethical distinction is one of rank, rather than of amount; of *quale*, rather than of *quantum*. Mill alone among Hedonists, acknowledged this essential distinction; and he obviously failed to establish it upon a hedonistic basis.¹

The ethical function of reason is sovereign and legislative; and she refuses the office of a servant, however plausibly urged upon her. But Rational Hedonism still places sensibility in the seat of supreme honour and of solitary dignity, on the throne of the moral universe: pleasure is still the only end, the only thing absolutely worthy of choice, that for the sake of which everything should be done. That seat of sovereign dignity and authority belongs to reason, and she will take no lower. It is for her to constitute the true content of choice,—to determine the scale of ethical values, and to assign to the several pleasures of life their place in that scale.

7. (b) Failure of sensibility to provide the principle of its own organisation. — This leads us to remark that Hedonism, as an ethical theory, can never account for more than the raw material of morality; the form, or principle of arrangement, of this raw material must be found elsewhere. In other words, sensibility does not provide for its own organisation; the unifying principle of its 'mere manifold' must be found in a rational and not in a sentient principle. To adapt a Kantian phrase, we may say that if reason without feeling is empty, feeling without reason is blind. Feeling needs the illumination of reason, and this is not to be resolved into the mere illumination of consequences or experience. Insight, as well as foresight, is needed; and if foresight is the reward of experience, insight is the gift of reason. This is only to repeat what Plato and Aristotle, and even Socrates, said long ago—namely, that the ordering and guiding principle of human life is to be

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 124-127

found in 'right reason,' and that it is the place of feeling to submit itself to that higher guidance and control. Feeling is capricious, peculiar to the individual, clamant, chaotic; its life, unchecked by the control of rational insight and foresight, would be a chameleon-like life, a thing that owed its shape and colour to the moments as they passed. If the life of sensibility is to be unified or organised, it can only be through the presence and operation in it of rational principle.

This problem of the organisation of sensibility early forced itself upon the attention of hedonistic moralists. It was seen that the ordering of man's life is in his own hands, that the organisation of sensibility which is effected *for* the animal must be effected *by* man; and the question forced itself upon reflection, Whither must he look for guidance? Is feeling self-sufficient, or must the appeal be made from feeling to reason? The history of Hedonism reveals, as we have seen, a growing place for reason in the life of feeling. The significance of this appeal to reason in an ethic of sensibility seems not to have been clearly perceived by the Greek Hedonists, for we find the appeal made with all openness and confidence by the Epicurean school.¹ A successful life of feeling must be a thoughtful life; a life which shall attain the end of sentient existence must be a rationally conducted life, which plans and considers and is always master of itself: the supreme virtue is prudence. Modern Hedonists have been no less conscious of the necessity of solving the problem of the organisation of feeling. The Utilitarians especially have widened the problem so as to include the organisation of the social, as well as of the individual life. To the ancient virtue of prudence they have added the modern virtue of benevolence. The problem of organisation has thus become more clamant and more

¹ The function assigned to reason, however, is merely the discovery of the means to sentient satisfaction; so long as the end is determined by feeling alone, the hedonistic standpoint is not abandoned.

complex than ever. A rational solution of this problem, however, is found to be inconsistent with Hedonism, and to involve a surrender of the case for the adequacy of that theory of life. The attempt has been made, accordingly, in different ways, to reduce this apparently rational control of sensibility to a mere control of feeling by feeling. Let us consider the success of these efforts, in the case (1) of the individual, and (2) of the social life.

(1) One of the chief novelties of Mill's statement of the hedonistic ethics is his recognition of a qualitative, as well as a quantitative, difference between feelings. Feelings are, he insists, higher and lower, as well as more or less intense, enduring, etc.; they differ in rank as well as in strength. A new element is thus added to the definition of happiness. The pleasures of the mind are superior to those of the body, not merely because the former are enduring and fruitful in other pleasures, while the latter are evanescent and apt to carry with them painful consequences, but because the former are the pleasures of the higher, the latter those of the lower nature. Now, the plea for this distinction of quality stands or falls with the validity or invalidity of the reference to the *source* of the pleasures compared. But the invalidity of such a reference, from the standpoint of Hedonism, is perfectly obvious. If pleasure is the only Good, then pleasure itself is the only consideration; the source of the pleasure has no hedonistic significance, and ought not to enter into the hedonistic calculus. If Hedonism will be self-consistent, it must forego this reference to source, and, with it, the distinction of quality in pleasures.

Mill's appeal is, like Plato's, to those qualified, by their wide experience and their powers of introspection, to judge of the comparative value of pleasures. The thinker knows the pleasures of thought as well as the pleasures, say, of sport, while the sportsman knows only the latter class of pleasures, and not the former; the thinker's

preference for the pleasures of thought has, therefore, the authority of experience. The preference of the higher nature covers the case of the lower, but not *vice versa*. But, on the hedonistic theory, this claim to authority must be disallowed. The preference of the higher nature covers only the case of the higher nature, the case of those on the same plane of sensibility as itself. Its preference (and the deliverance founded upon it) cannot be authoritative for a lower nature, for a being on a different plane of sensibility. A 'lower' pleasure will be more intense to a 'lower' nature; and if pleasure be the only standard, we cannot be asked to give up a greater for a less pleasure, to sacrifice quantity to quality. Quality is an extra-hedonistic criterion; the only hedonistic criterion is quantity—"the intensity of each kind, as experienced by those to whom it is most intense." Indeed, the so-called difference of quality will be found to resolve itself (so far as pleasure is concerned) into a difference of quantity *for the higher nature*. To the higher nature, the higher pleasure is also the more intense pleasure; to the thinker, say, the pleasures of thought are more intense than those of sport. This greater intensity is the only hedonistic ground of the higher nature's preference for its own chosen pleasures. Upon the lower nature the lower pleasures have, *quod* pleasures, an equally rightful and irresistible claim; and upon such a nature the higher pleasures will have no claim, as pleasures, until for it too they have become more intense, or the means to a more intense pleasure. Only thus can they make good their superior claim at the bar of sensibility.

If we press Mill to assign the ultimate ground of this preference, and of the corresponding difference in kind between pleasures, he refers us to the "sense of dignity" which is natural to man, and which forms "an essential part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong." Socrates would rather be Socrates discontented than a

contented fool; he could not lower himself to the fool's status and the fool's satisfaction, without the keenest sense of dissatisfaction, and therefore of misery. But this sense of dignity cannot be resolved into desire of pleasure; and while it certainly regulates man's pleasures, and becomes an important condition of his happiness, it is itself the constant testimony to the possibility and the imperative-ness for man of a higher life than that of mere pleasure. It is the utterance of the rational self behind the self of sensibility, demanding a satisfaction worthy of it—the expression of its undying aspiration after a life which shall be the perfect realisation of its unique possibilities, and of its eternal and divine discontent with any life that falls short of this realisation of itself. Not the attainment of pleasure as such, but the finding of our pleasure in activities which are worthy of this higher and rational nature,—such is the end set before us by our peculiar human sense of dignity. This interpretation of the end does enable us to understand the intrinsic difference of pleasures, but only at the expense of surrendering Hedonism as a sufficient ethical theory. For it is not *as pleasures* that the pleasures are higher or lower. The clue to the distinction is found in their common relation to the one identical rational self; according as *it* is more or less fully satisfied, by being more or less fully realised, is the pleasure higher or lower. Otherwise, there is no such distinction. The dignity is the dignity of reason, not of feeling. So great is this dignity of reason that, in its presence, the claims of feeling seem to be hushed to utter silence; that, before its higher claim, the question of pleasure and pain, in all their infinite degrees, may even seem to be unheard. Are there not occasions at least when we seem called upon to take this heroic view of life, and, in our loyalty to an eternal principle of right, above all particular sentient selves and their pleasures and pains, to be content to sacrifice all our capacity for pleasure, it may be utterly and for ever?

Such an action can only be described as faithfulness to the true self, to the divine ideal of our manhood; and the fact of the possibility of such an action and of other actions which, though on a more ordinary plane, would yet be impossible but for the inspiration of such a spirit, proves that, though man is an individual subject of feeling—of passion so intense that it may seem at times to constitute his very life—he is something more, and, in virtue of that ‘something more,’ is capable of rising above himself, above his own little life of clamant sensibility, and viewing himself and his present activity *sub specie æternitatis*, in the clear light of eternal truth and right, as a member of a rational order of being, and subject to the law of that order. For such an estimate of life Hedonism, as the Ethics of Sensibility, cannot find a place.

Other hedonistic writers, recognising the impossibility of reconciling Mill’s doctrine of the intrinsic difference of pleasures with orthodox Hedonism, have attempted to find the clue to the organisation of sensibility outside, in the external sanctions already mentioned, in the pressure of society upon the individual. The seat of authority is, they hold, outside the individual, in the law of the land, in public opinion, and the like; not within, in the individual conscience: the inner authority is only the reflection of the outer. No doubt there is a great deal of truth in this, as a representation of the normal course of moral education. Until a moral being has learned to control himself, he must be controlled from without; until the moral order is developed within him, that order must be enforced upon him. But the progress of moral education brings us, sooner or later, to the stage at which the outer law, if it is to maintain its influence, must produce its ‘certificate of birth,’ or, in other words, must show that it is only the reflection of an inner order. The *rationale* of the external order, the ‘why’ of the social forces, must inevitably become a question. This solution, therefore, only pushes the problem a step further back.

The Evolutionists see that the external controls, the physical, social and religious, are really "pre-moral controls within which the moral control evolves,"—its scaffolding, to be taken down as soon as the structure is complete. The external pressure of environment must be superseded by an internal psychological pressure. This inner, and strictly moral, control is described by Spencer as the subjection of the earlier-evolved, simpler, and presentative feelings to the later-evolved, more complex, and representative. But why this subordination? Not simply because the one set of feelings occurs earlier and the other later in the evolution, but because the one class of feelings are more efficient factors in the evolution of conduct than the other. But how are we to judge of the value of the evolution itself? What is the ideal or type of conduct which it is desirable to evolve? Our old question recurs once more, therefore, in the new form: What is the criterion of ethical value by which we may define and determine moral evolution or progress? Whither moves the ethical process; what form of conduct do we judge to be worth evolving? Are the ethical process and the cosmical process the same, or even coincident? The fact that one of the most distinguished among recent representatives of scientific Evolutionism has found himself forced to deny both the identity and the coincidence, is striking proof that this is no capricious or imaginary question.¹ The fact of a certain order, and the fact of its gradual genesis or development in time, furnish no answer to the question of the *raison d'être* of the fact; here, as elsewhere, the answer to the *Quid Facti* is no answer to the *Quid Juris*.

I think we can now see that it is the sheer stress of logic that compelled Sidgwick to appeal from the bar of sensibility to that of reason for the lacking element of moral authority, for the organising principle of the ethical life. Even within the sphere of individual

¹ Cf. Huxley's Romanes Lecture on *Evolution and Ethics*.

experience, sensibility does not provide a principle which shall determine its own distribution. How to compass the attainment of the greatest happiness, not for the moment but on the whole, is a problem which feeling alone is unable to solve. Hedonism fails to reach the maximum, and, still more obviously, the *summum* of individual happiness. The material of the moral life may be furnished by sensibility, as the material of the intellectual life is furnished by sensation; but the form or principle of arrangement of this raw material, the unifying and organising principle, is, in the one case as in the other, the gift of reason.

(2) When we pass beyond the sphere of the individual life to that of society, we find the same *impasse* for Hedonism. If sensibility does not provide the principle of its own distribution within the individual life, still less does it provide the principle of its distribution between ourselves and others. If the life of prudence and individual duty cannot be reduced to terms of mere sensibility, still less can the life of justice and benevolence—the life of social duty; if the instruction of reason is necessary in the former case, it is even more obviously necessary in the latter. Mill has been generally interpreted as attempting to extend his psychological “proof” of Hedonism in general to Utilitarianism or altruistic Hedonism, arguing that, since each desires his own happiness, the general happiness is desired by all. All that Mill intends to prove, however, is that the aggregate or collective happiness is the object of aggregate or collective, not of individual, desire. He is not attempting the solution of the problem of altruistic duty; he seems to *assume* that the greatest happiness of the greatest number has greater value, inasmuch as it is greater, than that of the individual. That it has such a value, and therefore authority, for the individual, however, does not follow. For the deeper assumption of Hedonism is that for each individual his own happiness

is the supreme good. Indirectly and secondarily—that is, as the means to the attainment of his own happiness—the general happiness may become an end for the individual; and thus an altruism may be reached, which is merely a transfigured or mediate egoism, and benevolence may be provisionally vindicated as only a subtler and more refined selfishness. This, however, is not the altruism of Mill and the Utilitarian school. Their aim is to establish benevolence as the direct and substantive law of the moral life; as the first, and not the second commandment of a true ethical code. They offer the greatest happiness of the greatest number as itself the end, not a means to our own greatest happiness. But that the former is the end for the individual, or that the individual ought to subordinate his own to the general happiness, remains unproved.

On the other hand, Mill is conscious of the difficulty of the practical transition from egoism to altruism, and he looks to sensibility to effect this transition. We have a feeling for the happiness of others as well as for our own, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and Hume had already maintained; let us take our ground upon this psychological fact—this feeling of unity with our fellows, a mighty emotional force which must break down any barriers of mere logic. To this disinterested sympathy we may confidently commit the task of the complete reconciliation of the general with the individual happiness. For we may expect an indefinite development of the feeling, as the pain which sympathy now carries with it is superseded by the pleasure of sympathy with more complete lives; or, as Spencer states it in the language of Evolution, as the pains of sympathy with the pains of maladaptation of individuals to their environment are superseded by the pleasures of sympathy with the pleasures of more and more perfect adaptation to environment.

Such a solution, however, is merely practical and does not touch the theoretical problem. It does not follow

that "conduct so altruistic would be egoistically reasonable," and what we are in search of is such a *rationale* of altruism as will reconcile it with egoism. Nor can the feeling of unity with our fellows, such love as casts out selfishness, such perfect sympathy as overcomes the dualism of virtue and prudence, of altruistic and egoistic conduct, and makes us love our neighbour as ourselves, be found in all the universe of sensibility. Uninstructed feeling is incompetent for the discharge of such a splendid task; though, when instructed and illuminated by rational insight, feeling alone can execute it. Like Mill's 'sense of dignity,' this 'feeling of unity' has a higher certificate of birth to show than that of blind unilluminated feeling. It, too, is the child of reason by sensibility; only the marriage of these twain could have such a noble issue. Sensibility alone might unite us with our fellows; but it might just as probably separate us from them. For if feeling is naturally sympathetic and altruistic, it is also naturally selfish and egoistic. The problem is to correlate and conciliate these two tendencies of human sensibility. Can we trust the correlation and conciliation to their own unguided operation? May we expect a parallelogram of these two opposing forces? On the whole, must we not say that the tendency of mere sensibility is rather to separate and individualise, than to unite and socialise men? It is reason that unites us; the sphere of the universal is the sphere of thought; we think in common. Sensibility separates us, shuts us up each in his own little, but all-important, world of subjectivity; its sphere is the sphere of the particular: we feel each for himself, and a stranger intermeddleth not with the business of the heart. At any rate, sensibility alone, inevitably and intensely subjective as it is, would never dictate that 'strict impartiality' as between our neighbour's happiness and our own which, Utilitarians agree, must be the principle of distribution of pleasures if the maximum general happiness is to be constituted. From the point of view of sensibility, I cannot be strictly

impartial in my estimate of the relative value of my own happiness and that of others; I cannot count myself, or even others, 'each for one, and no one for more than one'; I cannot 'love my neighbour as myself,' any more than I can love all my neighbours alike. I cannot reduce the various pleasures that offer themselves in the field of possibility to a unit of value; sensibility is not a unitary principle, it does not yield a common measure. My own pleasure has peculiar significance for me as a sentient being. To detach myself from it, or it from myself, and to regard it from the standpoint of an 'impartial spectator,' would be to destroy it. If all were thus strictly impartial, there would be no general, because there would be no individual, happiness. Utilitarianism puts an impossible strain upon sensibility.

The formula of evolution has been brought to bear, as we have seen, upon the problem of the reconciliation of egoism with altruism. Spencer finds that there is gradually establishing itself, in the history of evolving conduct, not merely a compromise, but a conciliation of individual and social interests; and he confidently constructs a Utopia in which the happiness of the individual and the interests of society will perfectly coincide. Leslie Stephen, on the other hand, acknowledges a permanent conflict between the two. "The path of duty does not coincide with the path of happiness. . . . By acting rightly, I admit, even the virtuous man will sometimes be making a sacrifice;" it is "necessary for a man to acquire certain instincts, amongst them the altruistic instincts, which fit him for the general conditions of life, though, in particular cases, they may cause him to be more miserable than if he were without them." And even Spencer acknowledges "a deep and involved"—though not a permanent—"derangement of the natural connections between pleasures and beneficial actions, and between pains and detrimental actions." But, it is contended, such a statement will not be "conclusive for the virtuous man. His own happiness is not his sole ulti-

mate aim; and the clearest proof that a given action will not contribute to it will, therefore, not deter him from the action." The individual, as a member of the social organism, forgets his own welfare or happiness in that of society.

From the hedonistic point of view, however, we cannot thus merge the individual in society. We must not be misled by the metaphor of the 'social organism,'—for it is only a metaphor, and a metaphor, as Leslie Stephen fears, "too vague to bear much argumentative stress." As Sidgwick points out, it is not the organism, but "the individual, after all, that feels pleasure and pain." It is true that "the development of the society implies the development of certain moral instincts in the individual, or that the individual must be so constituted as to be capable of identifying himself with the society, and of finding his pleasure and pain in conduct which is socially beneficial or pernicious." Yet the individual can never wholly identify himself with the society, simply because he remains, to the last, an individual. It is said that the antagonism of individual and social interests is incidental to the transition-stages of the evolution, and that, with the development of sympathy and the perfect adaptation of the individual to his social environment, complete identity of interests must be brought about. But, so long as the interest is merely that of pleasure, perfect identity of interests is impossible. The metaphor of the social organism is here particularly misleading. As Professor Sorley urges, "the feeling of pleasure is just the point where individualism is strongest, and in regard to which mankind, instead of being an organism in which each part only subserves the purposes of the whole, must rather be regarded as a collection of competing and co-operating units."¹ From the point of view of pleasure, society is not an organism, but an aggregate of individuals; and

¹ *Ethics of Naturalism*, p. 183 (2nd ed.).

if we speak of the 'health' of the society, we cannot mean *its* happiness, but simply the general conditions of the happiness of its individual members. It does not feel, they alone do. The several centres of feeling cannot be resolved into a single common centre. And, as Stephen acknowledges, there seems to be a permanent dualism between the "prudential" and the "social" rules of life, "corresponding to the distinction of the qualities which are primarily useful to the individual and those which are primarily useful to the society." The former code has not yet been incorporated in the latter.

Does not the stress of logic once more force us to appeal, with Sidgwick, from sensibility to reason? The latter writer holds that, though strict egoistic Hedonism cannot be transformed into universalistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism, yet "when the Egoist puts forward . . . the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is Good, not only *for him* but from the point of view of the Universe, . . . it then becomes relevant to point out to him that *his* happiness cannot be a more important part of Good, taken universally, than the equal happiness of any other person. And thus, starting with his own principle, he may be brought to accept Universal happiness or pleasure as that which is absolutely and without qualification Good or Desirable."¹ But such a hedonistic perspective is, as Sidgwick sees, impossible for unaided sensibility; to the sentient individual his own pleasure is indefinitely "more important than the equal happiness of any other person." The good of sensibility is essentially a private and individual, not a common and objective good. It is in the common sphere of reason that we meet; and, having met there, we recognise one another when we meet again in the sphere of sensibility. To the rational, if not to the sentient individual, we can "point out that his own pleasure is no

¹ *Methods of Ethics*, bk. iv. ch. ii. (6th ed.)

more important," objectively and absolutely regarded, "than the equal happiness of any other person"; and sensibility, thus illuminated by reason, may be trusted to effect that reconciliation of the individual with the social welfare, which it could never have brought about alone. From this point of view, the problem at once loses its hopeless aspect. The true altruism, we can see, is not reached by the negation of egoism, or only by the negation of the lower egoism. There is a higher egoism which contains altruism in itself, and makes 'transition' unnecessary. I have not indeed discovered my own true end, or my own true self, until I find it to be not exclusive but inclusive of the ends of other selves. I am not called, therefore, to transcend egoism, and exchange it for altruism, but to discover and realise that true egoism which includes altruism in itself. Since each is an ego—the others as well as I—to eliminate egoism would be to uproot the moral life itself. The entire problem is found within the sphere of egoism, not beyond it; and it is solved for each individual by the discovery and realisation of his own true ego. For, truly seen, the spheres of the different egos are like concentric circles. The centre of the moral life must be found within the life of the ego, not outside it. The claim of society upon the individual is not to be explained even by such a figure as that of the social organism. The moral ego refuses to merge its proper personal life in that of society. The unity or solidarity of the individual and society must be so conceived that the wider social life with which he identifies himself, so far from destroying the personal life of the individual, shall focus and realise itself in that life. But, if the social and the individual life are to be thus seen—as concentric circles, their common centre must be found; and it can be found only in reason, not in sensibility. Lives guided by mere sensibility are eccentric, and may be antagonistic; only lives guided by a sensibility which has itself been illuminated by reason

are concentric and, necessarily, co-operative, because directed to a common rational end.

(8. (c) The hedonistic account of duty.—Hedonism tends still further to break down moral reality by its interpretation of moral law as essentially identical with physical, by its resolution of the ideal into the actual, of the 'ought' into the 'is.' This criticism has been well expressed by Sidgwick in the statement that "psychological Hedonism is incompatible with ethical Hedonism." If it is the law of our nature to seek pleasure, then there is no more meaning in the command, 'Thou shalt seek it,' than there would be in the command, 'Thou shalt fall,' to the stone whose nature it is to fall. The law or uniformity of nature is in the one case physical, in the other psychological; but, in both cases, it is uniformity of nature. In the words of Bentham, so "sovereign" are those "masters"—pain and pleasure—that "it is for them alone," not only "to point out what we ought to do," but "to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other, the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while."¹ If pleasure is the constant and inevitable object of desire, and also the true end of life, it cannot present itself, except temporarily and relatively, as ethical law or 'ought,' as dictate or imperative. But, with this reduction of moral law to natural law, the conception of duty or obligation is at once invalidated. Man's attitude to the law of his life becomes essentially the same as the attitude of other natural beings: in him, as in all else—animal, plant, inorganic thing—nature must

¹ *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. i. § 1.

inevitably achieve its own end. The only difference between man and the other beings is that he can see further reaches of the road which he and they must in common travel.

This inevitable logic of the theory is recognised by its modern disciples; and the attempt is made, in the true empirical spirit, to account for the illusion of obligation by establishing its relative validity, and by exhibiting its genesis and function. Two classes of 'sanctions' have been recognised—the external and the internal. Bentham recognises only the external sanctions—physical, political, moral or popular, and religious—four forces, ultimately resolvable into the single force of nature itself, which coerce man to act for the general happiness rather than selfishly to seek his own. Mill, Spencer, and Bain also lay much stress upon the external sanctions of morality—the coercion of public opinion, the law of the land, education, etc. They insist, however, that the ultimate sanction is an internal one. There is an authority other than that of mere force; the element of coercion is not the ultimate factor in morality. There is an inner authority, which comes with insight into the utility of our actions. The recognition of this inner authority brings with it emancipation from obligation in the sense of coercion, and the substitution of spontaneity for constraint. This emancipation, however, merely means, as Evolutionism explains it, that the law of his environment, physical and social, has become the law of man's own life; that the outer has become an inner law; and that he does not feel the pressure any longer, because the moulding of him into the form of his environment has been perfected. Thus the evolution of morality falls within the evolution of nature, and our fancied emancipation from the necessity of the 'nature of things' is only a demonstration of the perfection of nature's mastery over us.

But, indeed, an ultimate vindication of obligation is

obviously impossible on the hedonistic theory. Feeling cannot be the source of this idea. Sensibility, being essentially subjective and variable, cannot yield the objectivity and universality of the ethical imperative. If the state of my sensibility be the sole criterion of good and evil activity, I cannot (theoretically at least) be obliged to do what offends my sensibility; I must so act as to gratify it. But feeling is just that element in my nature and experience which I cannot universalise; my sensibility is my intimate and exclusive individual property, and its word must be final for me. I cannot even be coerced to act against the dictates of my feeling; if, in my own nature, I have no other guide, then the outward constraint must become the inward constraint of sensibility, and this necessity of feeling is still the 'must,' or rather the 'is,' of nature, not the 'ought-to-be' of morality. But is not such a translation of 'ought' into 'must' or 'is' a contradiction once more of the healthy moral consciousness of mankind? The reality of moral obligation stands or falls with the reality of the distinction between the ideal and the actual; moral obligation is man's attitude towards the moral ideal. If, therefore, we resolve the ideal into the actual, as 'psychological Hedonism' does, we make the attitude of duty impossible.

This consequence is frankly accepted by at least some of the leaders of the Evolutionary school. The sense of obligation is, they say, only temporary, existing during the earlier stages of the evolution of morality, but destined to disappear with the completion of the process. Moral life is, in its ideal, perfectly spontaneous, and is always tending to become more entirely so. "The sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralisation increases."¹ But is not the conception of duty or obligation a central and essential element of the moral life, to be explained and

¹ Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, vol. i. p. 127.

vindicated in its permanent and absolute validity, rather than explained away as only temporarily and relatively valid? Moral progress, while in a sense it liberates us from the irksomeness of duty, also brings with it a larger sense of duty, and a more entire submission to it. The disappearance of the conception would mean either sinking to the level of the brutes, or rising to the divine. As Kant contended, to act without a sense of obligation does not become our station in the moral universe. It is this characteristic of the moral life that separates it forever from the life of nature. The moral life cannot, as moral, become spontaneous or simply natural. The goal of the physical evolution and that of the moral are not, *ipso facto*, the same. A perfectly comfortable life, that is, a life in which the discomfort of imperfect adaptation to the conditions of life should no longer be felt, would not necessarily be a perfect moral life. Thus, as from the non-moral a *quasi*-morality was evolved, so into the non-moral it would ultimately disappear. To 'naturalise the moral man' would be to destroy morality. To make the sense of duty a coefficient of the actual, by interpreting it as the transitional effect and manifestation of the imperfect adaptation of the individual to his environment, may be a partial account, but is at any rate a very inadequate account, of the moral situation. That situation is not fully understood until, in the consciousness of law and duty, is heard the eternal claim of the ideal upon the actual self.

9. (d) Its reduction of virtue to prudence.—In yet another respect does the hedonistic theory invalidate, instead of explaining, the healthy moral consciousness of mankind. Recognising in duty only a larger and wiser expediency, it reduces virtue to prudence. The distinction between good and evil becomes a merely relative one, a distinction of degree and not of kind. All motives being essentially the same, moral evil is identified with

intellectual error; the ethical distinction disappears in the psychological identity. "On the hedonistic supposition, every object willed is on its inner side, or in respect of that which moves the person willing, the same. The difference between objects willed lies on their outer side, in effects which follow from them, but are not included in them as motives to the person willing." Thus Bentham says that though "it is common to speak of actions as proceeding from good or bad motives," "the expression is far from being an accurate one," and it is "requisite to settle the precise meaning of it, and observe how far it quadrates with the truth of things. With respect to goodness and badness, as it is with everything else that is not itself either pain or pleasure, so is it with motives. If they are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects: good, on account of their tendency to produce pleasure, or avert pain; bad, on account of their tendency to produce pain, or avert pleasure. Now the case is, that from one and the same motive, and from every kind of motive, may proceed actions that are good, others that are bad, and others that are indifferent."¹ He concludes that "there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one." "Let a man's motive be ill-will; call it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive: the pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his adversary undergo. Now, even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself, is good: it may be faint; it may be short: it must at any rate be impure: yet while it lasts, and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any other that is not more intense."²

In this interpretation of motives we see demonstrated once more the externalism and the intellectualism of the theory. The criterion is found outside the action, in the consequences; not within the action, in the motive.

¹ *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. x. §§ 11, 12.

² *Loc. cit.*, § 10, Note.

Actions are simply tendencies to produce certain results. And in so far as we are forced from the outer to the inner view of the action, from the result itself to the tendency, our judgment proceeds entirely upon the relative intellectual efficiency of the tendency in question. The difference between virtue and vice is reduced to one between prudence and imprudence. The intellectual process may be more or less correct, the vision of the consequences may be more or less clear; but, inasmuch as the moral or practical source of the action is always found in the same persistent and dominant desire for pleasure, the intrinsic value of the action remains invariable. As Professor Laurie puts it: "A man may be careless or stupid, and cast up the columns of his conduct-ledger wrong; or he may be foolish, unwise, intellectually perverse; but nothing more and nothing worse." Of such a theory must we not say, with Green, that "though excellent men have argued themselves into it, it is a doctrine which, nakedly put, offends the unsophisticated conscience;" that, instead of explaining morality, Hedonism explains it away? For the very essence of morality is that the distinction between good and evil is a distinction of principle, and not merely of result, an intrinsic and essential, not an extrinsic and contingent distinction. With the elimination of this distinction in principle, the strictly ethical element in the case is eliminated. With the glory of the ideal, vanish also the shame and sorrow of failure to attain it; with the critical significance of moral alternative vanish also the infinite possibilities of moral life: all its lights and shadows, all the strangely interesting 'colours of good and evil' disappear, leaving only the blank monotony of a prudential calculation.

10. (e) *Its inadequate interpretation of character.*—The externalism of the theory involves in its turn a misleading and inverted view of character, an estimate of it which surely misses its true significance. The

hedonistic point of view is that of consequences and results, and only indirectly that of motives and intentions. Conduct alone, therefore, is of direct and primary importance; the significance of character is indirect and secondary. The attainment of a certain type of character, or of a certain bent of will, is, indeed, of the highest importance, but only because it is the surest guarantee of a certain type of activity. The latter is desirable in itself, and as an end; the former is desirable only as the best means towards the attainment of this end. Character, in other words, is instrumental; the good will is a means to an end, not an end-in-itself; will and action are subordinated to feeling. The whole estimate of motives, as compared with actual consequences, in the hedonistic school, implies this view; but we have the explicit statement of Mill himself as to the real importance of the good will. "It is because of the importance to others of being able to rely absolutely on our feelings and conduct, and to oneself of being able to rely on one's own, that the will to do right ought to be cultivated into this habitual independence. In other words, this state of the will is a means to good, not intrinsically a good."¹ This is to say that the state of feeling, or the production of pleasure, is the end, the only thing always and altogether good; while the character of the will is only a means to this end. Gizycki forms precisely the same estimate of the good will. "Virtue," he says, "is the highest excellence of man. It is not an excellence of the body, but of the mind; and not of the understanding, but of the will. Virtue, therefore, is excellence of will, or, in short, a good will. Why is it the highest excellence? Because nothing so much accords with the ultimate standard of all values. The character of man is the principal source of the happiness, as well as of the misery, of mankind. Certainly also health, strength, and intelligence are essential conditions of human welfare; but the good

¹ *Utilitarianism*, ch. iv.

will is still more essential, for it alone guarantees a benevolent direction of the others.”¹ The good man, then, according to the hedonistic estimate, is simply a good instrument, warranted not to go wrong, but to continue steadily producing the greatest amount of happiness possible in the circumstances, whether for himself or for others.

Now, this interpretation of character, it seems to me, falsifies the healthy moral consciousness of mankind, by simply reversing its estimate. That estimate is that character, the attainment of a certain type of personality—or bent of will, is not a means but an end-in-itself; that this, and not the production of a certain state of feeling, is the only thing which is always and altogether good, and itself ‘the ultimate standard of all values.’ And why? Because character is the expression and exponent of the total personality. Neither the sentient nor the intellectual state, but that state of will—that condition of the self—which includes them both, is the ultimate and absolute good, the chief end of man. It is true that this form of being is always at the same time a form of doing, that character and conduct are inseparable, that ἔξις expresses itself in ἐνέργεια. But the character is not there *for the sake of* the conduct, the being *for the sake of* the doing. That would still be an external view, and would make character merely instrumental. This is true even of Stephen’s view, that moral progress is always from the form ‘Do this’ to the form ‘Be this.’ As long as we thus distinguish the being from the doing, the character from the conduct, our interpretation must be inadequate. For we are still thinking of will as if it were a machine, cunningly contrived so as to produce something beyond itself. But, as Aristotle points out, the activity may be itself the end, and in natural activities (φυσικαί), as distinguished from artificial (τεχνικαί), this is the case. Above all, in the case of the human will, the

¹ *Moral Philosophy*, p. 112 (Eng. trans.)

end is not something beyond the activity, but is simply *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, such an *ἐνέργεια* as begets a certain *ἔξις*, or habit of similar activity. The will is not to be regarded as making something else—even a state of feeling, but always and only as *making itself*. By separating the action from the person, conduct from character, and by placing the emphasis on the conduct rather than on the character, Hedonism misses the true significance of both. The ethical importance of conduct is only indirect, as the exponent of character; the ethical importance of character is direct and absolute. Character and activity are inseparable; character is a habitual activity. But the ethical activity which is identical with character is not properly regarded as productive of anything beyond itself; it is its own end, and exceeding great reward.

11. (f) The final metaphysical alternative.—In coming to a final judgment as to the value of Hedonism as a theory of the moral ideal, we must be guided by metaphysical considerations with regard to man's ultimate nature, and place in the universe. It has been truly said that a noble action or life is a grand practical speculation about life's real meaning and worth. Hedonism, like every ethical theory, is, in the last analysis, implicitly, if not explicitly, a metaphysical speculation of this kind. What are we to say of its value?

The hedonistic view is the empirical, scientific, or naturalistic view of human life; it is the expression of ethical realism, as distinguished from ethical idealism or transcendentalism. It derives the ideal from the actual, the 'ought-to-be' from the 'is.' To it the ideal is only the shadow which the actual casts before it. Its effort is "to base ethics on facts, to derive the rules of our attitude toward facts from experience, to shape our ideals not from the airy stuff of something beyond the ken of science, but in accordance with laws derived from reality." It is an attempt to naturalise the moral man, by showing the

fundamental identity of moral laws with the laws of nature. This naturalism and empiricism of the hedonistic theory reach their culmination in the 'scientific' ethics of the Evolutionary school.

The metaphysical question is, more particularly, the question of the nature and worth of human personality. "Conduct will always be different," says M. Fouillée, "according to the value, more or less relative and fleeting, which one accords to the human person; according to the worth, more or less incomparable, which we attribute to individuality." Is man an end-in-himself, the bearer, as no other creature is, of the divine and eternal, capable of identifying himself with and forwarding the divine end of the universe by accepting it as his life's ideal, or of antagonising, and even, in a sense, of frustrating it? Is he a free spiritual being, with a sentient and animal nature, or is he only a 'higher animal'? In the words of the writer just quoted: "There are circumstances in which the alternative which presents itself in consciousness is the following,—Is it necessary to act as if my sensible and individual existence were all, or as if it were only a part of my true and universal existence?"

Hedonism rests upon what Mill has happily named the 'psychological' theory of the self. What Professor James calls the 'me,' the 'stream' of consciousness, is regarded as the total and ultimate self: man is a 'bundle of states,' and nothing more. It follows that his sole concern in life is with these passing states of feeling, which are not *his*, but *he*. If we are merely sentient beings, subjects of sensibility, then the nature of that sensibility must be all in all to us. If the permanence of a deeper rational selfhood is a mere illusion, and the changing sentient selfhood is alone real; then our concern is with the latter, not with the former, and Cyrenaicism is the true creed of life. At most, virtue is identical with prudence.

But we cannot, at least in ethics and in metaphysics, thus identify the self with its experience. Interpret our deeper selfhood how we may, we must acknowledge that *we* are more than the 'stream' of our feelings. Our very nature is to transcend the present, and to regard our life as having a permanent meaning and reality. These experiences are *mine*, part of my total and continuous experience, and I am more than they. It needs such an 'I' to account for the 'psychological Me.' The self persists through all its changing states, and its unceasing demand for satisfaction is the very spring of the moral life. It is not a mere sum of feelings; it is their unity, that by reference to which alone they gain their ethical significance. In mere feeling there is no abiding quality, it is a thing of the moment. The devotee of pleasure is no richer at the close of life than the beggar or the martyr. His pleasures, like the latter's pains, have passed, as all mere feelings must. But *he* remains, and all his life's experience, from first to last, has left its record in his character, in the permanent structure of the self. "Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure." A theory of life which concerns itself only with the passing experience, and not with the permanent character of the self, is fundamentally inadequate.

12. The merit and demerit of Hedonism.—Hedonism does well in emphasising the claim of sensibility in human life; but it errs, either in asserting this to be the exclusive claim, or in subordinating to it the more fundamental claim of reason. To take the demerit first, the history of Hedonism is itself a demonstration of the impossibility of an ethic of pure sensibility. The gradual modification of the theory which we have traced is a gradual departure from strict hedonistic orthodoxy, a gradual admission of reason to offices which at first were claimed for sensibility. Man's pleasure-seeking, being man's, cannot, the Hedonists very early saw, be un-

reflective; and, in the development of the theory, the reflective element is more and more emphasised. The successful life of pleasure is acknowledged to be essentially a calculating life, a life of thought. Mere feeling, it is found, is an insufficient principle of unity. It unifies neither the individual life itself, nor the individual and the social life. It does not supply a regulative principle, a principle of the distribution of pleasure. Sensibility, like sensation, is a mere manifold which has to be unified by the rational self: as the one is the material of the intellectual life, the other is the material of the moral life. But the form of knowledge and of morality alike is rational. Feeling does not provide for its own guidance; if it is to be the guide of human life, the darkness of animal sensibility must receive the illumination of reason. Sooner or later, Hedonism finds itself compelled to appeal to reason for the form of morality; and the history of the theory is the story of how this rationalism which was implicit in it from the first has gradually become explicit.

Yet sensibility is the material of morality; and if we would not have the mere empty form, we must recognise the momentous significance of the life of sensibility informed by reason. Feeling is an integral part of the moral life, which no ethical theory can afford to overlook; and Hedonism has done well to emphasise its importance. A merely rational life, excluding sensibility, is as impossible for man as a life of mere sensibility, without reason. The rational life is for him a life of sensibility rationalised, or regulated by reason; and his total rational well-being must report itself in sensibility. This is the permanent truth in Hedonism. The ascetic ideal is a false and inadequate one; it means the dwarfing of our moral nature, the drawing away of the very sap of its life. The spring of the action, its origin, is in sensibility; if the end or motive is a product of reason, the source of its attractive power is in sensibility. And the way to the

attainment of the end lies through pleasure and pain; the state of feeling is not merely the index and concomitant of successful pursuit, it is a constant guide towards success; and attainment itself brings with it a new pleasure, as failure brings with it a new pain. Pleasure is, as Aristotle said, the very bloom of goodness, it is the very crown of virtue. The threads of which our life is woven are threads of feeling, if the texture of the web is reason's work. The Hedonist unweaves the web of life into its threads, and, having unwoven it, he cannot recover the lost design.

I think we must go even further, and admit that, while the mere distinctions of feeling, as pleasant or painful, are not, as such, moral distinctions, and do not always coincide with the latter, yet these distinctions are naturally connected and coincident. If pleasure is not itself the Good, it is its natural and normal index and expression, as pain is the natural and normal index and expression of evil. Hence the problem always raised for man by the suffering of the good, the problem that fills the Book of Job, and seems to have been deeply felt by Plato. In the second book of the *Republic*, we find an impressive picture of a life of perfect justice (Plato's word for righteousness), misunderstood and misinterpreted, a life that is perfectly just, but seems to men who cannot understand it to be most unjust. "They will say that in such a situation the just man will be scourged, racked, fettered, will have his eyes burnt out, and at last, after suffering every kind of torture, will be crucified; and thus learn that it is best to resolve not to be, but to seem, just."¹ The 'just man' has generally been misunderstood by his fellows; goodness has always meant suffering, its paths have never been altogether paths of pleasantness and peace. The Christian world has drawn its inspiration from a Life that has seemed to it the fulfilment of the Platonic and Prophetic dream—a life of

¹ *Republic*, 361 E (Davies and Vaughan's trans.)

transcendent goodness, which was also a life of utmost suffering, of suffering even unto the death of the cross. We must indeed believe that the goal of moral progress is the complete coincidence of goodness with happiness. But at present it is not so, and the lesson of the best lives is that the way to that goal lies through suffering. Perhaps we cannot understand the full significance of pain in relation to goodness; but its presence in all noble lives tells of a higher end than pleasure—of an end in which pleasure may be taken up as an element, but which itself is infinitely more, of an end faithfulness to which must often mean indifference to pain, or, better even than indifference, a noble willingness to bear it for the sake of the higher good which may not otherwise be reached, for the sake of that highest life which is not possible save through the death of all that is lower than itself.

Sensibility is the dynamic of the moral life, its efficient cause; it is not the final cause of morality, or the source of the moral ideal. Pleasure is not the true object of choice. Though the true choice must needs be pleasant, it is not the choice of pleasure. The idea—and the ideal—of which the good life is the realisation is not the idea of pleasure. The object which thrills us with pleasure as we choose it, which we could not choose if it did not satisfy us, is itself something other than pleasure or satisfaction. What it is, we have still to inquire. But we must next consider the anti-hedonistic or rationalistic interpretation of the moral ideal.

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CHAPTER II.

RATIONALISM, OR THE ETHICS OF REASON.

1. The rationalistic point of view.—We have traced the implicit rationalism of the hedonistic theory gradually becoming explicit as we passed from Cyrenaicism to Epicureanism, from Paley and Bentham to Mill and Sidgwick. This appeal to reason became necessary, first, for the guidance of individual choice by reference to a criterion of the higher and lower, and even of the greater and less, in pleasure; and, secondly, as the only possible means of transition from egoism to altruism, from selfishness to benevolence.

But, in both ancient and modern times, the ethical rights of reason have been emphasised no less strongly, and often no less exclusively, than the ethical rights of sensibility. This assertion of the claims of reason in the life of a rational being is at the basis of the common modern antithesis, or at any rate distinction, between duty and pleasure, between virtue and prudence, between the right and the expedient. It is at the heart of the conviction that—

“To live by law,
Acting the law we live by without fear;
And because right is right, to follow right
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.”

In ethical theory, too, ‘duty for duty’s sake’ has been proclaimed, with no less emphasis than ‘pleasure for

pleasure's sake,' as the last word of the moral life. The effort to idealise or spiritualise the moral man has been no less strenuously pursued than the effort to naturalise him. In reason, rather than in sensibility, it has been maintained, is to be found the characteristic element of human nature, the quality which differentiates man from all lower beings, and makes him man. This is not so much an explicit theory of the end or ideal, as a vindication of the absoluteness of moral law or obligation, of the category of duty as the supreme ethical category. But it is, at any rate, a delineation of the ideal life, and therefore, implicitly or explicitly, of the moral ideal itself.

The rational, like the hedonistic, ethics takes two forms—an extreme and a moderate. The former is that the good life is a life of pure reason, from which all sensibility has been eliminated. The latter is that it is a life which, though containing sensibility as an element, is fundamentally rational—a life of sensibility guided by reason. In either case, the entire emphasis is laid upon reason, and the theory may be called rigoristic, because the attitude to sensibility is that of rational superiority and stern control, where it is not that of rational intolerance and exclusiveness. Reason claims the sovereignty, and sensibility is either outlawed, or degraded to the status of passive obedience.

Whether in its extreme or in its moderate form, Rationalism is the expression of ethical idealism, as Hedonism is the expression of ethical realism. The one is the characteristic temper of the modern Christian world, as the other is the characteristic temper of the ancient Classical world. Our normal and dominant mood is that of strenuous enthusiasm, of dissatisfaction with the actual, of aspiration after the ideal; the supreme category of our life is duty or oughtness. The normal and dominant mood of the Greeks was just the reverse,—the mood of sunny sensuous contentment with the present and the actual. That discontent which we

account the evidence of our diviner destiny was foreign to their spirit. The ethics of Socrates is the philosophical expression of this characteristic Greek view of life; moderation or self-control is the deepest principle he knows. For Aristotle, too, the sum of all virtue is the 'middle way' between the two extremes of excess and defect. The master-virtue of the Greeks, in life and in theory, is a universal temperance or *σωφροσύνη*.

Yet it is to the Greeks that we must trace back the rationalistic, no less than the hedonistic, view of life. For the Greek mind, though sensuous, was always clear and rational, always lucid, always appreciative of form; and the rational life had therefore always a peculiar charm for it. This appreciation of the rational life finds expression in the Socratic ideal of human life as a life worthy of a rational being, founded in rational insight and self-knowledge—a life that leaves the soul not demeaned and impoverished, but enriched and satisfied, adorned with her own proper jewels of righteousness and truth. Plato and Aristotle follow out this Socratic clue of the identity of the good with the rational life. For both, the life of virtue is a life 'according to right reason,' and the vicious life is the irrational life. Both, however, distinguish two degrees of rationality in what was, for Socrates, a single life of reason. First there is the reason-guided life of sensibility, or the life according to reason; but beyond that lies the higher life of reason itself,—the intellectual, contemplative, or philosophic life. The chief source of this ethical dualism in Greek philosophy—a dualism which Aristotle was unable to overcome, and which survives in his differentiation of the speculative or 'theoretic' life from the practical life of action—is to be found in Plato's separation of the ideal reality from the sensible appearance. If, however, we would learn the original exposition of Greek Rationalism, we must go back to the immediate disciples of Socrates, the notorious Cynic school.

2. (A) **Extreme Rationalism.** (a) **Ancient:** (a) **Cynicism.**—The quality in the Socratic character which most impressed the Cynics was its perfect self-control (*ἐγκράτεια*), its sublime independence of circumstances, its complete self-containedness and self-sufficiency. This became the ideal of the school. Happiness, they maintained, is to be sought within, not without; in virtue or excellence of character, not in pleasure (*αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*). Wisdom and happiness are synonymous, and the life of the wise is the passionless life of reason. The life of pleasure is the life of folly, the wise man would rather be mad than pleased. For pleasure makes man the slave of Fortune, the servant of circumstance. Independence is to be purchased only by indifference to pleasure and pain, by insensibility (*ἀπάθεια*), by the uprooting of the desires which bind us to outward things. There must be no rifts in the armour of the soul, through which the darts of fortune may strike: the man who has killed out all desire is alone impenetrable by evil. But the wise man *is* impenetrable. Not without, but within the soul, are the issues of life. Desire binds us to that which is external, and foreign (*ξενικόν*) to the soul. But “for each being that alone can be a good which belongs to it, and the only thing which belongs to man is mind or reason” (*νοῦς, λόγος*). This, man’s proper inner good, outward evil cannot touch; as Socrates said, “no evil can happen to a good man.” Without such virtue, nothing is good; with it, there is no evil. This is the constant text of Cynic morality—the supremacy of the human spirit over circumstance, its perfect mastery of its own fortunes, founded on the sovereignty of reason over passion. The sum of Cynic wisdom is the sublime pride of the masterful rational self, which can acknowledge no rule other than its own, and which makes its possessor a king in a world of slaves.

But these ‘counsels of perfection’ are hard to follow

The life of wisdom is a veritable 'choice of Hercules.' The true riches of the soul are to be purchased only by selling all the deceitful riches of pleasure; the one pathway to heaven is the beggar-life. The emancipation from the outward is difficult, and the Cynic rule of life is one long course of self-denial. We must reduce our wants to a minimum; we must extirpate all artificial, luxurious, and conventional needs, and return to the simplicity of nature. Better far to climb with staff and scrip the steep ascent of virtue than, burdened with wealth and houses and lands, to remain in the City of Destruction. For the reward of such self-denial is a perfect peace of mind, which nothing can disturb. The man who has attained to this wisdom of life has penetrated all illusions, and conquered death itself; if none of the experiences of life are truly evil, since they cannot touch the soul that has steeled itself in an armour of indifference, least of all is that an evil which is not an experience at all.

This pride of reason led the Cynics into strange extravagance and fanaticism. Their 'return to nature,' their scorn for public opinion, their self-conscious affectation, their lack of personal dignity, their contempt for their fellows, whom they, like Carlyle, regarded as 'mostly fools,' have become proverbial. Yet Cynicism is no mere irresponsible or unimportant vagary of the human mind. It is the first philosophical expression, among the Greeks, of that tendency with which we have since become so familiar,—the tendency to see in the life of reason the only life worthy of a rational being, and in all natural sensibility a trap laid for the soul of man, in which he will be snared if he avoids it not altogether; it is the first, and the most extreme, expression of the ascetic principle. That principle was reasserted later, by the Stoics, with such impressiveness and dignity that the importance and originality of its earlier statement have perhaps been under-estimated.

(β) Stoicism.—The Greeks do not appear to have taken the Cynics seriously; much had to occur in their experience before they were ready to accept that lesson of self-discipline which had been the burden of the Cynic school. The course of the moral life ran very smooth in those prosperous city-states; it was not difficult to live a harmonious, measured, rhythmic life in such conditions. And the Greek spirit was always æsthetic rather than ethical; the category of its life was always the beautiful rather than the good. Not until the jar came from without, not until the fair civic order broke down, was the discord felt, or the need of a more perfect and a diviner polity, and salvation sought in conformity to its higher law. Then men remembered the wistful note which had been struck by Plato, and by Aristotle too,—how both had spoken of another life than that of this world, and they were willing to listen to the Stoics as they repeated the old Cynic doctrine. Stoicism differed from Cynicism in several important particulars.

(1) For the crude 'naturalism' of the Cynics, the Stoics substitute a strictly idealistic or transcendental view of life. The ideal life of Plato and Aristotle—the life of reason itself—they regard as the only life worthy of man. The old Cynic phrase, 'life according to nature' (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν), thus receives, for the Stoics, a new meaning. For in nature (φύσις)—whether the nature of things or their own nature—they find, with Heraclitus, a common reason (λόγος) and a common law (νόμος). They are thus able to identify the rational life with the life 'according to nature,' and both with the life 'according to law.' They do not, like the Cynics, fly in the face of custom and convention; the common reason has for them taken shape and embodiment in the established laws and usages of human society, and conformity, rather than non-conformity, becomes man's duty. Not emancipation from law, but the discovery of the true law of man's life,

and obedience to that law, is the object of the Stoics' aspiration. In this sense, the Stoics are at once realists and idealists: for them 'the real is the rational.' And, although they too counsel callousness and indifference to the events of fortune and the changing circumstances of human life, their resignation to the course of things is supported by the conviction that 'all things work together for good,' that what happens is always most fit, and that it becomes man to accept as such all the events of life and the grand event of death itself. The part must not seek to separate itself from the whole, or mistake itself for the whole. "Nothing can happen to me which is not best for thee, O Universe."

(2) For the sheer individualism of the Cynics, Stoicism offers to man a new and nobler citizenship than that of any earthly State. The Stoic cosmopolitanism or citizenship of the world is no merely negative conception. It is true that the Stoics are individualists, and that their ideal life is self-contained and self-sufficient. This aspect of the Cynic ideal they reassert. But their emancipation from the narrow limits of the Greek State gives them a spiritual entrance into a larger and nobler society, a 'city of God,' the universal kingdom of humanity itself. On the earth that true city is not found; it is not, like Plato's, a 'Greek city,' but a spiritual State, and the Stoic citizenship is in the heavens. It is like Kant's 'kingdom of intelligence,' in which each citizen is at once legislator and subject, for its law is the law of reason itself. "Ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἔστιν—the world is as it were a commonwealth, a city; and there are observances, customs, usages actually current in it—things our friends and companions will expect of us, as the condition of our living there with them at all, as really their peers or fellow-citizens. Those observances were, indeed, the creation of a visible or invisible aristocracy in it, whose actual manners, whose preferences from of old, become now a weighty tradition, as to the way in which things

should be or not be done, are like a music, to which the intercourse of life proceeds—such a music as no one who had once caught its harmonies would willingly jar. In this way, the *becoming*, as the Greeks—or *manners* as both Greeks and Romans said, would indeed be a comprehensive term for duty. Righteousness would be, in the words of the Cæsar himself, but the ‘following of the reasonable will and ordinance of the oldest, the most venerable, of all cities and polities—the reasonable will of the royal, the law-giving element in it—forasmuch as we are citizens of that supreme city on high, of which all other cities beside are but as single habitations.’ ” ¹

(3) But the failure to find on earth any counterpart of that fair city in the heavens bred in the Stoics a new melancholy which was strange to the buoyant spirit of the earlier Greeks. Not that the Stoics are pessimists. The Cynics were pessimists, but their pessimism seemed to give them much satisfaction in the added sense of their own superiority. The Stoics, on the contrary, are optimists; idealism is always optimistic. All things are, truly understood, most fit: rational order pervades the universe. But the shadow of the ideal and supersensible lies upon the actual and sensible; the shadow of eternity is cast athwart the world of time. The soul that has beheld the abiding Reality is possessed by the sense of the utter insignificance and transitoriness of all temporal interests, and sees in all things the seeds of quick decay and dissolution. There is an inevitable melancholy in such a complete disillusionment; the *nil admirari* spirit cannot allow itself to rejoice in anything. Its cry is for rest and peace, cessation from futile striving. *Vanitas vanitatum!* The wise man has awakened from life’s fevered dream, and broken the spell of all its illusions. His is the quiet and imperturbable dignity of spirit that goes not well with mirth or vulgar enjoyment. To him death is more welcome than life, seeing it is the way out

¹ Walter Pater, *Marius the Epicurean*, vol. ii. pp. 15, 16.

of time into eternity. "I find that all things are now as they were in the days of our buried ancestors—all things sordid in their elements, trite by long usage, and yet ephemeral. How ridiculous, then, how like a country-man in town, is he who wonders at aught! Doth the sameness, the repetition of the public shows, weary thee? Even so doth that likeness of events make the spectacle of the world a vapid one. And so must it be with thee to the end. For the wheel of the world hath ever the same motion, upward and downward, from generation to generation. When, then, shall time give place to eternity?"¹ "To cease from action—the ending of thine effort to think and to do—there is no evil in that. . . . Thou climbedst into the ship, thou hast made thy voyage and touched the shore; go forth now! Be it into some other life; the divine breath is everywhere, even there. Be it into forgetfulness for ever; at least thou wilt rest from the beating of sensible images upon thee, from the passions which pluck thee this way and that, like an unfeeling toy, from those long marches of the intellect, from thy toilsome ministry to the flesh."²

Thus the Stoic ideal is a life of pure reason, in which no place is found for natural sensibility. It is founded on the Platonic dualism of form and matter, of the ideal and the sensible, as well as on the psychological dualism, common to both Plato and Aristotle, of the rational and the irrational. The maxim, Live according to nature, means: Live according to that rational order which is the deepest nature of things. Let the Logos which reveals itself in the universe reveal itself also in thee, who art a part of the universe. As for the life of passion and sensibility, that is essentially a lawless and irrational life. The animal may fittingly obey its claim, and submit to its slavery. But thou, who canst think, who canst enter into and make thine own possession the rational order of the

¹ Walter Pater, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 205.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 206.

universe, art surely called upon to follow the leading of that superior insight, and to conduct thyself in all thy doings as a sharer in the univereal Reason. Nor is it only needful that thou regulate and be master of thy feelings; thou must be absolutely emancipated from them. No harmony of the rational and the irrational elements is possible, such as Plato fondly dreamed of; there must be war to the knife, and no quarter given to the enemy of the soul, if the soul is to live. Feeling is the bond that ties thee to the external, to what is not thyself—nay, to what *is not* at all, to the shadows and illusions and make-believes, to the Lie and not to the Truth. Feeling makes thee the slave of circumstance and Fortune. Thou must assert thine independence of all outside thyself, and learn to be self-contained and at home with thyself; and thou canst only be so by living the life of reason, and obeying in all things and with a single mind its uncompromising law. Therein lies thy proper good; all else is in reality indifferent, and must become so to thee, if thou wouldst attain the peace and completeness of the good life. With the true wisdom of rational insight into the eternal substance of things will come ‘apathy’ to all the interests of time—mere ‘shadow-shapes that come and go’; and the emancipated spirit will lay hold on the eternal life of the universal Reason.

It was not among the Greeks themselves, but in the larger Roman and Christian worlds, that Stoicism was to come to its real influence upon mankind. The Romans seemed to themselves to have realised the Stoic dream of a universal empire of humanity, and in the ‘natural law’ of the Porch they found a theoretic basis for their splendid jurisprudence. So powerfully did its stern ideal of life appeal to the characteristic *severitas* of the Roman mind that Stoicism found at Rome a new life, and its finest achievements are Roman rather than Greek. It is, however, through the medium of Christianity that Stoicism has chiefly influenced the modern world.

3. (b) **Modern : (a) Christian asceticism.**—The fundamental idea of Christianity is the idea of the divine righteousness, with its absolute claim upon the life of man. This idea was the inheritance of Christianity from the Hebrews, but it was reasserted with a new emphasis and a new rigour: "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven." It is a righteousness not of external act or observance, but of the inner life, a righteousness of heart and will. And though the Founder of Christianity did not, by word or life, inculcate an ascetic ideal, but gave his ungrudging sanction to all the natural joys of life, his uncompromising attitude towards unrighteousness meant inevitably, for himself and for his disciples, suffering, self-sacrifice, and death. (The essential spirit of the Christian life is the spirit of the cross. It is out of the death of the natural man that the spiritual life is born. "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, that leadeth unto life." The way of the Christian life is the way of the Master, the way of utter self-sacrifice: "he that saveth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall find it." The natural life of sensibility is not in itself evil, but it must be perfectly mastered and possessed by the rational spirit. If it offends the spirit's life—and it may offend at any point—it must be denied. "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is better for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell." So exacting is the Christian ideal of righteousness.

We know how this moral rigour of Christianity was developed by its disciples into an asceticism of life, in which the Stoic 'apathy' was reproduced and given a new ethical significance. Not to save himself from the attacks

of a capricious and often evil Fate, but to save the Spirit's life from the snares of the tempting Flesh, is man called upon to eradicate all desire. For the flesh, as such, is antagonistic to the spirit, and matter is essentially evil. The thought of this ethical dualism—this home-sickness of the soul for the ideal world whence it had fallen into this lower life of sense and time—came to the Christian Church, as it had come to the Stoics, from Plato. To Plato all education had been a process of purification, a gradual recovery of what at birth man lost, an ever more perfect 'reminiscence' of the upper world. *There* is man's true home; not here, in the cave of sensibility, the soul's sad prison-house. If this thought never took hold of the Greeks themselves, we know how potent it was with the Neo-platonists and with the mediæval saints and mystics. The mediæval world was a world of thought and aspiration, of 'divine discontent' with the actual, an eternal world in which no room was found for the interests of time, a world of contemplation rather than of action. Of this spirit the characteristic product was Monasticism, with its effort to detach the spirit from the flesh, its separation from the world, and its vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience. The monk *dies* as an individual with ends of his own, as a man and a citizen, and becomes the devotee of the universal and divine end, as he conceives it: all 'secular' interests are lost in the 'religious.' Nor did Christian asceticism pass away with the Middle Ages. It survives not only in contemporary Catholicism, but, to a large extent, in the life of Protestantism as well. Christianity is still apt to be 'other-worldly,' to regard this life as merely a 'pilgrimage,' and a preparation for that better life which will begin with the separation of the spirit from the body of its humiliation; to regard time as but 'the lackey to eternity'; to think that here we have only the preface, there the volume of our life, here the prelude, there the music. Accounting his citizenship to be in the heavenly and eternal world, and preoccupied

with its affairs, the Christian 'saint' is apt to sit loose to the things of time, and to cultivate an aloofness and apathy of spirit no less real than that of Stoic sage or mediæval monk.

4. (β) **Kantian transcendentalism.** — The great modern representative, in ethical thought, of the extreme or ascetic form of Rationalism is Kant, the author of one of the most impressive moral idealisms of all time. For Kant the Good—the only thing absolutely and altogether good—is the good will; and the good will is, for him, the rational will, the will obedient to the law of the universal reason. It is the prerogative of a rational being to be self-legislative. The animal life is one of heteronomy; the course of its activity is dictated by external stimuli. And if man had been a merely sentient being, and pleasure his only end, nature would have managed his life for him as she manages the animal's, by providing him with the necessary instincts. The peculiarity of man's life is that it belongs to two spheres. As a sentient being, man is a member of the animal sphere, whose law is pleasure; as a rational being, he enacts upon himself the higher law of reason which takes no account of sensibility. Hence arises for him the categorical imperative of duty—the 'thou shalt' of the rational being to the irrational or sentient. As a rational being, man demands of himself a life which shall be reason's own creation, whose spring shall be found in pure reverence for the law of his rational nature. Inclination and desire are necessarily subjective and particular; and, in so far as they enter, they detract from the ethical value of the action. Nor do consequences come within the province of morality; the goodness of an action is determined solely by its inner rational form. The categorical quality of the imperative of morality is founded on the absolute worth of that nature whose law it is. A rational being is, as such, an end-in-himself, and may not regard

himself as a means to any other end. He ought always to act in one way—namely, so as to fulfil his rational nature; he may never use his reason as a means by which to compass non-rational ends. The law of his life is: "So act as to regard humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, always as an end, never as a means."

The moral law thus becomes for Kant the gateway of the noumenal life. As subject to its categorical imperative, man is a member of the intelligible or supersensible world—the world of pure reason. From that higher vantage-ground, he sees the entire empirical life disappear, as the mere shadow or husk of moral reality. As will, he lives and moves and has his being in that noumenal world from which, as intelligence, he is for ever shut out. As he listens to the voice of duty, and concedes the absolute and uncompromising severity of its claim upon his life, he 'feels that he is greater than he knows,' and welcomes it as the business of his life to appropriate his birthright, and to constitute himself in deed, what in idea he is from the first, a member and a citizen of the intelligible world. There too he finds the goodly fellowship of universal intelligence, and becomes at once legislator and subject in the kingdom of pure reason.

5. Criticism of extreme Rationalism, and transition to moderate.—Such are the chief forms of Rationalism, in its extreme type, and it is not difficult to see how the fundamental defects of such a view of life necessitate the transition to the more moderate form of the theory.

(1) The view rests upon an absolute psychological dualism of reason and sensibility, of the rational and the irrational. Because reason differentiates man from the animal, and his life must therefore be a rational life, it is inferred that the entire animal sensibility must be

eliminated. The logical result is seen in the Platonic and Aristotelian intellectualism,—the identification of goodness with wisdom, of virtue with knowledge, or philosophic contemplation. For the Cynics and Stoics, on the other hand, the good life is simply the passionless life of reason. But we cannot summarily dismiss the entire life of sensibility as irrational. Without sensibility, there is no activity; the moral life, as such, implies feeling or desire.

(2) If we dismiss feeling, we lose the entire content of morality, and what is left is only its empty form. The Kantian ethic is formalistic, in the sense that it separates the form from the matter of morality. By identifying will with practical reason, and by demanding that the determining principle of all activity shall be found within reason, it provides at most the mere form of will,—a ‘will that wills itself,’ a logical intellect rather than a good will. The ideal life of Plato and Aristotle is confessedly an intellectual or speculative, rather than a moral, life. The flesh and blood of moral reality come from sensibility. It has been truly said that the movement of the real world is not ‘a ghostly ballet of bloodless categories;’ no more is the movement of human life. In its dance, reason and sensibility must be partners, even though they often quarrel; nay, their true destiny is a wedded life, in which no permanent divorce is possible. That feeling is simply irrational, and incapable of becoming an element in the life of a rational being, is sheer Mysticism; and Mysticism in ethics is no less false than Mysticism in metaphysics. To deny the reality of any element of the real world, and to refuse to deal with it,—that is the essence of Mysticism. The very problem of the moralist is set for him by the existence of this dualism of reason and sensibility in human nature, and of this alternative possibility, in human life, of guidance by feeling or guidance by reason. To eliminate or to

disparage either element, to destroy the alternative moral possibility, is to cut the knot of life's great riddle rather than to unravel it.

An implicit acknowledgment of this necessity of feeling, if the ends of reason are to take body and shape, and to find their actual realisation, is made by Kant when, after excluding all 'pathological inclination,' that is, all empirical sensibility, he brings back sensibility itself in the form of 'pure or practical interest.'¹ The moral law, he finds, demands for its realisation a spring or motive-force in sensibility; only, the feeling must be the offspring of reason. The psychological distinction of reason and sensibility is, however, clearly admitted, as well as the ethical consequence that both must enter as factors into the life of will. Plato and Aristotle may be said to make the same concession, in their description of ordinary 'moral' or 'practical' virtue as the excellence of the compound nature of man, mixed of reason and irrational sensibility. This life of feeling controlled by reason, they both seem to say, is the characteristic life of man, the life of the ordinary man, though the higher and divine life may be attained at intervals by the best, and ought never to be lost sight of as the ideal.

(3) One phase of the problem seems to have been entirely ignored by the school whose views we are considering — namely, that it is through sensibility that we are delivered from ourselves and find the way to that fellowship with mankind which the Stoics so impressively portray, and which Kant contemplates in his 'kingdom of ends.' 'Cool reason' is not a sufficient bond; we must feel our unity with our fellows. Though reason is universal, the ethics of pure reason are inevitably individualistic. The Stoic and the Kantian life, the ascetic life, is essentially self-contained; it is a life which withdraws into itself. Its dream of a kingdom of universal intelligence, of a city of God, of a com-

¹ Cf. Dewey, *Outlines of Ethics*, p. 86.

munion of saints, remains for it a dream which can never be realised on earth. The bands that unite us with our fellows are bands of love; reason, alone, is clear in its insight into the common nature and the common weal, but powerless to realise it. The dynamic of the moral life is found in sensibility. Kill out sensibility, and you not only impoverish your own life, but you separate yourself from your fellows no less thoroughly than if you make your own pleasure your only good.

(4) Nor is self-sacrifice the last word of morality to any part of our nature, although it may be its first word to every part of that nature. It is only a moment in the ethical life,—one phase of its most subtle process, not its be-all and its end-all. The true life of man must be the life of the total, single self, rational and sentient; the sentient self is to be sacrificed, only as it opposes itself to the deeper and truer human self of reason. The sentient self is not, as such, evil or irrational, and it may be completely harmonised with the rational self. The ascetic ideal is thoroughly false and inadequate, and must always be corrected by the hedonistic. It is an ideal of death rather than of life, of inactivity rather than of activity. It is not right that the ruddy bloom of youth and health should be all 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,' that the thrill of quickened life should be stilled and deadened to the stately march of reason in the soul, and that apathy and insensibility should take the place of the eager pulsing life of nature in the human heart. The spectacle of the world is always fresh and fascinating, and we should keep our eyes bright to see it. The music of life need never grow monotonous, and our ears should be alert to catch its strains. Life is life, and we should not make it a *meditatio mortis*. Its banquet is richly spread, and we should enjoy it with a full heart, nor see the death's head ever at the feast. Aloofness of spirit from the world and all its eager crowding human interests

is not in the end the noblest attitude. The body is not to be thought of as the prison-house of the soul, from which it must escape if it would live in its own true element. Escape it cannot, if it would. The spirit and the flesh cannot cut adrift from one another; each has its own lesson for its fellow. The way to all human goodness lies in learning 'the value and significance of flesh.' The passionless life of reason strikes cold and hard on the human heart: *

"But is a calm like this, in truth,
 The crowning end of life and youth.
 And when this boon rewards the dead,
 Are all debts paid, has all been said?

 Ah no, the bliss youth dreams is one
 For daylight, for the cheerful sun,
 For feeling nerves and living breath—
 Youth dreams a bliss on this side death.
 It dreams a rest, if not more deep,
 More grateful than this marble sleep;
 It hears a voice within it tell:
Calm's not life's crown, though calm is well.
 'Tis all perhaps which man requires,
 But 'tis not what our youth desires."¹

(5) The Stoic and the Kantian view of life rests, as we have seen, upon a metaphysical idealism which finds no place for the reality of the sensible and phenomenal world: it is the expression of a metaphysical, as well as of a psychological, dualism. Such is the cleft between these two worlds that the one cannot enter into relation with the other, and withdrawal into the noumenal world of pure reason becomes the only path to the true or ideal life. The entire life of sensibility is disparaged and despised as shadowy and unreal, a dream from which we must awaken to moral reality. But such a transcendental idealism must always call forth the protest of a healthy moral realism. "The world and life's

¹ Matthew Arnold, *Poems*: "Youth and Calm."

too big to pass for a dream." Nay, the advocate of sensibility will not hesitate to say that your world of pure reason is all a mystic dream, that moral reality is to be found in the fleeting moments and the pleasures and pains they bring, that he who has dulled his sensibilities, and lived the Stoic life of apathy to these, has missed life's only treasure. The Cyrenaic argument for preoccupation with the present is the same as the Stoic argument for apathy to it—that the present is evanescent, and perishes with the using. If our idealism is to stand, it must contain realism within itself; if the spirit is to live its own proper life, it can only be by annexing the territory of the flesh, and establishing its own order there. The necessity of this acknowledgment of the claims of sensibility, and of the relative truth of the hedonistic interpretation of life has led, both among Greek and modern moralists, to a more moderate statement of the ethics of reason.

We must say, therefore, that the ethic of pure reason is, no less than the ethic of pure sensibility, a premature unification of human life. The true unity is the unity of the manifold; the true universal is the universal that contains and explains all the particulars; the true *a priori* is the *a priori* which includes the empirical. The simplification required is one which shall systematise and organise all the complex elements of our nature and our life, not one which is reached by the elimination of the complexity and detail. The rationalistic principle, like the hedonistic, is too simple. As well try to eliminate sensation from the intellectual life, as sensibility from the moral. In the one case as in the other, the form of reason, without the content of feeling, is empty; as the content of feeling, without the form of reason, is blind. The mere unity of reason is as inadequate to the concrete moral life as is the mere manifold of sensibility. The one provides a purely abstract ethical formula, as the other provides only the 'data of ethics.'

6. (B) *Moderate Rationalism, or Intuitionism.* — This is a product of modern ethical thought. It assumes two forms, an earlier or “philosophical” and a later or “dogmatic.” The former arose as a protest against the ethical Relativism of Hobbes, and is represented by the early English Rationalists; the latter is the answer offered by the Scottish Intuitionists to the ethical Relativism or Scepticism of Hume. The earlier and the later Rationalists are alike Intuitionists, their common doctrine being that our moral judgments are reducible to certain axioms or self-evident principles, and their only difference of opinion concerning the number, greater or smaller, of these self-evident or “first” principles of moral judgment. As Sidgwick says, “We can tolerably well distinguish among English ethical writers those who have confined themselves mainly to the definition and arrangement of the Morality of Common Sense, from those who have aimed at a more philosophical treatment of the content of moral intuition. And we find that the distinction corresponds in the main to a difference of periods: and that—what perhaps we should hardly have expected—the more philosophical school is the earlier. The explanation of this may be partly found by referring to the doctrines in antagonism to which, in the respective periods, the Intuitional method asserted and developed itself. In the first period all orthodox moralists were occupied in refuting Hobbism. But this system, though based on Materialism and Egoism, was yet intended as ethically constructive. Accepting in the main the commonly received rules of social morality, it explained them as the conditions of peaceful existence which enlightened self-interest directed each individual to obey; provided only the social order to which they belonged was not merely ideal, but made actual by a strong government. Now no doubt this view renders the theoretical basis of duty seriously unstable; still,

assuming a decently good government, Hobbism may claim to at once explain and establish, instead of undermining, the morality of Common Sense. And therefore, though some of Hobbes's antagonists (as Cudworth) contented themselves with simply reaffirming the absoluteness of morality, the more thoughtful felt that system must be met by system and explanation by explanation, and that they must penetrate beyond the dogmas of common sense to some more irrefragable certainty." It was the rise of a new ethical Relativism in the "Moral Sense" school of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, culminating in the subjectivism of Hume, that occasioned the new protest of the Scottish "Philosophy of Common Sense." "When . . . the new doctrine was endorsed by the dreaded name of Hume, its dangerous nature, and the need of bringing again into prominence the cognitive element of moral consciousness, were clearly seen; and the work was undertaken as a part of the general philosophic protest of the Scottish school against the Empiricism that had culminated in Hume. But this school claimed as its characteristic merit that it met Empiricism on its own ground, and showed among the facts of psychological experience which the Empiricist professed to observe, the assumptions which he repudiated. And thus in Ethics it was led rather to expound and reaffirm the morality of Common Sense, than to offer any profounder principles which could not be so easily supported by an appeal to common experience."¹

The early English Rationalists maintained, against Hobbes's theory of the artificial and conventional character of moral laws, against his reduction of "nature" to custom and contract, the rationality of these laws, their "eternal and immutable" character, as the expression not of will, whether human or divine, but of reason.

¹ Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, pp. 103, 104 (6th ed.)

For Cumberland the supreme "law of nature" is that of Benevolence, which directs us to seek in our every action "the common good of all"; while Clarke reduces our self-evident duties to our fellow-men to the two laws of Equity, or the principle that "whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do for me, that by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I in the like case should do for him," and of Benevolence, that "every rational creature ought in its sphere and station, according to its respective powers and faculties, to do all the Good it can to its fellow-creatures: to which end universal Love and Benevolence is plainly the most certain, direct, and effectual means."

The ethical theory of Hume, against which the Scottish Intuitionism of Common Sense was a protest, was the culmination of a tendency of thought which had already found expression in the "moral sense" school of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. These philosophers had reduced morality to terms not of the nature of things, but of human nature, referring it to an immediate and unerring perception of moral distinctions, a "moral sense" of the beauty and deformity of actions. The content of this moral faculty, according to Hutcheson, is Benevolence; and Shaftesbury also affirms, against Hobbes's egoistic interpretation of human nature, the equal naturalness of the social and the self-regarding impulses, and finds in the balance between them the clue to the nature of virtuous conduct. Hume followed Hutcheson in reducing all duties to that of Benevolence, the foundation of which he found in man's sympathetic nature, his feeling for the general happiness. Seeing in this new psychological Relativism of Hume, with its merely subjective basis of duty, a danger for the morality of Common Sense no less serious than that which their predecessors had seen in the political Relativism and Egoism of Hobbes, the

Scottish philosophers set themselves to re-establish the objectivity and absolute validity of moral principles, their self-evident or intuitive character. Conscience, they maintained, is not a "moral sense," peculiar to human nature, if not varying with the individual; it is only another name for Reason in its moral application. Our moral judgments are reducible to ultimate judgments of reason, not of feeling; they are the application of principles or general moral laws to the details of moral experience. The Scottish answer to Hume consists, therefore, in an appeal not to that "moral sense" which was represented as a mere taste or preference for certain kinds of conduct, but to the moral Reason of mankind — their moral "Common Sense" or common apprehension of self-evident moral principles. These principles, they hold, are implicit in the moral judgments of the ordinary man, and it is the function of philosophy to make them explicit. The method of proof is indirect: such principles, being the basis of all demonstration, cannot themselves be demonstrated. Demonstration implies indemonstrable or self-evident principles, axioms of moral as of intellectual judgment. The refusal to accept these ultimate principles of thought reduces thought to that universal scepticism which is the logical result of the Humian relativism and empiricism.

But such a dogmatic re-affirmation of the morality of Common Sense is obviously no answer to Hume, who had attempted to explain, in terms of experience and utility, the apparent rationality of the moral laws which Common Sense accepts as ultimate. The Intuitionist method of the Scottish Philosophy is "dogmatic," inasmuch as it assumes the validity of the moral laws of the ordinary conscience or Common Sense, and to this extent identifies the ordinary unreflective conscience with the reflective reason, accepting the convictions of the former as axioms

or ultimate premisses of moral reflection. The result is a mere restatement in abstract terms of the judgments of the ordinary moral consciousness, the several moral laws being conceived, as they are conceived by unreflective thought, as all equally absolute, instead of being reduced to the unity of a system through their common reference to some ultimate unifying principle. What is axiomatic to Common Sense is not axiomatic to ethical reflection. The only axiom of ethical science would be the rationality of the moral life, the possibility of systematising our moral judgments. The conception of a system, as distinguished from a mere series, of moral judgments, delivers us from the necessity of appealing to first principles or ultimate premisses of ethical thought, the demonstration of the supremacy of the unifying principle being found in the system of moral judgments which it enables us to construct and whose validity it thus establishes. Such a unifying principle can be found only in the Good to which the several moral laws prescribe the means; and it is because the Intuitional method is formalistic or legalistic, rather than teleological, because it refuses to deduce the validity of the several moral laws from the ultimate Good to which they lead, that it is dogmatic or uncritical in its attitude to these laws.

The intuitive character of a moral principle does not in itself alone prove its rationality or its absolute validity. This intuitive character may be accounted for by an empirical theory of morality. It may be shown that a principle is intuitive only in a secondary sense, and only for the individual. To the individual, in any age and country, the morality of that age and country, and even the particular modification of it in the atmosphere of which he has grown up, may be said to present itself as absolutely and immediately obligatory. The moral consciousness of the nation and of the society to which he

belongs is focussed and crystallised in the individual, who is their child. The absoluteness and originality of moral principles are therefore, or may be, merely subjective. Objectively, morality is constantly changing, and even the moral consciousness is found, when we regard it from without, to be changing too. The change in the one is correlative with the change in the other. A law of conduct which is intuitive or self-evident to the individual may yet be a generalisation from the experience of the race in the adaptation of means to ends or in the adjustment of its conduct to the conditions of its life.

Taken even at its own profession, as the ethics of Common Sense, Intuitionism is easily criticised. For apart from its implicit utilitarianism, Common Sense admits exceptions of a large kind to the principles of conduct which it recognises. These principles are not to it more than high generalisations which have to be modified, temporarily or permanently, according to circumstances. The solution of the problem offered by the "conflict of duties" implies the correction of the abstractness and absoluteness of the several moral laws through the reference of the action to the end to which it is a means, and from which alone the law derives its authority; and Common Sense is thus critically and explicitly utilitarian in its attitude to these laws. As Sidgwick has so convincingly shown, "the doctrine of Common Sense is rather a rough compromise between conflicting lines of thought than capable of being evolved into a clear and universally accepted axiom." Its first principles are not "capable of being converted into first principles of scientific ethics." "The morality of Common Sense may still be perfectly adequate to give practical guidance to common people in common circumstances; but the attempt to elevate it into a system of Intuitional Ethics brings its in-

evitable imperfections into prominence without helping us to remove them.”¹ To fix and stereotype its principles, to conceive them as eternally and absolutely valid, is to construct a Common Sense for mankind corresponding to a certain theory of it, rather than to interpret Common Sense impartially, as Intuitionism professes to do.

In view of these defects of Intuitionism in its later or Scottish form, Sidgwick has attempted to revive the older and more philosophical form of the theory. His unsparing criticism of the intuitions of the Common Sense philosophy leaves a residuum of intuitional thought which he finds it impossible to reject. This consists, as we have seen in the last chapter,² of the three principles, Prudence, Benevolence, and Justice, which are in reality simply three applications of the single principle of Equality or Impartiality. Sidgwick's three ultimate moral laws, therefore, are reducible to the single categorical imperative, “Act impartially or rationally”; and he admits that, without a content supplied to them from some other quarter, these laws are mere empty forms, which give no positive determination of conduct.³ The inadequacy of Sidgwick's ethical theory may indeed be said to be the result of this separation of the content from the form of morality, as well as of the fact that, when applied to the content of sensibility (or pleasure), these laws or regulative principles, supplied by reason, are found to provide not a single, all-inclusive imperative, and therefore a really unifying principle of conduct, but two imperatives, equally categorical, and necessarily conflicting in their practical application, namely, that of Prudence or Self-love on the one hand, and that of Benevolence or the love of others, on the other. So long

¹ *Methods of Ethics*, bk. iii. ch. xi. § 9, p. 361 (6th ed.)

² Pp. 109 ff.

³ *Methods of Ethics*, bk. iii. ch. xiii. § 3, p. 379 (6th ed.)

as we stop short of a single unifying principle, our ethical theory is not really "philosophical"; the flaw which results from the acceptance of the pseudo-axiom still attaches to it. But, as has already been pointed out, the only really unifying principle is found in the supreme End or Good, in whose light we discover the relative or instrumental value of each particular action and class of actions. The Good, when found, will reveal the principles of its own distribution: apart from it, we seek in vain for ultimate or self-evident principles. The mere reduction of the number of the principles regarded as intuitive does not convert dogmatic or uncritical into critical or philosophical thought. If we would reach a really philosophical theory of morality, we must abandon the Intuitionist method and point of view; we must cease to regard as final and self-evidencing any particular principle or law of conduct, and insist upon an explanation of the validity of each in terms of the supreme End to which all alike are instrumental.

Yet we must acknowledge that the Intuitionists have signalled an all-important truth, however they may have misinterpreted it. There is an absolute, an 'eternal and immutable,' element in morality. The fact that its history is a history of progress, and not of mere capricious variation—that we are able to trace a definite progressive tendency in the ethical process—proves the presence and operation, throughout the process, of such an element. But that element lies deeper than individual moral laws or principles, deeper than any given form of moral practice; for these are always changing. It is nothing less than the moral ideal itself. In virtue of the absolute claim and authority of the ideal, its various changing expressions, the several — so diverse — paths along which, in different ages, in different circumstances, by different individuals, that ideal may be reached and

realised, derive a claim and an authority as absolute as that of the ideal itself. Their claim is its claim, their authority its authority. Nor is the individual's moral obligation, in respect of these laws, a whit less absolute than it would be if the pathway to the ideal were fixed and unchangeable. This is the one path for him, here and now; and in practice the question does not arise: "And what shall this or that man do, in this or that age, or country, or set of circumstances?" but only, "What shall I do, in mine?" But if we are to find the theoretic basis of this absolute and eternal obligation of morality, we must seek it, not in the several moral laws themselves, but in the common, ideal which underlies and gives meaning to them all. The Intuitionist school can hardly be said to have done more than, by its insistence upon the 'ought' of moral life, upon the absolute significance of the distinction between right and wrong, to have emphasised the fact that there is such an absolute moral end or ideal. The definition of that ideal still remains as the task of ethical science.

7. The ethical service of Rationalism and its corresponding defects may be thus summarised:—

(1) It signalises the fundamentally important truth that reason, rather than sensibility, is the regulative principle in the life of a rational being. Only, it tends towards the extreme of saying that reason is the constitutive as well as the regulative principle, or that the life of man, as a rational being, must be a life of pure reason; which is to miss the nerve of the moral life, and to identify it with the intellectual, to make man at best a thinker only, and not a doer. This, the characteristic error of Greek ethics, has reappeared in modern Rationalism, and notably in the ethics of Kant.

(2) To the realistic interpretation of Hedonism, Rationalism opposes an idealistic view of morality. It signalises the notion of duty or obligation, the distinction

between the 'ought' and the 'is'; or, in short, it asserts that the ethical end is, in its very nature, an ideal demanding realisation. It reaches, however, only the form of the moral ideal. The content must come from sensibility, and for sensibility the ethics of reason has no proper place.

(3) The assertion, which is repeated again and again in the rational school, of the dignity and independence of man as a rational being, is a sublime and momentous truth. For man rises out of nature, and has to assert his infinite rational superiority to nature. Goodness means the subjugation of nature to spirit. The good life is the rational life; the life of mere nature is, in a rational being, irrational. And it may well seem, in the great crises of the struggle, as if all else but the rational self were unworthy to live, and must absolutely die. Yet nature also has its ethical function; and the moral life is not so entirely stern and joyless as Stoic and Kantian moralists would say. Even he who was called, by reason of the greatness of his moral task, 'a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief,' had yet his joy—the deep and abiding joy that comes of moral victory; and, according to the measure of his faithfulness, each combatant may share that joy.

8. Transition to Eudæmonism.—In Rationalism, therefore, no more than in Hedonism, do we find the final ethical theory. Reason must indeed be the governing power in the party-warfare of the soul. Without reason's insight, the moral life were impossible; a rational self-mastery is the very kernel of morality. But such a true self-mastery is not effected by the withdrawal of reason from the fray, by its retreat within the sanctuary of peaceful thought and undisturbed philosophic meditation. This would be mere Quietism. Life is not mere thought or contemplation, but strenuous activity; and the weapons of life's warfare are forged in the fur-

nance of sensibility, if the hand that wields them must be guided by the eye of thought. We must either fight with these weapons, or give up the fight; for other weapons there are none in all the armoury of human nature.

The inevitable confession of the abstractness of a pure ethic of reason has led, as we have seen, to the more moderate form of Rationalism, with its more or less grudging acknowledgment of the place of sensibility. The result is a transition from what we might call an abstract and negative ethical monism to a concrete and positive ethical dualism. The hedonistic principle, or the prudential maxim of life, since it can neither be eliminated nor absorbed, is co-ordinated with the moral, rational or virtuous principle. The only possibility of unifying these two principles would seem to be by reducing virtue to prudence; but this course would mean, from the standpoint of the theory, the disappearance of virtue, as the reverse course had already been found to mean the disappearance of prudence. The impossibility of a purely rational ethic is, however, most convincingly displayed in the case of the extreme Rationalism of Kant. His final appeal to sensibility, in the form of 'practical interest' or 'reverence,' is closely parallel to the appeal to reason on the part of Hedonists like Mill and Sidgwick. As the latter, Hedonists or advocates of sensibility though they are, are forced in the end to hold a brief for reason; so is Kant, the extreme Rationalist of modern ethics, compelled at last to admit to his counsels the despised sensibility. The lesson of both events surely is, that neither in Hedonism nor in Rationalism, neither in the Ethics of Sensibility nor in the Ethics of Reason, but in Eudæmonism, or the Ethics of that total human Personality which contains, as elements, both reason and sensibility, is the full truth to be found.

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CHAPTER III.

EUDÆMONISM, OR THE ETHICS OF PERSONALITY.

1. The ethical dualism. Its theoretical expression. —The preceding discussion has revealed a fundamental dualism in ethical theory, corresponding to a fundamental dualism in the nature and life of man. The task which now meets us is the solution of the problem raised by this dualism in ethical theory and practice ; but before attempting the execution of that task, it will be well to bring the two sides of the dualism into clear relief.

Looking first at the theoretical side of the question, we have found the two comprehensive types of ethical theory to be the Ethics of Reason and the Ethics of Sensibility. On the one hand, it has been felt, from the dawn of ethical reflection, that the true life of man must be a rational life. Reason, it is recognised, is the differentiating attribute of man, distinguishing him from the animal or merely sentient being. At first, it is true, no cleft was perceived between the life of reason and the life of sensibility. Even to Socrates, the proper life of man is one of sentient satisfaction, although it is essentially a rational life, the appropriate life of a rational being. The Socratic life is a self-examined and a self-guided life ; the measure of sentient satisfaction is set by the reason which is the distinguishing attribute of man ; the criteria of goodness are self-mastery and self-consistency. The place of reason

in the ethics of Socrates becomes evident in his central doctrine of the ethical supremacy of knowledge, of the identity of knowledge and virtue, or human excellence. The wise man, or the man who, in the entire conduct of his life, follows the voice of reason, is the man who has attained the chief human Good. By Plato and Aristotle, more explicitly and absolutely than by Socrates, the secret of the good life is found in reason, and the life of sensibility is condemned as essentially irrational. Plato, in his doctrine of the *θυμός*, recognises a secondary value in sensibility, but only in so far as it shares in the rational principle, and is reason's watch-dog. Aristotle recognises, more explicitly, a higher and a lower virtue, a virtue which is the excellence of a purely rational being, whose life is the life of reason itself, and a virtue which is the excellence of a compound nature like man's, partly rational, partly irrational or sentient. But both Plato and Aristotle, following in the footsteps of their common master, only going much farther than he had gone, find the ideal good in the exclusive life of reason, the philosophic or contemplative life. To both this is the divine life, some participation in which is vouchsafed to man even now, and in the aspiration after which, as the eternal ideal, he must seek to be delivered from the bondage of the lower world of sensibility. The Stoics did but accentuate this ascetic and ideal note, so prominent yet so surprising in the moral reflection of the Greeks; this divine discontent of the human spirit with its lot in the present and the sensuous, this craving for a rational and abiding Good behind the shows of sense and time, this sublime independence of all that suffers shock and change in mortal life. The rationalism and asceticism of modern ethics are little more than the echo of this ancient thought, that the only life worthy of a rational being is the life of reason itself. It is this thought that we have found working in the early English rationalists, who seek to demonstrate the absurdity of the evil life; in their successors of the Intuitionist school,

who maintain the self-evidence of moral law and the self-contradiction of moral evil; and in Kant, the greatest of modern Rationalists, for whom the good will is the will that takes as the maxim of its choice a principle fit for law universal in a kingdom of pure reason, and in whose eyes the slightest alloy of sensibility would corrupt the pure gold of the life of duty.

On the other hand, the life of sensibility has never been without its defenders, advocates who have shown no less enthusiasm on its behalf than their opponents have shown on behalf of reason. We have just noted the hedonistic element in the ethical teaching of Socrates. The importance of this element, neglected in the main by Plato, was signalled anew by Aristotle, who not only regarded the life of virtue as essentially a pleasant life, but saw in pleasure the very bloom and completion of goodness or well-being. The Epicureans, among the Greeks and Romans, and the Hedonists, among ourselves, have reversed the Aristotelian relation, and have made reason the servant of feeling, a minister to be consulted always, and listened to with respect and confidence, but still a minister only and not a ruler in the party-conflict of the soul. While the interpretation of happiness has so varied that it might well have been the watchword of both schools, the hedonistic interpretation of it is always in terms of pleasure, or of the life of sensibility. But if we would find the perfectly consistent Hedonism, the thorough-going Ethics of Sensibility, corresponding to the Stoic and Kantian Ethics of Reason, we must go back to the precursors of the Epicurean school, the early Cyrenaics. So complete is their confidence in sensibility that they surrender reason to it, or rather resolve reason into it; Sensationalists in intellectual theory, in ethics they are Hedonists. Since momentary feeling is the only moral reality, we must, if we would attain the Good of life, ~~surrender~~ surrender ourselves to the pleasure of the moments as they pass.

2. Its practical expression.—This theoretical conflict has its counterpart in the practical life of man, and in the characteristic attitudes and moods of different ages, countries, and individuals in view of the actual business of life. Moral theory is the reflection of moral practice, and the interest of the high debate that has raged through all these centuries between the rival ethical schools has a practical and not a merely scientific, still less scholastic interest. Party-spirit runs high on the question of the *summum bonum*, for every man has a stake in its settlement, the stake of his own nature and destiny; and the side which each takes, in practice if not in theory, will be found to be the exponent of that nature, and the prophecy of that destiny. Let us look, then, for a moment at the practical expression of this fundamental ethical dualism.

It is not only in the philosophic schools, but in actual life, that we find the two moral types—the Stoic and the Cyrenaic. In all ages we can distinguish the rigorist, ascetic, strenuous temper of life from the hedonist, impulsive, luxurious; the puritan from the cavalier spirit; the man of reason, cool and hard, from the man of feeling, soft and sensuous. We might perhaps call the two types the idealistic and the realistic. In historical epochs, and in whole peoples, as well as in the individual life, the distinction is illustrated. The Greeks were a sensuous people, but gradually the reason found the life of sensibility unsatisfying, and the Greek spirit took its flight to the supersensible and ideal—to the world of pure reason; they *were* realists, they *became* idealists. The result is found in Platonism, Stoicism, and Neo-Platonism. This mystic yearning after a satisfaction which the sensible world cannot yield, this home-sickness of a rational being, is at the heart of mediæval Christianity, with its monastic ideal and its anxious denial of the flesh for the sake of the spirit's life. The Byronic temper represents the other extreme. Man regards himself as

a creature of sensibility, of impulses, of enthusiasms and exaltations, of weariness and depression,—a kind of mirror that reflects the changes of his life, or a high-strung instrument that vibrates in quick responsiveness to them all. The realism of contemporary fiction represents the same one-sided assertion of the rights of sensibility; and the luxuriousness and material comfort of our modern life, the practical utilitarian spirit that threatens ideal aims, minister to the same result. But the two forces are always present and in conflict.

3. *Attempts at reconciliation.*—Each of these sides of our nature has its rights, just because both are sides of our nature, and, as Aristotle said, life and virtue must be in terms of nature. In actual life, we find either the sacrifice of one to the other, or a rough and ready, more or less successful, compromise between their rival claims. The task of ethical science, as it is the task of the moral life itself, is the reconciliation of these apparently conflicting claims—the full recognition both of the rights of reason and of the rights of sensibility, and their reduction, if possible, to the unity of a common life governed by a single central principle. This task of reconciliation was attempted long ago by Plato, who, after condemning sensibility as in itself irrational, yet described virtue as essentially a harmony of all man's powers,—a complete life in which every part of his nature, the lowest as well as the highest, should find its due scope and exercise, all in subjection to the supreme authority of reason. Aristotle, too, though he reasserted the Platonic distinction of the rational and irrational, conceived of man's well-being as a full-orbed life, which, while it was in accordance with right reason, included sensibility as well. To both Plato and Aristotle, however, the ideal life is the life of pure reason—of intellectual activity or contemplation.

The same kind of reconciliation has been attempted in

modern times, only in view of a deeper realisation of the width of the cleft than the Greek consciousness had attained. Hegel, in particular, has sought, in the ethical as in the metaphysical sphere, to correct the abstractness and formalism of the Kantian theory, by vindicating the rights of sensibility, and harmonising them with the rights of reason which Kant had so exclusively maintained. As, in the intellectual sphere, Hegel attempts to vindicate the rights of sensation and to demonstrate the essential identity of sensation and thought, so, in the ethical sphere, he seeks to prove the essential rationality of the life of sensibility. In both spheres he offers a concrete content for the abstract and barren form of the Kantian theory, since he holds that in both spheres 'the real is the rational.' This reconciliation has been so clearly and impressively set forth by Thomas Hill Green, in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, that it is needless to reproduce it here. But in order that the reconciliation may be successful, the conflict must first be felt in all its intensity; and if the ancient moralists tended to exaggerate the sharpness of the dualism, the modern disciples of Hegel may perhaps be said to underestimate it. In that life of sensibility which the ethical rationalists had condemned as the irrational, the Hegelian idealist sees the image and superscription of reason. Are not both interpretations a trifle hasty and impatient? Were it not better to follow the workings of the moral life itself, and see there how the antithesis is pressed until it yields the higher synthesis? If, even in the intellectual life of man, there is labour, the 'labour of the notion,' still more so is there in the moral life; and an adequate ethic must take account of, and interpret, this labour. The defect of the Hegelian interpretation of morality is that it is not faithful enough to the Hegelian method of dialectical progress through negation to higher affirmation. The 'everlasting Nay' must be pressed to the

last, before we can hear the 'everlasting Yea' of the moral life.

Finally, in the Rational Hedonism of Mill and Sidgwick we found the consummation of the growing rationalism of hedonistic ethics. Sidgwick's theory is essentially a compromise of the old sort—the acceptance of reason as instrumental merely, though as instrumentally indispensable, and therefore all the old difficulties which beset the hedonistic interpretation of the moral ideal return. Reason still exists and functions for the sake of sensibility: its only *raison d'être* is a larger and more complete sentient satisfaction; the only ethical interest is the interest of sensibility, namely, pleasure. But, from the standpoint of reason itself, such a view must always appear unworthy and superficial. In Mill's theory, the hedonistic interpretation of the moral ideal is really abandoned, and, under the guidance of reason, the Good is re-interpreted in such a way as to give a new rational significance to pleasure as an element in the life of a rational being. The ethical interest, not being an interest in pleasure merely, receives a new interpretation from the point of view of reason. Such a theory illustrates the impossibility of attaining the required reconciliation from the hedonistic point of view.

4. The solution of Christianity. — In Christianity we find the antithesis at its sharpest. It is just because Christianity recognises, and does full justice to, both sides of our nature, and because it asserts with a unique emphasis the conflict between them, that its interpretation of human life has been felt to be most adequate. The Greek ideal was one of moderation or the Mean, a measured sensuous life. Christianity widens the breach between the spirit and nature, between the mind and the flesh,—widens it that at last it may be overcome. The rights of the spirit are emphasised, to the negation, in comparison with them, of the rights of the flesh. The

flesh must be crucified, the natural self must die, the old man must be put off. The result is such a struggle between the flesh and the spirit, between the 'two men' in each man, that the victory seems uncertain, and the bitter cry is wrung from the weary wrestling spirit: "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" But this widening of the moral breach is the necessary first step in the life of goodness. The ascetic note is the primary and fundamental one, self-sacrifice must precede and make possible self-fulfilment, the moral life is mediated by death. For man rises out of nature, and must, as a spiritual or rational being, assert his superiority to nature. That it may guide and master sensibility, reason must first assert itself to the negation of sensibility. The true self is rational and spiritual; and, that it may live, the lower, fleshly, sensuous self must die. Only through this 'strait gate' is the entrance to the pathway of the spirit's life.

Yet Christianity is no merely ascetic or Mystic system. It does breed in its disciples a profound sense of dissatisfaction with the actual life, it does lead to the disparagement of nature and sensibility; but it does so just because it inspires in them the conviction of an ideal of which the actual for ever falls short, and shows man how much more and greater he is than nature. The sunny gladness of the Pagan spirit had to be darkened by the shadow of this prophetic discontent; but a new gladness came with Christianity. There can be no literal renaissance or re-birth of Paganism. The spiritual history of man does not repeat itself, there is no return to former stages of moral experience. The human spirit has been born anew, and has learned in Christianity lessons about its own dignity and task and destiny which it can never more unlearn. And in view of the fundamental lesson of Christianity, of the infinite, eternal, and divine worth of the human spirit, it may well seem as if all else

were unworthy to live, and must absolutely die. The good life is the rational life, a life in which reason, the same in God and man, must guide and be master. Yet nature has its rights, though they are not independent of the supreme rights of the rational spirit; and Christianity recognises the rights of nature. For each man there is a crown of joy, though the way to it lies through the pain and toil and death of the cross. As in the victorious march of the Roman arms, the vanquished territory of nature is not ravaged and laid waste; the conquering Reason annexes nature, the kingdom of nature and the flesh becomes the kingdom of the rational spirit. The whole man is redeemed from evil to goodness; the old *becomes* new. There is a re-birth of the entire being; nothing finally dies, it dies only to rise again to its true life. All lives in the new, transfigured, spiritual life; all becomes organic to the one central principle, an element in the one total life. The 'world' becomes part of the 'kingdom of God.' All other, separate and rival, interests die, because they are all alike superseded, transcended, and incorporated in this one interest. Nay, the individual self, in so far as it insists upon its separate and exclusive life, upon its own peculiar and private interests, must die. The 'world' is indeed just the sphere of this narrow selfish 'self,' and both together must be superseded. "It is no more I that live." But the narrow and selfish self dies, that the larger and unselfish self may live. Only he that so loseth his life shall truly find it.

All this is symbolised in Christianity in the incarnation, death, and resurrection of its Founder. The idea of incarnation—the root-idea of Christianity—is a splendid and thoroughgoing protest against the ascetic view of matter as in its very essence evil; of the body as the mere prison-house of the soul, to be escaped from by the aspiring spirit, as something between which and God there can be no contact or communion any more than between darkness and light. Christianity sees in matter

the very vehicle of the divine revelation, the transparent medium of the spiritual life, the great opportunity for the exercise of virtue. The Word was made Flesh—ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. Nor, in word or life, does Jesus suggest any aloofness of spirit from the things of this world, any withdrawal from its affairs as dangerous to the soul's best life, any superiority to its most ordinary avocations. "The Son of Man came eating and drinking," sharing man's common life, and realising the divine ideal in it. Even so, by his lowly and willing acceptance of human life in the entirety of its actual relations, did he transfigure that life, by turning to divine account all its uses and occasions, by making of each an element in the life of goodness. This transfiguration of human life was no single incident or crisis in the career of Jesus; men did not always see it, but his life itself was one continuous transfiguration. Nay, the life of goodness always is such a transfiguration; everything is hallowed when it becomes the vehicle of the divine life in man, nothing is any more common or unclean. Yet the persistent holding to the ideal Good of this earthly life means suffering and death; only so can the earthly nature become the medium of the divine. There are always the two possibilities for man, the lower and the higher; and that the higher may be realised, the lower must be denied. "From flesh unto spirit man grows"; and the flesh has to die, that the spirit may live. The eager, strenuous spirit has to crucify the easy, yielding flesh. But the good man dies, only to live again; his death is no defeat, it is perfect victory—victory signed and sealed. From such a death there must needs be a glorious resurrection to that new life which has been purchased by the death of the old.

5. The ethical problem: the meaning of self-realisation.—The conclusion to which we are forced by the facts of the moral life is, that the true and adequate in-

terpretation of it must lie, not in the exclusive assertion of either side of the dualism, but in the discovery of the relation of the two sides to one another. In order to the statement of this relation, we must have recourse to a fundamental principle of unity. In other words, we are led to consider the meaning of Self-realisation.

As the watchword of Hedonism may be said to be self-pleasing or self-gratification, and as that of Rationalism is apt to be self-sacrifice or self-denial, so the watchword of Eudæmonism may be said to be self-realisation or self-fulfilment. It seems, however, almost a truism to say that the end of human life is self-realisation. The aim and object of every living being, of the mere animal as well as of man—nay, of the thing as well as the animal and the person—may be described as self-preservation and self-development, or in the single term ‘self-realisation.’ In a universe in which to ‘exist’ means to ‘struggle,’ self-assertion, *perseverare in esse suo*, may be called the universal law of being. Moreover, every ethical theory might claim the term ‘self-realisation,’ as each might claim the term ‘happiness.’ The question is, What is the self? or, Which self is to be realised? Hedonism answers, the sentient self; Rationalism, the rational self; Eudæmonism, the total self, rational and sentient. The ethical problem, being to define self-realisation, is therefore in its ultimate form the definition of selfhood or personality. When we wish to describe the characteristic and peculiar end of human life, we must either use a more specific term than self-realisation, or must explain the meaning of human self-realisation by defining the self which is to be realised. And since man alone is, in the proper sense, a self or person, we are led to ask: What is it that constitutes his personality, and distinguishes man, as a person, from the so-called animal or impersonal self? The basis of his nature being animal, how is it lifted up into the higher sphere of human personality?

6. Definition of personality : the individual and the person.—Selfhood cannot consist in mere individuality ; for the animal, as well as the man, is an individual self—a self that asserts itself against other individuals, that excludes the latter from its life, and struggles with them for the means of its own satisfaction. Man is a self in this animal sense of selfhood: he is a creature of impulse, a subject of direct and immediate wants and instincts which demand their satisfaction, and prompt him to struggle with other individuals for the means of such satisfaction. These impulsive forces spring up in man as spontaneously as in the animal, their ‘push and pull’ is as real in the one case as in the other. And if might were right, these forces in their total workings would constitute the man, as they seem to constitute the animal ; and the resultant of their operations would be the only goal of the former, as of the latter life. But might is not right in human life ; it is this distinction that constitutes morality. As the Greeks said, man is called upon to ‘measure’ his impulses—in temperance or moderation lies the path to his self-fulfilment ; and the measure of impulse is found in ‘right reason.’ That is to say, man, as a rational being, is called upon to bring impulse under the law of the rational self ; man is a *rational animal*. Butler and Aristotle agree in this definition of human nature and in this view of human life. In Aristotle’s opinion, that which differentiates man from other beings is his possession of reason, and the true human life is a life ‘according to right reason.’ The distinctive characteristic of man, according to Butler, is that he has the power of reflecting upon the immediate animal impulses which sway him, and of viewing them, one and all, in relation to a permanent and total Good. In this critical and judicial ‘view’ of the impulsive and sentient life consists that ‘conscience’ which distinguishes man from the animal creation, and opens to him the gates of the moral life which are for ever closed to it.

It is this self-consciousness, this power of turning back upon the chameleon-like, impulsive, instinctive, sentient or individual self, and gathering up all the scattered threads of its life in the single skein of a rational whole, that constitutes the true selfhood of man. This higher and peculiarly human selfhood we may call 'personality,' as distinguished from the lower or animal selfhood of mere 'individuality'; and, in view of such a definition of the self, we may say that Self-realisation means that the several changing desires, instead of being allowed to pursue their several ways, and to seek each its own good or satisfaction, are so correlated and organised that each becomes instrumental to the fuller and truer life of the rational or human self. This power of rising above the impulse of the moment, and of viewing it in the light of his rational selfhood; this power of transcending the entire impulsive, instinctive, and sentient life, and of regarding the self which is but the bundle of impulses as the servant of the higher rational self, is what makes man, ethically, man. It is this endowment that constitutes 'will.' We do not attribute will to the animal, because, so far as we know, it cannot, as we can, arrest the stream of impulsive tendency, but is borne on the tide of present impulse. That is a life 'according to nature' for it; in such a life it realises the only 'self' it has to realise. But man, as we have seen, can take the larger view of reason, and can act in the light of that better insight. It is given to him to criticise the impulsive 'stream,' to arrest and change its course, to subdue the lower, animal, natural self to the higher, human, rational self; to build up out of the plastic raw material of sensibility, out of the *data* of mere native disposition, acted upon by and reacting upon circumstances or environment, a stable rational character. We do not attribute 'character' to the mere animal; its life is a life of natural and immediate sensibility, unchecked by any thought of life's meaning as a whole. In its life there is no conscious unity or totality. But for man, the *rational*

animal, the natural life of obedience to immediate sensibility is not a life 'according to nature,' according to his higher and proper nature as man. All his natural tendencies to activity, all the surging clamant life of natural sensibility, must be criticised, judged, approved or condemned, accepted or rejected, by the higher insight of reason which enables him to see his life in its meaning as a whole. His life is not a mere struggle of natural tendencies; he is the critic, as well as the subject, of such promptings: and it is as critic of his own nature that he is master of his own destiny. Just in so far as he makes impulse his minister, as he is master of impulse, or is mastered and defeated by it, does man succeed or fail in the task of Self-realisation.

7. **The rational or personal self: its intellectual and ethical functions compared.**—Thus interpreted, the business of self-realisation might be described as the task of moral synthesis. Since the time of Kant, epistemology has found in rational synthesis the fundamental principle of knowledge. Green has elaborated the parallel, in this respect, between knowledge and morality, and shown us the activity of the rational ego at the heart of both. Professor Laurie, in his conception of 'will-reason,' has also emphasised the identity of the process in both cases. The task of the rational ego is, in the moral reference, the organisation of sensibility, as, in the intellectual case, it is the organisation of sensation. Impulses and feelings must, like sensations, be challenged by the self, criticised, measured, and co-ordinated or assigned their place in the ego's single life. For this work of organisation or synthesis, the insight of reason is needed, as Plato and Aristotle saw. As, in the construction of the percept out of the original sensation, the ego recognises, discriminates between, selects from, and combines the sensations presented, and thus forms out of them an object of knowledge; so, in the construction of the end

out of the original impulse, we find the same recognition, discrimination, selection, and organisation of the crude *data* of sensibility. Only through this synthesis of the manifold of sensibility, through this reduction of its several elements to the common measure of a single rational life, can the ego constitute for itself moral ends, and a supreme end or ideal of life.

Following the clue of the epistemological parallel, we find that Hedonism in ethics rests upon the same kind of psychological 'atomism' as that which forms the basis of the sensationalistic or empirical theory of knowledge. Hedonism rests upon the atomism of the separate individual feeling or impulse, as Sensationalism rests upon the atomism of the separate individual sensation. A thorough-going empiricism, whether in ethics or in epistemology, fails to see the need of rational synthesis or system. The empiricist seems to think that the atoms of sensation or of sensibility will *unify themselves*; he endows them with a kind of dynamical property. And it is true that sensibility, like sensation, already contains within itself a kind of synthesis, that there is a certain continuity in the sentient as in the sensational life; that each is to be regarded rather as a stream than as the several links of a chain not yet in existence. But this elementary synthesis must be supplemented in either case by the higher and more complete synthesis of reason, if we would pass from the level of the animal to the higher level of human life. Feeling gives a 'fringe' or margin, narrower or broader—association more or less intimate—but system comes with reason. To be unified or systematised, feeling must be idealised or rationalised. Morality is the constant dictation of idea to existence, the continual chastisement of feeling by reason.¹ The integration of impulse is the work of reason. Man is more than a subject of feeling,

¹ Mr F. H. Bradley puts this in his own way when he says that "the 'what' of all feeling is discordant with its 'that.'" — *Appearance and Reality*, p. 460.

he is also a thinker ; and his thought, as well as his feeling, has a bearing upon his activity, though only through his feeling. The rational 'I' integrates the impulses by thinking or conceiving them, by considering their meaning. Like Plato and Aristotle, Butler and Kant saw that this 'practical wisdom,' or rational insight into the meaning of impulse, is the secret of self-control. Only through the exercise of this supreme endowment can the unity and harmony of a well-ordered life take the place of the chaos and discord of ungoverned impulse. The unity of moral life is the unity of rational purpose.

The answer of Kant to epistemological empiricism may therefore be extended to ethical empiricism. Psychology itself suggests the Kantian answer, and helps us to correct it. Feelings and impulses are not, any more than sensations, separate and atomic, but, even in their own nature, they form parts in the continuous stream of the mental life. But the life of feeling and impulse, as a whole, is 'loose' or separate, and has to be 'apperceived,'¹ or made an element in the life of the rational ego. The dualism of reason and sensibility is very real. The life of the spirit is never smooth and easy, like the life of nature ; there is always opposition, an obstinate matter to be subdued to spiritual form. And the labour and effort of the spirit is greater, the matter is more intractable, and the struggle with it harder, in the moral than in the intellectual life.

8. The sentient or individual self.—But while we thus extend to the ethical life the transcendental or Kantian answer to empiricism, we must be careful not to go to the other extreme, and lose the truth of Hedonism. Ethical, like intellectual empiricism, contains an important truth. Adopting Kant's terminology, we may say that ethical personality constitutes itself through the subsumption of the empirical or sentient ego by the

¹ In the Kantian sense of that term.

transcendental or rational ego. Neither in the life of the empirical ego alone, as the Hedonists maintain, nor in that of the transcendental ego alone, as the ethical Rationalists maintain, but in the relation of the one to the other, or in the 'synthetic unity of apperception,' does morality consist. We must conserve the real, as well as the ideal, side of the moral life. The error of Transcendentalism—whether Platonic or Kantian—is that it sacrifices the real, in morality as in knowledge, to the ideal, that it sublimates the life of feeling into the life of reason. It is the characteristic error of the great Greek moralists, the error of sacrificing the moral life, with all its concrete reality of living, throbbing human sensibility, on the altar of intellect or cool philosophic reason. We are not to think of reason as having exclusive interests of its own, apart from those of sensibility; its interest is rather the total interest of sensibility itself. By its peculiar insight and splendid impartiality, reason secures the well-being of the life of sensibility, and, through the integration of its several conflicting tendencies in the conception of a supreme end or moral ideal, effects that perfect and harmonious sentient satisfaction which we call happiness. We must insist that the person is always an individual; his personality acts upon, and constitutes itself out of, his individuality. The rational 'I' must not merely *think*, it must think the sentient and otherwise irrational 'Me'; the 'I' must live in the 'Me,' reason in feeling. The doctrine of the abstract universal, of pure rational selfhood, of form without content, is no less inadequate than the doctrine of the abstract particular, of mere individual sensibility, of content without form. In the moral, as in the intellectual sphere, the real is concrete,—the universal *in* the particular, such a unity of both as means the absolute sacrifice of neither. Such a moral realism at once recognises the truth of idealism, Platonic or Kantian, and supplements it by a more adequate interpretation of ethical fact. For,

morally as intellectually, "the individual alone is the real."

9. 'Be a person.'—The key to the ethical harmony, then, is: *Be a person*; constitute, out of your natural individuality, your true, ideal, or personal self. The difference between the life of man and that of nature is that, while nature is under law, man has to subject himself to law. The law or order is, in both cases, the expression of reason; but the reason which shows itself in nature as force, shows itself in man as will. Will is the power of self-government which belongs to a rational being, or, as Kant said, 'practical reason.' For, while the entire life of man is permeated by feeling, and may even be regarded as the outcome and expression of feeling, the law of that life, the law of feeling itself, is not found in feeling, but in reason. Feeling must become organic to reason, the life of the former must become an element in the life of the latter; not conversely. Feelings have no authority over one another, as Mill said the higher have over the lower, and as Spencer says the re-representative have over the representative, and these in turn over the presentative. The representative or higher feelings have not, *quâ* feelings, any authority over, or superiority to, the presentative or lower. It is the rational self that interprets all feelings by its self-reference, or by its synthetic activity upon them, and, by such self-reference, *makes* them higher or lower, assigning to each its place and value, according as each is a more or less adequate vehicle of its self-realisation.

Here we find the true autonomy of the moral life. The law of his life, the criterion of the manner and the measure of the exercise of each impulse, is found in the proper nature or rational selfhood of man. He cannot, without ceasing to be man, abjure this function of self-legislation, or cease to demand of himself a life which shall be the fulfilment of his true and characteristic nature

as man. Virtue is not a spontaneous natural growth, still less an original endowment of nature. Man has to constitute himself a moral person: slowly and laboriously, out of the original *data* of individual feeling and impulse, of disposition and environment, he has to raise the structure of ethical manhood. We have seen that, even in the animal life, there is an organisation of impulse; but we regard it as the result of instinct, because it is not self-planned and self-originated, as in man's case, who can say—"A *whole* I planned." It is the privilege and dignity of a rational being to have the unifying or systematising of impulse in his own hands, to construct for himself the order and system of reason in the life of sensibility. For, as Aristotle truly said, nature gives only the capacity, and the capacity she gives is rather the capacity of acquiring the capacity of virtue, than the capacity of virtue itself. The best reward of virtue is the capacity of a higher virtue; "as it is by playing on the harp that men become good harpers, so it is by performing virtuous acts that men become virtuous, and as at a race it is not they who stand and watch, but they who run, who receive the prize," so is the life of virtue rewarded with the crown of a future that transcends its past.

10. 'Die to live': the meaning of self-sacrifice.—

But the course of true virtue, like that of true love, never did run smooth. Its path is strewn with obstacles, and its very life consists, as Fichte perceived, in the struggle to overcome them. The subjection of the individual, impulsive, sentient self to the order of reason is a Herculean task. The immensity, the infinity, of the task is not, indeed, to be misinterpreted, as if sensibility were a surd that cannot be eliminated from the moral life. Sensibility is not to be annihilated—in that case the moral task would be an impossible and futile one—but co-ordinated and harmonised with the rational nature, made the vehicle and instrument of the realisation of the true

or rational self. But this co-ordination is also a subordination: sensibility must obey, not govern. Here we find the relative truth of asceticism, and the deeper truth of the Christian principle of self-sacrifice. The higher or personal self can be realised only through the death of the lower or individual self, as lower and merely individual. In its separateness and independence, the sentient self must die; for there may not be two lives, or two selves. Individuality must become an element in the life of personality; the 'psychological Me' must become the organ and expression of the rational 'I.' I must die, as an individual subject of sensibility, if I would live as a moral person, the master of sensibility. I must crucify the flesh (the Pauline term for the natural, impulsive, and sentient or unmoralised man), if I would live the life of the spirit. I must lose my lower life, if I would find the higher. With the law of the rational spirit comes the consciousness, and the fact, of sin or moral evil—that is, of subjection to mere animal sensibility; and this condemnation, by reason, of the life that is not brought into subjection to its law is a condemnation unto death. But as the life of the lower is the grave of the higher self, so from the death of the lower comes forth, in resurrection glory, the higher and true self. "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." Each selfish impulse (and all impulses, even the benevolent, are selfish, in the sense that each seeks its own, and disregards all other claims) must be denied, or brought under the law of the life of the total rational self. Importunity is not the measure of ethical importance, and the 'everlasting Nay' of such self-sacrifice precedes and makes possible the 'everlasting Yea' of a true self-fulfilment. The false, worthless, particular, private, separate self must die, if the true self, the rational personality, is to live.

I have said that this struggle, with its pain and death,

precedes the joy and peace of the higher life. But the sequence is logical rather than chronological; for, in truth, the process of death is always going on, simultaneously with the process of life, or rather death and life are two constant elements, negative and positive, in the life of virtue as we know it. Even the good man 'dies daily,' daily crucifies the flesh anew. Daily the old or natural man is being put off, and the new or spiritual man put on. There is a daily and hourly death of nature, and a daily and hourly new birth and resurrection of the spirit. As in the life of a physical organism, disintegration mediates a higher integration. *La vie c'est la mort.*¹ Always, therefore, there is pain; but always, beneath the pain, in the depths of the moral being, there is a joy, stronger and more steadfast even than the pain, in the assurance that "old things are passing away, and all things are becoming new"—the joy of the conviction that the struggle is worth while, nay, is the only thing that is ultimately worth while. For "the inward man is being renewed day by day," and, in the joy of that renewal, all the pity of the pain and sorrow that make it possible sinks out of heart and mind, or lends but a deeper and a graver note to the joy which it has purchased and made possible. So ever with the negative goes the positive side of the ethical life. The spirit has ever more room and atmosphere, and its life becomes
 ✕ richer and fuller; as the flesh becomes a willing instrument in its hands, it finds continually new and higher ends for which to use it.

And the goal of the moral life, the ideal after which
 it strives, is a spontaneity, a freedom, and a naturalness like that of the life of original impulse. As Aristotle said, virtue is first activity (*ἐνέργεια*), then habit (*ἔξις*); *ἐνέργεια* leads to a new *δύναμις* (or potentiality of activity), as well as *δύναμις* to *ἐνέργεια*. The originally

¹ Cf. Professor Royce's article on "The Knowledge of Good and Evil" (*International Journal of Ethics*, Oct. 1893).

indefinite potentiality—the potentiality of either vice or virtue—becomes a definite capacity for virtue, and almost an incapacity for vice, in the established character of the good man. This ‘second nature,’ which makes virtue so far easy, is virtue’s best reward. There is all the difference in the world between the mere rigorist or negatively good man, who thinks out his conduct, and whose life is a continual repression, and the positively good man, who knows “the expulsive power of a new affection,” and whose goodness seems to bloom spontaneously, like the flower, with a life that “down to its very roots, is free.” The one life is stiff, stereotyped, artificial; the other breathes of moral health, and commends goodness to its fellows.

11. **Pleasure and happiness.** — Such a complete moral life we have called Self-realisation or Self-fulfilment. We might have called it, with Aristotle, ‘happiness,’ and thus have reclaimed the word from the exclusive possession of the Hedonists. The Good must report itself in sensibility, it must satisfy desire; self-realisation is at the same time self-satisfaction. But we must distinguish, as Aristotle did, between happiness and pleasure. The word contains a reference to pleasure; but pleasures, even in their sum, do not constitute happiness. Happiness is not the sum or aggregate of pleasures; it is their harmony or system—or rather, the feeling of this harmony. The distinction between happiness and pleasure, even within the sphere of feeling, could hardly be better stated than by Professor Dewey:¹ “Pleasure is transitory and relative, enduring only while some special activity endures, and having reference only to that activity. Happiness is permanent and universal. It results only when the act is such a one as will satisfy all the interests of the self concerned, or will lead to no conflict, either present or remote. Happiness is the feeling of the whole self, as opposed to the feeling of

¹ *Psychology*, p. 293.

some one aspect of self." As misery or unhappiness is not mere pain, or even a balance of pain over pleasure, but lies in the discord of pleasures, so happiness lies in the harmony of pleasures, or in the reference of each to the total self. Happiness is, in a word, the synthesis of pleasures. And, since pleasure is the concomitant of activity, happiness, or the synthesis and harmony of pleasures, depends upon and is constituted by the synthesis of activities, and ultimately by that supreme activity of moral synthesis which we have been considering. We thus ascertain the true place of feeling in the life of goodness, and the partial truth of Hedonism as an ethical theory. We may, with Aristotle, regard pleasure as the bloom of the virtuous life, as the index and criterion of moral progress. But while self-realisation brings self-satisfaction, the former is not to be regarded as instrumental to the latter. The end of life is neither to know nor to feel, but to do and to be. The life of man's total selfhood is its own end,—a doing which is the expression of being, and the medium of higher and fuller being, of a deeper and richer unity of thought and sensibility. In so far as we attain that end, we learn to "think clear, feel deep, bear fruit well." Although its satisfactoriness is not its *raison d'être*, the life of Self-realisation is, in its very essence, a completely satisfying life:

"Resolve to be thyself; and know, that he
Who finds himself, loses his misery."

12. **Egoism and altruism.**—This interpretation of Self-realisation enables us to co-ordinate and unify, not merely the several elements of the individual life, but also the several individual lives. Since each is not a mere individual but a person, in the common personality of all is found the ground of the conciliation and harmony of the several individual lives. As Kant puts it, each man being, in virtue of his rationality, an end-in-himself, and each self-legislative, there is found a common

law: "So act as if thou couldst will the principle of thine act law universal." Every other person is, as a person, an end-in-himself, equally with me; my attitude to him must therefore be essentially the same as my attitude to myself. The law or formula which expresses both his life and mine is that we are to be regarded, whether by ourselves or by one another, always as ends, never as merely means or instruments. He cannot, any more than I, accept a law which does not find its sanction in his own nature as a rational self. Here we find a common ground and meeting-place: however we may differ in our individuality, yet in our deepest nature—in our rational personality—we are the same. We are the same in the form of our nature, and therefore in the law of our life, however diverse may be the content.

When we submit ourselves to the common law of personality, we cease to be a number of separate, competing or co-operating, individuals; we together constitute a society, a system or kingdom of ends. Individuality separates us; personality unites us with our fellows. It is as persons that we *are* fellows. It is thought, not 'nature' or feeling, that 'makes the whole world kin.' Reason is the common element, feeling the particular. The only strictly common or social Good is a personal Good—the Good of persons. The hedonistic or sentient Good is subjective and individual—the good of the sentient subject or individual. The common Good must be the product of reason, not as excluding feeling, but as containing its regulative form and law; of personality, as including and dominating individuality. Here, in the general as in the individual case, we find the clue to the harmony and co-ordination of sensibility. Feeling, being made organic to rational personality in each, comes under the wider as well as under the narrower law. Since man cannot, as a rational person, separate himself from his fellows, and shut himself up in his own individual being, he cannot do so even as a sentient individual, or as a subject

of sensibility. For he is not two selves, but one; his personality has annexed his individuality. The false and selfish self has been sacrificed to the true self which, as rational, is essentially unselfish. This is the real unity and solidarity of mankind. We are joined to one another, and breathe the same atmosphere, in the deeper things of the rational spirit, and therefore also in the lesser matters of our daily life. Our life is one, because our nature is one. From the true ethical standpoint, there is no cleft between egoism and altruism, as there is none between reason and sensibility. We are at once egoists and altruists in every moral action: each is an *ego*, and each sees in his brother an *alter ego*. The dualism and conflict, here as in the individual case, arise from the rebellion of the individual against the person. The claims of individuals conflict, always and necessarily; the claims of persons, never. The moral task, therefore, on its social as well as on its individual side, lies in effecting the subjugation of individuality to personality, or in obeying the law of reason which embraces the lives of our fellows as well as our own:—"Be a person, and respect others as persons;" subject your own clamant individuality to your abiding rational personality:

"To thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."

13. The ethical significance of law: the meaning of duty.—The conception of law, prominent in the ethical reflection of Plato and the Stoics, and further emphasised by Christianity, has been made a corner-stone of modern ethical theory by Butler and Kant. Not only in Intuitionism and Transcendentalism, but even in Hedonism and Evolutionism, the conception plays an important part. What significance can we attach to it from the standpoint of personality?

The foregoing discussion has partly anticipated the

answer to this question. We have seen that the moral task of man is the co-ordination or organisation of impulse into a system of rational ends, and that the co-ordinating or organising principle is the idea of rational selfhood or personality. In this idea of true human selfhood is found the law of man's life. It is a law universal; for while the content of these personal ends must vary with the individuality of the sentient subject, and with the stimuli that excite such individual sensibility, their form will be the same in all, being constituted by the common rational self in each. We thus avoid, on the one hand, the formalism of the Intuitionist and Kantian ethics, with their insistence upon mere obedience to rational, and therefore universal, law; and, on the other hand, the subjectivity and particularism of Hedonism, which finds the source of moral obligation in the feeling of the individual subject. The interpretation of personality as including individuality provides for the form of reason a content of sensibility, and thus secures a concrete view of the moral life: it discovers the universal in the particular. I am different from you, for we are both individuals; and since our individuality must colour our respective ideals of life, these ideals are, so far, different. But while it is the individual self that has to be realised, it is the complete self or personality of the individual, in whose common life the individuality of each must be taken up and interpreted as an element; and this secures a common ideal for all.

The peculiar form or category of moral experience is thus seen to be law, duty, or obligation. The difference between moral or spiritual and natural law is just the difference between the life of a being that shares consciously in reason and one that does not. The universe being rational through and through, the law or formula of all phenomena, of all occurrences, is rational. But that law may be expressed consciously or unconsciously, by the being or merely through the being. Now

the law of the life of a rational being must be autonomy: moral self-realisation is 'realisation *of* self *by* self.' The law of nature's life is heteronomy; it is part of a larger system, and comes under the law of that system. But a rational being is an end-in-himself, and can find nowhere save in his own nature the law of his life. This is the prerogative of reason—to legislate for itself, to be at once sovereign and subject in the kingdom of morality, as it is at once teacher and scholar in the school of wisdom.

The transition from the innocence, or non-moral condition, of the animal or the child which has not yet broken with nature, but remains in unconscious subjection to its law, to the moral status in which law asserts itself in the very consciousness of a possible and actual disobedience to it—thus creating the distinction between good and evil—has been naïvely represented by the imagination of early man as a 'fall' from a previous state of bliss. A fall, and yet also an ascent in the scale of being; a fall from holiness, but an ascent from innocence—the ascent from compulsion to authority, from might to right. "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil;" "lest they eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and become as one of us." Christianity has touched this yearning after a Golden Age in the past experience of the race, and changed it into a yearning after a future Golden Age. The conception of evolution has also led us to regard human history as a progress, not a regress. And we have ourselves seen that the consciousness of the breach between the ideal and the actual, of the dualism between nature and spirit, is the essential condition of a finite self-consciousness and self-realisation. It may be that we cannot explain the origin of evil; but, evil being there, we can understand its moral significance. Evil is the shadow cast by the moral ideal upon the actual life. The sense of failure comes with the consciousness of an ideal; nature never fails, man always does. And so long as the breach continues between the actual and

the ideal, so long must the element of law or obligation enter into the substance of the moral consciousness.

Various forms of law.—Law or obligation assumes different aspects at the successive stages of the moral life of the individual. It is first external, then internal: first 'Do this,' then 'Be this.' It is first the outer law or command, accompanied by coercion whether of reward or punishment, of the parent, of the State, of public opinion,—a kind of pressure from his environment, moulding the individual from without. This is the stage of passive and uncritical acquiescence by the individual in the conventional morality in whose atmosphere he has grown up—the reign of Custom. As he advances to moral manhood, the individual passes from this allegiance to the outer law to the more stringent rule of the law which he finds written in his own heart. This is the stage described by Hegel as that of *Moralität*, of the reign of the inner law of the individual Conscience, of the assertion of the right of private judgment in the moral sphere—the stage at which the life, become a law unto itself, is full of introspective conscientiousness, and liable, in its revolt from the morality of custom and convention, to become the prey of individual or sectarian enthusiasms and fanaticisms. Necessary as this stage is, and permanent as, in a sense, it may necessarily be for the individual, he must yet seek to escape from its subjectivity and limitation, and to reach the insight into the partial, if not complete, identity of the outer and the inner law—the stage of 'ethicality' or *Sittlichkeit*, the reign of Institutions. Still, the critical point in the moral history of the individual is that at which the law passes from the outer to the inner form. The outer law is always, in truth, from an ethical standpoint, the reflection of the inner: it is the deeper self of humanity that makes its constant claim upon the individual man, and demands its realisation. And the continual criticism of the outer by

the inner law, of convention and custom by conscience, is the very root and spring of all moral progress. Indeed the breach between the outer and the inner is never entirely healed; the ideal State is never reached.

Its absoluteness and permanence.—The inner demand is absolute, a 'categorical imperative.' Its unyielding 'Thou shalt' is the voice of the ideal to the actual man; and the ideal admits of no concession, no 'give and take,' no compromise with the actual. This demand of the rational and ideal self is not to be misinterpreted, as if its absoluteness meant the annihilation of feeling or nature. The demand is for such a perfect mastery of the impulsive and sentient, or natural self, that in it the true self, which is fundamentally rational, may be realised; that it may be the rational or human, and not the merely sentient or animal self, that *lives*. What produces the constant contradiction between ideal and attainment is not the presence of feeling as a surd that cannot be eliminated; it is that the harmony of a life in which feeling is subdued to reason must become ever more perfect, the life of the true self must become ever more complete, as moral progress continues.

For the demand of the inner self for realisation is infinite. The self never *is* fully realised, it remains always an ideal demanding realisation. Here, in the constant ethical conflict, in the perpetual contradiction between ideal and attainment, is the source of the undying moral consciousness of law or obligation. Ever as we attain in any measure to it, the ideal seems to grow and widen and deepen, so that it is still for us the unattained. One mountain-path ascended only reveals height after height in the great Beyond of the moral life. It is those who stay on the plains of a superficial and conventional morality, who think they can see the summits of its hills; those who climb know better. It is those who scale the mountain-tops of duty who know best what

heights are yet to climb, and how far its high peaks penetrate into God's own heaven. It is the infinity of the ideal self that makes it, in its totality, unrealisable, and the life of duty inexhaustible, by a finite being. No improvement in environment, physical or social, can effect the entire disappearance of the contradiction between the ideal and its attainment. For the ideal originates, not without but within ourselves, in 'the abysmal deeps of personality,' and the fountain of those deeps is never dried up. The ideal is always being realised, it is true, in fuller and richer measure. But 'to have attained' or 'to be already perfect' would be to have finished the moral life. Such an absolute coincidence of the ideal and the actual is inconceivable, just because the Good is the ideal, and not a mere projection of the actual. The latter interpretation of the Good would make it finite, and attainable enough by human weakness; but to limit the ideal were to destroy it. The man inspired with a loyal devotion to the Good is willing to see the path of his life stretch ever forward and upward, to lift up his eyes unto the eternal hills of the divine holiness itself. For he knows that he has laid the task upon himself, and that, if failure and disappointment come inevitably to him in the attempt to execute it, his is also the dignity of this high calling, and his too a success which, but for the ideal and the failure which faithfulness to it reveals, had been for him impossible. He would not exchange this human life, with all its pain and weariness, with all its humiliation and disappointment, for any lower. Better surely this noble human dissatisfaction than the most perfect measure of animal content. Is not such failure only 'the other side of success'; is not such discontent indeed 'divine'?

To seek to rise above duty or law is, as Kant said, 'moral fanaticism.' Duty is the peculiar category of human life, of the life of a being at once infinite and finite; it is the expression of the dualism of form and matter, of

reason and sensibility. Certainly we shall not overcome the dualism by minimising it; rather it must be pressed until, it may be in another life or in prophetic glimpses in the religious life even now, it yields the higher unity and peace for which our spirits crave. Meantime, it is no ignoble bondage; if the spirit is imprisoned, it is ever breaking through the bars of its prison-house. Authority is not coercion. Man lays the law upon himself; it is because he is a citizen of the higher world, that he feels the obligation of its law and the bondage of the lower. And when he recognises the source of the law, it ceases, in a sense, to be a burden; or it becomes one which he is willing and eager to bear, and which becomes lighter the longer and the more faithfully it is borne. The yoke of such a service is indeed easy, and its burden light.

14. Expressions of Eudæmonism: (a) in philosophy.—In the history of ethical theory we find not only a gradual approximation of the two opposed types—the Hedonistic and the Rationalistic—to the Eudæmonistic, but also an explicit formulation of Eudæmonism. This formulation is more or less incomplete; and its incompleteness leads to, or is itself the result of, a kind of survival now of Rationalism, now of Hedonism, alongside the deeper and more adequate view—an echo, as it were, of these one-sided theories which refuses to be silenced by the new voice that is striving to make itself heard. Whether we take Aristotle among the Greek or Butler among the English moralists, we find this to be the case.

Plato and Aristotle.—To understand Aristotle, we must take account, in ethics as in metaphysics, of his indebtedness to Plato. Like Aristotle, Plato bases his ethics, in part at least, upon psychology. In the soul of man he distinguishes three elements—reason, spirit, and desire (λόγος, θυμός, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). Reason is a unity, so also is spirit; but desire is manifold. Further, while both

spirit and desire are impulsive in their nature, their relation to reason is not the same. Desire is antagonistic to reason, and is strictly irrational (*τὸ ἀλογιστικόν*); spirit is reason's natural ally — reason's watch-dog sent forth to curb the alien force of desire, and again recalled and kept in check by its master reason. Here we find a recognition, first, of the dependence of reason upon sensibility for the execution of its own ends, and, secondly, of the seeds in the human soul alike of harmony and discord with the ends of reason. The various elements have in them the possibility of harmony, as well as of discord; and it is for reason, which possesses the key to the harmony, to use the force provided to its hand in the impulsive nature for the harmonising of these diverse elements.

The figure of the 'charioteer' has the same lesson. The charioteer is the rational self, whose function it is to guide the journey of the soul. But the charioteer were helpless without the steeds; his is the guidance only, it is theirs to perform the journey. And, again, there are two steeds; and while the one is rebellious, like the horde of ungoverned desires that would disturb the fair order of reason in the life of the soul, the other is, like the rationally-minded spirit, apt to obey the rein of the wise charioteer. But let the charioteer only do his driving well, holding the rein tightly over the unruly steed of earthly passion, and it, too, will be guided into the upward path, and will at last become the other's fellow there. "For the food which is suited to the highest part of the soul comes out of that meadow, and the wing on which the soul soars is nourished with this."

And, once more, the highest life of the soul, the life of philosophic contemplation, so far from being a passionless life of pure thought, is itself an intensely passionate life. For the supremely true and good is also the supremely beautiful, and the soul that is weaned from the beauties of the merely sensible world is rapt in the passion of that

Beauty, absolute and eternal, which is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. The loves of earth are our schoolmasters to bring us at last, when all the tempest of the soul is laid, and all its passion purified and ennobled, unto the heavenly love, the love of God Himself.

Plato's central ethical conception is cast in the mould of his psychology. It is that of a perfect harmony of all the elements of the soul. The good life is for him the musical life; the life of a soul perfectly attuned to reason cannot but 'make music.' His favourite figure is that of the State; the true soul, like the true State, will act as a unit, the sovereign will of the whole being accepted by each of the parts. The sovereign element in the soul is, of course, reason, whose insight into the common good fits it to plan for the whole and to compose the symphony of its common life. But if there is to be sovereignty, there must also be subjection and submission; and the subject-class is the brood of desires,—the artisans and labourers of the city of the soul, to be kept under and controlled, since they have no self-control. The 'spirit' fulfils the military and executive office, enforcing the behests of reason in the sphere of sensibility. Thus the harmony has two sides—a negative and a positive; it is at once temperance, or self-control, and justice, or self-realisation. If the order of reason is to be maintained, the disorder of sensibility must be put down; if the good of the whole is to be attained, the insurrection of the parts against the whole must be quelled. Temperance, or the non-interference of any part with the proper work of another part, is no less essential than justice, or the doing of its own work by each part of the soul. The essential evil in this spiritual city is the claim of the part to be the whole—the evil of disintegration. The unjust life is the intemperate or rebellious, the discordant life. Justice is "the health and beauty and well-being of the soul," the integrity of the nature;

injustice is the "disease and deformity" which come from the uprising of the part against the whole, of the inferior against the superior principle. The life of righteousness is the life of the integrated and harmonised nature, which has reduced itself from a "mere manifold" of sensibility to the unity of rational system (*ἐνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν*), and attained to friendship with itself (*φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ*). But we have seen that there are in human nature the seeds of discord as well as of harmony, of war as well as of peace, of disease as well as of health; and its true welfare must be reached through stern discipline and hard struggle. This struggle is the fight of clear reason against blind irrational desire; and victory comes with the opening of the eyes of desire to see that larger rational good which includes its own.

In Aristotle we find elements both of Eudæmonism and of Rationalism. His theory of practical virtue and good is, on the whole, Eudæmonistic; his theory of intellectual virtue and good is Rationalistic. Moreover, it is the rationalistic, or non-eudæmonistic, element in the former theory that explains the Rationalism of the latter. The very affirmation of two levels of virtue and good implies a double theory of both.

Aristotle first clearly differentiates moral from natural development or self-realisation, the ethical from the physical process. In both cases we have the actualisation of the potential; but the manner of the actualisation is different in the two cases. In nature the potentiality is a single and necessary one,—the acorn can only become the oak, the boy the man. In morality there is always a double or alternative potentiality,—a man may become either virtuous or vicious. It is, moreover, by doing the same things, only in a different way, that either of the alternative potentialities is actualised. As it is by playing on the harp that men become either good or bad harpers,—by playing well that they become good, by playing ill that they become bad musicians,—so it is with

all the activities of life; in the same activities are the beginnings of both good and evil habits, of both the virtues and the vices. Whether a man becomes virtuous or vicious, depends on the manner of these activities.

Whether he becomes virtuous or vicious, however, he has only actualised the character which already existed in him potentially. The seeds of the particular vice or virtue which reveals itself in his character lay in his original nature and the circumstances of his lot. For it is not in the choice of the absolute Mean, but of the Mean relative to the individual, that virtue lies. Virtue is universal and not of private interpretation, for it is always "according to right reason"; but it is also particular,—constituted by individual temperament and concrete circumstances (the latter being called by Aristotle "furniture of fortune"), or "as the good man would decide." Virtue and vice are the correlates of the individuality, and of its opportunities of actualisation; nor does Aristotle hold that these elements of idiosyncrasy can be eliminated, or the concrete life of man contained within the limits of an exact mathematical formula. If his moral ideal is, in a sense, universal and absolute—an ideal of reason, it is also, in a sense, particular and relative—an ideal of sensibility.

The doctrine of the Mean is itself most significant of its author's regard for the life of sensibility, as well as for that of reason. Vice consists in excess or defect of that which, in itself and in its appropriate measure, is good. And if in reason he finds the common measure of sensibility, he yet admits, as we have just seen, that this rational measure must be modified by a fresh reference to sensibility itself; that, in a way, sensibility also is a measure.

Aristotle's theory is incompletely eudæmonistic in two respects. (*a*) As regards practical virtue and good, he follows Plato in interpreting the subordination of

desire to reason as equivalent to mere moderation or limitation, as distinguished from negation or sacrifice. He accordingly condemns the life of practical virtue as hopelessly irrational, or *incompletely* rational and good. He does so because he has missed the secret of its rationalisation.

(b) As regards intellectual virtue and good, Aristotle is even more idealistic than Plato. He regards all action as petty, unworthy of a rational being. The true self is the rational self, and its life is the life of thought. The activity of thought alone is the activity that actualises the rational self. But this is not the life of will, of the ethical self; and if we exchange the life of action for that of thought, we leave the ethical task—that of the rationalisation of Desire—unaccomplished. The withdrawal of reason from the world of desire and action can only mean the demoralisation—the derationalisation—of the practical life. Even Plato insisted that the deepest insight of reason must be turned to practical account.

As regards both the life of practical and that of intellectual virtue, Aristotle's theory is essentially individualistic—much more so than Plato's. His ideal is that of the independence and self-sufficiency of the individual life. It is true that among the practical virtues he finds a place for justice and friendship. But justice is essentially a negative relation; its essence is the maintenance of the rights of the individual. And while friendship is positive, and, in its highest form, means disinterested love of another—the love of the good for the good, the discovery of the *alter ego*—it is rather for the completion which this fellowship gives to the individual life than as an expression of individual goodness, or an essential element in the Good, that its value is recognised. Friendship is rather the best of external goods (goods of fortune) than an aspect

of the Good. On the other hand, the intellectual life—the highest and best life—is most completely self-sufficient; and it is doubtless this intellectualism of his ideal that explains the essentially individualistic character of Aristotle's ethics as a whole. The life of social service is essentially the life of action, and of thought in the interest of action. But all action is, in Aristotle's eyes, irrational, unworthy of a rational being. Here, again, we see how a more complete understanding of that life of practical activity which he condemns as incapable of complete rationalisation must have altered Aristotle's judgment of its moral value. Had he appreciated the social possibilities of the practical life, had he realised that the true self is the social or self-sacrificing self, he could hardly have denied the right of practical virtue and practical good to the names "virtue" and "good" in the highest sense of these terms.

Butler.—Like Plato and Aristotle, and following the example of his immediate predecessors of the "Moral Sense" school, as opposed to that of the early English Rationalists, Butler adopts the psychological method in the sense of finding the clue to the content of Virtue in human nature. "There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole nature. In the former method the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to the nature and reason of things: in the latter, that it is a violation or breaking in upon our own nature. . . . The following discourses proceed chiefly in this latter method."¹ In the determination of the true meaning of "human nature," Butler uses to fine

¹ *Sermons*, Pref. §§ 12, 13 (Bernard).

purpose Plato's figure of the State. "A system, economy, or constitution" is "an one or a whole, made up of several parts," in such wise that "the several parts, even considered as a whole, do not complete the idea, unless in the notion of a whole you include the relations and respects which those parts have to each other."¹ Now, when we consider the various elements of human nature, we find that the most important relation which they sustain to one another is precisely that relation which is most important in the civil economy, namely, the relation of authority or of the right of certain parts to dictate to the others the measure and the manner of their activity. This difference in authority is not "a difference in strength or degree," but "a difference in nature and in kind."² In the hierarchy of human nature the higher place belongs of right to the rational or reflective principles; it is theirs to govern the unreflective, immediate, impulsive principles, the "particular affections" or "propensions." If human nature were, like animal nature, merely the sum of its parts, and pointed, like the latter, merely to the gratification of the present and strongest impulse as its appointed end, then human virtue would consist in following human nature in this animal sense. But human nature is, as such, a constitution or economy. The mere impulse, however strong, points away from itself to those reflective principles or powers which are man's peculiar possession, for that higher guidance which takes account of the significance of its gratification for human nature as a whole. There is "a difference in nature and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the inward principles. Some . . . are in nature and kind superior to others." And "the correspondence of actions to the nature of the agent" which "renders them natural," "arises from the action being conformable to the higher principle and the unsuitableness from its being contrary

¹ *Sermons*, Pref. § 14.

² *Ibid.*, ii. § 11.

to it.”¹ Even within the class of higher or reflective principles there is an order of precedence. The supreme place belongs to Conscience or the moral Reason, as such; it is Conscience that determines the nature of Virtue. Under Conscience are the two other reflective principles, Self-love and Benevolence; these also are rational, but they guide us immediately rather to the Good or happiness of ourselves and others respectively than to virtuous conduct as such.

(1) Conscience.—“There is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove, their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as respecting such objects, and in such degrees; and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience.”² The ability to act conscientiously is the peculiar prerogative of man. “Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions: so also are we. But, additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert.”³

As endowed with this power of judging his own actions and impulses, man is a law to himself. His rational or reflective nature prescribes the law to his impulsive or unreflective nature. He is not “left by his Maker to

¹ *Sermons*, iii. § 9.

² *Ibid.*, i. § 8.

³ *Dissertation*, “Of the Nature of Virtue,” § 1.

act at random . . . as passion, humour, wilfulness, happen to carry him: which is the condition brute creatures are in;” but “from his make, constitution, or nature, he is in the strictest and most proper sense a law to himself. . . . He hath the rule of right within.”¹ The law of his life is the law of his own nature as a rational being. Reason is the unifying and constitutive principle of human nature, and to act rationally or conscientiously is, therefore, to act conformably to human nature as a whole. And the obligation of virtue is simply the obligation of our own nature, of the end for which we are made. We ought to act virtuously, that is, conscientiously, reflectively, or rationally, because we are conscientious, reflective, or rational beings. Obligation is not a matter of sanctions, or of rewards and punishments; a being who is, by his nature, a law to himself, is independent of such sanctions. “Your obligation to obey this law, is its being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of action, is itself alone an obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature: it therefore belongs to our condition of being; it is our duty to walk in that path, and follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with impunity.”²

(2) Butler recognises, as we have seen, two other principles in human nature which, as “general affections” or reflective principles, are superior in rank to mere impulse or “propension,” namely, Self-love and Benevolence. These are simply the two chief forms of natural impulse made reflective or rational, that is, conscious of the end or object to which, as mere “propension,” it unconsciously guides. The object of Self-love is that

¹ *Sermons*, iii. § 3.

² *Ibid.*, iii. § 5.

"good" or happiness to which the self-regarding impulses unconsciously lead the agent; the object of rational Benevolence is that "public good" or general happiness to which the unselfish or social impulses similarly lead. Both forms of impulse rest in their immediate objects; neither considers the "good" or happiness which will result from the attainment of these objects, and the enjoyment of which is the real justification of their pursuit. The rational principles of Self-love and Benevolence discover this hedonistic value in the objects of impulse, so that these objects are no longer regarded as ends in themselves, but merely as means or instruments of the only true or rational "good," namely, happiness.

(a) *Self-love.*—Butler illustrates the nature of this principle by the contrast between the case of an animal allured by a bait into a snare by which he is destroyed and that of a man who, foreseeing the danger of certain ruin, rushes into it to gratify some momentarily strong impulse, say, that of revenge. The animal's action is natural, the man's unnatural; since the gratification is purchased in the latter case in disobedience to the higher direction of Self-love. The difference between this principle and mere impulse or passion is, as in the case of Conscience, a difference in nature or kind. "If passion prevails over self-love, the consequent action is unnatural; but if self-love prevails over passion, the action is natural: it is manifest that self-love is in human nature a superior principle to passion. This may be contradicted without violating that nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will act conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love must govern. Thus, without particular consideration of conscience, we may have a clear conception of the *superior nature* of one inward principle to another."¹ Nor is it

¹ *Sermons*, ii. § 11.

less necessary to insist upon the due claims of self-love than upon those of benevolence. "There is a manifest negligence in men of their real happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is inconsistent with a present gratification; for the sake of which they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and instruments of their own misery and ruin. Thus they are as often unjust to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally so to both by the same actions."¹ "Men in fact as much and as often contradict that part of their nature which respects self, and which leads to their own private good and happiness; as they contradict that part of it which respects society, and tends to public good: . . . there are as few persons who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment which they might attain in the present world, as who do the greatest good to others which they might do: nay, . . . there are as few who can be said really and in earnest to aim at one, as at the other."² What is the real explanation of the unhappiness of mankind? "Is it really the result of consideration in mankind, how they may become most easy to themselves, most free from care, and enjoy the chief happiness attainable in this world? Or is it not manifestly owing either to this, that they have not cool and reasonable concern enough for themselves to consider wherein their chief happiness in the present life consists; or else, if they do consider it, that they will not act conformably to what is the result of that consideration: *i.e.*, reasonable concern for themselves, or cool self-love is prevailed over by passion and appetite?"³

(b) Benevolence.—Co-ordinate with self-love is benevolence, or "love of our neighbour," that is, deliberate regard for the happiness of others. Actions guided by this principle are governed by the thought of the hedonistic value of the result for others as well as for

¹ *Sermons*, i. § 15.

² *Ibid.*, i. § 14.

³ *Loc. cit.*

the agent himself; the object is no longer sought as an end in itself, but as a means to the general good or happiness. "There is a natural principle of benevolence in man, which is in some degree to society what self-love is to the individual."¹ "So far as self-love and cool reflection upon what is for our interest, would set us on work to gain a supply of our own several wants; so far the love of our neighbour would make us do the same for him."² "As human nature is not one simple uniform thing, but a composition of various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular passions, and affections; for each of which reasonable self-love would lead men to have due regard, and make suitable provision; so society consists of various parts, to which we stand in different respects and relations; and just benevolence would as surely lead us to have due regard to each of these, and behave as the respective relations require."³ It considers distant, as well as immediate, consequences; it points out that the good of some persons, say those of our own family, is more particularly committed to our care; and it takes account of other relevant considerations, such as friendship or former obligations, as demanding of us that we do good to some preferably to others.⁴ It is plainly in the interest of the general good or happiness that such distinctions should be observed, and "just" benevolence is simply an impartial and unwavering regard for the general good. In such ways as these, impulsive or "passionate" benevolence needs the guidance of reason or reflection if its own real end, the public good, is to be fully attained. As reasonable self-love leads us to have due regard to, and make suitable provision for, all the elements of private good, so does rational benevolence lead us to have due regard to the different relations in which we stand to

¹ *Sermons*, i. § 6.

³ *Ibid.*, xii. § 29.

² *Ibid.*, xii. § 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xii. § 27.

society, and to seek the public good in all these relations.¹

(3) **Impulses or Propensions.**—Under these regulative principles comes the entire impulsive nature, which may be summarised in two main divisions, the self-regarding and the benevolent, or, as we should say, the egoistic and the altruistic. "Mankind has various instincts and principles of action, as brute creatures have; some leading most directly and immediately to the good of the community, and some most directly to private good."² The latter may collectively be termed "passionate or sensual selfishness," the former "passionate benevolence." These impulsive principles prompt us to seek their own appropriate objects, and thus normally guide us unconsciously to the ends consciously pursued by rational self-love and benevolence, our own happiness and the happiness of others, respectively. Thus on its impulsive as well as on its reflective or rational side, "there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good."³

The Nature of Virtue.—It follows, first, that virtue consists neither in self-interest nor in disinterestedness. "The goodness or badness of actions does not arise from hence, that the epithet, interested or disinterested, may be applied to them, any more than any other indifferent epithet."⁴ Hence, secondly, utility, or conduciveness to

¹ From the fact that Butler seldom refers to benevolence as a regulative principle, Sidgwick infers (*History of Ethics*, p. 195; cf. *Methods of Ethics*, p. 366, 6th ed.) that he really recognised only two such principles, namely, conscience and self-love, and that these are co-ordinate in authority. Butler's comparative neglect of the distinction between "cool" and "passionate" benevolence is, however, sufficiently explained by the unimportance of this distinction for the purposes of his controversy with Egoism, which led him specially to emphasise the distinction between true self-love and selfish impulse.

² *Sermons*, Pref. § 18.

³ *Ibid.*, i. § 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Pref. § 39.

happiness, is not the ground of virtue. We judge actions to be good or bad, "not from their being attended with present or future pleasure or pain, but from their being what they are"; namely, what becomes such creatures as we are, what the state of the case requires, or the contrary."¹ "We are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery."² "There are certain dispositions of mind, and certain actions, which are in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind, abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the happiness or misery of the world; approved or disapproved by reflection, by that principle within, which is the guide of life, the judge of right and wrong."³

Butler's statement of Eudæmonism: relation of Virtue to the Good.—So far as his account of Conscience and Virtue as such is concerned, Butler's theory is an impressive statement of the Eudæmonistic view of the moral ideal, limited, of course, by the practical purpose which inspires his discussion, as well as by the essentially "Common Sense" or Intuitional character of his point of view. It is only when we raise the further question of the nature of the Good, and of the relation of Virtue to Good, that his statement becomes really unsatisfactory from the Eudæmonistic point of view, affected as it is by the survival of that hedonistic element which had seemed, so far as his doctrine of Virtue was concerned, to have been so subdued to the rationalistic as to result in an organic unity of these elements in the complete life of personality.

To act virtuously or conscientiously is, we have seen, to act in conformity with human nature as a whole, to attain the end to which our nature points, to realise our

¹ *Loc. cit.*² *Dissert.* ii., § 8.³ *Sermons*, xii. § 31 (footnote).

true human self. The basis of moral obligation is found in human nature: man is made for virtue as the watch is made for keeping time. In this life of virtue the lower or impulsive nature attains completely the end to which it points, though it must obey the law of the higher or rational nature if it would attain that end. The law of conscience is the law of the total, and fundamentally rational self; it is the whole dictating to the part, the rational to the impulsive, the human to the animal self. And the value of the virtuous life is intrinsic and absolute; since the ground of its obligatoriness is found simply in its appropriateness, in the appeal which it makes to man as man.

Moreover, virtue leads inevitably to happiness, alike for the individual and for society. To act in conformity with conscience is at the same time to act in conformity with true or rational self-love and with just benevolence, to regard the happiness of others as well as our own. Virtue includes self-loving and benevolent conduct; such conduct is prescribed not only by the lower regulative principles, but also by conscience which approves of, and gives its own higher sanction to, the legislation of these subordinate principles. It is the rational or conscientious form of self-loving and benevolent conduct, not its consequences or the "good" which it accomplishes, that gives it its moral value: its "virtue" consists in its conformity with human nature. In the *Dissertation* "Of the Nature of Virtue" he describes prudence and benevolence as "species of virtue," defining the former as "a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it."¹ "It should seem that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others. This appro-

¹ *Dissert.* ii., § 6.

bation and disapprobation are altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. . . . In one case, what our thoughts fix upon is our condition, in the other, our conduct.”¹ “The faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves imprudent ones; I say prudent and imprudent *actions* as such, and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion.”² It makes no difference, in the eyes of conscience or reason, whether the Good in question is our own or that of another; and although the feeling of approbation or disapprobation may not be equally strong in the two cases, yet “in the greater instances of imprudent neglects and foolish rashness” the condemnation of conscience is severe, and the remorse that follows the action is acute.

But while prudence and benevolence are included in the content of the teaching of conscience, Butler is very far from regarding them as an exhaustive expression of its teaching or as together constituting the whole of virtue. They are species of virtue, but there are other species of it. He is especially emphatic in his denial of the coincidence of the spheres of benevolent and virtuous conduct. “Benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice.”³ This would imply moral indifference to everything but the degree of benevolence, and the measuring of our disapproval of falsehood and injustice by the amount of misery caused by such conduct; but this is not the judgment of conscience. So far from identifying virtue with benevolence, conscience limits the principle of benevolence by moral considerations which that principle itself is unable to provide, considerations, for example, of veracity and justice. “The happiness of the world is the concern of Him, who is the Lord and the Proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavour to

¹ *Loc. cit.*² *Ibid.*, § 7.³ *Dissert.* ii., § 8.

promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which He has directed ; that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice.”¹ Within the bounds of veracity and justice, it is our business and our duty to contribute to “the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion, of our fellow-creatures,” but not beyond these bounds. Thus while self-love and benevolence are reasonable principles of action, and both are, as such, approved by conscience ; while both are indeed expressions or aspects of conscience, they do not even together exhaust the content of conscience or virtue. Apart from their hedonistic significance, apart from their bearing upon the Good of ourselves or others, actions, as such, are right or wrong, virtuous or vicious, proportionate or disproportionate to human nature. The Good, that is, the happiness, which results from the action, or rather our attitude to this Good, contributes to, but does not completely determine, the moral quality of the action. Conscience approves of our considering the hedonistic results of our conduct, and disapproves of our ignoring these results : but it limits our consideration of them by other and higher moral considerations of its own. The ultimate standpoint of these higher considerations is the peculiar standpoint of conscience, the standpoint of reason and of human nature as a rational whole. To follow this nature is virtue ; to contradict it is vice. To follow the dictates of self-love and prudence is, so far as these are rational principles, to follow human nature ; but if we would completely follow that nature, if we would act in entire conformity with it, we must check even our rational pursuit of happiness for ourselves and others by the consideration how far, in this loyalty to our own good and theirs, we are loyal to that human nature which we share with them, and conformity to which constitutes the ultimate standard of human virtue.

¹ *Dissert.* ii., § 10.

If we ask Butler what, in particular, this additional content of conscience—this supreme element in virtue—is, his only answer is the mention of such principles as veracity, justice, friendship, and gratitude. He seems to think it unnecessary to specify the content further, or to develop it from its source in conscience or in human nature as a rational whole. He simply adopts the point of view of "Common Sense" and, like the Scottish Intuitionists, regards such principles as self-evident, no less self-evident than the principles of prudence and benevolence, while by their very nature they claim jurisdiction over the latter, inasmuch as they are the immediate expression of that conscience of which prudence and benevolence are further and secondary expressions. For example, in the *Dissertation* he says: "Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course of action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us, approves, and what it disapproves. For as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality an universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public: it is that, which every man you meet puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth make it their business and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon mankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good."¹ The ethical question, however, concerns the interpretation or explanation of these virtues in terms of the supreme unifying principle. Simply to identify the content of conscience with the ordinary conceptions of virtue, without justifying these conceptions in terms of conscience as understood in our ethical theory, is to give up the effort to reduce our

¹ *Dissert.* ii., § 1.

ordinary moral judgments to system. In this sense, at any rate, Butler's is an incomplete statement of the Eudæmonistic theory.

But even as regards the relation of the higher to the lower regulative principles, Butler fails to satisfy the demands of an adequate ethical theory. While he clearly regards self-love and benevolence as expressions of conscience, and says explicitly that prudence and benevolence are species of virtue, he yet never exhibits the relation in which they stand to conscience and to virtue as such. That they are only partial expressions is quite clear, for they have to be limited in their direction of human conduct by other and apparently more primary expressions, such as justice and veracity. The relation thus remains external and mechanical rather than internal and organic. This is due to the fatal dualism of Virtue and the Good. The Good is not found, as in a completely Eudæmonistic theory it must be, in virtuous activity as such, in the realisation of the complete, and fundamentally rational, self; it consists in happiness, alike in our own case and in that of others. To act rationally is, in part at all events, to reflect about this "good" or happiness, that is, to make happiness our end, to substitute this "good" or value for the various objects of immediate desire which, as such, have no value. "It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind or any creature, but happiness."¹ This hedonistic point of view is that of self-love and benevolence; and conscience, by approving of these principles, accepts its validity. To this extent—so far as Butler's account of the Good is concerned—we have a theory of Rational Hedonism, rather than of Eudæmonism. The form of Virtue, its regulative principles, are rational; but its content is happiness. Reason has only a regulative, not a constitutive function. While reason

¹ *Sermons*, xii. § 28.

is the critic of sensibility, the standard of its criticism is still supplied by sensibility itself. The Good is still a good of sensibility; and reason's function is not to criticise this good, to rationalise or moralise it, but simply to devise the ways and means of its attainment. If, in one sense, sensibility is subordinated to reason, in another and a more ultimate sense reason is subordinated to sensibility. As in the Rational Hedonism of Sidgwick, too, we find prudence co-ordinated with benevolence, self-interest with interest in others.

This dualism of ethical standard—that of conscience, on the one hand, namely, Virtue or rationality, and that of self-love and benevolence on the other, namely, Good or happiness—seems not entirely to have escaped the attention of Butler himself. He is always insisting that virtue and happiness, duty and interest, self-interest and disinterested concern for the happiness of others, must in the end coincide. A complete justification of the claims of virtue seems to him to imply the complete coincidence of virtue and happiness in the individual case. But the harmony thus reached is at best an external one; virtue and happiness are not really unified. As in the case of Sidgwick's theory, we are offered a doctrine of sanctions or compensations for the hedonistic imperfection of the virtuous life. The Good is still sought elsewhere than in Virtue itself.

This failure to exhibit the organic relation of Virtue and Good renders Butler's statement of Eudæmonism less adequate, after all, than that of Aristotle. For Aristotle virtuous activity, that is, rational activity, activity which actualises the rational self, *is* the Good; and the pleasure which accompanies and completes this activity shares its worth. Pleasure has no value in and for itself. For Butler, on the contrary, Virtue is not itself the Good, though it is in itself obligatory. We ought to be virtuous, or to act according to the constitution of our nature as rational beings: we ought to

realise our rational selves. Yet the Good is not for him this rational self-realisation, but happiness: the Good is not completely rationalised. If Aristotle finally surrenders Eudæmonism for Rationalism, Butler never completely abandons the hedonistic point of view. In the one case as in the other, the incompleteness of the Eudæmonism is the logical result of the persistence of the opposing principle, whether rationalistic or hedonistic. Complete Eudæmonism is the doctrine that the Good is found in the complete rationalisation of desire; but its complete rationalisation implies its negation, in order to its reaffirmation as rational desire. If we hold that desire can be thus completely rationalised, we leave no *residuum*, either of non-rational or of non-sentient, exclusively rational Good: we escape at once from Hedonism and from Rationalism.

15. (b) *Literary expressions of Eudæmonism.*—Let us look, finally, at one or two of the most striking and comprehensive literary expressions of the ethical dualism and of the process by which, in the ethical life, it is overcome. Take first the Faust legend—one of the most remarkable of these expressions—in Goethe's treatment of it. The temptation of Faust is to sacrifice the life of thought, the fruits, won by hard labour, of the scholar's life, for a career of merely sensuous satisfaction. Why 'scorn delights and live laborious days'? Why miss the pulse-beats of life's keenest joys? Both lives he cannot live; he must make his choice between them, and, once made, the choice will be irrevocable. The problem comes to Faust as the representative of the conflict between the spirit of the elder and the newer time. His has been the life of the mediæval scholar, a life of thought apart from the world of actual present interests and events; and, in the keen realisation of the emptiness of such a life, he longs for contact with reality, with nature, with human passion, with life in all its forms. The revolt of his eager unsatisfied spirit sends him forth

into the untried world of common human experience, to seek there the satisfaction which has eluded him in his scholar-life of seclusion and stern thought. The new way is easy enough; it is the broad smooth path of sensuous delight, and crowded with the multitude. If Faust can deliberately choose this life of carnal pleasure, if he can find in it the perfect satisfaction of his being and accept it as his portion, it will be the definitive choice of evil, the critical surrender of the higher to the lower nature. For if such sensuousness of life as that which Faust is now to put to the proof leads inevitably to sensuality and what is commonly called vice, the evil lies in the sensuousness itself, of which the sensuality is but the full-blown flower. That a being capable of, and therefore called to, a life of rational and strenuous activity, because of the pain and toil and disappointment implied in such a life, should choose the immediate and effortless delights of sensibility, 'herein is sin.' But for Faust there is no satisfaction in the new life of which he is represented as making trial. When, first under an animal guise, and then as Mephistopheles himself, the spirit of evil appears, we feel that it is only the manifestation and externalisation of the lower, undisciplined, irrational nature which, in Faust as in every man, is struggling for the mastery with the rational and higher self:

"Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach ! in meiner Brust,
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen ;
Die eine hält, in derber Liebeslust,
Sich an die Welt, mit klammernden Organen ;
Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust
Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen."

But, though all the glory of the world is spread out before Faust, and he tastes of the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eye and the pride of life, the moment never comes when he can say of it:

"Verweile doch ! du bist so schön !"

And deeply though he falls, we feel that, even at the lowest, he has fallen only to rise again, and, learning the deeper dissatisfaction of this lower life, to choose at last, with a new decision wrought by the strong hand of a bitter experience, the higher way of the victorious spirit. The lesson of the legend, or, at any rate, of the drama, surely is, that if a virtue cloistered and untried is no virtue at all, yet all virtue contains self-sacrifice at its heart, and the only true and complete self-fulfilment is mediated and made possible by self-renunciation:

“Und so lang du das nicht hast,
Dieses ; stirb und werde !
Bist du nur ein trüber Gast
Auf der dunklen Erde.”

The imperfection of the Faust representation is that the choice is pictured as one between the life of knowledge and the life of sensuous pleasure, though the idea of effort or labour, as implied in the former type of life, is strongly emphasised. In Wagner's music-drama of *Tannhäuser*, we have, in this respect, a more adequate portrayal of the actual moral conflict. Here, again, the choice is between strenuous activity and the delights of sensibility. As in the old Homeric story, the Siren-music of the sensuous life sounds in the hero's ears, and he is lulled to sleep and forgetfulness of duty in the arms of earthly love. The escape is made with bitterest anguish and regret; again and again, as the magic song of the Venus-berg sounds in his ears, and its voluptuous strains silence the solemn music of the pilgrim-choir, must the conflict be waged anew, until at last the decisive victory is won, and the hard steep way of the pilgrims of the cross becomes the final choice.

And from the first this has been the lesson of the prophets and didactic moralists to their fellows. The lesson of Ecclesiastes as well as of Carlyle is the lesson of work, the lesson that in activity, in deeds, in the chastening of

natural impulse to the obedience of rational purpose, lies man's only Good. The ethical necessity of self-discipline has always been recognised. The Greeks, though they did not feel the bitterness of the struggle as we do, yet recognised it in their central conception of temperance or self-control, of the essentially rational character of the virtuous life, of the limit which the gods have set to the career of man. In the popular reflection of the classical world, we find the same thought naïvely expressed in the myths of Fauns and Satyrs,—strange half-brute, half-human creatures; non-moral, and yet, through their external resemblance to humanity, shedding a grim ironical light over human life. We have an impressive recognition of the same fundamental necessity in the ancient Hebrew story of Esau, who, stung by animal appetite, sells his birthright for a mess of pottage, and finds no place of repentance, though he seeks it carefully with tears. The Christian conception of temptation, which finds such abundant expression in modern literature, is one grand illustration of it. The character of Tito in George Eliot's *Romola*—the story of the evolution of a life that has surrendered itself to momentary impulse and desire, of Markheim in R. L. Stevenson's little sketch, and many another psychological study in the fiction of our own and of previous times, might be mentioned in dramatic illustration of the possibilities (and the certainties) of evil that lie in an undisciplined nature. Shakespeare has given us a classical and unique picture of such a being. The character of Caliban in the *Tempest* seems to me to be a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* of the life of untrained impulse. Caliban is an impersonation of a *human animal*, such a monster as the ancient myths portrayed, half man, half beast; only, his deformity is moral rather than physical. In his master's eyes he is a "thing" rather than a man, a "thing of darkness . . . as strange a thing as e'er I look'd on." "He is as disproportionate in his manners as in his shape"—

“Abhorred slave,
Which any print of goodness will not take,
Being capable of all ill.”

“A devil, a born devil, on whose nature
Nurture can never stick. . . .
And as, with age, his body uglier grows,
So his mind cankers.”

Prospero has taught him language :

“You taught me language, and my profit on’t
Is, I know how to curse.”

So savage, rank, and repulsive, so full of all manner of darkness and evil, is undisciplined nature ; not beautiful and richly luxurious as physical nature is, when left untended and untrained. An untrained man, Shakespeare would seem to teach us, is a ‘monster’ of humanity, not worthy of the name, something between man and beast rather than a man. If sometimes we disparage the effects of civilisation and education, and long for ‘a touch of nature’ in its simplicity and untrained directness, let us remember that human nature, left to itself, in its native spontaneity, is a barren wilderness that yields but tares and thorns, and cannot be made to bring forth better fruits save with the sweat of our brow, and the hard labour of the spirit :

“That life is not as idle ore,

But iron dug from central gloom,
And heated hot with burning fears,
And dipt in baths of hissing tears,
And batter’d with the shocks of doom

To shape and use. Arise and fly
The reeling Faun, the sensual feast ;
Move upward, working out the beast,
And let the ape and tiger die.”¹

¹ Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, cviii.

Or, as another poet has finely expressed the contrast between nature's life and man's :

“With aching hands and bleeding feet
We dig and heap, lay stone on stone ;
We bear the burden and the heat
Of the long day, and wish 'twere done.
Not till the hours of light return,
All we have built do we discern.

Then, when the clouds are off the soul,
When thou dost bask in Nature's eye,
Ask, how *she* viewed thy self-control,
Thy struggling, task'd morality—
Nature, whose free, light, cheerful air,
Oft made thee, in thy gloom, despair.

And she, whose censure thou dost dread,
Whose eye thou wast afraid to seek,
See, on her face a glow is spread,
A strong emotion on her cheek !
'Ah, child !' she cries, 'that strife divine,
Whence was it, for it is not mine ?'”¹

Yet nature has its rights ; the moral person is to the end an individual, or subject of sensibility. Nature is to be disciplined, not annihilated. And if nature has to be moralised, it is not in itself immoral ; it does not even necessarily conflict with morality. It is only because it is part of a higher nature in us that it is not itself the guide. The lower nature is really the ‘footstool of the higher.’ It is in its rebellion against the law of the higher nature that evil consists ; evil is, as Plato taught, a rebellion and insurrection of the lower and subject element against the higher and sovereign part of the soul. It is when the citadel of our nature capitulates to the enemy within the city of Mansoul, that evil is done ; it is when reason becomes the slave of passion, that we lose our crown, and sell our birthright. The romanticists, the realists, the sentimentalists of literature have,

¹ Matthew Arnold, *Poems* : “Morality.”

as George Meredith says, got hold of a half-truth,—“the melodists upon life and the world who set a sensual world in motion and fiddle harmonics on the strings of sensualism, to the delight of a world gaping for marvels of musical execution rather than for music.” Some one has said of M. Zola, that he “sees in humanity *la bête humaine*. He sees the beast in all its transformations, but he sees only the beast.” For the music and deep harmony of human life has its keynote in reason, and, like all other harmonies, is reached through discord. “Our world is all but a sensational world at present, in maternal travail of a soberer, a braver, a brighter-eyed. . . . Peruse your realists—really your castigators for not having yet embraced philosophy. As she grows in the flesh, when discreetly tended, nature is unimpeachable, flower-like, yet not too decoratively a flower; you must have her with the stem, the thorns, the roots, and the fat bedding of roses.” The secret of true human living, the heart of ethical truth, lies in “the right use of the senses, reality’s infinite sweetness.” There is in every one of us a Caliban nature, “an unfailing aboriginal democratic old monster, that waits to pull us down; certainly the branch, possibly the tree; and for the welfare of life we fall. . . . You must turn on yourself, resolutely track and seize that burrower, and scrub and cleanse him.”¹ Civilisation contributes to the cleansing process; it at least keeps the monster well out of sight. But nature must be moralised, and the process of moralisation is one of sore pain and travail. It may mean the cutting off of a right hand or the plucking out of a right eye, that so we may enter, even halt and maimed, into the kingdom of the Good. It means the passing through the fiery furnace, in which nature is purified of dross and “hardened into the pure ore.” It means, as Plato already said, “conversion,” or “the turning round of the eye of the soul, and with it the whole soul, to the Good.”

¹ *Diana of the Crossways*, ch. i.

Man's life is like that of the Phoenix, that rises out of its own ashes; if he would live the true human life, he must be 'born again from above.' Into every element of natural impulse and desire must be breathed the new life of the rational spirit:

"The petals of to-day,
To-morrow fallen away,
Shall something leave instead,
To live when they are dead;
When you, ye vague desires,
Have vanished;

A something to survive,
Of you though it derive
Apparent earthly birth,
But of far other worth
Than you, ye vague desires,
Than you."¹

The same lesson, that "from flesh unto spirit man grows," is finely enforced by Matthew Arnold:

"Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more,
And in that *more* lie all his hopes of good.
Man must begin, know this, where Nature ends;
Nature and man can never be fast friends.
Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave!"

Perhaps one of the most complete descriptions of the ethical life, at least in English literature, is that which Browning has given us in his famous *Rabbi Ben Ezra*. In this poem, it will be remembered, age is represented as taking account of the total gain and loss of life, reckoning up its final significance, under the illumination of

"The last of life, for which the first was made."

And the element of value is found just in that doubt and strife, that failure and pain, which had been such mysteries to youth, with its eager thirst for pleasure and the satisfaction of the moment:

¹ A. H. Clough, *Poems*: "Sehnsucht."

"Rather I prize the doubt
 Low kinds exist without,
 Finished and finite clods, untroubled by a spark.
 Poor vaunt of life indeed,
 Were man but formed to feed
 On joy, to solely seek and find and feast ;
 Such feasting ended, then
 As sure an end to men ;
 Irks care the crop-full bird ? Frets doubt the maw-
 crammed beast ? . . .
 Then welcome each rebuff
 That turns earth's smoothness rough,
 Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go !
 Be our joys three-fourths pain !
 Strive, and hold cheap the strain ;
 Learn, nor account the pang ; dare, never grudge the
 throe !"

And as, in the quiet evening light, he meditates upon
 the meaning of that life whose day is now far spent,
 its real worth breaks in clear and definite outline upon
 his vision :

"He fixed thee mid this dance
 Of plastic circumstance,
 This Present, thou, forsooth, wouldst fain arrest :
 Machinery just meant
 To give thy soul its bent,
 Try thee and turn thee forth, sufficiently impressed."

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PART II

THE MORAL LIFE

THE MORAL LIFE.

Virtues and duties. The unity of the moral life.—The chief forms into which the good life differentiates itself are called by the ancients the cardinal virtues, by the moderns the table of duties. These two terms, 'virtue' and 'duty,' are two modes of describing the same thing; the former emphasises the inner character and its fundamental excellences, the latter the expression of character in conduct and the primary forms of that expression. Whether we look at the moral life from the standpoint of character or of conduct, we find it necessary to interpret it as an indissoluble unity. We cannot have any of the virtues without possessing in that measure all the rest, we cannot fulfil any duty without fulfilling in that measure all the other duties. The several virtues and duties are simply the several aspects of the good life, the various colours into which the perfect spectrum of character or conduct can be analysed; or, at the most, they are the several stages in the development of character and conduct, and each leads inevitably beyond itself to the next as the goal of its own perfection. Two main aspects of the moral life may be emphasised—the individual and the social; but the unity of these is apparent when we remember that both may be subsumed under the common term 'personal.' The individual cannot be true to his own personality without being true to

the personality of all whom his conduct in any way affects. To stand in the right relation to himself is to stand in the right relation to his fellows; to realise his own true self is to help all others to the same self-realisation. Again, we may divide the virtues and the corresponding duties into negative and positive groups. From the standpoint of the individual, the moral life may be regarded as a life at once of self-discipline and of self-development, resulting in the virtues of temperance and of culture. But the perfectly temperate or self-disciplined man would be also the man of perfect culture or self-development. Similarly, from the standpoint of society, we may distinguish the negative aspect of morality from the positive—the duty of freedom or non-interference with the self-realisation of others, with the corresponding virtue of justice, from the duty of fraternity or the positive helping of others in their efforts after their own perfection, with the corresponding virtue of benevolence. Here again it is obvious that we have only two aspects of a single life, that justice imperceptibly glides into benevolence, freedom into fraternity; that the one is the seed, the other the full-blown flower, of the same ethical quality. Without justice there can be no true benevolence, and justice made perfect is already benevolence in germ.

CHAPTER I

THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE.

I.—*Temperance, or Self-discipline.*

1. **Its fundamental importance.**—This is the first necessity of the moral life; it is essential to the constitution of virtue. The very essence of morality is, we have seen, the establishment of the order of reason in the chaos of natural impulse; and the reign of reason means the subjection and obedience of sensibility. Character is nature disciplined. The mastery of natural impulse by reason, in such wise that the original stream of tendency may become the dynamic of rational purpose; the conversion of the original irrational energy into an energy of reason itself; the transmutation of disposition into character,—this may be said to be the essential business of the moral life from first to last. Out of our natural individuality we have each to form a moral personality. The original or natural self is non-moral, and must be moralised. To be moralised, it must be disciplined, regulated, subdued; for only so can it be organised into the structure of a rational life. If the sphere of sensibility is to be finally annexed by reason, it must first be conquered; and this conquest of the self of natural sensibility by the rational self is temperance. For the heedless, partial, natural self is apt to rebel against the regulation of reason, it wants to rule; and the right

of reason has to become the might of a rationalised sensibility. The interest of the total self, which reason alone can discover, has to be asserted and maintained against the interest of the partial, fleeting, but clamant self of mere sensibility. This general purpose or end, chosen deliberately and reflectively, must be resolutely maintained against the particular, momentary or habitual, impulsive tendencies which would swamp it in the flood-tide of their power, and, if unchecked, would make us act as if the purpose did not exist, and had not been chosen. Intemperance is disintegration, disorganisation; it is the rule of unorganised or disorganised sensibility. Its watchword is self-gratification or self-indulgence. The temperate life, on the contrary, is a whole in its every part; if you take a section of it at any point, you discover in it the structure of the whole, the partial expression and realisation of its total purpose. All its energies are controlled from a common centre, they are the different manifestations of one great energy of goodness. Such a life is consistent and harmonious with itself; it has the calm strength of a resolute and even purpose. But this harmony and strength are the reward of a resolute self-denial and self-sacrifice.

No natural impulse is in itself evil, no element of sensibility is, as such, immoral. Evil or immorality arises only when the government of conduct is given to un-moralised sensibility. Sensibility needs the education of reason, before it is capable of government; it must itself be governed, before it is fitted to govern. Not that there may not be a certain system in a life controlled by uneducated sensibility. The life of the miser or of the man who is ambitious for mere power is, so far, a systematic and coherent life, though it is under the dominion of a single uncontrolled passion. But the system of such a life, we recognise at once, is not the true system; even the man himself would hardly claim that it is, and his larger and better nature will prob-

ably assert itself occasionally, and break up the little system of his short-sighted purpose. In such a life the part has claimed to be the whole; and the result is necessarily partial, abstract, contradictory. The true whole is the unity of all the parts; and that it may be constituted, every selfish impulse must submit to the control of the rational self, which alone can estimate the relative and permanent value of each. Most commonly, the absence of such true system and completeness is revealed in the obviously and painfully self-contradictory, fragmentary, and inconsistent character of the intemperate life, in its too evident want of unity. The main stream of its purpose is drained off into eddies and side-currents, and many a time is checked and turned by an undercurrent running in the opposite direction.

2. *Its negative aspect.* — The virtue of temperance or the duty of self-discipline has two aspects, a negative and a positive. First, negatively, it is the subjection of all impulse to the rule of rational choice, freedom from the domination of any single tendency of our nature, the setting to each its measure and limit by making it an element in a coherent and systematic rational life. In general, however, one particular impulse or set of impulses represents the principle of disintegration in the individual; the forces of the rebel nature are concentrated at some one point or at a few points. This impulse represents evil for the man; at this point the battle must be fought, here it must be lost or won. The struggle is not with evil in general, or with nature in the abstract; it is with this particular form of evil, it is with our own nature, or 'besetting sin.' The struggle of the drunkard is with the appetite for drink; he must master this appetite, or it will master him. The struggle of the miser is with cupidity, of the lazy and luxurious with the love of ease. In other words, the task is always one of self-conquest, and as the natural self of each is different

from that of his neighbour, the moral task is always very concrete and individual. What is temperance for one is intemperance for another; the Mean for one is for another excess; where one walks in perfect safety, another may not trust himself to walk at all.

Here we see the relative truth of asceticism. Self-discipline is, for each, self-denial or self-sacrifice. The individuality must be subdued to the rational personality, and the perfect subjection of individuality may, and often does, mean the absolute denial, at some point, of its right to live. If a natural impulse claims us as exclusively its own, if it enslaves us, and its indulgence at all means for us its immoderate indulgence—if, unless it is kept below its normal level, it will inevitably rise above it—the necessity is laid upon us to deny that impulse, to starve it, and, it may be, even to kill it outright. Better to enter into the life of goodness halt and maimed, if we cannot enter whole and sound, than not to enter at all. It may be profitable for us that one of our members perish, that some particular passion or appetite be denied indulgence altogether, because moderate indulgence of it is for us impossible. Thus, while temperance is moderation, not abstinence, abstinence may be to the individual the only means to moderation; and the ascetic principle of keeping the body under, lest it rebel against the rule of reason, is a safe ethical maxim for the average man. “Since it is hard to hit the mean, we must ‘tack as we cannot run,’ to use the sailors’ phrase, and choose the least of two evils. . . . and we must consider, each for himself, what we are most prone to—for different natures are inclined to different things. . . . And then we must bend ourselves in the opposite direction; for by keeping well away from error, we shall fall into the middle course, as we straighten a bent stick by bending it in the contrary direction.”¹

The concrete and individual character of self-discipline

¹ Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.*, ii. 9 (4, 5).

illustrates the importance, and even the necessity, of self-knowledge. A man is his own worst enemy; no other can do him such dire injury as that which he can inflict upon himself. If he would discover the enemy in his ambush, therefore, he must carefully explore and spy out the secret places of his own nature. He must discover his peculiar bias, and watch keenly its growing or decreasing strength. He must often "recollect" himself, and reckon up the gain and loss, the victory and defeat, in this inner combat with himself. And he must act in the light of this knowledge, with all the prudence of a general who calculates nicely the forces of the enemy and compares their numbers with his own.

3. Relation of its negative to its positive aspect. —This negative side of self-discipline, this work of mere subjection of natural sensibility, is, we all know, a much larger part of some lives than of others. In some the sensibility seems so to lend itself from the first to the wise control of reason that there is little consciousness of struggle or control at all. Such a moral career seems an almost even tenor of goodness; its fair Elysian fields are never stained with the blood of battle, its quiet peace is hardly broken with the noise of tumult or rebellion. Such well-tempered natures have the more energy to spare for the tasks of positive virtue; and to whom much is given, of them is much required. Others wage a bitter and life-long struggle against some natural tendency which, with their utmost efforts, they can only keep in subjection; these have little energy left for positive virtue. In them, however, to whom so little is given, a little of positive accomplishment may be much; for moral accomplishment is achieved in the sphere of character, and its significance is necessarily relative and individual.

Nor is it to be forgotten that positive and self-forgetting activity, the devotion of our entire energy to

some disinterested end, is one of the best means of deliverance from the slavery of individual impulse. The true self-discipline is inevitably positive as well as negative. The most perfect mastery of impulse comes with the guidance of all its energy into the path of our positive life-purpose. Temperance is not mere negation or annihilation of impulse, it is its co-ordination and control; and the characteristic impulsive energy of the individual ought to be utilised in the interest of the total purpose of the life. The only final subjugation of sensibility comes with its transmutation into the enthusiasm of some great end. Sensibility has then become organic to reason, it is then the dynamic of the rational life; and the danger of insurrection has almost disappeared. It is from idle impulse that there is danger; impulse which has its work assigned to it by reason soon becomes reason's willing servant. The strongest natures are always natures of strong impulse, mastered and subdued to the unity of a purpose which has possessed their entire being. The individuality has all passed into the personality; the fire of a consuming purpose has purified the dull ore of all their natural sensibilities. The search for Truth is the passion of a Socrates and a Newton; all the energy of a Luther's nature goes into the task of Reformation. Not till the depths of the moral being are thus stirred, and all the energy of its native passion captivated by rational purpose, is the work of self-discipline made perfect.

4. Its positive aspect.—Thus we have reached the second and positive aspect of temperance—namely, concentration or unity of purpose, self-limitation. The natural impulsive energy must be guided along a single path; its original tendency to diffusion must be checked. Diffusion means waste, economy of power implies limitation and definiteness of direction. The strong and effective man is always the man of one idea, of one book; the specialist, whether in the intellectual or in

other fields; the man who has one consuming interest in life, a master-interest and enthusiasm which has subdued all others to itself. Unity, simplicity, singleness of purpose—the correlation and integration of all the tendencies of the individual nature—this is the mark of a perfectly temperate, a thoroughly disciplined life. The forces of the nature are not merely checked and conquered; they are engaged in the service of an end which can utilise them all, and whose service is perfect freedom from the bondage of mere unregulated impulse. Here again we see the need of self-knowledge: we need to know the positive, as well as the negative, significance of our individuality. And such a knowledge of what we can do is at the same time a knowledge of what we cannot do: a knowledge of our individual capacity is at the same time a knowledge of our individual limitation.

II.—*Culture, or Self-development.*

5. **Its fundamental importance.**—The fundamental 'importance of a man to himself' has been made the corner-stone of their theory of life by all the great moralists, as it has been made the recurring note in the preaching of all the great moral teachers. Socrates insists, hardly less strenuously than Jesus, upon the supreme value of the individual soul, and the prime duty of caring for it. It was Christianity, however, that first brought home to the general consciousness of mankind the idea of the salvation of the self, not from punishment, but from sin; the conviction that the true Good is to be found in inner excellence of character; the thought of the treasure which is laid up where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, in the inner chambers of the spiritual being. What a hold this idea took of the Middle Ages, and how it produced the monastic life, with its preoccupation with the anatomy of spiritual

states, its morbid self-conscious pietism, we all know. We are also familiar with the narrower and more superficial self-consciousness of the man of 'culture' and the 'æsthete,' as well as with the equally foolish self-concern of the pedant who would fain be a scholar. These are instances of the obvious over-development of self-consciousness and self-concern. Better far to forget ourselves than to be thus ever mindful; better to be caught nodding, like Homer himself, than to be always thus painfully on the alert. There is an unconscious self-development which is often the best. But these are only exaggerations of the essential and fundamental virtue, the common root of all the rest. We must never really forget, in all the various business of life, that man's 'proper business' is with himself, that his grand concern is the culture of his own nature, the development of his true and total self. And since all so-called 'business' is, in this sense, more or less distracting, we have need of leisure from its care and trouble for self-recollection, of leisure to be with ourselves, to *be* ourselves. For we are not to perfect ourselves merely as instruments for the production of results, however good. A man's true work is that 'activity of the soul' (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς) which is its own sufficient end, the actualisation and development of the man's true 'soul' or self. The utilitarian estimate of education is essentially superficial; it is the estimate of the Philistine who asks always for the 'practical' value of culture, and thereby shows that he does not know what culture is. The true 'practice' of a human being is not that in which he discharges best a task which has no essential relation to himself; it is that which calls forth and develops all his human powers, the *man* in the man.

6. **Meaning of culture.**—I have said that it is the total self that is to be developed,—the intellectual, the emotional, and the active or volitional elements, each in

its perfection, and all in the harmony of a complete and single life. Culture means not merely the cultivation of the several capacities, but the symmetrical development of all. As, in the physical organism, the health of each member depends upon the health of the organism as a whole, so the true development of any part of our nature implies the concurrent development of all the other parts. The defective character of the intellectual man, whose emotional nature is atrophied and whom undue reflection has wellnigh incapacitated for practical activity; of the man of feeling, who has forgotten how to think or act; of the practical man, who has no time for thought, and to whom, perhaps, the emotional life seems a weakness or a luxury which he cannot afford himself,—is matter of common observation. It is perhaps not so commonly realised that true intellectual culture itself implies the culture of the emotions, if not also of the will; that true æsthetic culture implies the culture of both will and intellect; and, above all, that the best activity is the outcome of the largest thought and the deepest and warmest sensibility. In all spheres, the keynote of true culture is symmetrical self-development.

7. The place of physical culture.—The relation of physical to ethical well-being is apt to be misconceived. It is that of means to end. Physical well-being is not an integral part of the ethical end, though it is perhaps the most important means towards the realisation of that end. Health is the basis of the moral life, it is no part of that life itself. The body is only the instrument or organ of a life which is, in its essence, spiritual. It becomes a duty to care for the body, but this care is only part of our care for the soul or the spiritual self. My body is *mine*, it is not *I*. To make physical well-being an end-in-itself is to forget that animal perfection is an end unworthy of a rational being. It is the ends for which the human mind can use the body that give

the human body its peculiar dignity; and if man makes the mind the minister of the body's perfection, he is reversing their true ethical relation. In this connection Matthew Arnold has justly criticised the popular estimate of physical health as an end-in-itself;¹ it is that for the mere animal, but it cannot properly be that for man. 'Physical culture' is not an integral part of 'ethical culture.'

Health is only a part of that individual good which is, as such, subordinate to personal good, and has only an instrumental value. Like money, and position, social or official, it is part of our moral opportunity. But we have seen that the prudential life, whose concern is with the opportunity rather than with the exercise of virtue, does not coexist alongside the life of virtue, but is organic to that life. It is not the possession or non-possession of these things, but the use we make of them, that is of ethical significance. It would perhaps be helpful to clear ethical thinking to make the term 'prudence' cover the instrumental or the 'occasional'—those aspects of human life which, like physical health, pecuniary affairs, worldly position, or office, have in themselves no moral significance, but acquire such a significance through their being the material basis or condition of the moral life.

As a means towards the attainment of the ethical end, or as the basis of the moral life, the importance of physical well-being can hardly be exaggerated. Self-preservation and self-development are, in this sense, always primarily the preservation and development of the physical life. We must live, in order to live well; and our power of realising our moral purposes will be largely determined by our physical health. The ethical value of life, both in its length and in its breadth, in the duration and in the wealth of its activities, is to a considerable extent within our own power, being determined by our care or neglect

¹ See *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 21.

of the body. To despise the body, or to seek to escape from it, as the ascetic does, is as wrong as it is futile. The body is the chief condition of the moral life, its very element and atmosphere; and the athletic exaggeration of the importance of the body, like the estimate of cleanliness as not secondary to godliness, is probably, in the main, a not unnatural reaction from the ascetic extreme of contempt and neglect fostered by Puritan tradition. Above all, it is obvious that, if care for the body is an important although an indirect duty, the destruction of the physical life, or suicide, is an exceeding great sin. Our moral life being physically conditioned, the destruction of the body is an indirect attack upon that life itself. Suicide, being self-destruction, so far as that is possible to us, must always contradict the fundamental ethical principle of self-development.

8. *The individual nature of self-development.*—We have seen that self-development means the development of individuality into personality; that the person is always an individual. It is, therefore, essential to true self-development that the individuality be conserved, not destroyed. Many factors of our modern civilisation tend to substitute monotonous and dead uniformity for the living and interesting diversity of individual nature. Specialisation is apt to dwarf the individuality; political and other forms of social organisation tend in the same direction. We are much more apt than our forefathers to imitate others, and much less willing to be ourselves. Yet it is clear that vocation is determined chiefly by individual aptitude, though modified by the pressure of circumstances. The true career for a man is that which will most fully realise his individuality. Fortunate indeed is he to whom a thorough understanding of his own nature and an appropriate course of circumstances open up the path of such a career. With too many their so-called 'career' is a mere routine, a business for their

hands which leaves their deeper nature idle and unemployed, longing for a life more satisfying than that offered by the activities which consume its weary days, finding something of that true life, it may be, elsewhere, in some pursuit which has no relation to the daily avocation. There is a pathos in some men's 'hobbies'; they indicate that the soul is not dead but sleeping, and needs but the touch of an understanding sympathy to rouse it from its sleep. For the only true life is ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, activity of the soul or self. Happiest is he who can put his whole soul, all the energies of his spirit, into each day's work. His work, even as work, as sheer product, will have a different value: it will be honest work, the best work. It seems as if brute matter itself took the impress of the soul that moulds it; we feel, for example, that Carlyle's appreciation of his father's masonry is essentially a true appreciation.¹ And as the means of spiritual expression and expansion, the difference between nominal and real work is incalculable. How many imprisoned, unexpressed, unfulfilled souls behind the bleared, indifferent faces of the world's workers! For in every man there is a soul, a self, unique and interesting, waiting for its development; and sometimes, even from the deadest man, in the home among his own who understand him, or touched to life by some sign of brotherly interest in another, the soul that had slept so long will suddenly leap forth and surprise you.

The true *doing* is that doing which is also a *being*, and the medium of a better and fuller being, of a higher and more perfect self-development. But such doing is as unique as such being; the measure of it is found in the individuality of the worker. Each man, like each planet,

¹ "Nothing that he undertook but he did it faithfully, and like a true man. I shall look on the houses he built with a certain proud interest. They stand firm and sound to the heart all over this little district. Not one that comes after him will ever say, Here was the finger of a hollow eye-servant. They are little texts for me of the gospel of man's free will." — *Reminiscences*, pp. 5, 6.

has his appointed course, appointed him by his nature; "so starts the young life when it has come to self-discovery, and found out what it is to do by finding out what it is." Here, positively, for self-development, as already negatively, for self-discipline, we see the need of self-knowledge. Having found the end or purpose of our life, the true course of our self-development, and holding to this course steadily through all the storm and stress of passion and of circumstance, through the fiery time of youth and the deadening effect of years, we cannot fail of the completeness, fulness, and symmetry of our appointed life.

Such a care for our own true culture or self-development in all our work is the true 'self-love,' and at the opposite pole from selfishness. We ought not to be always trying to 'do good'; the first requisite for doing good is to be good. Philanthropy or benevolence will grow out of this self-development, as its flower and fruit. But self-culture is fundamental; and the unconscious and indirect philanthropy of faithfulness to ourselves is often the best and furthest-reaching. Such self-culture fits us for service to others; when the time comes, the man is ready. Moreover, we must first live the true life ourselves, if we would help others to live it too; it is thus we get the needed understanding. We must be, ourselves, before we can help others to be. It is because God is all that we would be, that we say and feel, "Thou wilt help us to be." So it is that, though we are separate from one another, separate by the very fact of personality, each 'rounded to a separate whole,' and though each man's single life, each man's 'own vineyard,' needs constant and exclusive care, yet the good man feels no cleft, as there is none, between the egoistic and the altruistic sides of his life. Egoism, in the sense explained, is fundamental, but it is the presupposition of an enlightened and genuine altruism. No narrowness is possible for him who cares for and develops his own true life; in himself he finds the moral microcosm. The best ambition a man could cherish, both for himself and

for his fellows, is that he and they alike may, each in himself, and each in his own way, so reflect the moral universe that none may have cause to travel beyond himself to find the fellowship of a common life and a common Good.

9. **Necessity of transcending our individuality : the ideal life.**—Yet it is necessary to transcend our individuality ; personality is essentially universal. All worthy and ennobling objects of human aspiration and achievement, the service of our fellows in any way, the scientific, the artistic, and the religious life,—all alike carry us beyond our own individuality. It is this inherent universality that gives life its note of nobility. The personal life is never merely particular and individual ; its atmosphere is always objective and universal, whether it be the intellectual pursuit of the true, the artistic pursuit of the beautiful, or the religious pursuit of the good. All these pursuits lift the individual out of the sphere of the particular and transitory into the sphere of the universal and abiding, out of the finite into the infinite relations. This is the touch that transfigures human life, and lends to it a divine and absolute significance. For a full self-development it is needful that we thus escape from the ‘cave’ of the particular, above all, from the ‘cave’ of our own individuality, into the freer atmosphere of the infinite and ideal, and let its winds blow about the soul ; they are the very breath of its higher life.

This is equally true of all three sides of our nature—the intellectual, the æsthetic, and the practical. How the horizon of the mind lifts with the apprehension of Truth, how the pursuit of it takes a man out of himself, how faithfulness to it delivers him from self-seeking and narrow aims, how the scientific and the philosophic life are essentially disinterested, and how educative of the personality is such a course of pure intellectual activity,—on all this there is little need to insist in a

scientific age like the present, which has been accused of the 'deification of Truth.' It was with no little moral insight, as well as with Greek partiality for the things of the mind, that Plato and Aristotle described the highest life of man as a purely intellectual activity, the life of speculation. That the contemplation of the Beautiful in nature and in human life, the apprehension of 'the light that never was on sea or land,' is also uplifting and enlarging to the soul; that the companionship of the graceful and harmonious makes the soul itself harmonious and graceful,—the Greeks at least knew well. To them the true education was 'musical.' The man who has seen the beautiful is easily recognised, his face shines with the light of that divine vision, his footsteps move to noble numbers, he is delicate and tender, and about him there is a gentleness and grace which you miss in the hard practical man, and even in the mere intellectualist. The beauty of the world has 'passed into his face.' Least of all can we be ignorant of the influence of the contemplation of the ideal Good. The soul that believes in, and lives in communion with, Goodness absolute, is touched to goodness as a soul that sees only the poverty of the actual cannot be. The moral value of an ethical religion is an undoubted fact, acknowledged by every one. Nor is the essence of religion mere constraint, its sanction of goodness mere fear of punishment or hope of reward. Far more powerful, though more subtly exercised, is the purifying influence of the divine vision itself. The Hebrews felt this so deeply that they were afraid of that vision which we have learned to call 'beatific.' "No man can see God's face and live." Evil cannot live in the presence of utter Holiness. Even among men, we know how stern to the impure is the silent rebuke of purity, how humiliating to the worldly and selfish soul is the contact with unselfishness and generosity; and we can understand something of the meaning of the words, "Our God is a consuming fire."

Therefore it is well and healthful for the soul that every man should breathe at times the pure atmosphere of the infinite and ideal, should lift up his eyes unto the hills from whence cometh his aid, should retire into the ideal world, and gaze upon the archetypal Truth and Beauty and Goodness, of which the actual world is but the dim reflection. Some must, and by natural vocation will, consecrate themselves to the more direct and immediate service of these ideals. The man of science and the philosopher; the artist, whether poet, painter, sculptor, or musician; the priest or minister of religion,—these are, in a peculiar sense, the servants of the ideal. But they are only the representatives of our common humanity in that supreme service and consecration. And while these live habitually within the veil, in the inner sanctuary of the Infinite, it is needful that they whose preoccupation with the world's business detains them in the outer courts of the finite world, if they would preserve their manhood and draw strength for life's casual duties, should sometimes enter too.

10. *Dangers of moral idealism.*—Yet we must never, in our devotion to the ideal and infinite, neglect the imperative claims of the actual finite world. We must always return—even the ministers of the ideal in art, in science, and in religion, must return—to the secular life, to the finite world and its relations. Nor must the vision of the infinite and ideal ever be allowed to distort our vision of the finite and actual. Emancipation from the 'cave' of the finite brings with it its own new danger: it tends to unfit man for the life of the 'cave.' Those who have lived in the upper air, and have seen the absolute Reality, are apt to be blinded by the darkness of the cave in which their fellows spend their lives, and, regarding all its concerns as shadowy and illusory, to lose their interest in them. They are apt, as Plato said, to be awkward and easily outwitted; for their souls sit loose

to this world, and dwell apart. The peculiar temptation of genius, moral, æsthetic, or intellectual; the peculiar temptation of those whose lives are spent habitually in the infinite relations,—is to minimise the finite, and fail to see the infinite shining through it. Gazing at the stars, they are in danger of falling into the well. So it is that ‘respectability’ is often on a higher ethical plane than genius and saintship. Even Plato said that we must bring the travellers back to the cave, and force them to take their part in its life; idealist and transcendentalist though he was, he saw that most men must live in the cave. No service of the ideal will atone for unfaithfulness in the actual. “He that is unfaithful in that which is least is unfaithful also in much.” The individual’s duty is determined and defined by his station, or his place in the actual finite relations; and even his cultivation of the ideal must be regulated by the imperious claims of this moral station. We know how inexorably severe were Carlyle’s judgments of self-condemnation for his failure in the little services of domestic piety; how, if these judgments were even in a measure true, his ‘spectral’ view of life, his preoccupation with the ‘immensities and eternities,’ shut out from his field of vision the duty that lay next him. Carlyle’s uncorrupted moral insight finds in his genius, which was perhaps as much moral as intellectual in its quality, no excuse for shortcoming in the ‘minor moralities’ of life. Nor does the world’s keen moral judgment find in the peculiar religious attainments of ‘professing Christians’ any excuse for such obvious moral defects as malice and ill-temper. In such cases the severity of our judgment is apt to be intensified by the very height of the ideal to which the life professes its devotion. The highest and most complete—the sanest—natures recognise most fully this claim of the actual, and most willingly surrender themselves to the burden of its fulfilment. In this meekness and lowliness of spirit Wordsworth sees the crown of Milton’s virtue:

“Thy soul was like a star and dwelt apart . . .
Pure as the heavens, majestic, free,
So didst thou travel on life's common way,
In cheerful godliness ; and yet thy heart
The lowliest duties on herself did lay.”

And Tennyson, in the *Idylls of the King*, sings in a like strain of the ideal life :

“And some among you held that if the King
Had seen the sight, he would have sworn the vow ;
Not easily, seeing that the King must guard
That which he rules, and is but as the hind
To whom a space of land is given to plough,
Who may not wander from the allotted field
Before his work be done.”

So must each man be content, king or subject, genius or day-labourer, to go forth unto his labour until the evening ; for in this world each has his appointed task, and if he do it not, it will be left undone. Even if our duty be to consecrate ourselves, in science, in art, or in religion, to the peculiar service of the ideal—the noblest service that life offers, and that which calls for the highest aptitudes—we still must not forget that, in respect of our duties in the actual, we stand on the common level. The priest, the artist, and the philosopher are also ‘ordinary men,’ and have no exemption from the common domestic, social, and civic duties. Such exemption would unfit them for their own high task—the discovery of life's ideal meaning, and its interpretation to their fellows. Nor must any man allow his excursions into the ideal world to dull the edge of his interest in the ordinary business of life. It is true that we all have need of leisure from the very finite occupations of life for such communion with the Infinite ; for in that communion the soul's best life is rooted, and it will wither if not well tended. The world of knowledge, of art, of religion, does claim us for itself, and our visits to it ought to be all the

more frequent because our actual world is apt to be so meagre and confined. But our acquaintance with the splendours of its many mansions must never breed in our souls contempt for the narrowness or the mean appointments of the house of our earthly pilgrimage. It is a danger and temptation neither unreal nor unfamiliar. Let us take two illustrations of it.

The artistic temper is apt to be impatient of the commonplaceness of its daily life; we are wont, indeed, to attribute to it a kind of practical irresponsibility. Led by visions of the beautiful into the romantic country of the imagination, the spirit is loath to return to the prosaic fields of ordinary daily duty. Its emotions are ideal, and seem to find no issue in action on the earthly plane; and more and more it comes to feel that there is no scope for such emotions in the actual world. The other world—the world of the imagination—is so much more interesting and exciting that, by comparison with it, the actual world of daily life, where duties lie, seems ‘stale, flat, and unprofitable.’ It is the Quixotic temper which we all know in childhood. Nothing will satisfy us but knight-errantry,—slaying giants, and rescuing fair ladies. The life of the Middle Ages would have suited us much better than that of our own century. It was so much more picturesque, there was so much more colour, the lights were brighter and the shadows deeper; life was romantic then. But, in reality, life is always the same; it presents always the same moral opportunities. The elementary realities do not change, the alphabet of human life is the same from age to age. The imagination is always apt to picture the Golden Age of life’s great opportunities of action either in the past or in the future, while really, if we had eyes to see them, they are always in the present. The pattern of man’s life may be very different in different ages, its colours may be brighter or more sombre; but its warp and woof, its inner texture, is always the same, and is wrought of the threads of good

and evil, virtue and vice, faithfulness and unfaithfulness to present duty.

Or take the 'saint' who, with his eye fixed on the Beyond, abstracts himself from this earthly life, either outwardly as in mediæval Monasticism, or in the inner life, like many a modern Protestant, mingling with his fellows as if he were not of them, not in hypocrisy or pride, but in real rapt abstraction of spirit, afraid lest he soil his hands with this world's business and render them unfit for the uses of the heavenly commerce. Such a life not only misses the influence it might have exerted on the world, but proves itself unworthy of, and unfit for, the higher just in the measure that it fails in the lower duties. The peculiar human way to the ideal is through utter faithfulness in the actual; and the reason why we need to leave the actual at all is just that we may get the inspiration which will enable us to see the ideal in it. It requires an eye that has seen the ideal shining in its own proper strength, to detect it in the disappointing surroundings of the actual world. In activity, not in passive contemplation, lies man's salvation. This is the Christian, as distinguished from the Buddhistic, life; it is also modern, as distinguished from mediæval, Christianity. The ideal must be found, after all, in the actual; the things unseen and eternal in the things which are seen and temporal; the infinitely True and Beautiful and Good in the finite relations of daily life. It is the function of the chosen servants of the ideal to open the eyes of their fellows, that they may see life even on 'this bank and shoal of time' *sub quâdam specie æternitatis*; and thus to make the secular for them henceforth sacred, the commonplace infinitely interesting and significant.

11. The ethical supremacy of the moral ideal.—The supreme category of the moral life is the Good, not as excluding, but as containing in itself, the Beautiful and the True. To make either the true or the beautiful

the containing notion leads to moral misappreciation. Æstheticism and intellectualism are both ethically unsatisfactory; the former is weak, as the latter is hard and cold. He who so gives himself to science or to philosophy as to *intellectualise* himself, or reduce his entire nature to terms of the true, does not even reach the highest truth. He who so gives himself to art or the culture of the beautiful as to sink the ethical in the æsthetic, must miss the vision of the highest beauty. These failures teach us that the fundamental term of our life is the Good; in so far as we attain to this ideal, we shall inevitably attain the others also. Greek ethics illustrate the inadequacy alike of the intellectual and of the æsthetic ideal. For both Plato and Aristotle the ideal life was a life of speculation or intellectual contemplation, in which no place was found for practical activity or the play of the ordinary sensibilities.¹ For Plato's artistic nature, again, as for the Greeks generally, the temptation always was to conceive the Good under the form of the Beautiful; and, as Pater has remarked, for Plato "the Beautiful would never come to seem strictly concentric with the Good." But until we see the three circles as concentric, we do not see any one of them as it really is. The Greeks were perhaps too intellectual to be conscious of the danger that lay in a too exclusive devotion to the intellectual life; they certainly do not betray such a consciousness. But Plato, poet and artist though he is, shows a nervous apprehension of the dangers, for the individual and the State, that lie in æstheticism. He has no place for the poets in his ideal State. His quarrel with them, it is to be noted, is a characteristic Greek one: the poets are condemned primarily in the interests of truth, rather than of goodness; they are the great deceivers. Where truth and beauty do not coincide, Plato would seem to say, truth must be preferred to beauty. Art—the poetic

¹ Both, of course, as we have seen, recognised the practical activities and the ordinary sensibilities as virtuous in a secondary sense.

art at least—being in its essence imitative, substitutes fiction for reality, and its fiction is apt to be a misrepresentation of the real. Therefore, though none has a higher appreciation of literary art than Plato, though none finds a more honourable place for ‘music’ in the education of the ideal man and citizen, he finds himself compelled, in loyalty to the higher interests of truth, to banish the poets lest they corrupt the State by making its citizens believe a lie. It is an impressive instance of the warfare of ideals, and of faithfulness to the highest knowledge. And if for us the warfare has ceased to exist, and the circles of our life’s interests have become concentric, it is perhaps not so much because we have reached a truer appreciation of the function of art than Plato knew, as that we have learned to include both the æsthetic and the intellectual life as elements in the undivided life of goodness. Let us separate any one of these three ideals from the others, and all alike are in that measure impaired and misunderstood. We can see that even the Greek devotion to the true is not the highest or most complete devotion of human life; our devotion to the true, as well as to the beautiful, must, if we are to be perfect, be part of our supreme devotion to the good. Hence the supreme value of the religious life, as compared with the other avenues to the universal and the infinite. Our deepest thought of God is Righteousness; and by reason of this, its ethical basis, the religious ideal not only includes the others, but also comes nearest to actual life, touching the otherwise commonplace and trivial duties of the finite relations and transfiguring them, shedding over all the actual the light of the ideal.

12. *Culture and philanthropy.*—Hence also it is in the service of our fellows that we find the continual emancipation from the prison-house of our individual selfhood, in philanthropy that we find the surest and most effective method of our self-development. The

lower and selfish self, because it is selfish, cannot serve; the very life of the true and higher self consists in ministry. Nor is there any danger, in such a life, of Quixotic knight-errantry or abstract moral idealism, of our failing, through our devotion to the ideal, in our duty to the actual. The most commonplace service, 'the cup of cold water,' any deed done for another, takes us entirely out of ourselves, idealises our life, breaks down its limitations. For a true ministry to any human need implies a perfect sympathy and identification of ourselves with the needy one, and we know the enlargement of the spirit's life that comes with such a sympathy. It opens up other worlds of experience—the world of poverty, of sickness, of sorrow, of doubt, of temptation, of sin; it unlocks the secret chambers of the human heart.

How much the man misses who, with miserly greed, hoards up his little selfish life and will not share it with his fellows, how miserably poor and valueless even to himself his life becomes, Butler has described in his strong, clear, didactic manner in his *Sermons*, and George Meredith has pictured in his powerful story *The Egoist*. Such a picture George Eliot has given us in *Silas Marner*, adding, with consummate skill, the companion picture of the deliverance that came with the first outgoings of the poor shrunken heart towards its fellows, and how there was born in the spirit of Silas Marner, through the love of a little child, a new and larger life. The specialist in science, the business man, the professional man, all alike need the expansion that comes from such a contact with the universal human heart and its universal needs. The least apparently significant duty to our fellows, to be adequately done, calls forth the whole man, intellectual, emotional, active; and it is most wholesome for the 'specialist'—and more and more we all, in some sense, are becoming specialists—to be distracted from a too entire preoccupation with his peculiar calling by the common everyday duties of our human life. Many illustrations

might be offered to show how truly such a service of others is a service of our own best selves. What a force, for example, in self-development is the faithful and adequate discharge of any office or responsibility : men grow to the dignity of their calling, and duties which at first almost overpowered them become, in the end, no burden at all. The expectation of others, silent it may be and undefined, is an incalculable force in steadying and elevating a nature which might otherwise have been unstable and even have become ignoble. To feel that we stand to another in any measure for the ideal, as the parent stands to the child, the teacher to the pupil, the preacher to his people, and friend to friend, is a tremendous spur to us to live up to and justify, not disappoint, these expectations. Is not this one of the secrets of greatness? To stand, like the prophet and reformer, to a whole people in this relation, must be an immeasurable stimulus to faithfulness to the responsibility thus created. Christianity has done much to bring home to the human mind the essential dignity and the high privilege of service, and to teach us how, in serving our fellows and in bearing one another's burdens, we may find the path of a perfect self-realisation. Here we find the bridge from the individual to the social virtues, the essential identity of altruism with the higher egoism. In this also lies the Christian idea of moral greatness, the greatness of humility and self-sacrifice, as opposed to the greatness of pride and self-assertion, the Pagan vanity and pomp of individuality. If we wish to feel the contrast of the Pagan and the Christian ideals of greatness, we have only to compare the Aristotelian picture of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, the proud aristocrat who lives to prove his independence and superiority, with that other picture of a Life that poured itself out in the service of others, that came not to be ministered unto but to minister, that was willing, for the sake of such a ministry, even to be misunderstood. This picture has touched the heart of the world as the other never could have touched

it. For it is a revelation of the blessedness that lies in escape from the prison-house of the private and selfish life, and entrance into the universal life of humanity.

13. *Self-reverence*.—Yet it is never to be forgotten that the moral life remains always a personal, and even an individual life; it never becomes impersonal or ‘self-less.’ The unselfish life is not self-less or impersonal; rather, as we have just seen, the life of the self is enlarged and enriched in direct proportion to the unselfishness of that life. Even the individuality is not, in such self-development any more than in self-discipline, negated or annihilated; it is taken up into, and interpreted by, the larger social good.

Nor must we forget that the fundamental and essential attitude of a man towards himself is one of self-respect—what Milton calls “the inward reverence of a man towards his own person,” reverence for the humanity which he represents. This is the true ‘greatness of soul’ which is perfectly consistent with the utmost humility as to our actual achievements and individual desert, with remorse and shame and bitter self-condemnation. For such self-reverence is reverence for the ideal and potential manhood in ourselves, and means the chastisement of the actual by comparison. This noble self-consciousness should enable a man to preserve his dignity in all the affairs of life, and make him, in the true sense, sufficient unto himself, his own judge and his own approver. We are told that Goethe had no patience with over-sensitive people, with those “histrionic natures” who “seem to imagine that they are always in an amphitheatre, with the assembled world as spectators; whereas, all the while, they are playing to empty benches.” Doubtless, if we filled the benches with the great and good of all ages, as with a great cloud of witnesses, and brought our actions to the penetrating gaze of *their* clear judgment, such a consciousness would be most beneficial and worthy. But we are far too apt to be play-acting instead of living, contented if only we

succeed in playing a certain *rôle*, and appearing to be what we are not. Such a 'histrionic' life is the very antithesis of the good life; and, when detected, it is rightly named 'hypocrisy.' The hypocrite wants to *get*, not to *be*. But oftener it passes undetected, and gains the applause for which it has striven. And even those who are not consciously masquerading, for whom life is real and earnest, are too apt to be dependent upon the judgment of others, and to forget that a man is called upon to be his own judge, and in all things to live worthily of himself. The general level of moral opinion subtly insinuates itself into our judgments of ourselves; we lose our independence, and sink below our own true level.

All strong natures are self-contained; it is the secret of moral peace and calm, the mark of the wise and good of every age. "Such a man feels that to fail in any act of kindness and helpfulness would be foreign to his nature. It would be beneath him. His sense of honour forbids him to stoop to anything selfish, petty, or mean. . . . The opulent or royal soul that has felt itself to be one with the great human life about it, would feel itself narrowed, and thus dishonoured, by any act through which it should cut itself off from these larger relations."¹ It would feel like a prince deposed. "In this sense it is that we may speak of stooping to a selfish act, or may say that such an act is not only foreign to the nature, but is unworthy of it and beneath it."² So sublimely independent, so nobly self-contained, is the life of personality. The good man is at home with himself, and his real life is an inner rather than an outer life.

"The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers."

The moral weakling lives always, or for the most part, abroad, and never retires within himself, to find behind the veil of his own inner being that vision of the perfect

¹ C. C. Everett, *Poetry, Comedy, and Duty*, p. 245.

² *Ibid.*, p. 246.

life for which the spirit yearns. For the lowly and contrite heart is His temple who dwelleth not in temples made with hands, and the pure and upright soul is His continual abode. But this truly 'sacred place' must be kept sacred; and it cannot be, if it is opened to all the riot and confusion of the market-place. "Solitude is to character what space is to the tree." The loneliness of personality is never to be forgotten; "the heart knoweth his own bitterness, and a stranger doth not intermeddle with his joy." In a deep sense, we are separate from one another, and every man must bear his own burden. The walls of personality shut us in, each within the chamber of his own being and his own destiny. It is therefore good, and most necessary, for a man to be alone with himself. It was one of the most genial and social-hearted of men who said: "If the question was eternal company, without the power of retiring within yourself, or solitary confinement for life, I should say, 'Turnkey, lock the cell.'"¹ But, happily, that is not the alternative. In the solitary places of the human heart, in the deep quiet valleys and on the high mountain-tops of our moral being, is to be found the goodly fellowship of the great and noble of all the ages of man's long history—nay, the fellowship of the Universal Spirit, the meeting-place of man with God. We must cherish the solitude, even as we would cherish that fellowship.²

¹ Sir Walter Scott, *Journal* (Lockhart's *Life*, vol. viii. p. 181).

² Archbishop Trench has given striking expression to this feeling in the following sonnet:

"A wretched thing it were, to have our heart
Like a thronged highway or a populous street;
Where every idle thought has leave to meet,
Pause, or pass on, as in an open mart;
Or like some roadside pool, which no nice art
Has guarded that the cattle may not beat
And foul it with a multitude of feet,
Till of the heavens it can give back no part.
But keep thou thine a holy solitude,
For He who would walk there, would walk alone;
He who would drink there, must be first endued
With single right to call that stream his own;
Keep thou thine heart, close-fastened, unrevealed,
A fenced garden, and a fountain sealed."

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CHAPTER II.

THE SOCIAL LIFE.

I.—*The Social Virtues : Justice and Benevolence.*

1. The relation of the social to the individual life.—Man has social or other-regarding, as well as individual or self-regarding, impulses and instincts. By nature, and even in his unmoralised condition, he is a social being. But this sympathetic or altruistic nature must, equally with the selfish and egoistic, be formed and moulded into the virtuous character; the primary feeling for others, like the primary feeling for self, is only the raw material of the moral life. And the law of the process of moralisation is the same in both cases; the dutiful attitude towards others is essentially the same as the dutiful attitude towards ourselves. For in others, as in ourselves, we are called upon to recognise the attribute of personality. They, too, are ends in themselves; their life, like our own, is one of self-realisation, of self-development through self-discipline. We must treat them, therefore, as we treat ourselves, as persons. The law of the individual life is also the law of the social life, though in a different and a wider application. Virtue is fundamentally and always personal; and when we have discovered the law of the individual life, we have already discovered that of the social life. Since men are not mere individuals, but the bearers of a common per-

sonality, the development in the individual of his true selfhood means his emancipation from the limitations of individuality, and the path to self-realisation is through the service of others. Not that we serve others, the better to serve ourselves: we ought not to regard another person as the instrument even of our highest self-development. They, too, are ends in themselves: to them is set the self-same task as to ourselves, the task of self-realisation. The law of the moral life, the law of personality, covers the sphere of social as well as of individual duty; and that law is: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, always as an end, never as a means to an end." We may *use* neither ourselves nor others. Truly to serve humanity, therefore, is to realise ourselves, and at the same time to aid others in the same task of self-realisation. In serving others, we are serving ourselves; in serving ourselves, we are serving others. For, in both cases, we serve that humanity which must ever be served, and never used.

The life of virtue, even on its social side, is still a personal, not an impersonal life. This is apt to be overlooked, owing to the illusion of the term 'social' and the antithesis, so commonly emphasised, between the individual and the social life. The individual and the social are, in reality, two aspects of the one undivided life of virtue, and their unity is discovered with their reduction to the common principle of personality. The social life is, equally with the individual life, personal; and the personal life is necessarily at once individual and social. We must not be misled by the phrase 'social life,' as if society had a life of its own apart from its individual members; society is the organisation of individuals, and it is they who live, not it. Apart from its individual members, society would be a mere abstraction; but we are too apt, here as elsewhere, to hypostatise abstractions. In reality, society is not an organism,

but the ethical organisation of individuals. Obviously, we must not isolate the organisation or the relation from the beings organised or related; this would be a new case of the old Scholastic Realism, or substantiation of the universal. Moral reality, like all finite reality, is, in the last analysis, individual. But while the life of virtue is always individual, it is never merely individual: to be personal, it must be social. If in one sense each lives a separate life, yet in another sense "no man liveth unto himself." A common personality is to be realised in each, and in infinite ways the life of each is bound up with that of all. Only, the individual must never lose himself in the life of others. As a person, he is an end in himself, and has an infinite worth. He has a destiny, to be wrought out for himself; the destiny of society is the destiny of its individual members. The 'progress of the race' is, after all, the progress of the individual. The ethical end is personal, first and last. As the individual apart from society is an unreal abstraction, so is society apart from the individual. The ethical unit is the person.

Thus we can see that there is no necessary antagonism between individualism, truly understood, and socialism, truly understood. Nay, the true socialism is the true individualism, the discovery and the development of the person in the individual. Society exists for the individual, it is the mechanism of his personal life. All social progress consists in the perfecting of this mechanism, to the end that the moral individual may have more justice and freer play in the working out of his own individual destiny. The individualism of the mere individual means moral chaos, and is suicidal; such a life is, as Hobbes described it, "poor, nasty, dull, brutish, and short." But the individualism of the person is, in its idea at least, synonymous with the true socialism, and the true democracy with the true aristocracy. For social progress does not mean so much the massing of

individuals as the individualisation of the social mass; the discovery, in the 'masses,' of that same humanity, individual and personal, which had formerly been discerned only in the 'classes.' The truly social ideal is to make possible for the many—nay, for all, or better for each—that full and total life of personality which, to so large an extent, is even still the exclusive possession of the few. Social organisation is never an end in itself, it is always a means to the attainment of individual perfection.

2. Social virtue: its nature and its limit. — We have seen that social or altruistic impulse, like individual or egoistic, is only the raw material of virtue, part of that nature which has to be moralised into character. Mere 'good-will' or 'sociality' is not the virtue of benevolence; the natural inclination to help others needs guidance, and may have to be restrained. So true is Kant's contention that natural impulse or inclination has, as such, no ethical value. We have also seen that the law, in the one case as in the other, is found in personality. Each man, being an ego or person, has the right to the life of a person. The true moral attitude of other persons to him, therefore, is the same as his attitude towards himself; and accordingly social, like individual, virtue has two sides, a negative and a positive. The attitude of the virtuous man towards his fellows is first, negatively, the making room for, or not hindering, their personal life, and secondly, the positive helping of them to such a life, the removing of obstacles from their way, and the bringing about of conditions favourable to their personal development. Here, with the conditions of the moral life in our fellows, we must stop; no man can perform the moral task for another, there is no vicariousness in the moral life. Not even God can *make* a man good. Goodness, by its very nature, must be the achievement of the individual: each must work out his own salvation. The

individual must fight his own battles, and win his own victories; and if he is defeated, *he* must suffer, and strive through suffering to his final perfection. The moral life is essentially a personal life; in this sense all morality is private. Life lies for each in 'the realisation of self by self'; that is our peculiar human dignity and privilege and high responsibility, and it is not allowed that any man come between us and our 'proper business.' But everything short of this moral interference and impertinence we may do for our fellows. 'Environment' counts for much, especially the social environment; and we can improve the moral environment of those whom we wish to aid. The will may be stimulated by suggestions from another, though no amount of pressure can coerce it. Ideals are potent, and, once accepted, seem to realise themselves; and, especially by our own practice and example, we may suggest true moral ideals to others. In such ways, society can stimulate in the individual, and individuals can stimulate in their fellows, the life of virtue. Only, we cannot take the moral task out of the hands of the individual, we cannot even strictly co-operate with him in the execution of that task. Such is the solitariness of the moral life.

3. Its two aspects, negative and positive: justice and benevolence.—Social virtue, on its negative side, we may call justice, with its corresponding duty of freedom or equality; on its positive side, we may call the virtue benevolence, and the duty fraternity or brotherliness. I use these terms, of course, very generally, to cover much more than civic excellence in the one case, and than what is ordinarily called philanthropy in the other. Whenever we do not repress another personality, but allow it room to develop, we are just to it; whenever, in any of the senses above suggested, we help another in the fulfilment of his moral task, we exercise towards him the virtue of benevolence.

There is the same kind of relation between justice and benevolence in the social life as between temperance and culture in the individual life. As temperance is the presupposition of a true culture, so is justice the presupposition of a true benevolence. This logical priority is also a practical priority. We must be just before we can be generous: we earn the higher power by our faithful exercise of the lower. This is obvious enough in the case of political action; the philanthropy of the State must be founded on justice, the interests of security form the basis of the interests of well-being. Indeed, the benevolence of the State is really a higher justice. But the principle is not less true of the relations of individuals to one another; here, too, benevolence is only justice made perfect. When the parent, out of a full heart and without a thought of self-interest, does his best for his child, when friend acts thus by friend, or teacher by scholar, what is each doing but striving to mete out to the other the full measure of a perfect justice? More or higher than that, no man can ask from another and no man can give to his fellow. The distinction, though so convenient, is artificial; it is one of those division-lines which, since they do not exist in reality, disappear with a deeper insight into the nature of things. Most pernicious have been the effects of the neglect of the true relation of priority in which justice stands to benevolence. The Christian morality, as actually preached and practised, has been largely chargeable with this misinterpretation. 'Charity' has been magnified as the grand social virtue, and has been interpreted as a 'giving of alms' to the poor, a doing for them of that which they are unable to do for themselves, an alleviation, more or less temporary, of the evils which result from the misery of their worldly circumstances. But this charity has coexisted with the utmost injustice to those who have been its objects. Instead of attacking the stronghold of the enemy—the poverty itself, the shameful inequality of conditions—the Church as a social

institution, and individuals in their private capacity or in other forms of association, have apparently accepted the evil as permanent and inevitable, or have even welcomed it as the great opportunity of the moral life. It has been assumed that we must have the poor always with us, and their poverty has been regarded as a splendid field for the exercise of the virtue of benevolence. Yet a moment's reflection will convince us that this virtue cannot find its exercise in the field of injustice: the only field for its development is one which has been prepared for it by the sharp ploughshare of a thoroughgoing justice. Injustice and benevolence cannot dwell together; and when justice has done its perfect work, there will be little left for the elder philanthropy to do, and charity will be apt to find its occupation gone. When the causes of distress have been removed, the distress itself will not have to be relieved, and benevolence will have its hands free for other and better work. When all have justice, those who now need help will be independent of it, and men will learn at last that the best help one man can give to another is to help him to help himself. It is because we have really given our fellows less than justice that we have seemed to give them more.

For what is justice? Is it not to recognise in our fellow-man an *alter ego*, and to love our neighbour as ourselves? Is it not the principle of moral equality—that each shall count for one, and no one for more than one? And when we remember that the reckoning is to be made not merely in terms of physical life or of material well-being, but in terms of personality; that we are called upon to treat our fellow-man as literally another self, to put ourselves in his place, and to take towards him, as far as may be, his own attitude towards himself,—do we not find that such equality is synonymous with fraternity, that others are in very truth our fellows and our brothers in the moral life? Might it not be less misleading to speak only of justice in the

social relations—of negative and positive justice—than of justice and benevolence?

The fact of the essential identity of justice and benevolence suggests that they have a common sphere. That sphere is the social, and, more particularly, the political life. Yet here also there is a distinction within the identity. While both virtues may be exercised in the political sphere, it is of the genius of justice to spend itself upon the community, of benevolence to single out the individual. The State is the sphere of justice, and in the eyes of the State all its citizens are alike—each counts for one, and no one for more than one. The peculiar sphere of benevolence or the higher justice is that of private and domestic life, and of the non-political association of individuals. The characteristically individual nature of this aspect of virtue was recognised by the Greeks, whose name for it was 'friendship.' So far is the conception carried that Aristotle is led to question whether we can have more than one true friend, whether it is possible to stand in this relation of perfect fellowship to more than one individual; for hardly shall we find more than one *alter ego*, happy indeed are we if we find even one. The modern conception is that of universal love or 'humanity.' But the essence of the virtue is the same in both cases,—brotherliness or fellowship. This conception signalises that intimateness of the relation which converts justice into benevolence, or imperfect into perfect justice. Where justice insists upon the equality of men in virtue of their common personality, benevolence seizes the individuality in each. Benevolence is more just than justice, because it is enlightened by the insight into that 'inequality' and uniqueness of individuals which is no less real than the 'equality' of persons.

4. Benevolence.—It is in the case of benevolence especially that we realise the necessity of the regulation

or moralisation of the original natural impulse or affection. Whether we take the promptings of the parent, of the friend, of the patriot, or of the philanthropist, we see that altruistic impulse is originally as blind as egoistic, and that it needs, no less than the latter, the illumination of reason. We need the wisdom of rational insight into the good of another, if we are in any measure to aid him in the attainment of that good; and all our benevolent activity must be informed and directed by such insight. Without its guidance, we cannot be really 'kind' to another. Unwise kindness is *not* kindness,—that, for example, of the 'indulgent' parent, teacher or friend, of blind philanthropy, of indiscriminate charity. The vice of such conduct is that it destroys the self-reliance and self-dependence of the individual so blindly 'loved.' The only true benevolence is that which helps another to help himself; which, by the very aid it gives, inspires in the recipient a new sense of his own responsibility, and rouses him to a better life.

It is amazing how potent for good is such a true benevolence; it seems to touch the very springs of the moral life. By this intimate apprehension of a brother's nature and a brother's task, it may be given to us to stir within him the dying embers of a faith and hope blighted by failure after failure, and to reawaken in him the old high purpose and ideal of his life. The fact that some one else has a real and unwavering confidence in him, sees still in him the lineaments of a complete and noble manhood, will inspire such a man with a new strength, born of a new hope. There was once a purpose in his life, but it has long ago escaped his grasp, and seems for ever frustrated; what once was possible seems possible no longer, his life is broken and can never again be whole. But one comes who reminds him of that former and truer self, and reawakens in him the old ideal. The way back may be long and difficult; but the sight of the goal, even at such a distance and up such steep, will give the traveller

strength for the journey. What does he not owe to him who shows him the open path? Zaccheus, the 'publican and sinner,' owed his 'salvation'—so far as this can be a debt—to One who reminded him that, in his deepest nature and best possibility, he was still a 'son of Abraham'; and others who had fallen lowest, when they heard from the same wise and tender lips, instead of the scathing condemnation they had feared, the words of a deeper insight and a larger hope, "Neither do I condemn thee,"—were filled with a new strength to obey the authoritative command, "Go, and sin no more." It must have been this grand insight, this hand of brotherly sympathy and sublime human hope, stretched out to raise a fallen humanity to his own ideal of it, that made tolerable that teacher's scathing exposure of every hidden evil.

And even in the ordinary course and less grave occasions of human life, we must acknowledge the power for good that lies in a sympathetic appreciation of another's task, and of his capabilities for its discharge. The parent may thus discover in the child possibilities which had else remained undiscovered and unrealised. The teacher may thus discover in the pupil the potential thinker, scholar, artist, and awaken in him the hope and ambition which will be a life-long inspiration. Here is the moral value of optimism and enthusiasm, as contrasted with pessimism and cynicism. If we would help another, in this high sense of helpfulness, we must believe deeply, and hope strenuously, and bear courageously the disappointment of our expectations and desires. The gloomy severity of condemnation, unlit by any ray of hope of better things, which marks the Puritanical temper, will crush a life which might otherwise have been lifted up to a higher plane. What many a struggling soul needs most of all is a little more self-reliance and buoyancy of hope; and the knowledge that another has confidence in him will breed a new confidence in himself. Why leave unspoken the word of encouragement or praise which might mean to him so

much good, out of the foolish fear of nourishing in him that quality of self-conceit which may be entirely absent from his character? Aristotle's observation was that most men suffered from the opposite fault of 'mean-spiritedness' and a deficient appreciation of their own powers.

This true benevolence means getting very near to our fellow-man, becoming indeed his fellow, identifying ourselves with him. It means the power of sympathy. We are apt to be so external to one another, and 'charity' is so easily given: we must give ourselves. We must put ourselves alongside our fellow; we must enter into his life and make it our own, if we would understand it. For such an understanding of another's life, such a right appreciation of another's task, is not easy. It is apt to seem a gift of moral genius, rather than a thing which may be learned. The perfection of it is found in love and in true friendship, where a man finds an *alter ego* in another; and perhaps, as Aristotle says, it is only possible to have one such 'friend.' But there is a great call for the quality, in some measure of it, in all the relations of life; without it, no true benevolence is possible.

5. Benevolence and culture.—Such benevolence implies self-sacrifice. The altruistic principle of life does sometimes conflict with the egoistic, even in its higher forms. The question, therefore, inevitably arises: How far ought self-sacrifice to go? Ought devotion to the interests of others to supersede the individual's devotion to his own highest interest? This is a peculiarly modern difficulty, and arises from the new spirit of altruism which Christianity has brought into our ethical life and thought. For the Greeks the question did not arise at all. They did not contemplate the possibility of any real conflict between the individual and the social good; to them it was an axiom of the moral life that the individual received back with interest that which he gave to the State. In the Hellenic State, of course, many gave with-

out receiving; but these were not regarded as citizens, nor did their life enter into the ethical problem. The many existed for the few, but the few existed for themselves. A life of complete self-culture was the Greek ideal, and a man could never be called upon to sacrifice any part of that life for the sake of 'doing good' to his fellow-men. But Christianity, with its watchwords of service and philanthropy, has forced us to realise with a new intensity and rigour of conviction the claim of others upon our life, and has left no part of our life exempt from the claim. Self-sacrifice, rather than self-realisation, has become the principle of life, and the relation of the one principle to the other has become the most baffling problem of ethical thought. That all may have the opportunity of self-culture, many an opportunity of self-culture must be sacrificed by the few. The very possibility of social progress implies such sacrifice on the part of the existing society for the sake of the generations to come. And often friend must be willing to make this sacrifice for friend, and parent for child, and master for scholar, and neighbour for neighbour. The willingness to make such sacrifices, without the certainty or even the likelihood of compensation, is of the very essence of the highest goodness we know. How far shall self-sacrifice be carried? Does a loyal and thoroughgoing self-sacrifice interfere with a true and complete self-realisation?

The whole difficulty arises from the narrow and arbitrary limitation of the terms 'self-culture' and 'self-realisation.' In the true or moral sense of these terms, no conflict is possible between the ends of the individual and those of society. The individual may be called upon to sacrifice, for example, his opportunity of æsthetic or of intellectual culture; but in that very sacrifice lies his opportunity of moral culture, of true self-realisation. The good which is sacrificed is only an apparent good; the good to which it is sacrificed is the real or moral good. The life of true citizenship may mean for the

individual a willingness to die for his country's good, and the rightful service of the citizen must always far transcend the limits of a virtue that calculates returns. Yet the State can never legitimately demand of the individual a moral sacrifice, or ask him to be false to his own ideals of life. The State, being an ethical institution cannot, without contradicting its own nature, contradict the moral nature of the individual; and what is true of the State is true of all other institutions, as the Family and the Church. We have seen that the best service of others is the true service of ourselves, that the most effective method of doing good is to be good, that the truest care for others is to keep carefully the vineyard of our own nature. And since service implies the gift to serve, and there is an endless diversity of gifts, he who finds his peculiar work and mission for others finds that into which he can put himself—the channel for the expression of his individual capacities, the sphere of his true self-realisation. When, moreover, we remember that the good of the moral life is not merely individual and exclusive, but universal and identical in all individuals, that the moral life is essentially a social life, the postulate of an ultimate harmony between the life of benevolence and the life of culture becomes a part of our faith in the reasonableness of things.

II.—*The social organisation of life : the ethical basis and functions of the State.*

6. The social organisation of life : society and the State.—The moral life, on its social side, organises itself in certain external forms, generally described as the ethical institutions—for example, the Family, the State, the Church. The total social organisation may be called Society, and the most important of its special forms—that which in a sense includes all the others—is the political organisation, or the State. Since man is by

nature and in his ethical life a social being, he is inevitably also a political being (ζῶον πολιτικόν). The question is thus raised, What is the true form of social organisation? and, more particularly, What is the ethical basis and function of the State? How far should Society become political?

The Greek world, we may say, had no idea of a non-political society; to it society and the State were synonymous terms, the social life was a life of citizenship. The distinction between society and the State is a modern one. The Hellenic State was an adequate and satisfying social sphere for the individual; he wanted no other life than that of citizenship, and could conceive no perfect life for himself in any narrower social world than that of the State. So perfect was the harmony between the individual and the State that any dissociation of the one from the other contradicted the individual's conception of ethical completeness. It is to this sense of perfect harmony, this deep and satisfying conviction that the State is the true and sufficient ethical environment of the individual, that we owe the Greek conception of the ethical significance of the State. Our modern antithesis of the individual and the State is unknown; the individual apart from the State is to the Greek an unethical abstraction. The ethical individual is, as such, a citizen; and the measure of his ethical perfection is found in the perfection of the State of which he is a citizen, and in the perfection of his citizenship. We find this characteristic Greek conception carried to its consummation in the *Republic* of Plato. This is at once a treatise on politics and on ethics, on the State and on justice. Plato's problem is to find the ideal State, or the perfect sphere of the perfect life. The good man will be the good citizen of the good State, and without the outer or political excellence the inner or ethical excellence is of little avail. The just man is not an isolated product, he is not even 'self-made'; he grows up in the perfect State, and un-

consciously takes on the colour of its laws; he is its scholar, and, even in the inmost centres of his life, he feels its beneficent control. To separate himself from it, in any particular, were moral suicide; to seek to have a 'private life,' or to call anything 'his own,' were to destroy the very medium of his moral being, to seek to play his part without a stage on which to play it. That is to say, social organisation is necessary to the perfection of the individual life; and the only perfect social organisation is the communistic State, which directly and immediately controls the individual, and recognises no rights, individual or social, but its own.

But the growing complexity of the ethical problem, the growing perception of the significance of personality, and the growing dissatisfaction with the State as the ethical sphere of the individual, led even the Greeks themselves to a revision of their view of the relation of the individual to the State. Greek ethics close with the cry of individualism and cosmopolitanism. The State proved its ethical insufficiency, as the individual discovered his ethical self-sufficiency; the outward failure co-operated with the deeper inward reflection, to effect the transition from the ancient to the modern standpoint. Christianity, with its universal philanthropy, its obliteration of national distinctions, its insistence upon the absolute value of the individual, its deeper and intenser appreciation of personality, added its new strength to the forces already in operation. The political societies of the ancient world were gradually supplanted by a Catholic ecclesiastical society. The Church to a large extent displaced the State, and reasserted on its own behalf the State's exclusive claim upon the life of the individual. Controversy was thus inevitably aroused as to the respective jurisdictions of Church and State. The Family, too, acquired a new importance and a new independence. The break-down of feudalism—the political order of the Middle Ages—was followed by the break-down of its ecclesiastical

order also, and the individual at last stood forth in all the importance of his newly acquired independence. Our modern history has been the story of the gradual emancipation of the individual from the control of the State, and its product has been an individualism in theory and in practice which represents the opposite extreme from the political socialism of the classical world. The principle of individual liberty has taken the place of the ancient principle of citizenship. We have become very jealous for the rights of the individual, very slow to recognise the rights of the State. Its legitimate activity has been reduced to a minimum, it has been assigned a merely regulative or 'police' function, and has been regarded as only a kind of balance-wheel of the social machine. Not that the individual has emancipated himself from society. That is only a part of the historical fact; it is no less true that the various extra-political forms of social organisation have assumed functions formerly discharged by the State. But the result is the same in either case—namely, the narrowing of the sphere of the State's legitimate activity.

Various forces have conspired to bring about a revision of this modern theory of the State in its relation to the individual and to the other forms of social organisation. The interests of security have been threatened by the development of the principle of individual liberty to its extreme logical consequences in Anarchism and Nihilism; the very life, as well as the property, of the individual is seen to be endangered by the gradual disintegration of the State; and the strong arm of the civil power has come to seem a welcome defence from the misery of subjection to the incalculable caprice of 'mob-rule.' Individualism has almost reached its *reductio ad absurdum*; the principle of the mere particular has, here as elsewhere, proved itself to be a principle of disintegration. That each shall be allowed to live for himself alone, is seen to be an impossible and contradictory ideal. Experience has

taught us that the State is the friend of the individual, securing for him that sacred sphere of individual liberty which, if not thus secured, would soon enough be entered and profaned by other individuals. The evils of a non-political or anti-political condition of atomic individualism have been brought home to us by stern experiences and by the threatenings of experiences even sterner and more disastrous.

The complications which have resulted from industrial competition, the new difficulties of labour and capital which have come in the train of *laissez faire*, have lent their strength to emphasise the conviction that the State, instead of being the worst enemy, is the true friend of the individual. The doctrine of the non-interference by the State with the industrial life of the individual has very nearly reached its reduction to absurdity. The evils of unlimited and unregulated competition have thrown into clear relief the advantages of co-operation; the superiority of organised to unorganised activity has become manifest. And what more perfect form, it is asked, can the organisation of industry take than the political? Only through the nationalisation of industry, it is felt in many quarters, can we secure that liberty and equality which capitalism has destroyed; only by making the State the common guardian, can we hope for an emancipation from that industrial slavery which now degrades and impoverishes the lives of so many of our citizens. Capitalism has given us a plutocracy which is as baneful as any political despotism the world has seen; we have escaped from the serfdom of the feudal State, only to fall into the new serfdom of an unregulated industrialism.

The evils of leaving everything to private enterprise force themselves upon our attention especially in the case of what are generally called public interests—those branches of activity which obviously affect all alike, such as the means of communication, railways, roads, and telegraphs. A more careful reflection, however, discovers a

certain public value in all forms of industry, even in those which are apparently most private. That mutual industrial dependence of each on all and all on each, in which Plato found the basis of the State, has once more come to constitute a powerful plea for the necessity of political organisation; and we have a new State-socialism which maintains that the equal interests of each can be conserved only by the sacrifice of all private interests to the public interest, at least in the means of production, that only by identifying the interest of each with that of all, in the industrial sphere, can we hope to establish the reign of justice among men.

One other force has contributed to the change of standpoint which we are considering, namely, the changed conception of the State itself. The progress towards individual freedom has at the same time been a progress towards the true form of the State; and as the oligarchical and despotic have yielded to the democratic type of government, it has been recognised that the State is not an alien force imposed upon the individual from without, but that, in their true being, the State and the individual are identical. Upon the ruins of the feudal State the individual has at length built for himself a new State, a form of government to which he can yield a willing obedience, because it is the creation of his own will and, in obeying it, he is really obeying himself. *L'état c'est moi.*

Such causes as these have led to the return, in our own time, to the classical conception of the State and its functions, and to the substitution of the question of the rights of the State for the question of the rights of the individual. The tendency of contemporary thought and effort is, on the whole, to extend the political organisation of society, to socialise the State or to nationalise society. What, then, we are forced to ask, is the ethical basis of the State? What, in its principle and idea, is it? If we can answer this question of the ethical basis of the State, we shall not find much difficulty in determining,

on general lines, its ethical functions, whether negative or positive, whether in the sphere of justice or in that of benevolence.

7. *Is the State an end-in-itself?*—From an ethical standpoint the State must be regarded as a means, not as in itself an end. The State exists for the sake of the person, not the person for the sake of the State. The ethical unit is the person; and the function of the State is not to supersede the person, but to aid him in the development of his personality—to give him room and opportunity. It exists for him, not he for it; it is his sphere, the medium of his moral life. Here there is no real difference between the ancient and the modern views of the State; in principle they are one. For Plato and Aristotle, as for ourselves, the State is the sphere of the ethical life, the true State is the complement of the true individual—his proper *milieu*. The Hellenic State, it is true, as it actually existed and even as Plato idealised it, contradicts in some measure our conception of personality; but it did not contradict the Greek conception of personality. From our modern standpoint, we find it inadequate for two reasons. First, it exists only for the few, the many exist for it: the Greek State is, in our view, an exclusive aristocracy, from the privileges of whose citizenship the majority are excluded. Yet, in the last analysis, we find that the end for which the State exists is the person; those who exist merely for the State are not regarded as persons. If the Greeks could have conceived the modern extension of the idea of personality, it is safe to say that they would have entirely agreed with the modern interpretation of the relation of the State to the individual. In the second place, it is to be noted that, with all their intellectual and æsthetic appreciation, the Greeks had not yet so fully discovered the riches of the ethical life. With our profounder appreciation of the significance of personality, the merely instrumental value of the State

is more clearly perceived. But to those who did reflect upon its essential nature the Greek State also was a creation of the ethical spirit—the great ethical institution. The ancient, as well as the modern State, based its right to the loyal service of its citizens upon the plea that, in serving it, the individual was really serving himself; that, in giving up even his all to it and counting nothing his own, he himself, or other persons, would receive from it a return of full and joyous life, out of all proportion to what he gave.

It is only when we reflect, however, that we fully realise this instrumental value of the State. In our ordinary unreflective thought we are the victims of the association of ideas, and in this, as in so many other cases, we confuse the means with the end. We cannot rationalise our loyalty to the State, any more than we can rationalise our other loyalties. It is a case of the familiar ‘miser’s consciousness.’ As the miser comes to think of money, because of its supreme instrumental importance, as an end-in-itself, and to regard the real ends of life as only means to this fictitious end, so does the citizen come to regard the State, because of its supreme importance as the medium of the ethical life, as itself the end, and himself as but its instrument. Yet it is the function of a medium to mediate and fulfil, not to negate and destroy, that which it mediates; and whenever we reflect we see that the true function of the State is to mediate and fulfil the personal life of the citizen. This theoretic insight is, of course, not necessary to the life of citizenship; we may most truly use the State for this highest end, when we act under the impulse of an unreflecting and uncalculating loyalty to the State itself. But the very fact that we can thus serve the State without disloyalty to our highest self implies that we are not serving two masters, that the only master of our loyal service is the ethical and personal ideal. The ultimate sanction and measure of political obedience is found in the ethical value of the State as the vehicle of the personal life of its citizens.

The true relation of the State to the individual has been obscured in modern discussion by the constant antithesis of 'State-action' and 'individualism.' The antithesis is inevitable, so long as we regard the individual as a mere individual. So regarded, he is like an atom that resists the intrusion of every other atom into its place: the mere individual is anti-social and anti-political, and to 'socialise' or 'nationalise' him is to negate and destroy him. His life is one of 'go-as-you-please,' of absolute *laissez faire*. But the ethical unit is not such a mere atomic individual; it is the person, who is social and political as well as individual, and whose life is forward-ed and fulfilled, rather than negated, by the political and other forms of social organisation. To isolate him from others, would be to maim and stunt his life. That the State has seemed to encroach upon the life of the ethical person, is largely due to the constant use of the term 'State-interference.' In so far as the State may be said to interfere, it is only with the individual, not with the person; and the purpose of its interference is always to save the person from the interference of other individuals. Neither the State nor the individual, but the person, is the ultimate ethical end and unit. "The State at best is the work of man's feeble hands, working with unsteady purpose; the person, with all his claims, is the work of God."¹ What is called 'State-interference' is in reality the maintenance of this ethical possibility, the making room for the life of the person. If all individuals were left to themselves, they would not leave each other to themselves: individual would encroach upon individual, and none would have the full opportunity of ethical self-realisation.

8. The ethical basis of the State.—Just here lies the ethical problem of the basis of the State. The essence of the State is sovereignty, and the maintenance

¹ S. S. Laurie, *Ethica*, p. 69 (2nd ed.)

of the sovereign power through coercion or control. In order that each may have freedom of self-development, each must be restrained in certain ways. Is not the process ethically suicidal? Is not the personality destroyed in the very act of allowing it freedom of self-development? Does not State-control supplant self-control, the sovereignty of the State the sovereignty of personality? Does not the political negate the ethical life, and the State constrain the person to act impersonally?

Two extreme answers are offered to this question. The first is the answer of Anarchism, the refusal of the self to acknowledge any control from without. This is the answer of pure individualism, and confuses liberty with license. The individual who refuses to acknowledge any obligations to other individuals, and denies the right of society to control his life, will not control himself. The life of individuals who refuse to become 'political' will be a 'state of war,' if not so absolute as Hobbes has pictured it, yet deplorable enough to teach its possessors the distinction between liberty and license, and to awaken in them the demand for that deliverance from the evils of unrestrained individualism which comes only with the strong arm of law and government. The other answer is that of Despotism, which allows no freedom to the individual. This would obviously de-personalise man, and, depriving him of his ethical prerogative of self-government, would make him the mere instrument or organ of the sovereign power. Do these alternative extremes exhaust the possibilities of the case? Is despotism the only escape from anarchy; can we not have liberty without license?

It seems at first as if there were no third possibility, as if the very existence of the State, of law, of government, carried with it a derogation from the personal life of the citizen. So far as its dominion extends, the State seems to take the management of his life out of the individual's hands, and to manage it for him. The will of another

seems to impose its behests upon the individual will or person, so that he becomes its creature and servant; losing his self-mastery, he seems to be controlled and mastered by another will. "It is the specific function of government to impose upon the individual, in apparent violation of his claim to free self-determination, an alien will, an alien law. . . . Preachers and teachers try to instruct us as to what course our own highest reason approves, and to persuade us to follow that course. When they have failed, government steps in and says: 'Such and such are the true principles of justice. I command you to obey them. If you do not, I will punish you.'"¹ Autonomy is of the essence of the moral life, since that life is essentially personal. But the very existence of the State seems to imply heteronomy, or an impersonal life in the citizen. The difficulty does not arise, it is to be observed, from the artificiality of the State, or from the natural egoism of human nature. Let us admit that the State itself is the product and creation of the human spirit, that man is by nature a political being, that is, a being whose life tends naturally to the political form. The question is, whether the human spirit is not imprisoned in its own creation; whether the ethical life is not lost in the political, autonomy in heteronomy.

The first thing to be noted is, that the imposition of the will of another upon the individual does not destroy the individual will. We are apt to think of the divine will as so imposed, of certain restrictions as laid by the very nature of things upon the life of the individual; yet we do not find in this any infraction of human personality or will. All that is imposed is a certain form of outward activity; the inward movement of the will is not necessarily touched. Thus all that is enforced by the political will or the sovereign power is outward obedience, not the inward obedience of the will itself. It is for the individual to say whether he will complete the outward surrender by

¹ F. M. Taylor, *The Right of the State to Be*, p. 44.

the inward self-surrender. He may yield either an outward conformity or an inward conformity; the act required may be performed either willingly or unwillingly. The appeal is to the will or personality, and it is for the will to respond or not to the appeal. What is coerced is the expression of the individuality in outward act: the citizen is not allowed to act as the creature of ungoverned impulse. Not that the task of self-control is taken out of his hands, or his individuality mastered by another will or personality rather than by his own. The mastery of the State extends only to the expression of individual impulse in the corresponding outward activities. The citizen may still cherish those impulsive tendencies the expression of which in the field of overt activity has been restrained, as the criminal so often does cherish his criminal instincts and habits, notwithstanding the outward repression. The criminal may remain a criminal, though the State prevents his commission of further crime. He cannot be mastered by another, but only by himself: it is for himself alone, by an act of deliberate choice, to say whether he will remain a criminal or not.

By its punishments the State not merely restrains the outward activity of its citizens; it further, by touching the individual sensibility, appeals to the person to exercise that self-restraint which is alone permanently effective. It is for the person to say whether he will, or will not, exercise such self-restraint. Just in so far as he re-enacts the verdict of the State upon his life, or recognises the justice of its punishment; just in so far as he identifies his will with the will that expresses itself in the punishment, so that what was the will of another becomes his own will,—is the result of such treatment permanently, and thoroughly, and in the highest sense successful. When the person has thus taken the reins of the government of sensibility into his own hands, political coercion ceases to be necessary. The will now expresses itself in the act, the dualism of inward disposition and outward deed has

disappeared, and the life is, even in these particulars, a personal life.

Thus interpreted, the coercion of the State is seen to be an extension of the coercion of nature. Nature itself disallows certain lines of activity, does not permit us to follow every impulse. The organisation of life in political society implies a further restraint upon individual tendencies to activity, a certain further organisation and co-ordination of the outward activities. But the organisation and co-ordination of the impulsive tendencies to activity—this is in the hands not of the State, but of the individual will. The right of the State to coerce the individual, in the sense indicated, is grounded in the fact that it exists for the sake of the interests of personality. As these interests are superior in right to the interests of mere individual caprice, so are the laws of the State superior to the instincts and impulses of the individual. The State restrains the expression of the individuality, that it may vindicate the sacred rights of personality in each individual. Its order is an improvement upon the order of nature; it is more discriminating, more just, more encouraging to virtue, more discouraging to vice. The political order foreshadows the moral order itself; it is a version, the best available for the time and place and circumstances, of that order.

And although the action of the State seems at first sight to be merely coercive, and its will the will of another, a closer analysis reveals the fundamental identity of the State, in its idea at least, with the ethical person. The sovereign will represents the individual will, or rather the general will of the individual citizens. Here, in the general will of the people, in the common personality of the citizens, is the true seat of sovereignty. The actual and visible sovereign or government is representative of this invisible sovereign. The supreme power in the State, whatever be the form of government, is therefore, truly regarded, the 'public person,' and, in obeying it, the

citizens are really obeying their common personality. The sovereign power is "the public person vested with the power of the law, and so is to be considered as the image, phantom, or representative of the commonwealth . . . and thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law."¹ Obedience to the State is obedience to the citizen's own better self; and, like Socrates, we ought to be unwilling to 'disobey a better.' The apparent heteronomy is really autonomy in disguise; I am, after all, sovereign as well as subject, subject of my own legislation. The right of the State is therefore supreme, being the right of personality itself. For the individual to assert his will against the will of the State, is ethically suicidal. Socrates went willingly to death, because he could not live and obey the State rather than God; he accepted the will of the people that he should die, and saw in their will the will of God. Death was for him the only path of obedience to both the outward and the inward 'better.' The individual may criticise the political order, as an inadequate version of the moral order. He may try to improve upon, and reform it. He may even, like Socrates, 'obey God rather than man,' and refuse the inner obedience of the will. But, where the State keeps within its proper function, he may not openly violate its order.

9. *The limit of State action.*—If the State should step beyond its proper function, and invade, instead of protecting, the sphere of personality; if the actual State should not merely fall short of, but contradict the ideal—then the right of rebellion belongs to the subject. If a revolution has become necessary, and if such revolution can be accomplished only by rebellion, rebellion takes the place of obedience as the duty of the citizen. Even in his rebellion he is still a citizen, loyal to the law and constitution of the ideal State which he seeks by his action to realise.

¹ Locke, *Treatise of Civil Government*, bk. ii. ch. xiii.

This contradiction may occur in either of two ways. In the first place, the action of the sovereign power may not be representative or 'public': it may act as a private individual, or body of individuals. As Locke again says: "When he quits this public representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he degrades himself, and is but a single private person without power, and without will that has any right to obedience—the members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society." The true sovereign must count nothing 'his own,' must have no private interests in his public acts: his interests must be those of the people, and their will his. If he acts otherwise, asserting his own private will, and subordinating the good of the citizens to his own individual good, he thereby uncrowns himself, and abnegates his sovereignty. Then comes the time for the exercise of 'the supreme power that remains still in the people.' The necessity of the English and the French Revolution, for example, lay in the fact that the actual State contradicted the ideal, seeking to destroy those rights of personality of which it ought to have been the custodian, and before which it was called to give an account of its stewardship. At such a time the common personality, in whose interest the State exists, must step forth, assert itself against the so-called 'State,' and, condemning the actual, give birth to one that shall be true to its own idea, that shall help and not hinder its citizens in their life of self-realisation. The power returns to its source, the general will, which is thus forced to find for itself a new and more adequate expression.

This brings us to the second form of the contradiction between the actual and the ideal State. When the present formulation of the general will has become inadequate, it must be re-formulated; and this re-formulation of its will by the people may mean revolution as well as reformation. Such a criticism and modification of the State is indeed always going on, public opinion is always more or less active and more or less articulate; and it is the function

of the statesman to interpret, as well as to guide and form, this public opinion. As long as there is harmony between the general will and the will of the government, as long as the government is truly representative of the governed, so long the State exists and prospers. As soon as there is discord, and the government ceases to represent the general will, so soon does a new delegation of sovereignty become necessary. "Emperors, kings, councils, and parliaments, or any combinations of them, are only the temporary representatives of something that is greater than they."¹ "The acts of the government in every country which is not on the verge of a revolution are not the acts of a minority of individuals, but the acts of the uncrowned and invisible sovereign, the spirit of the nation itself."² In the very indeterminateness of the general will; in the fact that no one of its determinations or definitions of itself is final; that no actualisation of it exhausts its potentiality or fixes it in a rigid and unchanging form; that, like an organism, it grows, and in its growth is capable of adapting itself always to its new conditions; that, like the individual will, it learns by experience and allows its past to determine its present,—lie the undying strength and vitality of that invisible State which persists through all the changing forms of its visible manifestation.

10. The ethical functions of the State: (a) Justice. —The State, being the medium of the ethical life of the individual, has two ethical functions: (1) the negative function of securing to the individual the opportunity of self-realisation, by protecting him from the encroachments of other individuals or of non-political forms of society—the function of Justice; (2) the positive improvement of the conditions of the ethical life for each of its citizens—the function of Benevolence. In the exercise of the former function, the State cares for the interests of 'being,' in the exercise of the latter it cares for the

¹ D. G. Ritchie, *Principles of State Interference*, p. 69.

² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

interests of 'well-being'; and as the interests of being or security precede in imperativeness those of well-being or prosperity, so is the political duty of justice prior to that of benevolence. In the case of the State, as in that of the individual, however, the one duty passes imperceptibly into the other, and benevolence is seen to be only the higher justice. This relation of the positive to the negative function suggests—what a closer consideration makes very clear—that there is no logical basis for the limitation of State-action to justice, and that those who would thus limit it are seeking artificially to arrest the life of the State at the stage of what we may call the lower and imperfect justice.

Even at this stage the activity of the State is, in its essence, the same as it is at the higher stages of that activity. Even here the function is not a mere police one; even here the State 'interferes' with the individual. To protect the individual from the aggression of other individuals and of society, the State must interfere with the individual, and be in some considerable measure 'aggressive.' Already the imagined sphere of sheer independent and private individuality has been penetrated, and the right of the State to act within that sphere established. While it is true that the preservation of the integrity of the individual life implies a large measure of freedom from government control, it is also true that the only way to secure such freedom for the individual is by a large measure of such control. If other individuals, and non-political society, are not to encroach upon the individual and destroy his freedom, the State must be allowed to encroach and set up its rule within the life of the individual. The tyranny of the individual and the tyranny of unofficial public opinion are incomparably worse than what some are pleased to call the tyranny of the State. The justification of State-interference in all its forms is, as we have seen, that it is exercised in the interest of individual freedom.

The fundamental limitation, as well as the fundamental vindication, of State-action is found in its ethical basis. Since the State exists as the medium of personal life, the limit of its action is reached at the point where it begins to encroach upon and negate the strictly personal life of the citizen. The State must maintain the life of the individual, not simply annex and take possession of it for itself; it must not abolish, but establish, the life of the individual. If the individual apart from the State is not a moral individual, a State in which the individual is lost is no true State. The best State is that in whose citizenship the individual most fully lives his own individual life, that which includes, and integrates in a higher and richer unity, the greatest number of individual elements, and, like an organism, incorporates in its own total life the lives of its several members. The *simplest* State is likely to be the worst rather than the best, since in the best there must be room for indefinite differentiation without the loss of the State's integrity. The true unity is, here as elsewhere, unity in difference. The true political identity is that which, like the identity of the organism, conceals itself in endless differentiation of structure and function. If the idea of the State is not to be contradicted, room must be found in it for the moral individual, in all the wealth of his individual possibilities. Does not the State exist to provide the true sphere for the actualisation of these possibilities?

Take, for example, the question of the attitude of the State to individual property. From of old the spell of the simple or communistic State has fascinated the imagination of political theorists. It has seemed self-evident that community of interest implies community of property; that, in the ideal State, the citizens shall have all things in common, and none shall call anything his own. For must not private property create private interests, and must not private interests undermine the public interest? What guarantee, then, for unity and identity of

interest, but the abolition of private interests? Yet, since these private interests have their roots in the very being of the individual, they cannot be eradicated, and must always cause disaffection to spring up towards the State which seeks to uproot them. The true function of the State is surely to act as the custodian and interpreter of this, as of all other aspects of the individual life. The interests of property are part of the interests of security. The State must not merely secure to the individual the opportunity of exercising his powers of activity; it must also secure to him the fruits of such activity, and the larger opportunity which comes with the possession of these fruits. In other words, the State is the custodian not only of the 'personal,' but also of the 'real,' rights of the individual. For these real rights or rights of property are essentially, as Hegel shows, personal rights, rights of the person: property is the expression of personality. My will sets its stamp upon the thing or the animal, and makes it mine—makes it, as it were, part of me. Ownership is founded deep in the nature of man as an ethical being, and the only absolute limit to it is the ethical limit of personality itself. A person cannot strictly own another person; he may buy his services, but not himself. The essence of slavery is the assertion of this impossible and suicidal claim to ownership of the man in his entire personality, in the whole range of his activities; which is to de-personalise the man, and to treat him as if he were only an animal or a thing. But whatever it be upon which I have placed the stamp of my will, into which I have put my selfhood,—that is mine. Rights of property are essentially, like all rights, personal—the creation and expression of personality.

The State is the custodian and interpreter of these rights; it does not create, and cannot destroy them. Its function is to recognise, to establish, and to formulate them in law; its law is only a version of moral law. It is for the State to define the rights of property, to for-

multate these rights; and the appeal, in cases of dispute, is to the State through its courts of justice. But the State, through its courts, seeks to dispense that moral justice to which the legal is only an approximation. It recognises rights in equity, as well as in justice, and has its courts to administer them. And while the power of the State is here also, by its very nature, sovereign, yet the seat of sovereignty is really in the general will of the citizens; and as soon as the general will has definitely decided that the present version of the moral law of property is inadequate, and that an improved version is possible, the amendment will be made.

Rights of property, again, give rise to rights of contract. Contract is not the source of property, still less the source of the State itself; but, the State and property having been created, contract, with its new rights (which are but extensions of the old), ensues. I have control of my property: it is mine, it is part of myself. My freedom has entered into it, and characterises it. The disposition of it is in my own hands; I have the right of use and exchange, as well as of possession. This right also the State must establish and interpret, not destroy. Yet it is often argued that, as the State ought to be the sole owner, so it ought to be the sole disposer of property; that, here again, the individual life, instead of being maintained and regulated, should be simply absorbed by the State.

It is to be noted that, in thus limiting the functions of the State, we are not maintaining 'individualism' in the ordinary sense of that term. The individual for whose sake the State exists is the moral individual or the person, and his security from the encroachment of other individuals implies a large measure of State control or interference. The State must not only establish the right of the individual to 'his own' and to the disposition of his own; it must also correct the abuses which are apt to occur in these spheres of the individual life. For

it is as true in the life of ownership as in other spheres that "no man liveth to himself." The individual cannot isolate himself, even in these particulars of his conduct; in them also his life has a public as well as a private value. And if great possession, instead of being used as a great ethical opportunity, becomes an instrument of moral evil to other citizens, it is for the State to intervene and, it may be, to interdict. The rule is the constant one of guarding the security of personal rights. No criterion of amount can be laid down *a priori*, certainly no rule of abstract equality. But, where the individual owner abuses his rights as a proprietor, that is, where he so uses them as to injure the free and fruitful self-development of others, the State may intervene. It is a case of punishment, and does not amount to a violation of the rights of personality. It is the caprice of the man's individuality—his greed, his laziness, his selfish indifference—that is punished (and the life of ownership is as liable to such caprice as any other life), not the essential and inviolable life of the person. The State may even generalise from its experience of the actual working of private ownership in the case of particular commodities and industries, of land, or of public services, and decide to nationalise them. The sphere of private ownership may thus be limited by the State, on the principle that the free and equal self-development of all its citizens is the treasure in its keeping. In comparison with this, the selfish satisfaction of the individual is of no account, and must be sacrificed. But a theory of Communism which insists that the State shall be the sole proprietor is suicidal, destroying as it does those very rights of personality which are the basis of the rights of property, and in the absence or annihilation of which the State itself, as an ethical institution, would have no existence, or at least no *raison d'être*.

A further limitation is set to the action of the State, by the principle of the existence and freedom of other

minor social institutions within it. The completely communistic State would absorb into itself, along with the individual, all extra-political forms of association, and would identify Society with the State. Now it is obvious that no form of social organisation can be, in an absolute sense, extra-political, inasmuch as these minor societies must all alike be contained within the larger society which we call the State. They, like the individual, depend upon the State for their very existence. Yet each of these minor societies has a sphere of its own which the State preserves from invasion by any of the others, and which the State itself must not invade. Each must be allowed to exercise its own peculiar functions, with due regard to the functions, equally rightful, of the others. Even the State must not usurp the functions of any other ethical institution. It has its genius, they have theirs; and, as they recognise its rights, it must recognise theirs also. The most important of these institutions within the State are the Family and the Church. The function of the State is not paternal, it does not stand *in loco parentis* to the citizen; nor is its function ecclesiastical, Church and State are not to be identified. The State is the guardian of these institutions; but the very notion of such guardianship is that the institution which is guarded shall be maintained in its integrity, and allowed to fulfil its own proper work and mission for mankind. In the exercise of this guardianship, the State may be called upon to act vicariously for the institutions under its care; but its further duty must always be, so to improve the conditions of institutional life, that that life shall pursue its own true course without interference or assistance from without. Institutions, like individuals, must be helped to help themselves. For example, the State may be called upon not merely to superintend the institution of the Family, but to discharge duties which, in an ideal condition of things, would be performed by the parent. The State may also not merely recognise the right of ecclesi-

astical association, but may even establish and endow an ecclesiastical society. All that is ethically imperative is that, within the Family and within the Church, freedom of initiation and self-development be allowed; that each institution be permitted to work out its own career, and to realise its own peculiar genius. On the other hand, neither the Family nor the Church must be allowed to encroach upon the proper functions of the State; here the State must defend its own prerogative. In general, the political, the domestic, and the ecclesiastical functions must be kept separate; since, however closely they may intertwine, each deals with a distinct aspect of human life.

The final principle of limitation—that which really underlies all the others mentioned—is the principle of individual freedom. The State may not use the individual as its mere instrument or organ. In a sense, and up to a certain point, it may and must do so; only it must not appropriate, or altogether nationalise him. The industrial State, for instance, of some Socialists would reduce the individual to a mere crank in the social or political machine. But if we thus destroy the proper life of the individual for himself, we undo the very work we are trying to do. Ultimately the State exists for the individual, and it is only because the individual—some individual—gets back, with the interest of an added fulness and joy in life, what he has given to the State in loyal service, that the service is ethically justified. The State has a tremendous and indefinite claim upon the citizen, but that claim is only the reflection of the individual's claim upon the State. The Communism which neglects the individual side of this claim is no less unsound than the Anarchism which neglects its social side. The measure of the service which the State can demand of the individual is found in his manhood. If the individual is not an independent unit, neither is he a mere instrument for the production of national wealth. The

true wealth or well-being of the nation lies in the well-being of its individual citizens; and while this universal well-being can be reached only through that partial sacrifice of individual well-being which is implied in the discharge by the individual of the functions demanded by the State as a whole, the limit to such a demand is found in the right of the individual to the enjoyment of a return for his service in a higher and fuller capacity of life. In the language of political economy, the individual is a consumer as well as a producer; and even if, in his latter capacity, he were exploited by the State, he would still, in the former, have claims as an individual. It is probably because the emphasis is placed on the production, and the consumption is so largely ignored, that the communistic State proves so fascinating to many. But, in truth, regard must be had to the individual life in both these aspects, if it is not to suffer in both. The State, in short, must not claim the entire man; to do so were to destroy its own idea. The most perfect State will be that in which there is least repression, and most encouragement and development, of the free life of a full individuality in all the citizens.

The function of the State being the maintenance of the social order, or of the necessary conditions of the moral life of its citizens, its characteristic method is Punishment. It is only through punishment that the State can maintain the system of rights and obligations; its exercise of force takes this form. From the point of view of the individual punishment is the forfeiture, temporary or permanent, of his rights as a citizen or of his civil liberty. This forfeiture is warranted only in so far as it is necessary in the interest of the common good which the individual has injured; since he has violated the conditions of social well-being, he is responsible for his own punishment as the new condition of that well-being, which includes his own. Its social justice lies in

its social necessity; the measure in which it exceeds that necessity is the measure of its injustice.

The object of punishment, therefore, is not retribution, in the sense of retaliation—"an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," pain for pain, loss for loss. Nor is its object compensation to the injured individual or individuals. Such compensation is impossible. Civil injuries are redressed or compensated; crimes are punished. Its object is not even, primarily at least, the reformation of the criminal character. The State has to do with conduct, not with character; with actions, not with motives. The primary object of punishment is simply prevention or deterrence. Its justification is found in its effect on others, rather than on the criminal. Its value is prospective rather than retrospective, social rather than individual.

This view of the object of punishment gives the true measure of its amount. This is found not in the amount of moral depravity which the crime reveals, but in the importance of the right violated, relatively to the system of rights of which it forms a part, and in the degree of terror which must be associated with the crime in order to the protection of the right in question. The measure of the punishment is, in short, the measure of social necessity; and this measure is a changing one. A punishment which may be just, that is, socially necessary, at an earlier stage of social progress—*e.g.*, capital punishment for theft—becomes unjust, because it is no longer a social necessity, at a later stage. And generally we may say that with social progress, with the growth of the social spirit or the spirit of citizenship, the necessity of punishment gradually decreases. As the will becomes more completely socialised, the *rôle* of force becomes less important.

And though the primary effect, as it is the primary purpose, of punishment is the prevention of crime, not

the reformation of the criminal, it acquires a reformatory value when accepted by the criminal's will as his good, that is, as just; when the criminal accepts the judgment of society upon his action, and makes it his own. It is indeed in this reformation of the criminal will that the true and permanent prevention of crime is to be found. Moreover, the criminal has his rights, though they are meantime suspended; and they ought to be regarded. He is not an outcast; and his future ought to be considered, though only after that of the society whose order he has disturbed. So far, therefore, as its primary purpose—the protection of the social order—allows, punishment ought to be reformatory, as well as deterrent. As Green says, “it must tend to qualify the criminal for the resumption of rights.” It ought so to reveal to him the anti-social character of which his crime was the expression as to shock him into a better life.¹

11. (b) Benevolence.—The State has positive, as well as negative, functions; it may set itself to compass the higher as well as the lower, the spiritual as well as the material, welfare of its citizens. There is, of course, no special virtue in the fact that a thing is done by the State, rather than by some other agency. The reason for the exercise of the higher functions by the State is the practical one, that the action of the State is most efficient, and on the largest scale. The State, for example, can care for the education of its citizens, as no individual or group of individuals can care for it. We must remember also that the action of the State may be indirect as well as direct, local as well as central. What functions the State should take upon itself in any particular country, how far it should go in discharging them, and how long it should continue to do so,—these are questions of practical politics, to be answered by the

¹ On this aspect of punishment, see Note at the end of this chapter.

statesman, and not by the political philosopher. All that ethics, in particular, can do is to formulate the ethical principles of State action in general.

How the negative function of the State passes into the positive, its activities of justice into those of benevolence, may be indicated in one or two of its chief aspects. The protection of the individual, or rather of the community of individuals, from the evils of ignorance implies, especially in a democracy, the education of the citizen. Compulsory, and even, under certain conditions, free education thus becomes a necessity of political well-being; and once the process of education has been undertaken by the State, it is difficult to say where it should be abandoned. For the higher education, even though limited directly to the few, penetrates, perhaps no less effectively than the lower, the mass of the citizens, and affects the common weal. Every loyal citizen may well, with John Knox, thank God for "another scholar in the land." Again, the permanent and thoroughgoing prevention of crime implies a concern for the positive ethical well-being of the criminal. Punishment, in the older sense, is now seen to be a very inadequate method of social protection. The only way in which the State can permanently deter the criminal from crime is by undertaking his education as a moral being, and providing for him, as far as may be, the stimulus to goodness. Only in so far as punishment is reformative and educative, is it truly deterrent. Further than this, and still in the interests of security, no less than those of well-being, the State must remove as far as possible the stimulus to crime that comes from extreme poverty; it must so far equalise the conditions of industrial life as to secure to each citizen the opportunity of earning an honest livelihood. And if it would prevent the general loss which comes from the existence of a pauper class, the State must take measures to secure the individual against the

risk of becoming a burden to society ; by taking upon itself the burden of providing him with the opportunity of self-maintenance, it will save itself from the later and heavier burden of maintaining him. Since, moreover, the progress of society must often mean a temporary injustice to the individual, the State must, again in its own permanent interest, provide some remedy for this injustice. Social progress costs much, and it is for the State to reckon up these costs of progress, and, as far as possible, to make them good to its citizens.¹ The State must seek to maintain the equilibrium which progress seems always temporarily to disturb.

When, however, we realise the fuller meaning of the State as an ethical institution, nay, as the all-containing ethical institution, we see that it must go further than that indirect or secondary benevolence which is implied in the lower or ordinary justice. The sphere of the higher justice, or that of true benevolence, is part of the sphere of the State's legitimate activity. This higher justice means that all be provided with the full opportunity of the ethical life which is so apt, even in our own civilisation, to be open only to the few. It is for the State to emancipate from the slavery of social conditions the toiling masses of society, to endow those who are citizens only in name with a real ethical citizenship, to make those who have neither part nor lot in the true life of humanity heirs of its wealth and partakers in its conquests. The development of our modern industrial system has given us back the essential evils of ancient slavery and of feudal serfdom in a new and, in many ways, an aggravated form. To the 'working classes,' to the 'hands,' into which machinery and free competition have transformed the masses of our modern population—

¹ Cf. Professor H. C. Adams's suggestive article, entitled "An Interpretation of the Social Movements of our Time" (*International Journal of Ethics*, vol. ii. p. 32).

to these the State must give not merely the political franchise, but the ethical franchise of a complete and worthy human life. As the custodian of the moral interests, and not merely of the material interests of its citizens, the State must see that the former are not sacrificed to the latter. The political sphere, being the ethical sphere, includes the industrial, as it includes all others; and while the industrial life ought to be allowed to follow its own economic laws, in so far as such independence is consistent with ethical well-being, it is for the State to co-ordinate the industrial with the ethical life. Industry is an ethical activity, and must be regulated by ethical as well as by economic law: there must be no schism in the body politic. If men were mere brute agents, their lives as producers and consumers of wealth would, no doubt, be subject to economic law as undeviating as the law of nature; but the fact that, as men, they are in all their activity moral beings, implies that even the economic world must come under the higher regulation of moral law. The State alone can enforce this higher regulation; and the advance from the theory of absolutely free competition, or *laissez faire*, to that of industrial co-operation and organisation is bringing us to the recognition of the ethical function of the State in the economic sphere. It is for the State to substitute for the mob-rule of unethical economic forces the steady rational control of ethical insight. In the words of Professor Adams, in the article already quoted: "Unless some way be discovered by which the deep ethical purpose of society can be brought to bear upon industrial questions, our magnificent material civilisation will crumble to ashes in our hands. . . . A peace born of justice can never be realised by balancing brute force against brute force. . . . The ethical sense of society must be brought to bear in settling business affairs. . . . Above the interest of the contending parties stands the

interest of the public, of which the State is the natural guardian; and one way to realise the ethical purpose of society in business affairs is, by means of legislation, to bring the ethical sense of society to bear on business affairs." This means, of course, State-interference with the industrial life of society; by such interference, however, "society is not deprived of the advantages of competition, but the plane of competition is adjusted to the moral sense of the community."¹

This maintenance by the State of the true relation of economic to ethical good, of material to spiritual well-being, may take many forms. The ultimate measure of well-being having been found in the perfection of the development of the true self of the individual, his instrumental value as a producer of wealth will be subordinated to his essential and independent worth as a moral being; regard to the external and industrial criterion will be checked by regard to the internal and ethical. In this ultimate relation all men will be seen to be equal; here, in the ethical sphere, will be found the true democracy. Class interests do not exist here; the capitalist and the day-labourer stand here on the same level, and the true State will regard the interests of each alike. And if, even here, the highest well-being of all implies a certain sacrifice of well-being on the part of the individual, the State will see that such sacrifice does not go too far, that no citizen loses the reality of citizenship and sinks to the status of a slave or of a mere instrument in the industrial machine, that for each there is reserved a sufficient sphere of complete ethical living. If the preservation and development of the highest manhood of its citizens is the supreme duty of the State and its ultimate *raison d'être*, an obvious case of this duty is the securing of a certain amount of leisure for all its citizens. The lowest classes—those which are technically

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. ii. pp. 47-48.

called the 'working classes'—need this leisure even more clamantly than the middle and higher classes. Their work is a far harder tyrant than the work of the latter, since it calls forth so much less of their true manhood; they are controlled far more largely by the needs of others than by their own. Yet they too have needs of their own, not less real and not less urgent than their 'betters'; they too have a manhood to develop, a moral inheritance to appropriate. How much more need have they of leisure to be with themselves, and to attend to their 'proper business'? Such a shortening of the hours of labour, such an extension of the area of the free individual life, as shall secure for them also their peculiar ethical opportunity—this surely is the duty of the State as the custodian of the higher justice.

The case of the regulation of the industrial life of the community offers perhaps the best example of the *via media* in which the true view of the ethical function of the State is to be found. The communistic extreme would place all industrial activities in the hands of the State, and would thus endanger, if not destroy, the proper life of the individual, by negating the principle of free competition. The individualistic extreme, on the other hand, would exclude the State from the industrial sphere, and leave economic law to operate unguided and unchecked by any ethical considerations,—a course equally fatal to the moral life of the community. The true view would seem to be that, while the industrial sphere is to be recognised as having a nature of its own, and economic law is not to be confused with ethical, yet the ethical sphere includes the industrial as it includes all others, and its law must therefore operate through the law of the latter. The State, accordingly, as the all-inclusive social unity, must guard and foster the ethical life of its citizens in the industrial as in the other spheres of that life.

As regards the distribution of material wealth, the State

has also a function assigned to it by its ethical constitution. In order that the struggle for mere 'bread and butter' may not consume all the energies of the masses of its citizens, but that each individual in these masses may have scope for the realisation of his higher ethical capacities, for his proper self-development, the State must see that the 'furniture of fortune' is not so unequally distributed that, in any individual, the activities of the moral life are rendered impossible, or so narrowly limited as to be practically frustrated. For though it may be true that the ethical good is in its essence spiritual, and that a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth, it is also true that the moral life, as we know it, has a physical basis, and that, without a certain measure of material well-being, the good will can find but little expression and realisation in activity. The potential manhood in each can be actualised only by an act of individual choice; yet, without certain conditions, such actualisation is impossible. It is for the State so to improve the conditions or environment of those against whom fortune—it may be in the shape of economic law—has discriminated, as to make a true ethical life for them also possible.

12. *The permanence of the State.*—In such ways as these the State may serve the ethical end. The question may finally be raised, whether the State is itself a permanent ethical institution, or destined, after discharging a temporary function, to give place to some higher form of social organisation. Is the final form of society non-political, rather than political? As the individual emancipates himself from political control by assuming the control of himself, may not society ultimately emancipate itself from the control of the State? And may not the narrower virtue of patriotism, or devotion to our own country, give place to the larger virtue of a universal philanthropy and cosmopolitanism? This is, of course,

a question on which we can only speculate; but our practical attitude towards the State will be to some extent affected by our disposition to answer it in the one way or the other. It seems to me that, while the form of the State may continue to change, the State itself must remain as the great institution of the moral life, unless that life undergoes a fundamental change. Peace may permanently supplant war, and harmony antagonism, in the relation of State to State. But the permanence of the State itself seems consistent with the highest development of the moral life. The concentration of patriotism is not necessarily identical with narrowness and limitation. "It is just the narrower ties that divide the allegiance which most surely foster the wider affections."¹ On the other hand, cosmopolitanism has proved a failure when subjected to the test of history. The Stoics were cosmopolitans; so also were the Cynics before them. But, in both cases, cosmopolitanism proved itself a negative rather than a positive principle: it resulted in individualism and social disintegration. We best serve humanity when we serve our country best, as our best service to our country is our service to our immediate community, and our best service to our community is the service of our family, and friends, and neighbours. For here, once more, we must be on our guard against the fallacy of the abstract universal. Humanity is only a vague abstraction until we particularise it in the nation, as the latter itself also is until we still further particularise and individualise it. The true universal is the concrete universal, or the universal in the particular; and we can well believe that in the life of domestic piety, of true neighbourliness, and of good citizenship, our best duty to humanity itself is abundantly fulfilled. The true philanthropy must always begin at home, and, as far as we can see, nationalism is as permanent a principle of the moral life as individualism.

¹ J. MacCunn, *Ethics of Citizenship*, p. 46.

NOTE.

THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT.

A GROWING number of ethical thinkers, as well as of practical philanthropists, maintain the necessity of a radical change in our view of punishment. We must substitute, they contend, for the older or retributive theory the deterrent and reformatory theories. The new science of criminology is founded upon the theory that crime is a pathological phenomenon, a form of insanity, an inherited or acquired degeneracy.¹ It follows that the proper treatment of the criminal is that which seeks his cure, rather than his punishment. Prisons must be superseded by hospitals, asylums, and reformatories.

An advance in human feeling, as well as in intelligence, is to be seen in this movement, both in its theoretical and in its practical aspects; an advance from the hard, blind desire for justice, and the unrelenting and unreasonable spirit of vindictiveness, to a gentler and wiser humanity. And society is now so securely organised that it can afford to be not merely just, but generous as well. The question, however, is, whether the newer and the older views of punishment are mutually exclusive, and, if not, what is their relation to one another; whether the substitution of the deterrent and reformatory for the retributive view is ethically sound, or whether, in our recoil from the older view, we are not in danger of going to the opposite extreme and losing the element of truth contained in the retributive theory.

We must acknowledge, to begin with, that the new theory can point to many facts for its basis. The general principle of heredity is operative in the sphere of crime and vice, no less than in that of virtue. We might almost say that the criminal is born, not made, or, rather, that he is *more* born than made. Crime seems to be almost as instinctive in some natures as goodness is in others. This instinctive tendency to evil, developed by favourable circumstances or environment, results in the criminal act and in the life of crime. There is a criminal class, a kind of caste, which propagates itself. Crime is a profession, with a code of honour and an

¹ Cf. A. Macdonald, "Ethics as applied to Criminology" (*Journal of Mental Science*, Jan. 1891).

etiquette of its own ; almost a vocation, calling for a special aptitude, moral and intellectual. Have we not here a great pathological phenomenon, a disease to be cured, not punished ?

But we cannot carry out the pathological idea. It is only an analogy or metaphor after all, and, like all metaphors, may easily prove misleading, if taken as a literal description of the facts. We distinguish cases of criminal insanity from cases of crime proper. In the former, the man is treated as a patient, is confined or restrained, is managed by others. But he is, by acknowledgment, so much the less a man because he may be treated in this way : he is excused for that which, in another, would be punished as a crime ; he is not held accountable for his actions. The kleptomaniac, for example, is not punished, but excused. Are we to say that the difference between these actions and crimes proper is only one of degree, and that the criminal is always a pathological or abnormal specimen of humanity ? Do all criminals border close on insanity ? Even if so, we must recognise, among bad as well as among good men, a border-line between the sane and the insane ; to resolve all badness into insanity does not conduce to clear thinking. A point may indeed be reached in the life of crime, as in the life of vice generally, after which a man ceases to 'be himself,' and may therefore be treated as a thing rather than as a person ; a point after which, self-control being lost, external control must take its place. But normal crime, if it has anything to do with insanity, is rather its cause than its result.

To reduce crime to a pathological phenomenon, is to sap the very foundations of our moral judgments ; merit as well as demerit, reward as well as punishment, are thereby undermined. Such a view may be 'scientific' ; it is not ethical, for it refuses to recognise the commonest moral distinctions. After all these explanations have been given, there is always an unexplained *residuum*, the man himself. A man knows himself from the inside, as it were ; and a man does not excuse himself on such grounds. Nor would the majority of men, however criminal, be willing to have their crimes put down to the account of insanity ; most men would resent such a rehabilitation of their morals at the expense of their 'intellects.'

This leads us to remark a second impossibility in the theory—namely, that the ordinary criminal, whether he be a pathological specimen or not, will not submit to be treated as a patient or a case. For he, like yourself, is a person, and insists on being respected as such ; he is not a thing, to be passively moulded by society according to its ideas either of its own convenience or of his good. Even

the criminal man will not give up his self-control, or put himself in your hands and let you cure him. His will is his own, and he alone can reform himself. (He will not become the patient of society, to be operated upon by it.) The appeal, in all attempts at reformation, must be to the man himself; his sanction must be obtained, and his co-operation secured, before reformation can begin. He is not an automaton, to be regulated from without. The State cannot annex the individual; be he criminal or saint, his life is his own, and its springs are deep within. It is a truism, but it has to be repeated in the present connection, that all moral control is ultimately self-control.

In virtue of his manhood or personality, then, the criminal must be convinced of the righteousness of the punishment. Possessing, as he does, the universal human right of private judgment, the right to question and criticise according to his own inner light, he must be made to see that the act of society is a punishment, and to accept it as such; he must see the righteousness of the punishment, before it can work out in him its peaceable fruits of righteousness. Here, in the force of this inner appeal, in such an awakening of the man's slumbering conscience, lies the ethical value of punishment. Without this element, we have only a superficial view of it as an external force operating upon the man. Such a violent procedure may be necessary, especially in the earlier measures of society for its own protection; but it is not to be taken as the type of penal procedure, nor is it effective beyond a very narrow range. A man may be restrained in this way from a particular act of crime on a particular occasion; but the criminal nature in him is not touched, the criminal instincts are not extirpated—they will bloom again in some other deed of crime. The deepest warrant for the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent and reformatory agent is found in its ethical basis as an act of justice. True reformation comes only with the acceptance of the punishment, by mind and heart, as the inevitable fruit of the act. For punishment thus becomes a kind of revelation to the man of the true significance of his character and life. A man may thus be shocked into a better life. For accidental calamity, or for suffering which he has not brought upon himself, a man does not condemn himself. Such self-condemnation comes only with insight into the retributive nature of the calamity. It is just this element of justice that converts calamity or misfortune into punishment. The judgment of society upon the man must become the judgment of the man upon himself, if it is to be effective as an agent in his reformation. This private re-enactment

of the social judgment comes with the perception of its justice or desert.

Punishment is, in its essence, a rectification of the moral order of which crime is the notorious breach. Yet it is not a mere barren vindication of that order; it has an effect on character, and moulds that to order. Christianity has so brought home to us this brighter side of punishment, this beneficent possibility in all suffering, that it seems artificial to separate the retributive from the reformative purpose of punishment. The question is not "whether, apart from its effects, there would be any moral propriety in the mere infliction of pain for pain's sake."¹ Why separate the act from its effects in this way? In reality they are inseparable. The punishment need not be "for the sake of punishment, and for no other reason"; it need not be "modified for utilitarian reasons." The total conception of punishment may contain various elements indissolubly united. The question is, Which is the fundamental; out of which do the others grow? Nor do I see that such a theory of punishment is open to the charge of syncretism. I should rather call it synthetic and concrete, as taking account of all the elements, and exhibiting their correlation. Might we not sum up these elements in the word 'discipline,' meaning thereby that the end of punishment is to bring home to a man such a sense of guilt as shall work in him a deep repentance for the evil past, and a new obedience for the time to come?

In proceeding from the deterrent to the reformative view of punishment, we are only proceeding from an external to an internal view of the same thing. To be permanently deterrent, punishment must be educative or reformative as well; there must be an inner as well as an outer reformation. To the social prevention must be added self-prevention, and this comes only with inner reformation. Such a reformation, again, implies the acceptance, by the criminal, of the punishment as just, his recognition in it of the ethical completion of his own act; and this is the element of justice or desert, which is thus seen to be the basis of the other elements in punishment.

¹ H. Rashdall, *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. ii. p. 22.

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CHAPTER III.

MORAL PROGRESS.

1. The nature of moral progress. — The fact of moral progress is, from an ethical point of view, indubitable. The very nature of an ideal implies the possibility, and the fact, of a gradual approach toward its realisation; an ideal which did not thus reveal itself in the process of the moral life would be no ideal. Moreover, if the moral ideal is the key to the individual life, it is no less the key to the larger life of the race of moral beings. The history of the race becomes intelligible, as we shall see later, only on the presupposition of the presence and operation in it of such an ideal principle. The verification of any interpretation of the moral ideal remains incomplete until it is shown to explain the history of evolving moral life, the process of moral experience as a whole. The ideal must be the unifying principle of the successive historical manifestations of morality, as well as of its various present forms. Not that we are to find any theoretic or reflective view of the ideal consciously and explicitly present at every stage of moral evolution, or that such an explicit and reflective consciousness of it is needed to explain that evolution. The ideal may work unconsciously as well as consciously, and may disguise itself under many strange forms. But the recognition of the presence and operation, from the beginning, of

this ideal factor, the identification of it as the grand agent in the universal ethical process, would be the crowning verification of an ethical theory.

For, while we must never forget the empirical element in the evolution of morality—the play of circumstances, the action of ‘environment’—this alone would not explain moral progress. Although circumstances determine the form which the ideal assumes from age to age, it is still the ideal itself, as thus determined, that explains the process of its own gradual realisation. While the ideal is approached by different paths at different stages of moral experience, it is as the several ways to a common goal that these paths are followed. Although the choice of means is determined by the concrete relations in which man actually finds himself, the choice of these means would still not be made unless the end which they mediate had itself been chosen.

It is moral progress or evolution, not moral creation—the course, not the origin, of morality—that we are to look for. Morality cannot arise out of the non-moral, as Spencer seems to think. Moral progress is morality in progress, ‘progressive morality’; never at any stage a progress *to* morality, or a progress from the non-moral to the moral stage. This last form of progress, even if it existed, would have an interest only for the anthropologist, not for the moralist, in whose eyes man is from the first moment of his existence, potentially if not actually, a moral being. If man started on his career as a non-moral being, he could never become moral, any more than he could make any intellectual attainments if he were not from the first an intellectual being. The moralist cannot accept any catastrophic, or revolutionary, or artificial theory of the origin of morality. A theory which seeks to explain this origin by reference to a pre-moral condition, to which morality stands in antithesis, condemns itself by its very statement. If the original

and natural condition of man were that of universal antagonism, *bellum omnium contra omnes*, the peace of morality had been impossible. If the original and natural state were *homo homini lupus*, the 'ape and tiger' nature had never given place to the gentleness and love of the moral world. It is as true in the sphere of morality as in that of nature or of knowledge, that the seeds of the latest fruits of the evolutionary process must be already present in the first stages of that process. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. It is also and equally true in all these spheres that we find in the later stages the fuller manifestation of the essential nature whose evolution we are tracing, that the latest is the truest. As the oak is the truth of the acorn, so is the man of ripe culture and refinement the truth dimly prefigured by the primeval savage.

Accordingly, when we investigate the most primitive forms of human practice, we find that we are already in presence of that feature which characterises its latest forms—the consciousness of moral obligation. Certain types of activity are approved, others condemned. The seat of authority is custom, established usage, public opinion. To this authority the individual is responsible. From the first, man is a social being; the tribe or the family is the unit, and the individual has no interests apart from the tribal and domestic interests in which he shares. Apart from this social relation, he would be a mere fragment, an unreal abstraction which the primitive mind is unable to conceive. This relation prescribes to him the law of his conduct, and any breach of the law is visited with such penalties as the instinct of self-preservation teaches the primitive society. The transformation of the tribe, with its unformulated social requirements, into the State, with its written laws, comes later, but does not essentially alter the situation; it only makes explicit what had before been implicit. The social relation, whether tribal, domestic, or political, is always in its essence a moral relation, and the conscious-

ness of these wider relations and of their claim upon the individual life is the consciousness of moral obligation.

Nor is the constant and invariable element in morality a mere abstract consciousness of obligation—the consciousness of a distinction between the better and the worse. We find, further, an approval of a certain concrete quality or type of character and conduct, and a disapproval of the opposite quality or type. The variable element is found in the specific form or concrete application of the virtues; in their sphere, or in the extent of their application; and in the estimate of their relative importance, or in the emphasis placed upon each.

For example, the primitive man agrees with his pagan and Christian descendant in the approval of courage as a virtuous and praiseworthy quality, and in the condemnation of cowardice as a vicious and contemptible quality. To the primitive society, however, courage inevitably takes the form of unflinching purpose in attack and defence, as for the classical world also it takes the form of military virtue; while in a modern industrial society it takes more naturally the form of quiet and patient endurance of inevitable evil or unflinching devotion to some domestic or friendly duty. The earlier limitation of the virtue to some single form of activity or to some one relation is at a later time removed, and the sphere of its application extended, until at last it finds application in the total sphere of human activity and in all the relations of human life. Further, the emphasis placed upon the virtue of courage in early times and in a military State, and in times of war in a peaceful State, is transferred, in later times and in an industrial State, to some other virtue, such as honesty, which the changed conditions call for more imperiously. Even in Plato's time the emphasis had shifted, and for him courage was "the fourth and not the first part of virtue, either in individuals or States."¹

¹ *Laws*, ii. 666 E. Cf. G. L. Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life*, p. 102.

Or take the virtue of benevolence. At no stage in the evolution of morality is benevolence condemned and malevolence approved. The variation of moral sentiment and practice is seen first, as before, in the specific form or application of the virtue. In primitive life the most common form of benevolence is hospitality, while the entire service rendered by the individual to his family and tribe may be regarded as benevolent or altruistic activity. In later times the virtue is less apt to take the forms of hospitality and patriotism, and in place of these we find philanthropy and charity arising in response to the new conditions. On the other hand, the limitation of the virtue, in primitive times and in the military State, to the individual's own society; the fact that, as Spencer expresses it, 'internal amity' means 'external enmity,' illustrates the narrowness of the sphere of that benevolence which has in later times been so extended as to include mankind within its scope, and to sublimate patriotism into humanitarianism. Moreover, as the storm and stress of the struggle for existence give place to settled peace, the emphasis falls more and more upon benevolence, and love is seen to be the fulfilment of all virtue.

Again, the virtue of justice is to be found in the earliest, as well as the latest, stages of morality. The only forms of it, however, which are recognised at first are the most obvious and external. It manifests itself only in the form of retaliation of injury for injury, and the aggressions which are thus repaid in kind are of the rudest physical order; later it takes more positive, as well as subtler, forms. At first the scope of the virtue is intra-tribal; and, even in the later times of the military State, the range of its application is generally limited, like that of benevolence, to the members of the same nation or empire. It is only in the modern industrial State that the limits of nationality and of empire are really transcended, and that the scope of justice becomes

international and cosmopolitan. We find, also, that the comparative emphasis placed upon justice and benevolence is gradually reversed as we pass from earlier to later times. In a ruder age, when security is the first interest and there is no leisure to spare from the maintenance of being for the pursuit of well-being, it is inevitable that the claims of justice should seem paramount. In a later and more peaceful time, when the foundations of the social order have been well and truly laid, and the opportunity has come to build upon them the fabric of a more perfect social life, it is no less inevitable that the claims of mere ordinary justice should give place to the claims of that higher justice which we call benevolence.

Perhaps the last virtue which we should expect to find in primitive society is temperance. Yet the license of primitive life is not unbridled. There are limits beyond which it is not allowed to go, although the limits are not placed where we should place them. The application of the virtue is apt to be limited to one relation of life, the sexual, and even here its range is very narrow, and its claims are easily satisfied. In the military State and, in times of war, in the industrial State, this virtue develops slowly. The Greeks are the classical representatives of temperance, but the Greek virtue is much narrower and less exacting than its modern equivalent.¹ The range of the virtue has been so greatly extended, and the rigour of its claims so keenly appreciated, by the Christian consciousness of the modern world as completely to overshadow its earlier manifestations. Yet temperance being an essentially negative virtue, it was inevitable that the emphasis which for the Greek mind and for the mediæval Christian mind made it the cardinal and fundamental virtue, should later be transferred to the positive virtue of culture or self-realisation. It has been very slowly and gradually

¹ Cf. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. iii. ch. v. §§ 261-271.

that this change of emphasis has taken place, and self-sacrifice has yielded to self-fulfilment as the law of the moral life.

2. The law of moral progress : the discovery of the individual.—Sir Henry Maine has formulated the law of social progress in the memorable words that “the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”¹ “The individual is steadily substituted for the family, as the unit of which civil laws take account.”² In the recognition of the power of contract this distinguished student of ancient law finds the first clear perception of the individual as a separate and responsible agent, who occupies henceforth in the eyes of the law the place hitherto occupied by society. It seems to me that the fundamental law of moral progress, whether in the race or in the individual, may be stated in essentially the same form. That progress is, in sum and substance, *the gradual discovery of the individual*. It is difficult for us to realise that the idea of individual moral independence and responsibility is the product of long centuries of moral development. The ethical unit of earlier times is the tribe or the family; later it becomes the State; later still perhaps the caste or class; and, last of all, the individual. It is long before, from the tribe and the family, from the State and the class, the individual emerges in the completeness and independence of his moral being. And even when the individual has differentiated himself from the larger social whole, it is long before he comes to a true understanding of himself and of his relation to society. An abstract and extreme individualism invites a return to the no less abstract extreme of socialism. The true nature of the individual answers to the true nature of society, and with the self-discovery of the former comes the self-discovery of the latter.

¹ *Ancient Law*, ch. v. p. 170 (11th edition).

² *Ibid.*, p. 168.

Of the solidarity, in ancient society, of the family and the individual, we have a striking illustration in the *patria potestas* of the Romans. The paternal authority vested in the head of the family was absolute, and against it the individual had no rights. Of the solidarity of the State and the individual, the grand illustration is that of the Hellenic city-states. Plato, in his *Republic*, gives expression to this ideal. So confident is he in the ethical supremacy of the State, so convinced of the absoluteness of its value, that he would make it the sole criterion of individual virtue. The State is the ethical unit, and its claim upon the service of the individual is absolute. Plato cannot conceive any distinction or antagonism between the good of the individual and that of the State, between the ethical and the political point of view. The measure of ethical and political well-being is the same. The life of citizenship is an exhaustive expression of the moral nature of its citizens; there is no distinction between the citizen and the man. Those who cannot discharge the duties of citizenship—the helplessly weak and the incurably sick—have no *raison d'être*, and ought not to be allowed to live, a burden and an evil to the State. The entire education of the individual is an education in citizenship. The family and private property are disallowed, as inconsistent with a perfect loyalty to the State. And while the Platonic State is doubtless an idealisation of the actual Greek State, it is yet only the extreme logical development of the Greek view of the State as the true ethical unit and norm.

This absolute confidence in the State did not last long. Its ethical inadequacy soon began to appear, and the peril of staking their moral well-being upon the well-being of the State soon became manifest to the more reflective minds among the Greeks. In Aristotle we see the beginning of the change of standpoint from the State to the individual. For him the individual has become clearly an end-in-himself, and the State but the medium of

his ethical life. While the individual implies the State as the condition of his complete life, the State exists for the sake of the individual, for the sake of the distinction between good and evil, justice and injustice, and the like. It is the means, he is the end. Aristotle still maintains, however, like Plato, that man is a 'political animal,' and that the individual apart from the State would not be a moral being. The man without a State is either below or above man as we know him in his civilised condition, is either a brute or a god. Aristotle's empirical faithfulness to the individual, indeed, colours his ethics as well as his metaphysics. He believes that "there is a superiority in the individual as against the general methods of education." As "a teacher of boxing does not teach all his pupils to box in the same style, it would seem that a study of individual character is the best way of perfecting the education of the individual."¹ Yet for Aristotle, as for Plato, ethics is only a part of politics; in the one we see the Good writ small, in the other it is writ large. "For although the good of an individual is identical with the good of a State, yet the good of the State, whether in attainment or in preservation, is evidently greater and more perfect. For while in an individual by himself it is something to be thankful for, it is nobler and more divine in a nation or State."²

This belief in the inherent divinity or 'naturalness' of the State had been undermined by the Sophists, who saw in it only an artificial product of human convention, and pointed to the individual, in ethics as in metaphysics, as the only reality. The early Socratic schools had also sought for a merely private and individual good, the salvation of the individual soul. The ineffectiveness and disappointing failure of the actual State, and the growing despair of its future, led to a revival of political scepticism in the post-Aristotelian period; and the

¹ *Nic. Eth.*, x. 9 (15).

² *Ibid.*, i. 2 (8).

waning confidence in the State meant an increasing confidence in the individual. Thus it was only the break-down of the State itself that compelled the individual to look within himself for the good which he could no longer find without. The Stoics still believe in the ideal State, but it has become for them 'a city of God' which can never be realised on earth, a spiritual community, a Church rather than a State—the Church invisible of the wise and good. The ideal of the Epicureans is frankly unpolitical; friendship takes the place of citizenship as the bond between man and man, and the medium of the highest life in the individual. If we feel that in both cases, as well as in the case of the Academic Sceptics, a negative has been substituted for a positive ideal, that the rest and peace of the individual soul has taken the place of the full and engrossing activity of the life of citizenship, we also feel that a new value is found in the individual, and that the man behind the citizen has at last been discovered.

That the moral or practical individualist should be no less extreme in his appreciation of the individual and in his depreciation of the State than is the intellectual or metaphysical individualist in his exaltation of the perceptual above the conceptual, need not surprise us. On the other hand, there is a great positive advance in this moral individualism of the later Greeks. So long as the political and the ethical points of view were identified, not only was the life of the individual citizen inadequately interpreted, but the life of the individual who was not a citizen found no interpretation at all. If the man behind the citizen remained undiscovered, the man who was not a citizen was not regarded as an ethical being. He was simply an instrument of the State; the ethical life of the State rested upon an unethetical, because an unpolitical, basis. Not only the woman and the slave, but, in Sparta at least, the artisan and the labourer, too, were thus excluded from the moral world, because they were excluded

from the political. But the Stoic city of God includes the slave as well as the free man, the 'barbarian' as well as the Greek. The ethical franchise does not depend upon the political; it belongs to every man, to man as man. Thus the discovery of the individual meant a great widening, as well as a great deepening, of the moral consciousness of the Greeks.

It was political adversity that taught the Hebrews the same lesson; for them also the dissolution of the State wrought the moral emancipation of the individual. Their conscience was, like that of the Greeks, essentially political; and as long as the State remained, they saw in it the unit of responsibility. The nation as a whole sinned and was punished, or followed righteousness and was rewarded. This sense of a corporate life and responsibility extended backward over the past and forward over the future generations of Israel. The life of the nation was continuous, and the sins of the fathers were visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation. It comes to them at last with all the surprise of a fresh discovery that responsibility is an individual affair, and that "the soul that sinneth, it shall die."

Christianity taught with a new emphasis the supreme value of the individual as a moral being. Its chief interest was in the salvation of the individual soul, and its message came as a veritable gospel to men who had already learned that their soul's good was not to be found without but within themselves. It recognised no distinction between the rich and the poor, the cultured and the uncultured, the freeman and the slave; or if it did, it was primarily to the poor, the uncultured, and the downtrodden that its gospel came. It might well have seemed impossible that the importance of the individual should ever again be forgotten, or subordinated to that of the State. Yet such a return to the older view is not so surprising as it might at first sight appear.

For the Christian ideal was from the first emphatically a social, as well as an individual, ideal; it was a gospel for human society as well as for the individual man, and from the first the Christian Church was not contented to remain the Church invisible. As Christianity gradually took visible form in a new human society, the ecclesiastical polity came to resemble the civil, and the *Civitas Dei* became also an earthly State. Throughout the Middle Ages Church and State are one, 'a double-faced unity,' like soul and body. The Holy Roman Empire is the realisation of the ideal of the ecclesiastical State. The political genius of the Romans was engaged in the service of the new religion, and the individual member of the Christian Church was subordinated to the ecclesiastical State as absolutely as the individual citizen had ever been subordinated to a merely political society. Such a reabsorption of the individual in the social good was inevitable. The theory which prevailed throughout the Middle Ages was that the universal is alone the real, and that its existence is independent of the individual. The ideal essences—the Church and the State—were therefore hypostatised, and made ends in themselves. Perhaps it required such a perfect confidence in the ecclesiastical State and such a complete devotion to its service, to make possible that new start in civilisation which was implied in the organisation of the hosts of northern barbarians into a stable political society.

This subordination of the individual to the ecclesiastical State meant, however, at the same time, the subordination of morality to theology, of ethics to politics. The Church became the keeper of the individual conscience, the priesthood controlled the conduct of the laity. Moreover, what the Church through its councils and its priests primarily insisted upon was not the secular part of conduct, not the 'moral' phase of life, but its sacred and religious part; the performance of certain

ceremonies, the doing of certain outward acts, rather than the inward conformity of the spirit to the rule of Christianity. So far as the inward life was taken into account, it was rather the intellectual than the moral attitude which was considered, it was rather the obedience of the mind than of the will that was demanded. Faith was inculcated at the expense of works, and the power of absolution which the Church claimed for itself was exercised and magnified in a way which was very detrimental to the interests of morality.¹ The moral corruption of the Church itself—the poisoning of the fountains of the moral life—is familiar to the student of mediæval history. The withdrawal of the best spirits of the age from the service of their fellows into the monasteries, the substitution of the ideal of ‘saintly’ self-culture for that of social service, of ascetic self-denial for positive self-realisation, of ‘other-worldliness’ for ‘this-worldliness,’—all this meant the failure of Christianity in its mission of the moral regeneration of mankind. Instead of quickening and deepening the conscience of the individual, the Church deadened it, and made it more superficial than ever.

The awakening from this moral torpor was the re-birth of the individual. The break-down of Mediævalism is contemporaneous with, and causally related to, the break-down of Realism, or the belief in the universal. The Reformation is one phase of the triumph of Nominalism, or the belief in the individual. The metaphysical doctrine of the exclusive or primary reality of the individual finds practical expression, moral and religious, in the assertion by the individual of his right to be his own judge in matters of conduct and of thought, in the new sense of the importance of conduct and character, in the revival of interest in the secular life and the affairs of this world. The Protestant version of Christianity, indeed, so emphasised the individual as

¹ Cf. James Cotter Morrison, *The Service of Man*, ch. vi.

almost to lose sight of the social significance of the Christian religion as it was originally taught and understood, and to make it the servant of self-interest. It has only been very slowly, too, that the mediæval view of the insignificance of the earthly life, and the mediæval tendency to an ascetic ideal, have been exchanged for the modern interest in the present world and in the total life of man as a member of this world. The turning-point in this direction was the Renaissance, the re-birth of the pagan spirit. The new Socialism and Secularism of the present is mainly the result of the new pressure of industrial conditions.

On its secular side, mediæval life came more and more under the control of the feudal system, thus reverting, Christianity notwithstanding, to the ideal of the military State. Here again the individual was entirely subordinated to the larger whole of which he formed only an insignificant part. He was, more or less literally and absolutely, the servant of another, and could call nothing his own. The feudal society was a hierarchy, into whose complex system the life of the individual must be fitted, and as one of whose functions it must be regulated. The rise of industry gave the individual a new importance and new rights; independent competition superseded feudal subordination, and aristocracy was opposed, if not superseded, by democracy. The rise of Capitalism has again threatened, if it has not destroyed, the independence of the individual; the apparent failure of Individualism as an industrial principle has turned the world's attention once more in the direction of Socialism; and it seems possible that the individual may again be absorbed in the State. Yet we can see in the entire movement a real progress; the shadow on the dial does not turn backward, history does not repeat itself. It is of the essence of progress that no solution of the problem of

life is final, and that one extreme provokes a recoil to its opposite. But it also belongs to the nature of progress that no solution will satisfy a later age which does not do fuller justice to, and rest upon a better understanding of, the individual than any previous solution; and that, as the individual advances in the understanding of his own nature and of his relations to the social whole, the problem of the adequate interpretation of that nature and those relations must become more complex.

The trend of moral progress has been in the direction of a true Individualism: it has meant the gradual discovery of the place of the individual in the body politic. The system of caste has gradually given place to the democratic system; the artisan and the slave have been admitted to the status of citizenship, and given a share in the government of the State. Yet while political disabilities have been removed, social disabilities have not always disappeared with them; political enfranchisement is not necessarily social enfranchisement. Class-distinctions are still apt to hide from us our essential identity as human beings, and the man behind the citizen is not yet clearly perceived. There are many signs that this veil also is yet to be drawn, that mutual recognition and respect will yet supersede mutual distrust and misunderstanding, and that behind the inevitable distinctions of avocation, of birth, of property, of capacity, each will yet see and acknowledge his fellow-man.

We have seen, moreover, that the mediæval conception of Christianity as having to do only with the things of eternity and not with those of time, only with the welfare of the spirit and not with that of the body, is giving place to a larger conception of its meaning which includes temporal and material good. Science, too, has taught us to look for causes everywhere, and, even in the moral and religious life, to note the influence of environment. This

modern scientific view is obviously leading to a revision of our conception of 'charity,' and must result in new manifestations and applications of the Christian principle of love. The temporary relief of poverty, disease, and distress is seen to be inferior in ethical value to the radical cure of such evils by the removal of their causes. A new sympathy, more intelligent as well as more intimate, with the disfranchised masses of our vast city populations, whose citizenship is no more real than that of the Greek slave who was encouraged to lay no such flattering unction to his soul, is leading men everywhere to an anxious consideration of the ways and means by which these masses may be given the moral opportunity to which, as 'men of like passions with ourselves,' they are entitled no less than we. We are slowly coming to see that they do not exist for us any more than we exist for them; that they, no less than we, are ends-in-themselves and have a destiny of their own. Such a development and education of social sympathy is only a further step in the direction of the discovery—behind all varieties of class, of outward condition, and of special avocation—of a common moral personality.

3. Aspects of the law of moral progress: (a) Transition from an external to an internal view.—Of the general law of moral progress, already stated and illustrated in its general bearing, we find in the history of morality certain more specific illustrations, to the chief of which attention may now be called. The growing appreciation of the individual as moral person and ethical norm is manifested, first, in the increasing internality, spirituality, or depth of the moral consciousness as expressed in moral judgment; secondly, in the gradual subordination of the sterner to the gentler virtues; and thirdly, in the greater and greater scope attributed to morality, or the larger and larger number of persons to whom its application is extended.

First, we can trace in moral progress a gradual transition from an external and utilitarian to an internal and spiritual estimate of action, from conduct and consequences to character and causes, from doing to being, from the action to the man. With the growing discovery of the ethical importance of the individual, we find taking place a corresponding change in the estimate of the comparative importance of conduct and character. What the individual *does* counts for less and less; what he *is* counts for more and more. When it is perceived that certain types of conduct are the expression and result of certain types of character, a higher value comes to be placed upon the inner character than upon the outward deed, and the centre of moral judgment changes from the act to the intention. Virtue or excellence of character is approved, as the sure guarantee of excellent activity; vice or baseness of character is condemned, as the sure prophecy of base activity. Nor is a man judged to be courageous or honest simply because he does a courageous or honest deed. The courageous and the honest man is seen to be the man to whom a cowardly or a dishonest deed is unnatural and impossible. Even this, however, is only an intermediate step; and once the emphasis is shifted from conduct to character, the further step is easily taken, and the virtuous character comes to be valued not merely as the security of the corresponding activity, but for its own sake. "Progress with regard to the standard and practice of virtue means the gradual recognition that the true end consists not in external goods, nor even in the virtues as means to these, but in the virtues as ends-in-themselves."¹ As this progress takes place, a personal, or spiritual, is substituted for an impersonal, or utilitarian, interpretation of human life.

How slowly and with what difficulty this advance has been made, we may learn from the case of the gradual transition from the Greek to the modern Christian point

¹ Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 246 (Summary).

of view. The utilitarianism of the ordinary Greek conscience is reflected in the naïve doctrine of Socrates that virtue is knowledge of the consequences of our actions—a kind of ‘hedonistic calculus,’ and even in Aristotle’s conviction of the dependence of human happiness or well-being, for its completion and highest perfection, upon the gifts of fortune. From such statements we should be compelled to conclude that the Good is finally in nature’s hands rather than in our own, and that virtue is to be valued merely as a means of making the best of the consequences. Both Socrates and Aristotle, it is true, as well as Plato, strike a deeper note, signalling the inherent and intrinsic value of virtue, and suggesting the Christian estimate of character as the only thing absolutely and altogether good. But the Greek conception of citizenship, as an exhaustive expression of the moral life, tended to retard the advance to a strictly spiritual estimate of virtue. As long as the good man is identified with the good citizen, the measure of his virtue cannot fail to be his utility to the State. The man is valued as a political instrument, and his character is regarded only as a guarantee of political service. It was only with the break-down of the State itself that its inadequacy as the medium of the moral life became apparent to the Greeks, and men sought within themselves the Good which they failed to find without. Then came the conviction, so impressively set forth by the Stoics, of the inherent and essential value of virtue itself. Not what a man is good *for*, but what he *is*, determines his ethical value. What he does is worthy of approbation or of condemnation only as the expression of what he is, as the action is worthy or unworthy of himself. The Greeks had always made much of obedience to the laws of the State, but outward conformity had seemed to them a sufficient obedience. To the Stoics the only true obedience was a conformity of the will, and the law that claimed such

self-surrender was the expression of a man's own rational nature.

The position to which the Greeks were only brought at last by the dissolution of their political being was the starting-point of Christianity; the lesson which the Greeks taught their Roman conquerors was the first lesson of the new religion to its disciples. That the true criterion of virtue is an internal and spiritual one, that consequences are morally irrelevant, that the true salvation is salvation not from outward but from inward evil, that the true obedience is not that of the lip or hand or foot, but of the mind and heart, that neither evil nor good happen to a man, but that both are the creation of his own will, that righteousness of character is the alpha and the omega of Good,—these are the very rudiments of Christianity. Rudimentary, however, as these principles are for the Christian consciousness, they were themselves the later stages of a long and difficult moral progress. It was only very slowly that the Hebrew mind made the advance from the standpoint of conduct to that of character, and learned to substitute an internal and spiritual standard for an external and mechanical one. A legalistic and ritualistic interpretation of righteousness was always their besetting sin. They were in constant danger of resting satisfied in outward conformity to rules, instead of requiring of themselves an inward obedience to principles, and they were always measuring their moral attainments by the national prosperity which rewarded them, rather than by an internal standard. They, too, had to learn the distinction between moral and material Good, between virtue and consequences, from the lips of a cruel experience. To them, as well as to the Greeks, political disaster brought moral emancipation, for it taught them also to seek the true Good within and not without, and to reverse their estimate of righteousness.

The mediæval mind, in losing sight once more of the

individual, fell back into the old mechanical and external view of the moral life, and sought the standard and measure of moral worth in external conformity to rule rather than in inward conformity of spirit, in conduct rather than in character, in specific acts rather than in the prevailing attitude of the will. The ecclesiastical organisation overshadowed the individual, of whose spiritual life it ought to have been simply the medium and expression; the rule supplanted the principle, the letter was substituted for the spirit, the means was mistaken for the end. The Reformation, being a reassertion of the Christian estimate of the supreme importance of the individual, was at the same time a return to the true inwardness of Christianity, a reassertion of the essentially spiritual character of its point of view. The Protestant doctrine of 'justification by faith alone' is a theological expression of the ethical principle that the moral situation hinges not upon what a man does, but upon what he is,—upon the attitude of his will and the bent of his character. The Protestant churches themselves, however, soon became the victims of the external and the letter in a new form, substituting bibliolatry for ecclesiolatry, conformity to the letter of the creed for spiritual obedience, doctrine for life, theology for religion. In our own time we see many signs of a return to the moral simplicity of early Christianity.

The modern industrial system shows the same tendency to relapse from an internal to an external, from a personal to an impersonal, view of human activity, the same tendency to lose sight of the moral individual, and the same necessity of the rediscovery of the individual in his true ethical importance. The development of commerce and the organisation of society upon an industrial basis have led to the economic estimate of human worth, according to the measure of the individual's efficiency as a part of the economic machine, whether he be producer,

distributor, or consumer, labourer or capitalist. Economic value is so prominent and so important to modern society, as well as to the individual, that it is apt to pass for the supreme or moral value; the 'economic' man is apt to be mistaken for the man himself. But we are coming to see that economic value is an 'abstract idea,' that in reality it is inseparable from moral value, and that, though the former is not reducible to the latter, the one is dependent upon the other. The 'economic man' is an expression of the moral man, as truly as is the 'political man' or the citizen.

The error of modern, as of ancient and mediæval Socialism is that it tends to regard the individual as a thing to be managed and controlled from without, rather than as a person, the springs of whose activity are within. It is forgotten that men cannot be made virtuous by Act of Parliament, that men cannot be *made* virtuous at all. Moral alternatives are resolved into alternatives of outward condition, of wealth or poverty, of comfort or discomfort. Environment is substituted for will, conditions for choice. We have to remind ourselves that the only thing absolutely and altogether good is the good will, that not things but persons alone are good in themselves, and that the moral situation turns not upon external conditions but upon the use which the moral individual makes of these conditions. Social regeneration depends upon the regeneration of the individual, and the regeneration of the individual depends upon himself.

4. (b) Subordination of the sterner to the gentler virtues.—A second manifestation of the law of moral progress is found in the gradual subordination of the sterner to the gentler virtues, of the virtues of being or security to those of well-being or amenity. The discovery of the individual in his intrinsic moral worth brings with it a new sense of the individual's moral

claim, of his right to consideration, and therefore a new consideration for him. This lesson of consideration for the individual is the lesson of gentleness. The transition from the sterner to the gentler virtues is the transition from an unsympathetic to a sympathetic, from an inconsiderate to a considerate attitude towards the individual. The approval of the sympathetic type of character and conduct, and of the gentler virtues in which it finds expression, and the disapproval of the opposite type of character and conduct and of its rougher forms of virtue, has become for us an instinct and an intuition; we can hardly understand the possibility of any other estimate. Yet this also is a lesson of moral experience, not an innate idea; and it has meant the reversal of the older preference. The history of moral progress is, in one aspect, the history of this reversal. This phase of moral progress is, moreover, immediately connected with the preceding: with the transition from an external to an internal view comes the transition from an unsympathetic to a sympathetic attitude towards our fellow-men.

Both the primitive and the pagan forms of society are predominantly military, and the forms of virtue which they chiefly develop are accordingly the militant forms. The same devotion to the interests of the family which now produces the quiet domestic virtues was forced to find expression for itself, in a ruder age, in the physical courage and cruel deeds of the battle-field. Primitive man has no country or home to be the hearth of the gentler virtues; the chase fills his days of peace, as attack and defence are the occupation of the rest.

With the transition from the nomadic to the pastoral life, we have the beginnings of domesticity: agriculture takes the place of the chase, and becomes the nurse of the more peaceful virtues. A later age is apt to look back to that quiet and simple life in the bosom of nature as the golden age, and to endow it with ideal qualities which make it a very garden of Eden and an earthly

paradise. Yet the later stages of village, town, and city communities produce forms of virtue which the pastoral life could never have made possible. The industrial life is no less peaceful than the pastoral, and it makes demands upon the complex nature of man which the life of the fields would never have made. The business of commerce gives a new sense of mutual dependence and mutual service; and under its influence a new ideal of well-being is gradually substituted for the old ideal of mere security from attack. Internal development succeeds external defence, and a new channel is found for human energies in the organisation of the community, whether village, town, or city. The foundations of government are laid, old customs are formulated in laws, and a new sense of order is developed. The State itself has come into being, and with the State all the political virtues begin to manifest themselves. The political virtues, again, carry the domestic in their wake, and the more settled and peaceful the life of the State becomes, the more room is found for the life of the Family, the peculiar nursery of the gentler virtues.

In Greece we have a striking illustration of the contrast between the moral influence of the unsettled military State and that of the settled industrial State, in the rival polities of Sparta and Athens. The Spartan type of virtue has become proverbial for later ages. It found no place for the gentler and more amiable qualities, and comparatively little place even for the intellectual qualities. Spartan virtue was entirely of the heroic and fighting order. The State claimed the entire manhood of its citizens, and disallowed all domestic ties, as destructive of political loyalty and fatal to the virtues of the soldier-citizen. The typical Athenian citizen, on the other hand, was the embodiment of a gentler and more humane virtue. Excellence was measured in Athens also by the standard of the State, but the State itself existed for the sake of the harmonious and graceful life

of its citizens,—as the grand means of their intellectual and æsthetic culture. Moreover, the industrial basis of the State was recognised by the political status conceded to the industrial class, which was in Sparta excluded from citizenship.

Yet the ancient type of virtue remained, even in Athens, hard and stern, as compared with the modern Christian type. The gentleness and grace of the highest forms of Greek life are rather the qualities demanded by the æsthetic sensitiveness and by the extreme intellectualism of the Athenians than the qualities which are reached by a renunciation of the sterner and rougher ideal of life. And when Athenian supremacy gave place to Spartan, and Spartan to Roman, the career of the gentler virtues might well have seemed to be finally closed. But Rome was destined to be overcome by a greater power than that of arms, the power of gentleness itself. Renouncing the old political and military ideal of life, and proclaiming itself from the first as the religion of love, as the gospel of forgiveness and non-resistance, Christianity breathed a new life into the body of human virtue.

Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of the change of standpoint wrought by Christianity is, that it substituted for the narrowly and exclusively masculine ideal of the ancient world an ideal which not only included the feminine qualities, but made the specially feminine virtues typical and fundamental—the very essence and presupposition of virtue. While the classical moralists are obviously thinking of man rather than of woman, in their efforts to formulate the ideal life, and the classical State no less obviously exists for man and not for woman, Christianity taught a new reverence for woman, because it found a higher expression of certain essential aspects of its own ideal, especially a higher development of that sympathy which it regarded as the key to all the virtues, in womanly than in manly virtue.

The Christian reverence for childhood is only another aspect of the same conception. The halo of a tender grace and gentle simplicity encircles childhood and womanhood, and consecrates them the eternal types of the highest human virtue. In the Master's character and life the Christian saw all the gentleness and sympathy of woman combined with, and subduing to its own beautiful rule, all the strength and wisdom of man.

The special sphere of Christian virtue was not the battle-field, or even the market-place, but the ministry of help to the poor and the sick, the forsaken and the oppressed. Christianity discovered to the Western mind "the sanctity of weakness and suffering, the supreme majesty of compassion and gentleness."¹ All forms of cruelty and vain display of mere animal strength met the rebuke of the new spirit of reverence for weakness and scorn of unmitigated strength, which had been born into the world. "The high conception that has been formed of the sanctity of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games, the creation of a vast and multifarious organisation of charity, and the education of the imagination by the Christian type, constitute together a movement of philanthropy which has never been paralleled or approached in the Pagan world."²

It is the effect of this change of standpoint in the estimation and determination of character that claims our attention—the new measure of virtue which it prescribes. "Christianity for the first time gave the servile virtues the foremost place in the moral type. Humility, obedience, gentleness, patience, resignation, are all cardinal or rudimentary virtues in the Christian character; they were all neglected or underrated by the Pagans."³ The superiority of patient endurance to angry resentment, of forgiveness to revenge, of gentleness to force, was impressed

¹ Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. ii. p. 100.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 68.

ineffaceably upon the moral imagination of Christendom by the life of its meek and lowly Founder. The hierarchy of the virtues was henceforth reversed: the first were made last, and the last first. "In that proportion or disposition of qualities which constitutes the ideal character, the gentler and more benevolent virtues have obtained, through Christianity, the foremost place,"¹ while the sterner and more virile have been compelled to accept a subordinate position. For in that true and complete manhood which is the final measure of human virtue, the gentler virtues are the essential complement of the sterner, and the sterner must be subdued to the rule of the gentler. If the sterner virtues are the hands and feet, sympathy or love is the eye of our moral nature, without which it had been blind to that common spiritual being which, uniting us in a common life with our fellows, and making the whole world kin, points out the path of all truly virtuous activity.

5. (c) Wider scope of virtue.—We are thus led to notice a third phase of moral progress, its increasing scope, its growth from particularism to universalism, from patriotism or nationalism to humanism or cosmopolitanism. As the individual comes to self-discovery, he discovers his community of being and of life with his fellows, his citizenship in the city of humanity. With the discovery of the true and total self comes the discovery also of the true relation to all other selves: a true self-consciousness is at the same time a consciousness of others. With the recognition of moral personality in new and unsuspected places man learns the lesson of a larger sympathy and a wider considerateness in his relations towards others. In presence of this deep natural affinity, artificial and conventional barriers disappear. This phase also of the law of moral progress we find illustrated by the facts of moral history.

¹ Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. ii. p. 101.

As the moral life of mankind proceeds, it seems to break down the barriers that divide man from man, the barriers of nationality and race as well as those of rank and occupation. We have already seen how, in its very beginnings, that life is social and not merely individual, altruistic as well as egoistic. But the primitive society is very circumscribed in area, being limited to the family or the tribe. The law of its conduct is external enmity as well as internal amity; and comparing the respective areas of the two principles, we must say that enmity is the rule, amity the exception.¹ With the transition to the village community and the city-State, we find a great extension of the social consciousness. But the essential limitation still remains: natural kinship still prescribes duty, the stranger and the alien is still regarded as a barbarian and an enemy.

Of the ethical limitations of the particularistic and patriotic point of view we have a striking illustration in the life of the Greeks. So absolute was their loyalty to the particular city-State of which they were citizens that not merely was the non-Hellenic world despised as barbarian, but one Greek State was always apt to see in another its rival and its foe. It was this inter-Hellenic enmity that prevented the Greeks from ever becoming a great nation, and that led to their final loss of political existence. The Greeks seem never to have understood the strength that lies in union; so narrow and so intense was their patriotism that it blinded them even to their own larger and more real national good.

The Jews resembled the Greeks in the intensity of their national consciousness, in the undying fervour of their love of country. But as the tribal gave place to the national unity, Hebrew patriotism grew larger in its scope, and the fortunes of Israel as a whole became the engrossing interest of every true Israelite. This loyalty to Israel was, however, at the same time

¹ Cf. Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, vol. i. p. 350.

an attitude of hostility to all other nations. Israel was the one nation that represented the interests of righteousness, and the other nations were Israel's foes because they were the foes of the righteousness which she represented. Israel alone stood in the divine favour; she was a 'peculiar people,' chosen out of the nations of the world for a career of glory by God himself. Her destiny was the ultimate subjection of the world to her sway.

It was political disappointment and disaster that taught both Greece and Israel the lesson of a larger loyalty, as it taught both the lesson of the intrinsic worth of the individual. It was in the gloom and despair of the Exile that there came to the Hebrews the larger hope of a glorious destiny for humanity itself, and a new insight into their own function in the moral redemption of the world. Weakening one another's power of resistance, the Greek city-States succumbed before the superior strength and organisation of Rome. But the autumn of her decay brought to Greece a harvest of moral insight, a breadth of moral outlook, which her more glorious summer of prosperity had never yielded. As the fair vision of the Greek State faded for ever from his eyes, the Greek saw a more glorious vision still—the city of Humanity itself, whose citizenship was more precious than that of any Hellenic State, and yet was limited by no distinction of race or city or nationality. The grand surprise of this discovery of a common citizenship, nay of a common family relation, with the outside barbarian world, still speaks to us from the pages of the Stoic moralists. What is perhaps a commonplace of our moral consciousness was to them a discovery and a surprise.

In contrast with the narrow nationalities of the past, the Roman Empire might well have seemed the realisation of the Stoic dream of a world-State. Distinctions

of Greek and Jew were lost in the identity of Roman citizenship: the ideal of national was exchanged for that of universal empire. But Roman citizenship was found by the subject-races to be no real substitute for the loss of national existence; such a cold and abstract relation did not compare with the warm, concrete life which Greek and Jew alike had enjoyed in the narrower, but fuller and more interesting, world of their own nationality. It is from the lips of a Roman Emperor that we hear the saddest commentary on the real insignificance and utter transitoriness of the Roman Empire, and the profoundest yearning for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God. The dream of the City of God is still unfulfilled: its empire is vaster, its order more perfect, its sovereignty more enduring than that of Rome.

To a world waiting for it, to men in whom the very disappointment of their lower ideals and narrower hopes had wakened a higher ideal and a larger hope, Christianity came with its gospel of divine humanity; its spirit of piety to a universal Father took the place of loyalty to a world-Emperor, and its principle of brotherly love supplanted that of a common citizenship. The conception of the Kingdom of God superseded that of the Roman Empire; men were filled with a new enthusiasm of humanity, as the idea of the common brotherhood of man took possession of them. Jew and Greek and Roman each saw the new ideal against the background of his own national experience, and recognised in it the counterpart of his own highest hopes. In the fire of this new enthusiasm the old patriotism was consumed, and it seemed as if the foundations of the spiritual city of the Stoics had at last been laid. With the fall of the Roman Empire and the rise of the Christian Church, it seemed as if the old ideal of the State and of political ethics had finally died out of the world.

But the necessity of organising its own life compelled

the Church before long to ally itself with the apparently superseded State, and the Roman Empire was revived under the name of the Holy Roman Empire. The Catholic Church became at the same time the world-Empire, and obedience to the head of the Church was at the same time obedience to the head of the Empire. Although it recognised no distinctions of race or of nationality, and its councils were œcumenical, the Church became identified with its visible and political organisation, and the larger catholicity of the Church invisible was lost. The ecclesiastical State was more universal than any State the world had yet seen, but it was not yet the City of God. That city was invisible, or visible only to the eye of the spirit. The Reformation, while it was in one sense the assertion of individualism, was in another sense the assertion of the true catholicity, the catholicity of the spirit, against the particularism of the flesh and of the letter, the catholicity of the invisible against the particularism of the visible Church.

Amid the rise and fall of church and empire—for churches, no less truly than empires, have their rise and fall—there rises slowly in the human spirit that ‘city of God’ which is the perfect development of the human spirit itself. To the building of this city the nations and the churches, like individuals, make each its peculiar contribution, and the work survives the workman in the one case as in the other. The world will never outgrow the lessons it has learned from the nations of the past. The real warfare of the ages is a warfare of ideals, and in this warfare the victory is often hidden from the outward eye. In this warfare the Greek and the Jew conquered the Roman, and the Roman conquered the northern Barbarian. In the very hour of their political death, the nations of the past left great spiritual legacies to their successors, and made their conquerors their debtors and their subjects for evermore. We could not afford to miss out of our modern culture the Greek

sense of grace and courtesy in conduct, the Greek reverence for law and instinctive 'obedience to a better,' the Greek regard for the things of the mind, the Greek ideal of the perfect union of physical and spiritual development, the Greek appreciation of 'music' and 'gymnastic' as the sum of human education. Nor could we afford to miss the sterner and more solid virtues of the Romans, whose heritage of law and order we all confess, and the searching moral sense of the Hebrews, with its conviction of the supreme importance of righteousness. These are only representative instances of the debt which the present owes to the past, and the victorious to the conquered nations.

Between nations, as between individuals, there must doubtless always be competition as well as co-operation, rivalry as well as love and mutual service. It is only through the struggle for existence that progress is made, and the worthier sifted from the less worthy. But the rivalry may be generous, and must surely become more so, if we remember that in serving our country we are serving humanity itself, and that we cannot truly serve the one without serving the other. Modern patriotism ought to differ from the patriotism of the past in a larger and more sympathetic understanding of the service which our own country is called to render to the world at large. To think thus even of our own country as not the be-all and the end-all of our devotion, but rather as the representative to us of that humanity in which alone our devotion can terminate and find rest, is at once the true patriotism and the true cosmopolitanism.

Conclusion.—Here, as elsewhere, the later does not supplant the earlier phase of virtue; rather, the one is the needed complement of the other, the one without the other cannot be made perfect. As the internal does not negate the external view of virtue, nor the sympathetic the more

virile virtues, so the true universalism does not exclude but includes, and is the expression of, the true individualism. If moral progress consists in the discovery of the true individual, then moral progress can never leave the individual behind. Whether in his relations to others or to himself, the individual can never be called upon to negate himself as moral personality. Sheer and absolute self-sacrifice can never be the path of virtue for a being the supreme principles of whose life are self-knowledge and self-realisation. The individual is the moral microcosm, and he need never go beyond himself to find the universal. The fatal error of mediæval Realism and of that Platonic theory of which Realism was the reproduction, as well as of the Neo-Platonic and all other forms of Mysticism, is the idea that the only pathway to the universal is the negation of the individual. This is also the fundamental error of Stoic, of Neo-Platonic, and of Mediæval asceticism. The error lies in supposing that the universal alone is real, and the individual illusory; while in truth the universal, apart from the individual, is no more real than the individual, apart from the universal. Scorn of the individual means scorn of morality itself, and the ambition of the Mystic has always been to transcend individuality and morality alike. Despite their rationalism, the Stoics were essentially Mystics in spirit; their 'sage' is very like the mediæval 'saint.' The sage and the saint alike despise 'the daily round, the common task' of ordinary duty; both alike have set their affections upon the things which are above the level of ordinary activity. Their interest in the universal and divine saps that interest in the individual and the human which it ought to feed; and the result is that, both on the individual and the social side, the springs of activity are arrested, and life becomes a dream, an untroubled reverie, a *meditatio mortis*. The true life of man is not a self-less life, but the life of the true human self; 'the way of the blessed life' is the way along which the

human spirit has so long and so laboriously travelled, the way of self-discovery.

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PART III

METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF MORALITY

THE

AMERICAN

REVIEW

METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MORALITY.

Introductory. 1. Ethics and metaphysics.—We have seen¹ that while the science of ethics must be carefully distinguished from metaphysics or philosophy, yet the science of ethics must have for its complement an ethical philosophy or a metaphysic of ethics. Metaphysics must endeavour, here as elsewhere, to travel beyond the scientific explanation to one that is deeper and ultimate. But here as elsewhere we are met by the agnostic objection to all metaphysics. We are asked to substitute physics for metaphysics, positivism for transcendentalism, science for philosophy. A science of ethics, it is urged, is all that is needful and possible. Mr Leslie Stephen, the ‘apologist’ of Agnosticism, tells us, in his *Science of Ethics*, that, in his opinion, “it is useless to look for any further light from metaphysical inquiries.” His demand is for ethical realism, which means for him ethical empiricism, positivism, or phenomenalism. Let us keep to the moral facts or phenomena, to “moral reality,” and not seek to penetrate to its transcendental background, or think to find the sanctions of human conduct in the divine or the ideal. If we understand the inter-relations of the facts of the moral life, we shall sufficiently understand their moral significance. Let us ascertain “the meaning to be attached to morality so long as we remain

¹ Introduction, ch. ii.

in the world of experience; and if, in the transcendental world, you can find a deeper foundation for morality, that does not concern me. I am content to build upon the solid earth. You may, if you please, go down to the elephant or the tortoise."¹ It is not necessary "to begin at the very beginning, and to solve the whole problem of the universe" before you "get down to morality." "My view, therefore, is that the science of ethics deals with realities; that metaphysical speculation does not help us to ascertain the relevant facts. . . . This is virtually to challenge the metaphysician to show that he is of any use in the matter."²

This challenge the metaphysician need have no hesitation in accepting, and his answer to it will consist in a careful definition of the ethical problem and of the possible solutions of it. That problem is not, What are the facts or phenomena of morality? but, How are we to interpret these facts? What is their ethical significance? The former question will no doubt help us to answer the latter; knowledge of the *φύσις*, or the actual nature, will lead us to the knowledge of the *οὐσία*, or the essential nature and meaning, of moral as of other facts. We must admit that the empirical and inductive method has its rights in the ethical as in all other fields of inquiry, and that the 'high *priori* road' is a road that leads to no result in ethical any more than in natural philosophy. We need always the instruction of experience; knowledge lies for us in an unprejudiced study of the facts. But the Baconian method of pure induction, or mere observation, will not serve us any better than the method of pure metaphysical deduction. The low *posteriori* road will also bring us to no goal of knowledge. It is never mere facts that we seek, it is always the meaning of the facts; and the accumulation of facts is never more than a means towards the attainment of that insight into their significance which makes the facts luminous. Every fact, every element of

¹ *Science of Ethics*, p. 446.

² *Ibid.*, p. 450.

reality, carries us beyond itself for its explanation ; if we would understand it we must relate it to other facts, and these to others, until, to understand the meanest, slightest fact or element of reality, we find that we should have to relate it to all the other facts of the universe, and to see it as an element of universal Reality. In the perfect knowledge of the "little flower . . . root and all, and all in all, I should know what God and man is." Even so the lowliest flower that grows on the soil of human life is rooted in the deeper soil of universal Reality, and is fed by the sap of the cosmos itself. The controversy between agnosticism and metaphysics is, therefore, not a controversy between realism and idealism, between science and unscientific philosophy. It is rather a controversy between a narrower and a wider view of Reality, between a more superficial and a more profound interpretation of the facts. The distinction between science and philosophy is not a distinction of kind, but only of degree. Science, not less than philosophy, is 'the thinking view of things': what the man of science seeks to apprehend is the meaning of the facts. And the philosopher is ambitious to gather from the hints of science the total meaning of the facts. Where science seeks to think the facts, philosophy seeks to think them out. Science abstracts certain elements of reality from the rest, in the hope of mastering these elements ; but always, as the investigation proceeds, it is found that the mastery of the elements selected for examination implies the mastery of others, and the mastery of these the mastery of others, until—even from the scientific point of view—it is seen that a perfect mastery of any would imply the perfect mastery of all. And on our journey towards this 'master-light of all our seeing' it is hardly possible to say where science ends and philosophy begins. Metaphysics, we are told, is 'a leap in the dark.' But even the man of science makes his leap in the dark, his leap from the light of the known to the darkness of the unknown. It is only by such venture-

someness that the light of knowledge is let into the darkness of the unknown, but not unknowable. Why should a limit be put to this speculative courage, which is at the root of all intellectual progress? Why should not the metaphysician be allowed to make his bolder leap into the deeper darkness? The darkness is thick indeed, but not therefore impenetrable. At any rate, "it is vain," as Kant says, "to profess indifference to those questions to which the mind of man can never really be indifferent."

In the case now in question, the metaphysician only seeks to attain a more intimate and exhaustive knowledge of moral reality than the scientific moralist, to penetrate to the deeper reality of moral phenomena, to understand what it is that thus 'appears,' to grasp the 'being' of moral 'seeming.' The scientific moralist studies morality in abstraction from its bearing on the whole theory of the cosmos. His ambition is to discover the true system of the moral judgments; and he does not raise the question of the ultimate validity of these judgments or of their relation to other judgments, intellectual or æsthetic. But a final and adequate view of morality itself is not reached, a satisfactory explanation of morality is not attained, so long as we separate morality either from nature or from God. Reality is one, and its elements must be seen in their mutual relation if they are to be understood as in reality they are. The question of the objective and ultimate validity of our moral judgments, and of the relation of these judgments to our other judgments of value and to our judgments of fact, is a question that insists on being heard. Ethics is therefore finally inseparable from metaphysics, and it needs no "ingenious sophistry" to "force them into relation." If we would reach an adequate interpretation of human life, we must place man in his true human 'setting,' we must discover his relation to the world and to God. The meaning of human life is part of the meaning of the universe itself; the moral

order is part of the universal order, the ethical process is part of the cosmic process. The establishment of the superior claims of the positive or scientific explanation is itself a metaphysical undertaking, and demands, for its successful accomplishment, a comparison with the transcendental or metaphysical view. We must, in any case, test the metaphysical possibilities of the case, before we have any right to pronounce against metaphysics, here or elsewhere.

To investigate the metaphysical basis of morality is simply to go from the outside to the inside, from the circumference to the centre, from a partial to a complete view of the ethical problem. If all questions are, in the last analysis and in the ultimate issue, metaphysical questions, the ethical question can least of all escape this fate. Ethics is not mere anthropology. To interpret the life of man as man, we must interpret human nature, and its world or sphere; we must investigate man's place in nature, his relations to his fellows, and his relation to that life of God which in some sense must include the life of nature and of man. Man, with his moral life, is part of the universe; and it has been truly said that it is really the universe that, in him, is interrogating itself as to the ultimate meaning of moral experience. For, in the moral world no less than in the intellectual, experience is not the last word. The transcendental or 'metempirical' question will not be silenced: What, in nature, man and God, in the universal Reality, is the basis, presupposition, or sanction of this experience? We must distinguish the scientific or 'relative' ethics from such a philosophic or 'absolute' ethics. But the scientific must in the end fall within the philosophic, the relative within the absolute; and, short of a metaphysic of ethics, there is no final resting-place for the human mind. That metaphysic may be either naturalistic or idealistic. On the one hand, the law of human life may be reduced to terms of natural law, the moral ideal may be resolved into the

reality of nature. Or, on the other hand, the ultimate measure of human conduct and character may be found in a spiritual order which transcends the natural; the moral ideal may be found to express a divine Reality to which the real world of nature would, in itself, give no clue. But, be our metaphysic of ethics what it may, metaphysics we cannot in the end escape.

2. The three problems of the metaphysic of ethics.—The central or metaphysical principle of morality—the ultimate presupposition of ethical theory—assumes different aspects when we examine it from different standpoints or in different moral lights. The single problem presents itself for solution in three different forms, as, according to Kant, the metaphysical problem necessarily does. When we try to discover the ultimate warrant for our ethical interpretation of human life, we find (1) that it must be a certain interpretation of man's essential being, as either a product of nature, sharing nature's life, and without an end essentially different from that of the animal and the thing; or a being apart from nature, with a being and a life in which nature cannot share, standing in a different relation to the course of things, and possessed of a unique power to order his own life and to attain his own end, a unique capacity of failure or success in the attainment of his life's possibility. In other words, the world-old problem of human freedom, and the comparative merits of the two rival solutions—libertarianism and determinism—inevitably present themselves and claim our consideration. (2) We cannot help asking the question whether nature, the physical cosmos, is a sufficient sphere and environment for man as a moral being, or whether it is necessary to postulate a higher and supernatural sphere, a moral order other than the physical order, a moral Being or God other than nature. This is only another aspect of the first question. For if, on the one hand, we

can naturalise the moral man, or resolve man (and with him his morality) into nature, then there will be no call for an order higher than the order of nature, or for a God other than nature itself. If, on the other hand, such a naturalistic theory of man is impossible, we shall be forced to postulate a universal ethical Principle or Being, answering to the ethical being of man. Even then the relation of man to this universal Principle or Being will have to be determined,—a problem which will be found to be only the problem of freedom in another aspect. (3) Last of all, there is the problem of the destiny of man as a moral being, the problem of the issues of the moral life. Here, once more, if man is a merely natural being, his destiny must be that of nature; only a unique being, with a unique life, can claim a unique destiny. If, on the other hand, it is found impossible to resolve man into nature, and necessary to postulate for him a being and a life different in kind from nature's, and an ethical universe as the sphere of that life, it would seem to be necessary to the fulfilment of his being and the completion (instead of the negation) of his task, that he should have an immortal destiny. Here again, however, the solution of the problem would depend upon our interpretation not only of man's relation to nature, but also of his relation to God; and both these interpretations throw us back once more upon the question of the essential and ultimate nature of man himself.

CHAPTER I.

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM.

1. **Statement of the problem.**—After what has been said in general about the necessity of raising the metaphysical question in an ethical reference, we need not further attempt to vindicate the propriety of discussing the problem of freedom. That problem is, like the other metaphysical problems, very old, but not therefore, as some would say, antiquated. It is not “a problem which arose under certain conditions, and has disappeared with the disappearance of these conditions, a problem which exists only for a theological or scholastic philosophy.”¹ The conditions of the problem are always with us, and the problem, therefore, can never become obsolete. It is one of the central questions of metaphysics, or rather, it is one aspect of the central metaphysical question; and though its form may change, the question itself remains, to be dealt with by each succeeding age in its own way.

For us, as for Kant, the problem of freedom takes the form of a deep-seated antithesis between the interests of the scientific or intellectual consciousness on the one hand, and the moral and religious convictions of mankind on the other.

From the scientific or theoretical point of view, man must regard himself as part of a totality of things, animals, and persons. In the eyes of science, human

¹ Paulsen, *Ethik*, vol. i. p. 351.

nature is a part of the universal nature of things, man's life is a part of the wider life of the universe itself. The universal order can admit of no real exceptions; what seems exceptional must cease to be so in the light of advancing knowledge. This, its fundamental postulate, science is constantly verifying. Accordingly, when science — psychological and physiological, as well as physical — attacks the problem of human life, it immediately proceeds to break down man's imagined independence of nature, and seeks to demonstrate his entire dependence. The scientific doctrine now prefers, indeed, to call itself by the 'fairer name' of determinism; but if it has the courage of its convictions, it will acknowledge the older and truer name of necessity. For though the forces which bind man are primarily the inner forces of motive and disposition and established character, yet between these inner forces and the outer forces of nature there can be no real break. The forces, outer and inner, are ultimately one; human nature is part of the nature of things. The original source of man's activity lies, therefore, without rather than within himself; for the outer force is the larger and the stronger, and includes the inner. I get my nature by heredity from nature itself; and, once got, it is further formed by force of circumstances and education. All that I do is to react — as any animal or plant or even stone does also in its measure — on the influences which act upon me. Such action and reaction together yield the whole series of occurrences which constitute my life. I, therefore, am not free — as determinists are apt to insist that I am, though my will is determined; motives are, after all, external forces operating upon my nature, which responds to them, and over neither motive nor nature have I any control. I am constrained by the necessity of nature — its law is mine; and thus determinism really means constraint. The necessity that entwines my life is conceived, it is true, rather as an inner than as an outer necessity; but the outer and the inner necessity are seen,

in their ultimate analysis, to be one and the same. The necessity that governs our life is "a magic web woven through and through us, like that magnetic system of which modern science speaks, penetrating us with a network subtler than our subtlest nerves, yet bearing in it the central forces of the world."¹

The distinction between the new 'determinism' and the old 'necessitarianism' has been finally invalidated, so far as science is concerned, by the scientific conception of evolution. Science now insists upon regarding man, like all else, as an evolved product; and the evolution must ultimately be regarded as, in its very nature, one and continuous. The scientific or modern fashion of speaking of a man's life as the result of certain 'forces,' into which it is the business of the biographer and historian to resolve him, is no mere fashion of speech. In literal truth, the individual is, in the view of science, the child of his age and circumstances, and impotent as a child in their hands. The scientific explanation of human life and character is the exhibition of them as taking their place among the other products of cosmical evolution. In our day, accordingly, it is no longer scientific to recognise such a break as Mill, following Edwards's hint, insisted upon, between outward constraint and inward determination. All the interests of the scientific ambition are bound up with the denial of freedom in any and every sense of the word; its admission means embarrassment to the scientific consciousness, and the surrender of the claim of science to finality in its view of human life.

With the assertion of freedom, on the other hand, are as undeniably bound up all the interests of the moral and religious consciousness: Kant's saying still holds, that freedom is the postulate of morality. The moral consciousness dissolves at the touch of such scientific explanation as I have just referred to. The determinist may try to prop it up, and to construct a pseudo-morality

¹ W. Pater, *The Renaissance*.

on the basis of necessity; but the attempt is doomed to failure. The living throbbing experience of the moral man—remorse and retribution, approbation and reward, all the grief and humiliation of his life, all its joy and exaltation—imply a deep and ineradicable conviction that his destiny, if partly shaped for him by a power beyond himself, is yet, in its grand outline, in his own hands, to make it or to mar it, as he will. As man cannot, without ceasing to be man, escape the imperative of duty, so he cannot surrender his freedom and become a child of nature. All the passion of his moral experience gathers itself up in the conviction of his infinite and eternal superiority to nature: it ‘cannot do otherwise,’ he can. Engulfed in the necessity of nature, he could still conceive himself as living the life of nature, or a merely animal life, but no longer as living the proper and characteristic life of man. That is a life rooted in the conviction of its freedom; for it is not a life, like nature’s, ‘according to law,’ but a life ‘according to the representation of law,’ or in free obedience to a consciously conceived ideal.

The grand characteristic of the moral life of man, which forbids its reduction to the life either of nature or of God, is responsibility or obligation. This is more than expectation of punishment, to which Mill would reduce it. It is rather punishability, desert of punishment or of reward. The element of retribution or desert, instead of being accidental, is essential to the conception. In the common human experience of remorse there is implied the conviction that different possibilities of action were open, and, therefore, that the agent is accountable for what he did—accountable not necessarily *in foro externo*, human or divine, but primarily and inevitably to himself, to the inner tribunal of his own nature in its alternative possibilities. And retribution comes, if not from without, yet, with sure and certain foot, from within. Our moral nature, in its high possibilities, is inexorable in its de-

mands, and relentless in its penalties for failure to satisfy them. To say that the actual and the possible in human life are, in the last analysis, identical; to resolve the 'ought to be' into the 'is,'—would be to falsify the healthy moral consciousness of mankind.

On the other hand, the admission of the full claim of that consciousness may mean the surrender of metaphysical completeness in our scheme of the universe. For it means the recognition of a spiritual agency different in kind from the natural or mechanical, and therefore the surrender of a materialistic monism or a scientific synthesis. It means also the recognition of a plurality of spiritual agents, and therefore the surrender of such a spiritual or idealistic monism as would exclude that plurality. It may even mean, as Professor James insists that it does, the entire abandonment of the monistic point of view, or of the conception of a "block-universe." The admission of free personality may cleave the universe asunder, and leave us with a seemingly helpless pluralism in place of the various monisms of metaphysical theory. Such an admission means further the recognition of evil, real and positive, alongside of good, in the universe. It may therefore mean the surrender of optimism, philosophical and religious; or, at any rate, it may force us to pass to optimism through the strait gate of pessimism. All this darkness and difficulty may result to metaphysics from the recognition and candid concession of the demands of the moral consciousness. Nor will this seem strange when we remember that the moral problem of freedom is just the problem of personality itself, which cannot but prove a stone of stumbling to every metaphysical system:

"Dark is the world to thee; thyself art the reason why;

For is He not all but thou, that hast power to feel 'I am I'?"

2. The 'moral method.'—Recognising these difficulties, and regarding them as insuperable, we may still

accept freedom as the ethical postulate, as the hypothesis, itself inexplicable, upon which alone morality becomes intelligible. This is the 'moral method,' which some living thinkers share with Kant. The method or standpoint has received a brilliant exposition and defence from Professor William James, in a lecture on "The Dilemma of Determinism."¹ "I for one," says the latter writer, "feel as free to try the conception of moral as of mechanical or of logical reality. . . . If a certain formula for expressing the nature of the world violates my moral demand, I shall feel as free to throw it overboard, or at least to doubt it, as if it disappointed my demand for uniformity of sequence, for example." Insisting upon the integrity of our moral as well as of our intellectual judgments, and especially upon that of the "judgment of regret," and upon the equal legitimacy of the postulate of moral with that of physical coherence, Professor James thus states his conclusion: "While I freely admit that the pluralism and restlessness [of a universe with freedom in it] are repugnant and irrational in a certain way, I find that the alternative to them is irrational in a deeper way. The indeterminism offends only the native absolutism of my intellect—an absolutism which, after all, perhaps deserves to be snubbed and kept in check. But the determinism . . . violates my sense of moral reality through and through."

Now, such a solution of the problem of freedom is, to say the very least, a plausible one; but let us note exactly what it means. It recognises, and gives a new emphasis to, the Kantian antithesis between the intellectual or scientific consciousness on the one hand, and the moral and religious on the other; and the solution offered consists in an assertion of the rights of the latter along with, and even in precedence of, those of the former. The decision in favour of freedom is thus a kind of "moral wager," as M. Renouvier has well called

¹ *The Will to Believe, and Other Essays*, pp. 145-183.

it; the odds seem to be on the side of morality, and therefore the odds are taken. And probably the question is generally answered on some such grounds, though not so explicitly formulated. The philosopher is the man, after all; and the stress is laid on the one side of the question or the other, according to the temper of the individual. One man feels more keenly the disappointment of his moral expectation, another feels more keenly the disappointment of his intellectual or scientific ambition. For the ethical and the scientific temper are not generally found in equal proportions in the same man. As men are born Platonists or Aristotelians, so are they born moralists or intellectualists, men of practice or men of theory; and this original bent of nature will generally determine a man's attitude to such an ultimate question. While the intellectualists will, with Spinoza, ruthlessly sacrifice freedom to completeness and finality of speculative view, the moralists will be content, with Kant and Lotze, to "recognise this theoretically indemonstrable freedom as 'a postulate of the practical reason.'" The latter position, if it confessedly falls short of knowledge, is at any rate entitled to the name which it claims for itself, that of a "rational faith"; it is a faith grounded in the moral or practical reason. Since man must live, whether he can ever know how he lives or not, freedom may well be accepted as the postulate or axiom of human life. If moral experience implies freedom, or even the idea of freedom, as its condition; if man is so constituted that he can act only under the idea of freedom, or as if he were free, then the *onus probandi* surely lies with the determinist. It is for him to make good this libel upon human nature, that it is the constant dupe of such deep delusion; as it is for the agnostic to make good that other libel of the mere relativity of human knowledge.

But, while fully recognising the merits of this 'moral

method,' and, above all, the intellectual candour which it expresses, must we not seek to establish freedom upon some higher and yet more stable ground? Kant's antithesis still remains; can it not be overcome? Is it not possible to exhibit the unity of the intellectual and moral judgments, and thus to eliminate the subjective element which seems to cling to the solution just referred to? We, and our life, moral as well as intellectual and physical, are after all part of a single reality; moral reality and physical reality are elements of a real universe. The moral consciousness is the consciousness or expression—one among other expressions, conscious and unconscious—of the universe itself.¹ It is objective as well as subjective; we cannot detach the moral subject and his consciousness from the universe in which he finds his place and life. The conception of duty or oughtness, with its implicate of freedom, is not an artificial product, or a foreign importation into the universe; it is a genuine and authentic exponent of the universe itself, and therefore we must interpret the universe in its light. Whatever the difficulties which the moral consciousness may raise for the metaphysical intellect, it is of right, and not of favour or of choice, that its utterance is heard. It, too, is the voice of reason—the voice of the universal reality or nature of things; and the determinism that would choke its utterance, or treat it as illusion and 'pious fraud,' is a libel not only upon human nature, but upon the universe itself. The breach between our intellectual and our moral judgments can be only apparent, not real or permanent. Must we not then continue the effort to achieve their reconciliation, and to understand freedom in its relation to so-called necessity? Let us revise both conceptions once more, to discover whether such a reconciliation is still possible.

3. The 'reconciling project.'—It has always been the

¹ Cf. Fouillée, *L'Avenir de la Métaphysique*, pp. 262 ff.

ambition of the determinists to show that there is no real controversy in the case, that all the difficulty has arisen from a misunderstanding of the terms employed on either side, and that necessity, rightly understood, does not exclude freedom, rightly understood. This reconciling project is as old as Edwards, with his distinction of the free man and the determined will ; but its greatest advocate is Hume.¹ One of its latest and not least persuasive advocates is Mr Shadworth Hodgson, who insists that "the true and proper meaning of freedom is freedom as opposed to compulsion ; and the true and proper meaning of necessity is necessity as opposed to contingency. Thus, freedom being opposed to compulsion, and necessity to contingency, there is no antithetical opposition between freedom and necessity. Determinism maintains the uniformity of nature, or necessity, as opposed to contingency, not to freedom ; and therefore "a determinist is perfectly at liberty to maintain the freedom of the will."² Accordingly, while "indeterminism imagines a freedom apart from necessity . . . necessity is the inseparable condition, or rather let us say co-element, of freedom. And without that co-element, freedom is as incapable of being construed to thought, is something as impossible as walking without ground to tread on, or flying without air to beat."³ This, Mr Hodgson further maintains, is the only freedom that interests the ordinary man. "By freedom, whether of the will or anything else, men at large mean freedom from compulsion. What know they, or care they, about uniformity of nature, or predestination, or reign of law ?" The ordinary man holds both ideas together—the idea of the freedom or non-compulsion and the idea of the necessity or uniformity of actions ; he realises no contradiction, as in reality there is none, between them. The debate is between the philosophers themselves, and has its source in the ambiguity of the

¹ *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, sect. viii.

² *Mind*, O.S., vol. vi. p. 111.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. v. p. 252.

term 'necessity.' This has been conceived dynamically, or as a force,—a misunderstanding which has arisen from carrying over the metaphorical idea of 'law' into scientific and philosophical thought. In reality, whether applied to human activity or to the phenomena of nature, law means simply uniformity. But while law is thus the merest abstraction, and "incapable of operating as an entity," it has been hypostatized as the agent, not merely in the occurrences of nature, but also in the process of human activity. H

In such argumentation one can hardly help suspecting a certain sleight of hand; one can hardly believe that a debate of this kind is altogether a war of words. And one cannot but note that such an evaporation of the debate into the thin air of pure verbiage is always equivalent to its settlement in favour of determinism. The interpretation of necessity, suggested in the sentences just quoted from Mr Hodgson, is interesting and significant. It indicates that the complexion of the question has changed considerably since the classical presentation of it by Edwards. Determinism no longer takes the 'high *priori*' road of the older necessitarians; it is now content to follow the humbler path of scientific method. Hume has, once for all, emptied the conception of 'necessity,' for the scientific mind, and for the mind of the empiricist in philosophy, of all suggestion of mystery and force; and it would seem that the mere uniformity which is left is a very innocent affair, and quite consistent with freedom. Yet I cannot think that this is the case. Non-compulsion is certainly one element in the notion of freedom, but it is not the whole notion. If it were, man could be called free only in a sense in which nature also is free. For, as we have just seen, necessity has no dynamical connotation, even in the sphere of natural occurrences; the laws of nature are simply the uniformities which characterise the behaviour of bodies. The problem still remains, so to differentiate human activity from action

determined by mere natural uniformity as to vindicate our moral judgments, to rationalise the judgment of regret. Mere uniformity would be, no less than mere compulsion, the negation of freedom.

At the same time, this paring down of necessity to mere uniformity is a certain contribution to the solution of our problem. While the advocates of freedom, instead of resting content with uniformity, must continue to contend for a freedom which transcends the uniformity, we can yet see how the life of freedom may be realised in the midst of mechanical uniformity; how it may, so to speak, annex the latter, and use it in its own interests. In a narrower sense necessity, interpreted as uniformity, may be called "the co-element of freedom." As Lotze says, "freedom itself, in order that it may even be thought of as being what it aims at being, postulates a very widely extended, although not an exclusive, prevalence of the law of causation." But, if freedom is to be saved, the causal uniformity must not be all-inclusive; it must not include the moral self. Uniformity or mechanism may be instrumental, an organic element in the life of the self; but the supreme category of that life is freedom.

4. Definition of moral freedom : its limitations.—

The preceding considerations make necessary a revision of the conception of freedom itself, with a view to its more exact definition, and, it may be, limitation. Freedom means self-determination, rather than indetermination; it presupposes, rather than negates, uniformity. Certain lines are laid down for each man, in his inner nature and outward circumstances, along which to develop a character. A man has not the universal field of possibilities to himself; each has his own moral sphere. This is determined for him, it is the 'given' element in his life. Two factors, an internal and an external, contribute to such determination. The internal factor is the nature, disposition, or temperament, psycho-

logical and physiological, which constitutes his initial equipment for the moral life. The external factor consists in the force of circumstances, the places and opportunities of his life, what is often called his 'environment,' physical and social. So far there is determination; so far the field of his activity is defined for each man. But unless, out of these two factors, the external and the internal, you can construct the moral man, room is still left for freedom. Its sphere may be determined; the specific form and complexion of the moral task may be different for each, and determined for each. But the moral alternative lies within this sphere. All that is necessary to constitute it is the possibility for the man of good or evil, not of any and every particular form of good and evil. They may take any form, and what form they shall take is determined for the individual, not by him. But the choice between the alternatives is essentially the same in all cases; it is a choice between good and evil, and that choice must be shown to belong to the individual. Inner nature and outward circumstances are, as it were, a raw material out of which he has to create a character—a plastic material which, like the sculptor, he has to subdue to his own formative idea.

The chief moral limitation is individuality. It is just because we are individuals that the moral ideal takes a different complexion for each of us, and that no man's moral task is exactly like his brother's. Yet, amid all the variety of detail, the grand outlines of the task remain the same for all. In its very nature, the task is universal; and though it must be realised in a variety of concrete particulars, it may be realised in any particulars, without losing its universal significance. For each man there is an ideal, an 'ought-to-be'; for each man there is the same choice, with the same momentous meaning, between good and evil. To each there is set fundamentally the same task—out of nature and

circumstances, the equipment given and the occasion offered—to create a character. For character is, in its essence, a creation, as the statue is; though, like the statue, it implies certain given materials. What, in detail, character shall be, in what way good and in what way evil, depends upon the given elements of nature and circumstances; whether it shall be good or evil, depends upon the man himself. Out of the plastic material to create a character, formed after the pattern of the heavenly beauty, that is the peculiar human task. Is not the material of the moral life essentially plastic? Out of the most unpromising material have we not often seen surprising moral creations? Just when the task seemed hardest, and came nearest to being impossible, have we not sometimes seen the highest fulfilment of it? And, with the most promising material, do we not often see conspicuous moral failure? Must we not admit that success or failure here is determined ultimately not by the material, but by the free play of the energy of the self? Ethical, if not psychological, choice implies a real alternative.

5. The resulting metaphysical problem.—It is the task of metaphysics to resolve this antithesis, to heal the apparent breach between the scientific and the moral consciousness, to mediate between their seemingly rival claims and interests. Various metaphysical solutions are possible. It may be that the scientific (which is here the psychological) view is the only available explanation of human life. Should that be so, freedom would be lost so far as knowledge is concerned. We might still, of course, adopt the agnostic attitude, and say that the ultimate or noumenal reality is here, as elsewhere, unknowable. But to insist upon the finality and adequacy of the scientific or psychological view is to pass beyond science, and to take up a philosophical or metaphysical position. The metaphysical proof of freedom, therefore, must be the demonstration of the inadequacy of the

categories of science: its metaphysical disproof must be the demonstration of the adequacy of such scientific categories. In the words of Mr Shadworth Hodgson: "Either liberty is true, and then the categories are insufficient; or the categories are sufficient, and then liberty is a delusion." Such a determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of scientific categories is the business of philosophy, as universal critic. A negative, as well as a positive, vindication of freedom is therefore possible—the former by the condemnation of the categories of science as insufficient, the latter by the provision of higher and sufficient categories for its explanation. Even if such higher categories should not be forthcoming, and we should find ourselves unable to formulate a theory of freedom, or to categorise the moral life, we might still vindicate its possibility.

That the problem of freedom is ultimately a metaphysical one, is indicated by the fact that all deterministic theories base themselves, either explicitly or implicitly, upon a definite metaphysic. The denial of individual freedom is, for instance, the obvious corollary of such a pantheistic metaphysic as Spinoza's. Human personality being resolved into the all-comprehending divine Nature, from the necessity of which all things, without exception, follow, man's conception of his freedom, and of his resulting importance as an *imperium in imperio*, is explained away as an illusion of his ignorance, destined to disappear in an "adequate" knowledge of the universe. The consequence is strictly logical. If I am not a person, but merely an aspect or expression of the universe or God, I cannot be free. The life of the universe is mine also: freedom can be predicated, in such a system, of God alone, and even of him in no moral sense. Materialism, again, carries with it the same ethical consequence. If matter is everything, and spirit merely its last and most complex manifestation, once more freedom is an illusion. Freedom means spiritual independence; and if spirit is

the mere product of matter, its life cannot in the end escape the bondage of material law. The evolutionary metaphysic, whether of the biological or of the mechanical type, also obviously binds its adherents to the denial of freedom. Moral life is interpreted either as a series of adjustments of the individual to his environment, or as a series of balancings of equilibrium. In neither case is room left for freedom, or self-determination.

In such cases as those just indicated, the connection of the interpretation of human life with the general metaphysical theory is obvious enough. The connection, though not less obvious, has not been so generally remarked, in the case of the 'psychological' theory of determinism. This theory has been chiefly studied in the form given to it by Mill, and in that form the parallel between the metaphysical sensationalism and the ethical determinism is easily detected. The theory was originally stated, however, by Hume, and its logical dependence upon his metaphysical empiricism or sensationalism is no less evident. If I am resolvable into the series of my conscious states; if I am merely the bundle or mass of sensations and appetites, desires, affections, and passions which constitute my experience; if, in short, my existence is entirely phenomenal,—then the phenomena which *are* 'me' can be accounted for, or refunded into their antecedents, like any other phenomena which *are* animals or things.

Here, then, emerges the sole possibility of a metaphysical vindication of freedom—namely, in another than the Humian, empirical, or 'psychological' account of the moral person or self. The nature of the self is a metaphysical question, and must be investigated as such; it is not to be taken for granted on the empirical or sensationalistic side. There is another alternative account, the transcendental or idealistic—namely, that the self, so far from being equivalent to the sum of its particular experiences or feelings, is their permanent subject and presupposition.

Thus the central problem of morality is seen to be, like the central problem of knowledge, the nature and function of the self. We have to choose between an empirical and a transcendental solution of both problems. If, on the one hand, the self is resolvable into its phenomenal states, if these exhaust its nature, the case for freedom is lost: these states determine, and are determined by, one another in the unbroken nexus of antecedent and consequent. If, on the other hand, such a resolution of the self into its successive experiences is impossible, if moral experience presupposes at each stage the presence and operation of a permanent self, the case for freedom is made good.

6. The transcendental solution.—That the latter, and not the former, is the true statement of the case, has, I think, been finally proved by the transcendental analysis of experience. It is still possible, of course, to rest in the scientific or psychological view of moral activity; one may not be prepared to adopt the transcendental standpoint, and may fall back upon the psychological or empirical view, as more in accordance with common-sense. Moral, like intellectual scepticism, and even agnosticism, are still, even after Kant and Hegel, intelligible attitudes of thought. But, unless it is shown that the scientific or psychological is also the final and adequate, or metaphysical, view; unless, that is, the whole self is resolved into its several states or its experience,—freedom is not disproved. Now such an empirical resolution of the self is as impossible in the moral as in the intellectual sphere; the phenomenal or empirical view, *when offered as a metaphysic*, is at once seen to be abstract and inadequate. To understand or think out the moral, equally with the intellectual life, we must regard the former as, like the latter, the product of the activity of the self. That activity is the heart and centre of the process, from which alone its real nature is recognised. Neither the moral nor the intellectual man can be re-

solved into his experience. It implies him; for, as experience, it is not a mere series or sum of states, but the gathering up of these in the continuous and single life of an identical self. If determinism is to be established, all the elements of the action must be known and observed as its phenomenal factors; but *the* source of the action cannot be thus phenomenalised. Determinism gives a mere dissection or anatomy of the action. Under its analysis, the living whole of the action itself is dissolved into its dead elements; the constitutive synthetic principle of the ethical life is absent. That principle is the self, or moral personality, to which the action must be referred if we would see it as a whole and from within. Motive, circumstances, temperament, character—the several parts of the determinist whole—all imply such an activity of the self, if they are to enter as living factors into the moral situation. And the self which is shown to be the source of this original and formative activity is thereby proved to be free. The self cannot be snared, any more than the spider, in the web of its own weaving.

The transcendental proof is essentially the same in the case of the moral and the intellectual life. It is the necessary complement, in either case, of the empirical or psychological view. For the previous question of metaphysics or 'first philosophy' is: How is experience itself possible? Experience, not being self-explanatory, requires to be explained. The empirical or psychological self is not ultimate, but only phenomenal; we must therefore ask: What is the self which manifests itself in these phenomena or states, and what is the *rationale* of its self-manifestation? The transcendental answer is, that the entire process of experience is a process of self-activity. The psychologist is concerned only with the empirical process; his business is to establish the true causal connections between the antecedent and consequent phenomena. But if, in an intellectual reference, it can be shown that the presupposition of knowledge is a constant

activity on the part of the self in the synthesis of the presentational data; that, without a unifying self, the ordered unity of experience would be impossible, it is no less evident that, without a similar synthetic activity on the part of a single central rational self, the unity of moral experience would also be impossible.¹ The self weaves the web of its own experience, intellectual and moral. Out of wants, out of animal promptings, out of the provocations of sensibility, the self, by an activity of appropriation, constitutes motives or ends of its own activity. The entire process of motivation takes place within the circle of its being, and is conducted by itself. To press the psychological or empirical view, and to insist that the scientific interpretation of the moral life is the ultimate and sufficient interpretation of it, is to rest in a superficial view when a deeper view is possible and necessary. The empirical or phenomenal self may be regarded as the mere sum of motive-forces, of tendencies and counter-tendencies, whose resultant describes its life. But when we ask what a motive is, we find that it is nothing apart from the self; it is mine, I have made it. I am not merely the subject of tendencies, or the permanent deposit of tendency. I am the theatre of the entire process; it goes on within me.

Hence the well-marked limits of psychological explanation. The life of man, which is in its essence a personal life, is regarded by psychology as an impersonal stream of thought, a series of phenomenal states of consciousness. But metaphysics must correct the abstractness of psychology, as it corrects the abstractness of science generally, and must re-view the moral life from its personal centre—from the standpoint of that selfhood which, as unifying principle, is not to be phenomenalised, because, without its constant operation, there would be

¹ The parallel between the intellectual and the moral activity of the self is strikingly enforced by Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. ii., and by Professor Laurie, in his companion volumes, *Metaphysica* and *Ethica*.

no phenomenal process at all; which cannot itself be accounted for, or explained, by psychology, because it is presupposed in every psychological explanation.

In particular, we have found that the ethical view of life is the personal view of it. Personal behaviour has ethical significance: impersonal behaviour has none. The psychological or impersonal view, even of morality, is legitimate, and valuable so far as it goes. But the final explanation of morality demands that we view it from the ethical standpoint of personality, which we have just seen to be also the inevitable standpoint of metaphysical explanation in general. Here is the centre of the circle whose circumference psychology has so carefully and laboriously described.

7. Difficulties of the transcendental solution: (a) psychological difficulty offered by the presentational theory of will.—But our metaphysics of the self must be based upon our psychology of the self; and serious difficulty is offered to the transcendental theory by a leading tendency of current psychology—the tendency, namely, to adopt what Dr Ward has called a “presentational” view of the self. This is the view of those who hold that we can have a ‘psychology without a soul.’ It is insisted that we must not predicate the existence of a hyper-phenomenal reality, in the mental any more than in the physical world; that the *Ding-an-sich* is equally unreal in both cases. The real is the phenomenal or empirical, that which can be observed and classified; and what we do observe and classify is not ‘the soul’ or any ‘pure ego,’ but simply ‘mental phenomena’ or the ‘psychological me.’ There are mental events, as there are physical events; and we can trace, in either case, the relations of antecedents to consequents in the series, as well as the relation of the one series to the other. Psychology, as a ‘natural science,’ must limit itself to the phenomena; and its success in accounting

for all the phenomena without the hypothesis of a soul or self as their 'place' or cause, suggests very forcibly, if it does not prove, the superfluity, even for metaphysics, of such a hypothesis. *Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*, and it seems as if scientific psychology had taken away the occupation of the metaphysical 'self.'

In the first place, it is maintained that we cannot know the pure ego, the identical soul, or 'I,' because it is never presented, it never becomes part of the content of consciousness. All that is presented, and can be known, is consciousness itself—conscious states or phenomena, the empirical, changing, transient ego, or the 'me.' What cannot be phenomenised cannot be known; and, *ex vi termini*, the pure ego or transcendental self, as the condition of all phenomena, is itself the unphenomenal or non-presentable. This is, of course, no discovery of the 'new' psychology. It is the familiar doctrine of sensationalism and empiricism, and is as old as Protagoras. The sole ascertainable reality, the latter held, is the momentary sensation, the *percipere* and the *percipi*. Neither subject nor object has any identical or independent existence; the psychological moment is the only certain reality. The Lockian school also found in the 'idea' or sensation the only certain fact. Berkeley saw, hardly less clearly than Hume, that we can never know the self; our knowledge, he holds, is confined to our 'ideas' (sensations or presentations), and we can never have an idea or sensation of the self, the subject of all ideas. And Hume reported that he "never caught *himself* without a perception"; the only self he caught was a sensational self, the only psychological reality was the sensation of the moment. When, therefore, 'psychology as a natural science' insists upon objectifying or sensationalising the self, and refuses to acknowledge the psychological reality of a self which cannot be presented or phenomenised, it is only carrying out the tradition of the older empirical metaphysics.

But, further, it is maintained that we can account for the only self there is—for the empirical ego, or the psychological 'me,' without invoking the hypothesis of a transcendental and pure ego or 'I.' The 'me' is self-explanatory, and calls for no reference to an 'I' beyond itself. Here we cannot help remarking how much the theory has gained in plausibility through the advance of scientific psychology. This has revealed, first, that the presentational series is a *continuum*, a fluid 'stream' rather than a rigid 'chain' of sensations. The individual presentation is not an isolated point, self-contained and self-sufficient: it points beyond itself for the apprehension of its own reality; its character, both qualitative and quantitative, is determined by its place in the series of presentations or the 'fringe' of consciousness, by its context or setting. The mental life, as empirically manifested, is not discrete and atomic; it does not consist of isolated sensations or 'simple ideas,' but is in its very nature continuous. The problem of synthesis accordingly, it is claimed, is in large measure solved without any appeal to a transcendental self; with the surrender of the atomic theory of consciousness, and the acceptance of a 'stream of thought,' the problem of synthesis ceases to be a problem. Secondly, for the old meagre synthetic principle of simple association contemporary psychology substitutes the much more adequate and scientific principle of apperception (in the Herbartian sense) or 'systematic association.' This principle provides for a much more intimate connection between the parts of the mental life than that of mere simple association. For the mechanical unity of the latter it substitutes an organic unity, and, where association yielded mere aggregates, apperception yields wholes or systems. Apperception is "the process by which a mental system incorporates, or tends to incorporate, a new element;" it is the process of mental assimilation, emotional and volitional as well as intellectual, by which not merely is the new added to the

old, but each is so adjusted to the other that the new becomes old and the old becomes new. Thus, once more, the unity and continuity of the mental life seem to be explained, consistently with its never-ceasing change alike in form and content. The genesis of the only self we know seems to have been fully accounted for on purely empirical principles.

Yet I do not see that psychology has shown cause for discarding the transcendental or metaphysical self. On the contrary, such a hypothesis, truly understood, seems to me to be the necessary implication of psychological science, required to account for that empirical self which is its subject-matter. Without the 'I' we could not have the 'me.' For what is the basal fact, the psychological unit? What is any and every mental phenomenon, as such? It is certainly not a pure ego or a 'self without a sensation'; but no more is it a sensation, or a complex of sensations, without a self or mind. The one abstraction is no less unreal and impossible than the other; we can no more separate the sensations from the self, than the self from the sensations. Or, to use Professor James's terminology, we can no more have a "stream of thought" without a thinker than a thinker without thought. If, as Hume puts it, "they are the successive perceptions only that *constitute* the mind" which we can know, it is because in each of these perceptions "the mind" is already from the first contained. The fundamental and elementary psychological fact is not consciousness, but conscious mind, or mind in a particular state of consciousness. Consciousness refuses to be made objective; it ceases to be consciousness so soon as it is divorced from the conscious subject. The psychological unit is not *percipere* or *percipi*,—'it feels' or 'it is felt,' but *percipio*, 'I feel.' This subjective or personal reference constitutes the very form of consciousness. It is only by hypostatizing or substantiating 'experience' or 'consciousness,' by making the phenomenal unphenomenal, that the case

for a 'psychology without a soul' seems plausible at all.¹ Hamlet without the Prince is no less possible than the drama of the mental life without a mind. In this drama there is only one player, but he is a player equal to every part, and he is never off the stage.

We have only to consider the meaning of a psychological phenomenon, to see the necessity of this subjective reference. We speak of 'conscious states' or 'states of consciousness'; but the state is not conscious of itself, it is a state of *my* consciousness. Abolish *me*, and *it* ceases to exist; to separate it from the individual mind is to contradict its very nature, and to destroy it. We speak of 'mental phenomena,' and reduce them to their elements of presentation. But what is a phenomenon that appears to no mind; what is a presentation that is presented to no self? The metaphysical demand for a subject, as well as for an object, of consciousness becomes irresistible as soon as we realise the meaning of our terms. To phenomenalise the self, to objectify the subject, to reduce the I to a complex of presentations, is impossible, for the simple reason that an unphenomenal self is necessary to the existence of phenomena, a subject which cannot become its own object is necessary to the existence of objects, and an unrepresented I to the existence of presentations. "Since the psychical standpoint—the standpoint, that is to say, that the psychologist studies—is the real, if not the logical presupposition of the physical, to resolve it into the latter is tantamount to saying that there are phenomena that appear to no one, objects that are over against nothing, presentations that are never presented."² The impersonal or objective view of the mental life is thus seen to be self-contradictory and

¹ Of course, no criticism of the standpoint or method of scientific psychology is here intended. It is only when psychology is offered as metaphysics that the criticism indicated in the text becomes legitimate.

² J. Ward, "Modern Psychology: a Reflexion" (*Mind*, N.S., vol. ii. p. 54).

suicidal. The very elements to which it would reduce the self are seen to imply the self; the empirical or phenomenal reality stands or falls with the reality of the transcendental self. The psychologist's refusal to accept the reality of the self, like the phenomenalist's refusal to accept the reality of God, rests on the ground that the self, like God, 'does nothing.' The answer is the same in both cases. It is because the self in the subjective world, like God in the objective, in reality does everything that it seems here, as He seems there, to do nothing. If the self did not do everything, if it were not present in every presentation, it could never emerge as the product of their aggregation. To say that it could, is to adopt a theory as unthinkable as the theory of 'mind-stuff,' to beg the question as baldly as those do who account for the mind by endowing the elements out of which they profess to manufacture it with the properties of mind itself. No combination of zeros will produce a number.

When we pass from the individual presentation or state of consciousness to the unity and system which characterise the mental life, from the problem of the individual mental state to the problem of the organisation of the several states, we find a new function for the unitary self. It now becomes the principle of unity, and only a unitary principle can unify. The reason which explains alike the continuity of the states and their systematic association or apperceptive unity, is the same reason which explains their existence at all, namely, that they are the states of a single identical self. Only, the self which we have so far regarded as the passive spectator or mere subject of the presentational states, must now be regarded as the agent that attends to and selects from among the competing presentations, and thus organises them into their apperceptive wholes. Without this activity, we cannot explain the organisation of the mental life; and we cannot have

the activity without an agent. The states do not associate or organise themselves; without a permanent organic centre of unity, organisation is impossible. Apperception, like the old simple association, implies a mind or self to discharge such a function. Psychology may, of course, confine itself to a statement of the law, or *modus operandi*, of the mind; but an ultimate or metaphysical explanation must take account of the mind itself, as the source of that activity.

And behind apperception there is attention. Without the movement of attention, apperception would be a very inadequate principle of explanation. The systematic character of apperceptive association is ultimately due to attention, which is, therefore, the power behind the throne, the principle which explains the apperceptive system itself. For it is the movement of selective attention which alone explains the fact of the superior interest of certain points, as compared with other points in the stream of thought; without it, indifference would reign, and there would be no centres in the mental life. "We must assume that the unique salience and dominance of the presentations which successively occupy the focus of consciousness is due to a specific process. This process must be called attention."¹ The tendency towards 'mono-idealism' seems to reside in the ideas themselves only because the ideas are inseparable from the mind, and it is the very nature of mind to attend, and, by attending, to select. The relation of apperception to attention has been very clearly described by Mr Stout: "Every presentation which is attended to is also apperceived. . . . The effect of attention is to a great extent dependent on the apperception which accompanies it. Those aspects of the presentation attended to, which are congruent with the apperceptive system, acquire special distinctness. Others pass unnoticed. The physician will

¹ G. F. Stout, "Apperception and the Movement of Attention" (*Mind*, O.S., vol. xvi. p. 28).

at a glance detect in a patient symptoms which have escaped the anxious scrutiny of friends and relatives. The reason for this does not lie in his superior power of concentrating attention. He is able to note what they fail to note, because in his mind an apperceptive system has been organised, which they do not possess.”¹ Thus may the self delegate to the care of mechanism that which it has originally itself performed by an effort of attention. But the work must originally be done by the self, it continues to be superintended by the self, and at any moment the self may intervene and modify the apperceptive system.

But the self does more than watch and connect, it is more than the active subject of presentations. It compares and ‘comments’; the *νοῦς* is, as Plato said, the ‘critic’ of sensation. Can we conceive of the genesis of such a ‘commenting intelligence’ out of the presentations themselves? How, on the theory that “all is sensation, can there be an element not co-ordinate with sensation”? Can we explain how the “particular sensation can acquire a wholly new kind of independence, and come to measure the worth of other sensations, or constitute the attitude in which they are ‘apprehended’?”²

When we pass from the intellectual to the emotional and volitional life, the reality of the subject, and the impossibility of phenomenalisng it, or of reducing it to the object, become still more obvious. It is indeed to the limitation of attention to the cognitional or intellectual life that the metaphysical plausibility of a ‘psychology without a soul’ is largely due. Wundt has rightly charged contemporary psychology with a one-sided intellectualism. And Dr Ward has persuasively shown that while, in the intellectual life, the subject is content to spend its entire activity in equipping us for the mastery of the object, in such wise that its own existence is almost inevitably lost

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

² Ward, “‘Modern’ Psychology : a Reflexion” (*Mind*, N.S., vol. ii. p. 77).

in the vision of the world which, without it, had been impossible, yet, in the other two phases of its undivided life, a no less exclusive stress is laid by the subject upon itself. It is in the emotional and conative life that the ego may be said with unmistakeable emphasis, and in the only way possible, to 'posit itself.' It is chiefly because "feeling and activity" are "elements irreducible to cognition, and yet part of the facts," that we find "the antithesis of subject and object to be the very essence of the science" of psychology. Feeling and activity are "always subjective, and sensations always objective." Hence "the duality of consciousness, or the antithesis of subject and object, is fundamental." Only the extreme desire to make psychology a 'natural' or 'objective' science will account for the thoroughly unscientific simplification of the mental life which is accomplished by the reduction of feeling and volition to cognitional elements. Yet this is what the presentational theory attempts to do. The fundamental unity of the mental life is to be found not in the object, but in the subject—in the unitary self, the elements of whose common life are not to be reduced to one another and without *it* would have no organic unity. And if, in the cognitional life, the subject seems to be lost in the object, in feeling and in activity the subject becomes the prime reality.

The presentational theory of the self is followed out to its further consequences in the 'automaton' or 'parallelism' view of the mind and its relation to the body. If we give up presentationism and maintain the essential activity of the self, we must abandon, at the same time, the interpretation of the mind as the passive 'spectator' of 'concomitant' physical phenomena.

8. (b) *Metaphysical difficulty of Transcendentalism itself.*—We must now turn from the consideration of

the difficulties offered by psychology to the transcendental theory of freedom, to those offered by metaphysics, and inherent in the transcendental theory itself as that theory is generally stated. Transcendentalism, as well as empiricism, has its own peculiar snares. These are of two opposite kinds, illustrated by the Kantian and Hegelian forms of the theory respectively. Kant, by making absolute the distinction between the noumenal or rational and the empirical or sentient self, by insisting that the true self, of which alone freedom can be predicated, is a self that entirely transcends experience, gives us only an empty and unreal freedom. Hegelianism, on the other hand, by identifying the self with God, offers for our acceptance a new or transcendental version of Determinism. Let us examine in turn the Kantian and the Hegelian form of the transcendental theory.

(1) **In Kantianism, an empty and unreal freedom.**—Kant sees no escape from determinism except by removing the ethical self out of the empirical or psychological sphere. Within the latter sphere there is only necessity; and here, as everywhere, Kant tries to save ethical reality by disproving the real validity of human knowledge. Since knowledge is only of the phenomenal and not of the noumenal or essential, it can never solve such an ultimate problem as that of freedom. That, so far as we know it, our life is one of necessity, does not prove that, as it is in itself, it is not free. And the practical reason compels us to “think” or postulate that freedom which the speculative reason can never “know.” The “thou shalt” of the moral law which, no less truly than the law of causation itself, issues from the depths of reason, implies, in the subject of it, “thou canst.” It is necessary, therefore, without invalidating the scientific or empirical interpretation of our life, as

made from the phenomenal standpoint of science, to advance to this other and ethical interpretation of it—an interpretation no less valid from the noumenal standpoint of ethics. As a moral being, man escapes from the heteronomy of nature and sensibility; as a rational being, he comes under reason's autonomy, and is free. His peculiar ethical task is to emancipate himself from the necessity of the life of sensibility, and to appropriate that freedom which belongs to him of right as a member of the kingdom of pure reason. Thus that idea of freedom which speculatively is but "regulative" and ideal becomes practically "constitutive" and real.

Now it is obvious that this theory does not vindicate actual freedom. Here, as elsewhere, Kant so presses the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal as to make that distinction absolute. In my noumenal nature, or in myself, I am free; in my empirical or phenomenal states, I am not free, but under the necessity of nature. This is hardly better, as M. Fouillée has remarked,¹ than to tell a prisoner that outside his prison there is freedom, and that he has only to think himself outside, to realise that he is free. We are confined within the prison-house of desire and passion, of sensibility and motive-force, and the only life we know is that of prisoners. What matters it to us that there is freedom, if we cannot make it our own? But escape we cannot, without ceasing to be men; our very manhood is our prison-house.

But, it may be urged, the Kantian freedom is the true freedom after all, inasmuch as, though not actual, it is yet the ideal or goal towards which the moral man is always approximating. But even regarded as an ideal, it is but a one-sided freedom, as the life of duty which realises it is but a one-sided life. For, according to Kant's view, man is free only in so far as he acts

¹ *L'Évolutionnisme des Idées-Forces*, Introd., p. 76

rationally, or without impulse of sensibility; in so far as he acts from impulse or even with impulse, he acts irrationally, and is not free. Good alone is the product of freedom, evil is the product of necessity. But freedom, if it is to have any moral significance, must mean freedom in choosing the evil equally with the good; only such a double freedom can be regarded as the basis of responsibility or obligation. Freedom is that which makes evil evil, as it is that which makes good good.

If freedom is to be of real moral significance, it must be realised in the concrete life of motivated activity, in the apparent necessity of nature, which is thereby converted into the mechanism of freedom; not apart from this actual life of man, in a life of sheer passionless reason, which is not human life as we know it. By withdrawing it from the sphere of nature and mechanism, of feeling and impulse, and constituting for it a purely rational sphere of its own, Kant has reduced freedom to a mere abstraction. What is left is the mere form of the moral life without its content. The content of human freedom can only be that life of nature and mechanism, of feeling and impulse, which Kant excludes as irrational. The self in whose freedom we are interested, because it is our self, is the self that rejoices and suffers, that is tempted and falls, that agonises also and overcomes, this actual human self and not another—a self of pure reason, which, if indeed it is the ideal self, must remain for man, as we know him, a mere ideal.

9. (2) In Hegelianism, a new determinism.—In recoil from the absolute dualism of the Kantian theory, Hegelianism insists upon the immanence of the noumenal in the phenomenal, of the divine in the process of human experience. History, like the course of things, is a logical process, the process of the

universal Reason; in the one case as in the other, the real is the rational, and all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature. As to the self, it is accounted for by being referred to the absolute Reality of which it is the passing manifestation. If the biological and mechanical Evolutionists, refusing to regard the individual self as ultimate and self-explaining, trace it to a past beyond itself, and see in it the highly complex resultant of vast cosmic forces, the Absolute Idealist, seeing in the universe the evolution of divine Reason, finds in the life of the self the manifestation or reproduction in time of the eternal Self-consciousness of God. There is only one Self—the universal or divine; this all-embracing Subject manifests itself alike in the object and in the subject of human consciousness, in nature and in man. Both *are* God, though they *appear* to be somewhat on their own account. Obviously, if we are thus to interpret man as only, like nature, an aspect of God, we must de-personalise him; it is his personality that separates, like a 'middle wall of partition,' between man and God. Nor is this conclusion shunned. Personality is explained to be mere 'appearance'; the ultimate Reality is impersonal. This is Mr Bradley's view. "But then the soul, I must repeat, is itself not ultimate fact. It is appearance, and any description of it must contain inconsistency." The moral life is governed by two "incompatible ideals," that of self-assertion and that of self-sacrifice. "To reduce the raw material of one's nature to the highest degree of system, and to use every element from whatever source as a subordinate means to this object, is certainly one genuine view of goodness. On the other hand, to widen as far as possible the end to be pursued, and to realise this through the distraction or the dissipation of one's individuality, is certainly also good. An individual system, aimed at in one's self, and again the subordination of one's own development to a wide-embracing end, are each an aspect of the moral

principle. . . . And, however much these must diverge, each is morally good; and, taken in the abstract, you cannot say that one is better than the other.”¹ “Now that this divergence ceases, and is brought together in the end, is most certain. For nothing is outside the Absolute, and in the Absolute there is nothing imperfect. . . . In the Absolute everything finite attains the perfection which it seeks; but, upon the other hand, it cannot gain perfection precisely as it seeks it. For . . . the finite is more or less transmuted, and, as such, disappears in being accomplished. This common destiny is assuredly the end of the good. The ends sought by self-assertion and self-sacrifice are, each alike, unattainable. The individual never can in himself become an harmonious system. And in the wider ideal to which he devotes himself, no matter how thoroughly, he never can find complete self-realisation. . . . And, in the complete gift and dissipation of his personality *he*, as such, must vanish; and, with that, the good is, as such, transcended and submerged.”²

After such a frank statement of the full meaning of the Hegelian metaphysics of the self, it is hardly necessary to argue that it sacrifices, with the freedom of man, the reality of his moral life. If I am but the vehicle of the divine self-manifestation, if my personality is not real but only seeming—the mask that hides the sole activity of God—my freedom and my moral life dissolve together. It is true that God reveals himself in man in another way than He does in the world; but man’s life is, after all, only His in a fuller manifestation, a higher stage, really as necessary as any of the lower, in the realisation of the divine nature. Such a view may conserve the freedom of God; it inevitably invalidates that of man. If man can be said to be free at all, it is only in so far as he is identical with God. If it be contended that just here is found our true selfhood, and with it our real freedom, I

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 414, 415.

² *Ibid.*, p. 419.

submit that this view of the self means the loss of self-hood in any real sense of the term, since it means the resolution of man and his freedom as elements into the life of God, the single so-called Self. Thus freedom is ultimately resolved by the Transcendentalists into a higher necessity, as it is resolved by the Naturalists into a lower necessity : by the former it is resolved into the necessity of God, as by the latter it is resolved into the necessity of nature. Hegelianism, like Spinozism, has no place for the personality of man, and his proper life as man. Equally with Naturalism, such an Absolute Idealism makes of man a mere term in the necessary evolution of the universe, a term which, though higher, is no less necessary in its sequence than the lower terms of the evolution. It may be that the doctrine is true, and that "necessity is the true freedom." But let us understand that the freedom belongs to God, the necessity to man; the freedom to the whole, the necessity to the parts.

Such a Transcendentalism, equally with Naturalism, also and at the same time invalidates the distinction between good and evil, resolving apparent evil into real good, and seeing things as, in their ultimate reality, all very good. Or rather, both good and evil are resolved into a *tertium quid*. "Goodness [and, of course, badness too] is an appearance, it is phenomenal, and therefore self-contradictory."¹ "Goodness is a subordinate and, therefore, a self-contradictory aspect of the universe."² Such distinctions are fictions of our own abstraction, mere *entia imaginationis*, as Spinoza called them, the results of a partial knowledge, and therefore cease to exist from the standpoint of the whole.

But man, as an ethical being, is a part of the universe, and, as a part, he must be explained, not explained away. To interpret his moral life as mere 'appearance,' to depersonalise and thus to de-moralise him, is to explain

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 419.

² *Ibid.*, p. 420.

away his characteristic being. This pantheistic absorption of man in God is too rapid an explanation; the unity thus reached cannot be the true unity, since it negates, instead of explaining, the facts in question. Such an unethetical unification might conceivably be a sufficient interpretation of nature, and of man in so far as he is a natural being, and even in so far as he is an intellectual being; it is not a sufficient interpretation of man as man, or in his moral being. The reality of the moral life is bound up with the reality of human freedom, and the reality of freedom with the integrity of the moral personality. If I am a person, an 'ego on my own account,' I am free; if I am not such a person or ego, I am not free.

10. Resulting conception of freedom.—It would seem, then, that the only possible vindication of freedom is to take our stand on the moral self or personality, as itself the heart and centre of the ethical life, the key to the moral situation. The integrity of moral personality may be tampered with, as we have found, in two ways. Man may be de-personalised either into nature or into God. And although the naturalistic reduction may be the favourite course of contemporary determinism, the greater danger lies perhaps in the other direction; it was here that the older Determinists like Edwards waged the keenest warfare. The relation of man, as a free moral personality, to God is even more difficult to conceive than his relation to nature; theology has more perils for human freedom than cosmology. To think of God as all in all, and yet to retain our hold on human freedom or personality,—that is the real metaphysical difficulty. To see in our own personality a mere appearance behind which is God, is to destroy the reality of the moral life; yet when we try to think of that life from the divine standpoint, the difficulty is to understand its reality. But, even though the ultimate reconciliation of

divine and human personality may be still beyond us, I do not see how either conception can be given up, whether for a religious Mysticism or for an absolute metaphysical Idealism. The Mystic has always striven to reach the consciousness of God through the negation of self-consciousness; it must rather be reached through the deepening and enriching, the infinite expansion, of self-consciousness. Even for metaphysics personality, or self-consciousness, would seem to be the ultimate category. For, after all, the chief guarantee of a worthy view of God is a worthy view of man. The affirmation of the reality of the moral life must give us in the end a higher view of God, as well as enable us to conceive the possibility of a higher union with him—the union and communion not only of thought with Thought, but of will with Will. It is through the conviction of his own superiority to nature, of his own essential dignity and independence as a moral person, that man reaches the conception of One infinitely greater than himself. To resolve the integrity of his personality even into that of God, would be to negate the divine greatness itself, by invalidating the conception through which it was reached. We must, indeed, think of our life and destiny as, like the course and destiny of the worlds, ultimately in God's hands, and not in our own. If man is an *imperium*, he is only an *imperium in imperio*. If God has, in a sense, vacated the sphere of human activity, he still rules man's destiny, and can turn his evil into good. The classical conception of Fate and the Christian thought of a divine Providence have high metaphysical warrant. All human experience

"Should teach us
There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will."

Yet man cannot regard himself as a mere instrument in

the divine hands, a passive vehicle of the energy of God. Activity is the category of his life as man, and his highest conception of his relation to God is that of co-operation. He must regard himself as a fellow-worker, even with God. This is his high human birth-right, which he may not sell.

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CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF GOD.

1. The necessity of the theological question.—The demand that we shall be positive, scientific, or un-metaphysical in our thinking, reaches its climax when we approach the problem of the divine government of the world. If a scientific theory of morals is not based upon the doctrine of moral freedom, still less does it rest, we are told, upon a doctrine of God; if a rational psychology is illegitimate, still more obviously so is a rational theology; if metaphysics in general is ruled out as unscientific, then theology, which is metaphysics run wild, is *a fortiori* condemned. The maxim, "Be non-metaphysical," is, more closely interpreted, the maxim, "Be non-theological." The entire argument of contemporary Agnosticism and Positivism is to the effect that God is either the unknown and unknowable, or the most unreal of all abstractions, the merest fiction of the human imagination. The phenomenal alone is real and intelligible. The noumenal is either unreal, or, if real, unintelligible. Let us be content, then, with the relative and phenomenal, the positive reality of experience, whether that experience be intellectual or moral.

It is customary with scientific and Evolutionary moralists, even with those who, like Leslie Stephen, profess Agnosticism, to correlate man with nature, and to seek to demonstrate the unity and continuity of his life with

that of the physical universe. This is, of course, a metaphysical endeavour, and if its legitimacy is not open to question, I do not see why the effort to correlate the life of man with that of God should be pronounced illegitimate. If morality has natural sanctions, why should it not have divine sanctions? Metaphysics is essentially and inevitably theological; if we cannot exclude metaphysics, we cannot exclude theology. If we must ask, What is man's relation to nature? we must also ask, What is his relation to God? It is probably fear of theology, rather than fear of metaphysics, that inspires the Agnostic and Positivist ethics. Nor is the fear unreasonable, considering the views of morality which have been inculcated in the name of theology, the supernatural machinery that has been called into play to execute the sanctions in question, and the 'terms of hell' to which theologians have often striven to reduce the life of man. Such views are the expression of crude thought and blind dogmatism; they are not entitled to the proud name which Aristotle claimed for his 'first philosophy' or metaphysics, the name 'theology.' No less unworthy is it to employ the conception of God as a mere refuge of ignorance; the *deus ex machina* is as unwarrantable in ethical as in natural philosophy. The 'will of God' is not to be invoked as a mere external authority, to spare us the trouble of discovering the *rationale* either of nature or of morality. God must be rather the goal than the starting-point of our philosophy. To 'see all things in God' would be to understand all things perfectly; to see anything in that Light would be to see all things as they truly are. Yet we cannot rest content in any lower knowledge; the world and life remain dark to us until they receive that illumination.

The Agnostics invite us to follow with them the well trodden paths of moral and religious faith, of practical or ethical belief. Indeed the deepest motive of modern Agnosticism, as it originated in Kant, was the preservation

of such moral faith, the defence of ethical and religious reality, as unknowable, from rationalistic dissolution. The Agnostic is not generally content, with Spencer, to celebrate the Unknown and Unknowable, or, with Hamilton and Mansel, to proclaim the inspiration that comes of mystery, to glory in the imbecility of the human mind and the relativity of all its knowledge. He is apt, with Locke and Kant, nay, with Hamilton and Spencer themselves, to insist on the rights of the ethical and religious spirit, and its independence of the intellectual or scientific understanding. The interest of the former, he contends, is practical, not theoretical; its sphere is not thought, but life. Its instrument is the creative imagination; its atmosphere is not the dry light of the intellect, but the warmth and glow of the emotional nature, and the moving energy of the will. It is with the appreciation of true culture and of delicate moral and religious susceptibility, that this acknowledgment is made. It is made, in slightly different ways, by Lange and Tyndall, no less fully than by Huxley and Spencer. To speak of such writers as 'atheistic' or 'irreligious,' is most unfair and most misleading. It is not the heart, but the head, that is at fault. Their view of human nature is both broad and deep; what it wants is logical clearness and coherence.

That there is a moral, as well as an intellectual reality, and that the moral life, as such, is independent of any theoretical understanding of it, is surely true and important. But, that this independence is absolute and ultimate, we cannot believe. Unless we are sceptics, and have only Hume's blind belief of custom, we cannot say that. The Kantian Agnostic is right when he recognises a spiritual element in man, and concedes its claim to an appropriate life. Man is an ethical, as well as an intellectual being; the will and emotions demand a sphere of their own. But if the world of man's moral and religious life is the mere projection of the emotional

imagination, it is a world in which that life cannot continue to live. It has been said that if there is no God, we must make one; but a God of our own making is no God. If the moral and religious ideal is a mere ideal, the shadow cast by the actual in the sunshine of the human imagination; if the ideal is not also in very truth the real; if the Good is not also the True, the reality of man's spiritual life is destroyed, its foundations are undermined. Man cannot permanently live on fictions; the insight that his deepest life is but "the baseless fabric of a vision" must bring with it, sooner or later, the downfall of the life thus undermined. Agnosticism, if it is true, must carry with it the ultimate disappearance of religion, and, with religion, of all morality higher than utility. For we cannot permanently separate the ethical and intellectual man. His nature and life are one, single, indissolubly bound together; and ultimately he must demand an intellectual justification of his ethical and religious life, a theory of it as well as of the world of nature. The need of ethical harmony must make itself felt: a moral being demands a moral environment or sphere. The attempt to divorce emotion and activity from knowledge is a psychological error of a glaring kind. Our life is one, as our nature is one. We cannot live in sections, or in faculties. Temporarily and in the individual, an approximation to such a divorce may be possible, but not permanently or in the race. The practical life is connected, in a rational being, with the theoretical; we cannot be permanently illogical, either in morality or religion. The postulate of man's spiritual life is the harmony of nature and spirit, or the spiritual constitution of the universe.

2. *Agnosticism and Positivism.*—If we ask, then, Where is the source of ethical enthusiasm to be found? the answer of the scientific or un-metaphysical philosopher is: Either in the unknowable Absolute, or in that phenomenal

moral reality which we know, in the ethical life of humanity. The former is the answer of Agnosticism, the latter is that of Positivism. The first answer is purely negative, and does not carry us far. According to this view, morality is not, any more than any other phase of human experience, a true exponent or expression of ultimate Reality. If it has any positive meaning, it is simply that the real is not the phenomenal, that phenomena or facts are but the appearances of a more ultimate Reality. It is indeed a most important truth, that the universe is not a mere flux or process, a stream of tendency which tends no whither, but that it has an abiding meaning. But no more is the universe a sphinx, on whose dead expressionless face we must for ever gaze without a suggestion of a solution of the riddle of the earth. If the meaning of things is one which we can never hope in any measure to decipher, then for us there might as well be no meaning at all. And as for the needed moral inspiration, an unknown quantity can hardly be the source of inspiration. One can hardly wonder at Mr Harrison's travesty of the Agnostic's prayer to his unknown God: "O x^{nth} love us, help us, make us one with thee!"

If the Agnostic sends us to an unknown and unknowable Absolute for the inspiration of our moral life, the Positivist bids us see in that never-ceasing human procession, of which we ourselves form such a humble part, the object of reverent adoration, and draw from the sight the moral inspiration which we need. Comte and his followers would have us, in this day of the intellectual majority of the race, dethrone the usurper gods of its theological and metaphysical minority, and place on the throne the true and only rightful God—the *Grand Être* of Humanity itself. In our weakness, we may cast ourselves upon its greater strength; in our foolishness, upon its deeper wisdom; in our sin and error, upon its less erring righteousness. Nay, we can pray to this 'mighty mother' of our being; we are her children, and

she is able to sustain us. Nor need we stop short of worship, for the *Grand Être* is infinitely greater than we, and contains all our greatness in itself. And if we ask for a moral dynamic, for an energy of goodness which shall make the good life, otherwise so hard, if not impossible, a possibility and a joy to us, where shall we find such an abiding and abundant source of moral inspiration as in the 'enthusiasm of Humanity'? Here is a motive-force strong enough to carry us steadily forward in all good living, deep enough to touch the very springs of conduct, enduring enough to outlast all human strivings and activities.

It would be ungrateful to deny or to minimise the importance of this truth, to deny or to belittle the fact of the solidarity of the race, and the capital importance of that fact for human conduct. That we are not separate from our brethren, but members one of another, that in our deepest interests and best endeavours we are one with our fellows, and that in the realisation of that fellowship there is a deep moral inspiration,—all this is true and most important. But in order that we may find in Humanity all the inspiration that we need, in order that it may become to us a veritable *Grand Être*, which may claim our unwavering reverence and trust, we must abstract from the concrete and actual humanity of our experience, from the real men and women whom we know, and know to be imperfect, to have failings as well as virtues and excellences of character, whom we love even in their weakness, and perhaps even because of it, but whom we cannot worship, or regard as the complete embodiment of the moral ideal. Not men, but man, then, must be the object of our worship and the source of our ethical enthusiasm; not the members of the race, but the race itself, must be our *Grand Être*. What is this but to set up, on the throne vacated by the fictitious deity of metaphysical abstraction, a new fiction, the latest product of hypo-

statisation, the last relic of scholastic Realism, a 'great being' which derives its greatness and worshipfulness from the elimination of those characteristics which alone make it real and actual? The race consists of men and women, of moral individuals; and the moral individual is never worthy of our worship. 'Humanity' is only a collective or generic term: it describes the common nature of its individual members, it does not denote a separate being, or the existence of that common nature, apart from the individuals who share it. A touch of logic, or, at any rate, of that metaphysic which we are supposed to have outgrown, but which we cannot afford to outgrow, is enough to reveal the unreality and ghostliness of the Positivist's *Grand Être*.

The Religion of Humanity is, it seems to me, a misstatement of an all-important truth, namely, that God is to be found in man in a sense in which he is not to be found in nature, that he is to be found in man as man, as an ethical and non-natural being. But this very differentiation of man from nature, on which the Religion of Humanity rests, must be vindicated; and its vindication must be metaphysical. Such an interpretation of human life implies an idealisation of man, the discovery in his phenomenal life of an ideal meaning which gives it the unique value attributed to it. Man is divine, let us admit; but it is this divinity of man that has chiefly to be accounted for. What is the Fountain of these welling springs of divinity in man? Unless behind your fellow and yourself, and in both, you see God, you will not catch the 'enthusiasm of humanity.' The true enthusiasm for humanity is an enthusiasm for God, for God in man. When, in the good man, we see the image of God; when, behind all the shortcomings of actual goodness, we see the infinite divine potentiality of good, we can mingle reverence with our human love, and hope with our pity and regret. But the roots of our reverence and our hope are deep in the absolute

Goodness, which we see reflected in the human as in a mirror. If this human goodness is the original, and reflects not a higher and more perfect than itself, its power to stimulate the good life is incalculably diminished.

3. **Naturalism.**—I have devoted so much attention to Agnosticism and Positivism, because these are the contemporary equivalents of that anti-theological spirit which, till quite recently, called itself Materialism or Atheism. The general attitude of mind common to the earlier and the later form of thought might be described as Naturalism or Phenomenalism, as opposed to Supernaturalism or Noumenalism. It adopts a mechanical or materialistic explanation, rather than a teleological and idealistic. But the absolute or ontological Materialism of former times has been supplanted by the relative or 'scientific' Materialism of the Agnostics. The Agnostic denies the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in general, and of a metaphysic of ethics in particular. All knowledge being positive or scientific, and the ultimate positive reality being physical energy, it follows that all explanation, even of psychical and ethical phenomena, is in terms of this energy, in mechanical and material terms. In spite of his professed impartiality between matter and mind, Spencer does not hesitate to offer such a materialistic or naturalistic interpretation of the moral life. Even when the attempt is not made to explain the moral life in terms of mechanism, the possibility of any other explanation is denied, and we are asked to be simply agnostic or positive in our attitude to it. This is the position of the late Professor Huxley in his notable Romanes Lecture on *Evolution and Ethics*, a brilliant statement of the consistent and characteristic ethics of Agnosticism.

What, then, are we offered in the name of scientific explanation, and as a substitute for metaphysical speculation? A naturalistic scheme of morality, the correla-

tion of the ethical with the physical process, the incorporation of man—his virtue and his vice, his defects and his failures, his ideals and attainments—as a term in the process of cosmical evolution. We are offered, in short, a new version of the ‘ethics of Naturalism,’ far superior to the old utilitarian version, superior because so much more scientific. Man, like all other animals, like all other beings, is the creature of his conditions, and his life is progressively defined by adjustment to them; his goodness is simply that which has given or gives him the advantage in the universal struggle for existence, and has enabled him to survive. The ethical category is one with the physical; the ‘best’ is only the ‘fittest.’ The ideal is the shadow of the actual, and the distinction arises from the very nature of evolution as a process, as the becoming of that which is not yet but shall be. Thus would the Evolutionist in ethics naturalise the moral man, account for him, and even for his ideals, by reference to that nature of which he forms a part, and make the ethical process only a later stage of the cosmical process. Thus for God we are asked to substitute nature, and in “the ways of the [physical] cosmos to find a sufficient sanction for morality.” Where is the need of God, whether for moral authority or for moral government, when Nature is so profoundly ethical, so scrupulously discriminating in her consideration for the good and in her condemnation of the evil; when goodness itself is but the ripe fruit of Nature’s processes, and evil, truly interpreted, is only goodness misunderstood, or goodness in the making?

But, as we have learned to know Nature better, better to understand the ways of the physical cosmos, we have found that these ways are by no means ways of righteousness. The doctrine of Evolution has itself made it infinitely more difficult for us than it was for the Stoics to unify the ethical and the cosmic process. It is one of the closest students of nature, as well as one of the

clearest thinkers of our time, Professor Huxley, who has stated this difficulty in the most emphatic terms, who has confessed in the fullest way the failure of the scientific effort "to make existence intelligible and to bring the order of things into harmony with the moral sense of man,"¹ and who speaks of "the unfathomable injustice of the nature of things."² He has reminded us how ancient the problem is, and how ancient the confession of man's inability to solve it; how "by the Tiber, as by the Ganges, ethical man admits that the cosmos is too strong for him;" how the roots of pessimism are to be sought for in this contradiction; how "social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process, the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which exist, but of those who are ethically the best;"³ how "the practice of that which is ethically the best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence;" how the history of civilisation is the record of "the steps by which men have succeeded in building up an artificial world within the cosmos;" how Nature's "moral indifference" culminates in her undoing of that moral creation which had seemed her fairest work; how she, for whom there is no 'best' and 'worst,' and for whom the 'fittest' is only the 'ablest,' will yet undo her own work, and man's resistance to her mighty power will avail him nothing to "arrest the procession of the great year."

Professor Huxley doubtless goes too far when he says that "the cosmic process bears no sort of relation to the ethical," but he has at any rate stated clearly the issue at stake, namely, the question of the legitimacy of the identification of the ethical process with the process

¹ *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 8.² *Ibid.*, p. 12.³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

of the physical cosmos, the identification of 'the power that makes for righteousness' with the necessity of natural evolution. If, as I have contended, a naturalistic explanation of the moral ideal is impossible, if that ideal has another and a higher certificate of birth to show, then we need not wonder that nature should prove an insufficient sphere for the moral life, and that we should fail to harmonise the order of nature with the order of morality. If man is not part of nature, but disparate from nature, then his life and nature's may well conflict in the lines of their development. If we acknowledge such a conflict, we may either be candidly agnostic, and, regarding physical explanation as the only explanation, we may say that morality, just because it is undeniably different from nature, is inexplicable; or we may seek for another explanation of it, and try to answer Spencer's question: "If the ethical man is not a product of the cosmic process, what is he a product of?"¹ Does not the very insufficiency of Naturalism necessitate—unless we are to remain agnostic—a supernatural or transcendental view of morality? Does not the non-moral character of nature necessitate a moral government of man's life higher than the government of nature, a discipline, retribution, and reward that transcend those of nature in justice, insight, and discrimination? Professor Huxley's lecture, with its emphatic, almost passionate, assertion of the dualism of nature and morality, with its absolute refusal to merge the latter in the former, is itself a fine demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysical indifference. The profound ethical faith which it expresses is the best evidence of the author's superiority to his creed, the best proof that Agnosticism cannot be, for such a mind, a final resting-place. For the mere assertion of the dualism and opposition of the ethical and the cosmical process is not the whole case. That dualism and opposition raise the further question of the possibility of

¹ *Athenæum*, August 5, 1893.

their reconciliation. As one of Professor Huxley's reviewers said: "The crux of the theory lies in the answer to the question whether the ethical process, if in reality opposed altogether to the cosmical process, is or is not a part of the cosmical process; and if not, what account can be given of its origin. In what way is it possible, in what way is it conceivable, that that should arise within the cosmical process which, in Mr Huxley's comprehensive phrase, 'is in all respects opposed' to its working?"¹

4. **Man and nature.**—The dualism of nature and morality raises for us the question whether we must not postulate for man as a moral being another and a higher environment or sphere than nature, whether the ethical process is not a part of the process of a larger cosmos which transcends and includes the physical? The fact that the physical scheme is not the ethical scheme, renders necessary, for the justification and fulfilment of morality, a moral theology, a scheme of moral government which will right the wrongs of the physical government of the universe. The fact of opposition between nature and spirit, the fact that man's true life as man has to be lived in a foreign element, that the power which works in the physical cosmos is not a power which makes for righteousness or a power which cares for righteousness, the fact of 'these hindrances and antipathies of the actual,'—the indubitable and baffling fact of this grand antinomy forces us beyond the actual physical universe and its order, to seek in a higher world and a different order the explanation and fulfilment of our moral life. Intellectually, we might find ourselves at home with Nature, for her order seems the reflection of our own intelligence. But morally, she answers not to the human spirit's questionings and cravings; rather, she seems to contradict and to despise them. She knows her own children, and answers their cry. But man she knows

¹ *Athenæum*, July 22, 1893.

not, and disclaims; for, in his deepest being, he is no child of hers. As his certificate of birth is higher, so is his true life and citizenship found in a higher world. Thus there comes inevitably to the human spirit the demand for God, to untie the knot of human fate, to superintend the issues of the moral life, to right the wrongs of the natural order, to watch the spiritual fortunes of his children, to be himself the Home of their spirits. Nature is morally blind, indifferent, capricious; force is unethical. Hence the call for a supreme Power akin to the spirit of man, conscious of his struggle, sympathetic with his life, guiding it to a perfect issue—the call for a supremely righteous Will. This belief in a moral order is necessary if we are to be delivered from pessimism. Mere agnosticism means ethical pessimism; the only escape is to ‘see God.’ Without such a vision the mystery of our human life and destiny is entirely dark, the ‘riddle of the painful earth’ is absolutely inexplicable. Unless our human nature and life are, in Professor Huxley’s phrase, “akin to that which pervades the universe,” unless God is on our side, and we are in a real sense not alone but co-workers with him, our life is, as Hume described it, “a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery.”

The problem raised for human thought by this dualism of nature and morality is as old as human thought itself. It is the problem of Fate or Fortune—a Power blind but omnipotent, that sets its inexorable limit to the life of man, that closes at its own set time and in its own appointed way all his strivings, and blots out alike his goodness and his sin; a Power which the Greeks quaintly thought of as superior even to the gods themselves, and which to the modern mind seems to mean that there is no divinity in the world, that the nature of things is non-moral. That which so baffles our thought is “the recognition that the cosmos has no place for man”; that he feels himself, when confronted with nature’s might and

apparent indifference, an anomaly, an accident, a foreigner in the world, a "stranger from afar." The stream of good and evil seems to lose itself in the mazes of the course of things; the threads of moral distinctions seem to get hopelessly intertwined in the tangled skein of nature's processes.

"Streams will not curb their pride
The just man not to entomb,
Nor lightnings go aside
To give his virtues room :

Nor is that wind less rough which blows a good man's barge.

Nature, with equal mind,
Sees all her sons at play :
Sees man control the wind,
The wind sweep man away ;

Allows the proudly riding and the foundering bark."¹

I have said that it is a world-old problem, this of the ultimate issues of the moral life. And it has often seemed as if the only escape from total pessimism lay in a calm and uncomplaining surrender of that which most of all in life we prize. Let us cease to make our futile demand of the nature of things; ceasing to expect, we shall also cease from disappointment and vexation of spirit. Be it ours to conform with the best grace we can to Nature's ways, since she will not conform to ours. Let us meet Nature's "moral indifference" with the proud indifference to Nature of the moral man. A stranger in the world, with his true citizenship in the ethical and ideal sphere, let man withdraw within himself, and escape the shock of outward circumstance, by cutting off the tendrils of sensibility which would take hold on the course of the world and make him its slave. "Because thou must not dream, thou needst not then despair!" But neither the philosopher nor the poet, no, nor even the ordinary man, will consent to forego his dreams and hopes, nor will humanity pass from its bitter plaint

¹ Matthew Arnold, *Poems* : "Empedocles on Etna."

against the evil course of things and the tragic wreck of human lives. Such a dualism and contradiction between man and his world presses for its solution in some deeper unity which shall embrace and explain them both. The Stoics, themselves the great preachers of resignation, had their own solution of the problem. The ways of the cosmos were not for them dark or unintelligible; the nature of things was, like human nature, in its essence altogether reasonable. The question raised by the impossibility of correlating man and nature by naturalising the moral man is, whether we cannot reduce both man and nature to a deeper unity; whether, though human nature is for ever distinct from physical nature, and the world of morality an artificial world within the cosmos, both are not expressions or exponents of a deeper nature of things. Such a question the unifying instinct of man cannot help raising. Even Professor Huxley admits that "the ethical process must bear some sort of relation to the cosmic." Nor need this relation be that of levelling down, of reducing man to nature. Why should we not level up? Why should not nature, if in one sense the eternal enemy of man, to be subdued under his feet if he is to be man, yet also be the minister and instrument of man's moral life, charged with a moral mission even in its moral enmity and indifference? If the ethical process is not part of the cosmic process, may not the cosmic be part of the ethical? Or, better, may not both be parts of the divine process of the universe? Since man has to live the ethical life in a natural world, in a world which is in a sense the enemy of that life, and in a sense indifferent to it, may not the ethical process be "more reasonably described as an agency which directs and controls, rather than entirely opposes, the cosmical process"?¹

To the question whether we can thus correlate the ethical with the cosmical process, man with nature, by

¹ *Athenæum*, July 22, 1893.

seeing God in both, in such wise that nature shall become the instrument and servant of the ethical spirit ; or whether nature must remain for man an alien and opposing force which, by its moral indifference, is always liable, if not to defeat, to embarrass and endanger moral ends, —to this question I do not see that we can give more than a tentative answer. Our answer must be rather a speculative guess, a philosophic faith, than a reasoned certainty. Nature in ourselves we may annex, our natural dispositions, instincts, impulses, we may subdue to moral ends ; this 'raw material' we may work entirely into the texture of the ethical life. But what of the nature which is without ourselves ? What of that 'furniture of Fortune' of which Aristotle speaks, which seems to come to us and to be taken away from us without any reference, oftentimes, to our ethical deservings ? What of that Fate in which our life is involved, whose issues are unto life and unto death, which disappoints and blights our spiritual hopes, whose capricious favours no merit can secure, whose gifts and calamities descend without discrimination upon the evil and the good ? Call it what we will—fortune, circumstance, fate—does there not remain an insoluble and baffling quantity, an x which we can never eliminate, and whose presence destroys all our calculations ? Yet the ground of moral confidence is the conviction, inseparable from the moral life, of the supremacy and ultimate masterfulness of the moral order. Professor Huxley himself expresses a sober and measured confidence of this kind : "It may seem an audacious proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm, and to set man to subdue nature to his higher ends ; but I venture to think that the great intellectual difference between the ancient times . . . and our day lies in the solid foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise may meet with a certain measure of success." With the advance of science, man has learned his own power over nature, the power, which increasing knowledge

brings, to subdue Nature to his own ends ; and his confidence inevitably grows that he is Nature's master, not her slave. But whether he can ever entirely subdue her, whether the natural order will ever be so filled with the moral order as to be the perfect expression and vehicle of the latter ; or whether the natural order must always remain the imperfect expression of the moral, and some new and perfect expression be framed for it, we cannot tell. Only this we can say, that since each is an order, since nature itself is a cosmos, not a chaos, and since they issue from a common source, nature and morality must ultimately be harmonised.

5. The modern statement of the problem.—This, in itself unchanging, problem assumes two different aspects, as it appears in ancient and in modern speculation. It is in the latter of these aspects that we are naturally most familiar with it, and in this form perhaps its most characteristic statement is that of Kant. The ultimate issue of goodness, he contends, must be happiness ; the external and the internal fortunes of the soul must in the end coincide. This is the Kantian argument for the existence of God, as moral governor of the universe, distributor of rewards and punishments in accordance with individual desert. For though the very essence of virtue is its disinterestedness, yet the final equation of virtue and happiness is for Kant the postulate of morality. We have seen that the Hedonists, who reduce virtue to prudence and the right to the expedient, find themselves forced, for the sake of the vindication of altruistic conduct, or of that part of virtue which refuses to be resolved into prudence, to make the same postulate in another form. Either the appeal is made to the future course of the evolutionary process, which, it is argued, cannot stop short of the identification of virtue and prudence, individual goodness and individual happiness ; or it is maintained, as by Professor Sidgwick, that the gap in ethical

theory must be filled in by a theological hypothesis of the Kantian sort. The Socratic conviction is reasserted, that "if the Rulers of the universe do not prefer the just man to the unjust, it is better to die than to live." Nor is such a demand the expression of mere self-interest. "When a man passionately refuses to believe that the 'wages of virtue' can 'be dust,' it is often less from any private reckoning about his own wages than from a disinterested aversion to a universe so fundamentally irrational that 'Good for the individual' is *not* ultimately identified with 'Universal Good.'"¹ The assumption of such a moral order, maintained by a moral Governor, is accordingly accepted as "a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradiction in one chief department of our thought."² Even in this aspect, the problem is not exclusively modern. The coincidence of outward prosperity with righteousness, individual and national, was the axiom of the Hebrew consciousness—an axiom whose verification in national and individual experience cost the Hebrews much painful thought, and often seemed to be threatened with final disappointment. Even the lesson, learned by bitter experience, that man must be content to 'serve God for nought,' never carried with it for them the definitive divorce of righteousness and prosperity. Their intense moral earnestness persisted in its demand for an ultimate harmony of external fortune with inward merit; sin and suffering, goodness and happiness, must, they felt, ultimately coincide. And, like our modern Kantians and Evolutionists, they were compelled to adjourn to the future, now of the community, now of the individual, the solution of a problem which their present experience always left unsolved.

Yet we cannot help feeling that this is not the most adequate, or the worthiest, statement of the problem. There is a feeling of externality about such a moral universe as that of the Hebrews, of Kant, or of Pro-

¹ Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 504 (3rd ed.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 506 (6th ed.)

fessor Sidgwick; such a God is a kind of *deus ex machina*, after all—an agent introduced from outside into a scheme of things which had seemed already complete, to re-adjust an order already adjusted. Especially in Kant we feel that, in spite of all his skilful pleading, there is a fall from the elevated and consistent Stoicism of his ethics to the quasi-Hedonism of his moral theology; the old keynote sounds no longer. Nor is his God much better than ‘a chief-of-police of the moral universe.’ It seems to me that the ancient Greek statement of the problem was much more adequate than the characteristic modern version of it, and that the Greek solution is also more suggestive of the true direction in which the solution must be sought.

6. *Its ancient statement.*—The Greek problem was that of an adequate sphere for the exercise of virtue. In general this sphere was found in the State, and Plato held that there was no contradiction more tragic than that of a great nature condemned to live in a mean State; great virtue needs a great sphere for its due exercise. And the Greek State, at its best, did provide for the few a splendid, and to the Greeks a satisfying, sphere for the exercise of human virtue. It enlarged and ennobled, without annulling, the life of the individual citizen. For Aristotle, though the State is still the ideal sphere of virtuous activity, and ethics itself “a sort of political inquiry,” the problem has already changed its aspect, and become more directly a problem of the individual life. For him the question is that of the opportunity for the actualisation of the virtue or excellence which exists potentially in every man. The actualisation (*ἐνέργεια*) of virtue is for him of supreme importance; and whether any man’s potential virtue shall be actualised or not, is determined not by the man himself but by his circumstances—his initial and acquired equipment, his furniture of fortune,—wealth,

friends, honour, personal advantage, and the like. These things constitute the man's ethical opportunity, and determine the scale of his ethical achievement. A good, or passively virtuous, man might "sleep all his life," might never have a fit opportunity of realising his goodness, never find a sufficient stage for the demonstration of his powers in act, or never find his part in the drama of human history. The tide of fortune might never for him come to the flood, and, as it ebbed away from him, he might well feel that it carried with it all his hopes of high enterprise and achievement. Here Aristotle seems to find a baffling and inexplicable surd in human life—a 'given' element which, in a moment, may wreck men's lives, and which must fill some men from the first with despair, or at best must confine their lives within the narrowest horizon. In view of this, we are not masters even of our own characters. Character is the result of exercise; it is not the swift, but they who run, that receive the crown of virtue. But we may never be allowed on the course, or we may not have the strength that is needed for the race. The ethical end cannot be compassed, at least it cannot be fully compassed, without the external aid of Fortune; and Fortune, Aristotle seems to feel almost as irresistibly as Professor Huxley feels about Nature, is ethically indifferent. The most a man can do is, he says, to make the best use of the gifts of fortune, such as they are, "just as a good general uses the forces at his command to the best advantage in war, and a good cobbler makes the best shoe with the leather that is given him."¹ But oftentimes the forces available are all too scant for any deed of greatness, and the leather is such that only a very indifferent shoe can be made out of it. So that, after all, it is rather in the noble bearing of the chances of life than in any certainty of actual achievement that we ought to place our

¹ *Nic. Eth.*, i. 10 (13).

estimate of true nobility of soul. Even in the most untoward circumstances—in those calamities which mar and mutilate the felicity of life by causing pains and hindrances to its various activities—nobility may shine out, when a person bears the weight of accumulated misfortunes with calmness, not from insensibility but from innate dignity and greatness of soul.

In this attitude of Aristotle we are already very near the position of the Stoics. The problem of Fortune, which Aristotle never completely solved, became the chief problem of his successors; and the Stoics and Epicureans found in part the same solution of it. The only salvation from the evil chances of life is to be found, they agree, in a self-contained life, which is independent of outward change and circumstance. The life of the wise man is a closed sphere, with its centre within the man himself; 'his mind to him a kingdom is,' he is his own sufficient sphere. For the outward sphere has become manifestly inadequate; the splendid life of the Greek States has disappeared in a narrow provincialism. Fortune has played havoc with man's life, and shattered the fabric of his brave endeavours. The lesson is that man must find his good, if he is to find it at all, entirely within himself, and must place no confidence in the course of outward things. And has he not the secret of happiness in his own bosom? Is it not for him to dictate the terms of his own true welfare? Can he not shield himself from Fortune's darts in a complete armour of indifference and impassibility?

Yet this is not the final resting-place, either for Aristotle or for the Stoics. The problem of Fortune, it is quite manifest, is not yet solved, nor can the attempt to solve it be abandoned. There is a very real kinship and community, it is felt, between man's nature and the nature of things. The latter is not the sphere of blind chance, after all; its essence is, like man's, rational. "Live according to nature" means, for the Stoic, "Live

according to the common Reason, obey that rational order which embraces thy life and nature's too." Nothing happens by chance, everything befalls as is most fit; and man's true salvation is to discover the fitness of each thing that befalls him, and, in all things, to order his behaviour in accordance with the eternal fitness of the divine order. Fortune is, in reality, the Providence of God; no evil can happen to a good man, his affairs are not indifferent to God. The universe is itself divine; it is the perfect expression of the divine Reason, and therefore the home of the rational spirit of man. Man is not, after all, alone, or his life a solitary and exclusive one, contained within the narrow bounds of his individual selfhood. Without ever straying beyond himself, he can become a citizen of a fairer and greater City than any Greek or earthly State — a *civitas Dei*, the goodly fellowship of humanity, yea, of the universe itself; for his life and the life of the universe are in their essence one. This splendid and spacious home it was that the Stoics built for themselves out of the wreck of worldly empire and the shattering of their earlier hopes; such sweet uses hath adversity for the human spirit. Aristotle's problem seems very near its solution.

Aristotle had himself suggested this Stoic solution, and had even, in his own bold metaphysic, transcended it. He could not stop short of a perfect unification of man's life with the life of nature, and of both with the divine universal Life. The universe has, for him, one end and one perfect fulfilment. The form of all things, and the form, if we may say so, of human life, are the same; the form of the universe is reason. And the apparent unreason, the 'matter' of the world and of morality, is only reason in the making or becoming. It is the promise and the potency of reason, and will in due time demonstrate its rationality by a perfect fulfilment and actualisation. The process of nature and the process of human life are really only stages in the one entirely rational

process of the divine life. To God all things turn, after his perfection they all aspire, in him they live and move and have their being.

And if we ask, What, then, of man's place in nature? we have Aristotle's answer in his doctrine of the human *ψυχή*. It is the 'form' of the body, its perfect actualisation or *ἐντελέχεια*. Nay, the true soul of man, the soul of his soul, is that same active and creative reason, that pure activity of thought, which is the alpha and the omega of being. In fulfilling the end of his own nature, therefore, man is a co-worker with God in the fulfilment of the universal end. For the end of the universe is the same as the end of human life. Man, in virtue of his higher endowment of reason, can accomplish with intelligence and insight that which the lower creation accomplishes in its own blind but unerring way. So that ultimately man cannot fail of his end, any more than Nature can fail of hers; let him link his fortunes with those of the universe itself, and he cannot fail. The cosmic process is not indifferent to man, who is its product and fulfilment, and also, in a sense, its master and its end. Aristotle, it is true, never brings together his ethical doctrine of Fortune as an external and indifferent power which may as readily check as forward the fulfilment of man's moral nature and the accomplishment of his true end, and his metaphysical doctrine of the unity of the divine or universal end with the end of human life — a unity which would imply that there cannot be, in man any more than in nature, such a thing as permanently unfulfilled capacity, or potentiality that is not perfectly actualised. But the profound meaning of his total thought about the universe would seem to be that man must share in the fruition of the great consummation, that without his participation it would be no consummation at all, and that into that diviner order the lower order (or disorder) of outward accident, in which his life had seemed to be confined and thwarted

of its fulfilment, must ultimately disappear. Thus interpreted, the thought of Aristotle would at once anticipate and transcend the Stoic philosophy of man and nature, in the measure that the Aristotelian theology anticipates and transcends the theology of the Porch.

7. *The Christian solution.*—Christianity offers its own bold solution of the problem we are considering. It knows no ultimate distinction between the course of the world and the course of the moral life, but sees all things working together for good, and discerns in each event of human history a manifestation of the divine Providence. The natural order is incorporated in the moral; and even where, to the Greek mind, and to the pagan mind in general, nature seemed to thwart and retard morality, it is felt most surely to advance moral interests. Misfortune and calamity, instead of being obstacles to the development of goodness, are the very soil of its best life—the atmosphere it needs to bring it to perfection. Not the wealthy, but the poor; not the prosperous, but the persecuted; not the high-minded, but the lowly, the weary, and the heavy-laden, are called blessed. A new office is found for suffering and calamity in the life of goodness; man is made perfect through suffering. While Aristotle thought that length of days was needed for a complete life, Christianity has taught us that—

“In short measures life may perfect be.”

Nor is salvation found any longer in a mere Stoical indifference or apathy to misfortune; such a bearing is no real bearing of calamity, but rather a cowardly retreat from it. It is in the actual suffering of evil that Christianity finds the ‘soul of good’ in it. Its office is disciplinary and purifying; and though “no chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous but grievous, nevertheless afterward it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteous-

ness unto them which are exercised thereby." Instead of negating, or at best limiting, the exercise of virtue (as Aristotle thought), calamity provides the very opportunity of its best and highest exercise, and therefore must be regarded as the most perfect instrument in the development of goodness.¹

8. *The ideal and the real.*—If philosophy finds itself precluded from going the whole length of the Christian doctrine of divine Providence, yet it seems to me that Christianity puts into the hands of philosophy a clue which it would do well to follow up, especially since the conception is not altogether strange, but is the complement and development of the Aristotelian and Stoic theology which has just been sketched. All that we are concerned at this point to maintain is the speculative legitimacy and necessity of the demand for a moral order, somehow pervading and using (in however strange and unexpected wise) the order of nature, and thus making possible for the moral being the fulfilment of his moral task, the perfect realisation of all his moral capacities. That the universe is not foreign to the ethical spirit of man, or indifferent to it, but its sphere and atmosphere, the soil of its life, the breath of its being; that "the soul of the world is just," that might is ultimately right, and the divine and universal Power a Power that makes for righteousness; that so far from the nature of things being antagonistic to morality, "morality is the nature of things,"—this at least, it seems to me, is the metaphysical implication of morality

¹ Addison has given quaint expression to this Christian estimate of so-called 'misfortune' in his fine allegory of *The Golden Scales*: "I observed one particular weight lettered on both sides, and upon applying myself to the reading of it, I found on one side written, 'In the dialect of men,' and underneath it, 'CALAMITIES': on the other side was written, 'In the language of the gods,' and underneath, 'BLESSINGS.' I found the intrinsic value of this weight to be much greater than I imagined, for it overpowered health, wealth, good fortune, and many other weights, which were much more ponderous in my hand than the other."

as we know it. A moral universe, an absolute moral Being, is the indispensable environment of the ethical life, without which it cannot attain its perfect growth. A 'first actuality' of goodness, as of intelligence, is the presupposition of, and the only sufficient security for, the perfect actualisation of moral as of intellectual capacity. Philosophy must acknowledge the right of a moral being to self-realisation and completeness of ethical life, and must substantiate his claim upon the universe, whose child he is, that it shall be the medium and not the obstacle and negation of his proper life. This ultimate and inalienable human right is not a 'right to bliss,' 'to welfare and repose,' but a right to self-fulfilment and self-realisation. To deny this right, to invalidate this claim, is either to naturalise, that is, to de-moralise man, or to convict the universe of failure to perfect its own work, to say that, in the end, the part contradicts the whole. Our reasons for dissenting from the former alternative have already been given, and belong to our entire ethical theory; to assent to the latter would be to deny the reality of the *universe*, and to surrender the possibility of philosophy itself. Accordingly, we seem not only warranted, but compelled, to maintain the moral constitution of the universe. This is, in the words of a recent French writer, "the only hypothesis which explains the totality of phenomena, moral phenomena included, which grasps the harmony between them and us, which gives, with this unity and harmony, clearness to the mind, strength to the will, sweetness to the soul."¹ Fichte's question is most pertinent: "While nothing in nature contradicts itself, is man alone a contradiction?"² A moral universe is the ultimate basis of our judgments of moral value, without which the objective validity of these judgments cannot be established.

¹ Ricardou, *De l'Idéal*, p. 325.

² *Popular Works*, vol. i. p. 346 (Eng. trans.)

The same conclusion is reached by pressing the investigation of the ultimate significance of morality itself. We have seen that the moral life is in its essence an ideal life—a life of aspiration after the realisation of that which is not yet attained, determined by the unceasing antithesis of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be.’ What, then, we are forced at last to ask, is the source and warrant of this moral ideal, of this imperious ‘ought-to-be’? To answer that it is entirely subjective, the moving shadow of our actual attainment, would be irrevocably to break the spell of the ideal, and to make it a mere foolish will-o’-the-wisp which, once discovered, could cheat us no longer out of our sensible satisfaction with the actual. An ideal, with no foothold in the real, would be the most unsubstantial of all illusions. As Dr Martineau has strikingly said: “Amid all the sickly talk about ‘ideals’ which has become the commonplace of our age, it is well to remember that, so long as they are dreams of future possibility, and not faiths in present realities, so long as they are a mere self-painting of the yearning spirit, . . . they have no more solidity or steadiness than floating air-bubbles, gay in the sunshine, and broken by the passing wind.” What is needed to give the ideal its proper dignity and power is “the discovery that your gleaming ideal is the everlasting real, no transient brush of a fancied angel wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls.”¹ The secret of the power of the moral ideal is the conviction which it carries with it that it is no mere ideal, but the expression, more or less perfect, and always becoming more perfect, of the supreme Reality; that “the rule of right, the symmetries of character, the requirements of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet; they are known among the stars; they reign beyond Orion and

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 12. Cf. Ricardou, *De l’Idéal*, p. 262: “It is not enough that the ideal charm the imagination by its poetry; it is necessary that it satisfy the reason by its truth, its objective and absolute truth.”

the Southern Cross; they are wherever the universal Spirit is."¹ The entire preceding discussion serves to show that to make morality entirely relative and subjective, to give a merely empirical evolution of it, is to destroy its inner essence, and to miss its characteristic note. That note is the ideal, without whose constant presence and operation moral development would be impossible. But we have reserved the question of the origin and warrant of the ideal itself; and when we ask it to produce its certificate of birth, it is compelled to refer us to the nature of things, and to proclaim that the way in which it has commanded us to walk is the way of the cosmos itself, the way of the divine order.

Thus an adequate interpretation of morality compels us to predicate an ultimate and absolute moral Reality, a supreme Ground of goodness as well as of truth; and the moral idealism which we have maintained against empirical realism in ethics brings us in the end to a moral realism, to a conviction of the reality of the moral ideal. We are driven to the conclusion that the ideal is not simply the unreal, but the expression and exponent of the real; that what on our side of it is the ideal is, on its further side, the real; that behind the 'ought' lies the 'is,' behind our insistent 'ought-to-be' the eternal 'I am' of the divine Righteousness. But that supreme moral Reality we can apprehend only on this, its human side; its further side we may not see. "No man shall see God's face and live"; the full vision would scorch man's little life in the consuming fire of the divine perfection. To see God, we must be like him; it is a moral, rather than an intellectual apprehension. Yet, as we obey the 'ought-to-be,' and realise in ourselves the ideal good, we do in our human measure and in our appropriate human way come to the fuller knowledge of the divine goodness. The veil that hides it from us, the veil of our own failure and imperfec-

¹ Martineau, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 26.

tion, is gradually taken away, and "the pure in heart see God."

To make the antithesis between the ideal and the real final, and to refuse to recognise the reality of the ideal, is to betray a radical misunderstanding of the ideal and of its relation to the real. We must distinguish carefully between the *real* and the *actual*, between the absolute and eternal real and the empirical and historical actual. The ideal is, as such, always opposed to the actual; but this does not prevent its being the exponent of the real. Whence comes the ideal of the actual but from the reality or true being of the actual itself? Thus the ideal brings us nearer to reality than the actual; the one is a more perfect, the other a less perfect, expression of the single Reality in relation to which both stand, and out of relation to which the distinction between them would disappear. For that distinction must be interpreted as having an objective, and not merely a subjective, basis and significance. The criticism of the actual, if it is to be valid, must be objectively grounded or warranted. "The ideal, founded upon the reasoned and positive knowledge of the essential nature of being, is at once true and possible; it is superior, not contrary, to the actual fact; in a sense it is truer than fact itself; for it is fact purified and transformed, such as it would be if nothing opposed its development; it is reality tending to its complete actualisation."¹ The ideal is, truly understood, the mirror in which we see reflected at once the real and the actual; it is founded in the real, and is at the same time and for that reason the heart and truth of the actual. The ideal or potential is not simply what the actual is not, it is also the prophecy and guarantee of what the actual shall be, nay, the revelation of what in its essence it is—its very being, its *τί*

¹ Ricardou, *De l'Idéal*, p. 22. Cf. Edward Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 229: "The ideal reveals itself as the reality which is hid beneath the immediate appearance of things."

ἡν εἶναι. The 'ought' of morality is the dictation of the ethical whole to its parts; for the true nature of the parts is determined by the nature of their common whole. It is only the empiricist who subordinates the ideal to the actual; who sees in the actual the only real, and in the whole merely the sum of the parts. But Evolution itself, in its philosophical if not in its scientific sense, should teach us to find the real always in, or rather behind, the ideal; never in, but always ahead of, the actual. The empirical time-process, if it has a meaning, implies an eternal Reality—a being of the becoming, a something that becomes, the beginning and the end of the entire process of development. The process is the evolution, the gradual unfolding or appearing, of that essential Reality which is its constant implication.

9. *The personality of God.*—Such an interpretation of moral reality, as only the other side of the moral ideal, enables us to be faithful to the great Kantian principle of the essential autonomy of the moral life. It is a principle divined by other moralists, by Plato and Butler especially, that man cannot properly acknowledge subjection to any foreign legislation, but is for ever a law unto himself, his own judge, at once subject and sovereign in the moral realm. But the Kantian autonomy is not a final explanation of morality. How comes it, we must still ask, that man is fitted for the discharge of such a function; whence this splendid human endowment? Kant does not himself connect the self-legislation of man with the divine source of moral government in the universe; but his doctrine of autonomy teaches us that the connection must be no external one. The supreme Head of the moral universe, he who, as holy and not placed under duty, is only sovereign and never subject, must be akin to its other members who occupy the 'middle state' and are subjects as well as sovereigns, legislators who with difficulty obey the laws of their own making. But what

is this but to say that as the ideal is the truth of the actual, so the supreme Reality can only be the perfect embodiment and realisation of the ideal? In no one of these three terms do we depart from the single concrete fact of moral experience; abstract any one of them, and that concrete experience becomes impossible.

What is the concrete fact, the single term of which these three are only aspects, but selfhood or personality? Behind the actual there is the ideal self, and behind the ideal the real or divine Self. The whole drift of the argument tends to show that, in essence, God and man must be one, that God—the supreme moral source and principle, the alpha and the omega of the moral as of the intellectual life—is the eternally perfect Personality, in whose image man has been created, and after the pattern of whose perfect nature, the archetypal essence of his own, he must unceasingly strive to shape his life. Since the moral ideal is an ideal of personality, must not the moral reality, the reality of which that ideal is the after-reflection as well as the prophetic hint, be the perfection of personality, the supreme Person whose image we, as persons, bear and are slowly and with effort inscribing on our natural individuality? We must thus complete the Kantian theory of autonomy; that alone does not tell the whole story of the moral life. Its unyielding ‘ought,’ its categorical imperative, issues not merely from the depths of our own nature, but from the heart of the universe itself. We are self-legislative: but we re-enact the law already enacted by God; we recognise, rather than constitute, the law of our own being. The moral law is the echo within our souls of the voice of the Eternal, whose offspring we are.

All this, I need hardly say, is not intended as mathematical demonstration. Metaphysics never is an ‘exact science.’ Rather it is offered as the only sufficient hypothesis of the moral life. The life of goodness, the ideal life, is necessarily a grand speculation, a great ‘leap in

the dark.' It is a life based on the conviction that its source and its issues are in the eternal and the infinite. Its mood is strenuous, enthusiastic, possessed by the persuasion of its own infinite value and significance. The man lives under the power of the idea of the supreme reality of moral distinctions, and of their absolute significance. To invalidate the hypothesis would be to invalidate the life which is based upon it. But the life of goodness is unyielding in its demand for the sanction, in ultimate divine Reality, of its own ideal. For that ideal is infinite—to make it finite were to destroy it; and, as infinite, it must seek its complement in the Infinite or God. And if a life thus founded is in reality an infinite Peradventure, one long Question always repeated, its progress brings with it the gradual conversion of the speculative peradventure into a practical certainty; the persistent question is always answering itself. The touch of this transcendent faith alone transfigures man's life with a divine and absolute significance, and endows it with an imperishable and unconquerable strength. "If God be for us, who can be against us?" "We feel we are nothing, but Thou wilt help us to be." If indeed we are in alliance with the Power that rules the universe, we may well feel confident that "we can do all things"; if we must go this warfare at our own charges, we may as well give up the struggle. But the very essence of goodness is that it will never give up, but perseveres even to the end. One thing alone would be fatal to it—the loss of belief in its own infinite reality, in its own absolute worth. With that surrender would come pessimism. But again the good life never is pessimistic.¹

¹ Cf. Professor James, *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. i. pp. 352, 353: "When, however, we believe that a God is there, and that he is one of the claimants, the infinite perspective opens out. The scale of the symphony is incalculably prolonged. The more imperative ideals now begin to speak with an altogether new objectivity and significance, and to utter the infinitely penetrating, shattering, tragically challenging mode of appeal. . . . All through history, in the periodical conflicts of puritanism with the

10. Objections to anthropomorphism : (a) from the standpoint of natural evolution.—The objection is made to such an ethical or personal conception of God, that it is anthropomorphic, and rests, like all anthropomorphism, upon a false estimate of man's place in the universe, upon such an exaggerated view of his importance as is fatal to the vision of God in his true being. This objection comes from two sides—from that of Naturalism and from that of Transcendentalism, or from that of empirical and from that of dialectical Evolutionism. The former need not detain us long; the latter will require more careful consideration.

The evolutionary view of the universe, it is held, emphasises the lesson of the Copernican change of standpoint. As the geo-centric conception was supplanted by the helio-centric, so must the anthro-po-centric view give place to the cosmo-centric. As man has learned that his planet is not the centre of the physical universe, he is now learning that he himself is only an incident in the long course of the evolutionary process. His imagined superiority to nature, his supposed uniqueness of endowment, must disappear when he is found to be the product of natural factors, and the steps are traced by which he has become what he is.

But such a deduction from the theory of Evolution is don't-care temper, we see the antagonism of the strenuous and genial moods, and the contrast between the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high, and those of prudence and the satisfaction of merely finite needs. The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural human possibilities that even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest. Our attitude towards concrete evils is entirely different in a world where we believe there are none but finite demanders, from what it is in one where we joyously face tragedy for an infinite demander's sake. Every sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity for handling life's evils, is set free in those who have religious faith. For this reason the strenuous type of character will, on the battle-field of human history, always outwear the easy-going type, and religion will drive irreligion to the wall."

the result of a misinterpretation of that theory. Here, as elsewhere, the theological consequence is a metaphysical deduction from scientific statements, rather than a finding of science itself. It is for science to discover the laws of phenomena, or the manner of their occurrence, to describe the 'how' of the world and of man. The 'what' and the 'why' are questions for philosophy. The 'laws' of nature which science discovers may be at the same time the 'ways' of God, the modes of the divine activity. Why should not evolution by natural selection be the mode of the divine activity? Even if evolution be the supreme law of the universe, it is only the highest generalisation, the most comprehensive scientific statement of the phenomenal process. But the process does not explain itself. The 'genetic method' may be adequate for science; it is not adequate for philosophy. Philosophy can never rest in a universe of mere becoming, it must explain becoming by being rather than being by becoming. Heraclitus, as a philosophical Evolutionist, recognised this in his assertion of the law or path (ὁδός) of the process; and Aristotle saw still more clearly that the process of evolution is not self-explanatory, that becoming rests on being, that the *τί ἐστιν* of the actual presupposes the *οὐσία* or *τί ἦν εἶναι* of the essential and ideal. In other words, we understand the becoming only when we refer it to the being that is becoming. The very conception of Evolution, philosophically understood, is teleological. Such evolution is not mere change, or indefinite movement; it is progress, movement in a certain direction, towards a definite goal. "The process of evolution is itself the working out of a mighty teleology, of which our finite understandings can fathom but the scantiest rudiments."¹ It has been truly said that "evolution spells purpose." The philosophic lesson of Evolutionism is the constant lesson of science itself, that the universe is a universe, a many which is also a one, a whole through

¹ J. Fiske, *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 406.

all its parts. And while it is the business of the scientific Evolutionist to analyse this whole into its component parts, it is for philosophy to make the synthesis of the parts in the whole.

To discover this total meaning of the evolutionary process, this end which is at the same time the beginning of the entire movement, philosophy must reverse the evolutionary method, as understood by science, and explain the lower in terms of the higher, rather than the higher in terms of the lower; the earlier in terms of the later, rather than the later in terms of the earlier; the simpler by the more complex, rather than the more complex by the simpler. For it is in the higher and later and more complex that we see the unfolding of the essential nature of the lower and earlier and simpler forms of being. In the former we discover what the latter had it in them to become, what the latter in promise and potency already were. The oak explains the acorn, even more truly than the acorn explains the oak. Now the highest, and latest, and most complex form of being that we know is man; and thus teleology becomes inevitably anthropomorphism. The superiority of the anthropo-centric view to the cosmo-centric receives a new vindication when we see that man, instead of excluding, includes nature. "That which the pre-Copernican astronomy naïvely thought to do by placing the home of man in the centre of the physical universe, the Darwinian biology profoundly accomplishes by exhibiting man as the terminal fact in that stupendous process of evolution whereby things have come to be what they are. In the deepest sense it is as true as ever it was held to be, that the world was made for man, and that the bringing forth in him of those qualities which we call highest and holiest is the final cause of creation."¹ For in man we now see, with a new distinctness, the microcosm; he sums up in himself, repeats

¹ J. Fiske, *The Idea of God*, Pref., p. 21.

and transcends, the entire process of the world. Humanism is more adequate than Naturalism, because in man we are nearer the whole, and nearer the centre, than in nature. Evolutionism sends us, for the explanation of nature, from nature to man. The continuity of the process of evolution in nature and in man is a new vindication of anthropomorphism. As long as man could separate himself from nature, and regard himself as unique, a Melchisedec birth, he had no right to interpret the process of nature in terms of himself; the unity of man and nature which science is slowly establishing is the vindication of that right. It does not matter where man's home may be, at the centre or the circumference of the physical system; it does not matter what his history has been, or by what slow stages he has become what he is. It is in what he is, and always in promise and potency was, that man's supreme importance lies. The Darwinian, like the Copernican, change of standpoint has forced us to revise our conception of man's place in nature, of his temporal as well as of his spatial place. But his essential being shines out all the more clearly in the changed light.

If we regard the universe as one continuous evolution, we must find in man the key to the entire process. For while in the organic we find the fulfilment and *raison d'être* of the inorganic, the end to which the latter is a means, in the rational soul of man we must, with Aristotle, discover that for the realisation of which his body exists (*ἔντελέχεια σώματος*). The course of evolution, as we can empirically trace it, should teach us this. Till man is reached, there is no stopping anywhere; each species seems to exist only as a step towards the next. Nature seems to be not merely 'careless of the single life,' but to be careless even of 'the type.' But with man the movement seems to change its course, and the progress appears to be inwards rather than onwards. The human species once evolved, the function of evolution

seems to be the perfecting of this species. The material world seems to exist for the body of man, and man's body for his soul. "On earth there is nothing great but man: in man there is nothing great but mind." Man seems indeed to be the microcosm, the focal point of the evolutionary process, the universe itself in miniature. It seems as if in his perfection it attained its end, and accomplished its destiny.

11. (b) From the standpoint of dialectical evolution. — But the charge of anthropomorphism comes from the Transcendentalists as well as from the Naturalists, from the dialectical as well as from the empirical Evolutionists. Absolute Idealism has no place for personality, or at any rate for a plurality of selves, human and divine. It is difficult to define Hegelian orthodoxy, but it seems to demand an impersonal view of both God and man. God becomes either the One which is not the many, or the All, the universal process itself. Both views are found, I think, in a recent English exposition of Hegelian theology, Dr Edward Caird's Gifford Lectures on *The Evolution of Religion*. On the one hand, it is maintained that we must not conceive God in terms either of the object or of the subject, that Naturalism and Monotheism are alike inadequate. God, being the principle of unity that underlies both subject and object, must not be identified with either. The result would seem to be the impossibility of conceiving God at all. If, in order to think God, we must think away all the reality we know, it is clear that we cannot know God at all. A mere "principle of unity," beyond the dualism of subject and object, is hardly to be distinguished from the Spencerian Absolute—neither material nor spiritual, but the unknown and unknowable basis alike of material and spiritual phenomena. Mr Caird is evidently conscious of this difficulty, and tries to answer it: "What, it is asked, can we make of a Being who is neither to be

perceived or imagined as an object, nor to be conceived and determined as a subject, but only as the unity in which all difference begins and ends? Must we not content ourselves with the bare acknowledgment of such a Being, and bow our heads before the inscrutable?" The answer is, that though "in a sense such a universal must be beyond knowledge, . . . it is the ground on which we stand, the atmosphere which surrounds us, the light by which we see, and the heaven that shuts us in."¹ But if the God of Idealism must remain mere indeterminate Being, a Something of which we cannot predicate any attributes, Idealism has only brought us round by a new path to Agnosticism. At best, such a "principle of unity" could be only the form of our knowledge, and a form into which we are not allowed to put any content must needs remain empty and abstract.

The only escape from this formalism of a mere "principle of unity" seems to lie in the identification of God with the process of experience, the system of relations, the dialectical movement of Reason in nature and in man. God thus becomes the All regarded as One, the Whole, the Universe itself. Now since this Whole, to be interpreted as such—that is, as the unity of the All—must be regarded as the rational order which makes the cosmos a cosmos, the result is Pan-logism. Of this position we have various statements. To Hegel himself God is the Absolute Idea—the self-contained and self-completed Thought which lives, and moves to its self-realisation, in 'all thinking things, all objects of all thought.' To Mr Caird, God is neither subject nor object, but the higher term presupposed in and containing both. This Absolute is simply Kant's 'unity of apperception,' left alone after the withdrawal of the Kantian 'things-in-themselves,' objective and subjective alike. For Kant himself this was the mere form of experience, the principle

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 153.

of its possibility, and was not to be substantiated as a Being outside experience. If, therefore, we deny the reality of Kant's noumenal or supra-experiential world,¹ there remains what was for Kant himself the only knowable Reality, the rational system of experience itself. The 'thinking thing' disappears, with the 'objects' of its thought, in 'thought' itself; the real is the rational; form is filled with content, because content and form are one.

If the former view led us to the Eleatic unity of indeterminate Being, this brings us to the Heracleitean unity of mere Becoming. This version of Hegelianism is indeed essentially a revival of Heracleiteanism. Nothing is, everything becomes; the process itself is the entire reality, and the process is rational. It is instructive to notice how near 'Pan-logism' thus comes to 'Pan-phenomenalism.' The one theory interprets the process rationally, the other empirically; but in both alike the process is everything. But Heracleiteanism is no more adequate than Eleaticism. Becoming implies being, as being implies becoming; either alone is a half-truth. Thought without a thinker, relations between nothing, order without an orderer, are unintelligible. To hypostatise the thought, the relation, the order, is the very acme of scholastic Realism.

This impersonal and merely dynamical conception of the Absolute Reality is connected inseparably with an impersonal and dynamical view of man. As 'mind' was for Spinoza only *idea corporis* or *idea ideæ corporis*, a collective name for the 'ideas' or 'states,' but representing no 'substantial' reality, so for the Hegelian school is the thinker resolved into his thought. The subject has no more reality than the object; both are aspects or modes of the Absolute, which contains them. But if, as I have tried to maintain,² we cannot resolve

¹ From what follows it will be seen that I am not here contending for the rehabilitation of the Kantian *Ding-an-sich*.

² *Supra*, part iii. ch. i. §§ 6, 7.

the finite subject into its experience, whether intellectual or moral, no more can we identify the Absolute with experience, or with the process of the actual. The very conception of 'experience' implies a reference to a subject or self, permanent amid its ceaseless flux, and never ceasing to distinguish itself, as one and identical, from the changing manifold of that experience. That the ultimate Reality should be found by transcendental Idealism in experience itself, is one more example of how, in the history of thought, philosophical extremes may meet.

If, however, Hegelianism is to maintain itself as an idealistic and spiritual interpretation of the universe, it is obvious that it must be by accepting the subject, as a more adequate exponent than the object, of the ultimate or divine Reality. Hegel himself regarded God as the absolute Subject, and conceived the great advantage of his system over Spinozism to lie in the substitution of 'subject' for 'substance' as the term for the ultimate Reality. It is indeed the implication of Hegel's evolutionary view of the universe, that in the higher stage, that of human self-consciousness, the manifestation of ultimate Reality should be more adequate than at the lower stage of mere nature. It is also of the essence of Idealism, as distinguished from Spinozism, to perceive that spirit and nature, thought and extension, subject and object, are not co-ordinate, but that the former always 'overlaps' the latter. Accordingly we find Green characterising God as the 'eternal Self' or 'Self-consciousness,' and many Hegelians professing Theism or the doctrine of divine personality. Mr Caird, for example, holds that on the basis of Absolute Idealism "we can think of God—as he must be thought of—as the principle of unity in all things, and yet conceive him as a self-conscious, self-determining Being."¹

But it is a tolerably obvious deduction from Absolute

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 82.

Idealism that if God be Subject, his absoluteness precludes the existence of any other subjects or any relation between him and them. Accordingly the finite subject is regarded by Green as the "reproduction in time" of the one eternal Self. Mr Caird also maintains explicitly the entire immanence of God in man as well as in nature, and the resulting unity of God and man. To deny that identity, he insists, is to rest in an external view of the universe, to stop short of the divine unity. The immanence of God precludes his transcendence; his unity with man, as well as with nature, makes impossible that separateness of being, whether in him or in ourselves, which we are accustomed to call personality. "It is equally impossible for us to recall or to maintain the attitude of mind of the pure monotheists, for whom God was merely one subject among other subjects; and though lifted high above them, the source of all their life, was yet related to them as an external and independent will. Our idea of God will not let us conceive of him as external to anything, least of all to the spirits who are made in his image, and who live and move and have their being in him. We cannot, therefore, avoid thinking of God as a principle who is within us as he is without us, present in self-consciousness as in consciousness, the presupposition, the life, and the end of all."¹ On the theory of Absolute Idealism, on the other hand, "it becomes possible to think of man as a 'partaker in the divine nature,' and, therefore, as a self-conscious and self-determining spirit, without gifting him with an absolute individuality which would cut him off from all union and communion with his fellow-creatures and with God."²

These statements, while they contain most important and much-needed truth, also reveal the nature of the reasoning upon which the central position of Hegelian Idealism rests. That position, it seems to me, obtains its chief plausibility by pressing into the service of

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 72.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 84.

philosophic thought the spatial metaphor which underlies such terms as 'externality,' 'relation,' 'separation,' and the like. Things which are external to one another, related to one another, separated from one another in space, are not one and the same, but manifold and different. But the spatial metaphor must not blind us to the fact that, in investigating the relation of man to God, we are dealing not with spatial but with spiritual existence; and, in the spiritual sphere, it does not follow that a real separateness of being, a real relation between man and God, is fatal to the unity of the terms in question. "When we speak of God, all idols of space and time must be forgotten, or our best labour is in vain."¹

The Hegelian unification is too easy; its synthesis of the elements of reality, human and divine, is too rapid. Hegelianism unifies the finite subject with the absolute or divine Subject only by objectifying the subject, that is, by confusing the subject with the object. But it is the very nature of the subject to refuse to be identified with the object, of the ego to oppose itself for ever to the non-ego.² Hegel's conception of God is the result of the exclusive intellectualism of his view of the universe. From the standpoint of the intellect, such a synthesis might conceivably be satisfactory. But will and feeling are factors of human reality, no less than intellect; and, from the point of view of will and feeling, we cannot unify, in the sense of identifying, man with God. For the Hegelian, as for the Spinozist, the process of the universe is one. But that is because the Hegelian view is, no less than the Spinozistic, a purely intellectual view, and its unity is, therefore, the unity of thought, not the unity of will and feeling. The process of thought might conceivably be one in God and in man; the process of will and feeling cannot be so conceived. It is the very nature of will to separate, to substantiate, if also to

¹ Herder, quoted by Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, p. 161.

² Cf. C. F. D'Arcy, *Short Study of Ethics*, part i. ch. v.

relate its possessors; and, as a moral being, man claims for himself a moral sphere of freedom and independent selfhood.

It is this inalienable human quality of freedom, of independent moral initiation, that dictates the true moral relation of man to God. It is not the intellectual burden of finitude, but the moral burden of evil, that sends man beyond himself to God; and the moral relation of man to God is, in its essence, a personal relation, a relation of will. "Our wills are ours, to make them Thine." If we absolutely unify or identify God and man, the ethical attitude, which is one of relation, not of identity, becomes impossible. In avoiding the evils of the doctrine of the divine transcendence, Hegelianism falls into the no less serious evils of the doctrine of the mere immanence of God. Morality implies, in the last analysis, a relation between man and God, "union and communion of the human will with the divine Will"; not such a unity and identity of man and God as must imply the negation of all relation between them. It is the spiritual difference, or separateness of being, that gives the union its entire moral and religious significance; it is the very possibility of saying "I will" that gives its infinite value to man's "Not my will, but Thine, be done." A philosophy which includes the life of man in the one divine process of the universe, and makes his life, like nature's, simply a "reproduction" of the life of God, may perhaps be intellectually satisfying, but it cuts away the roots of morality and of ethical religion.

The greatest strain comes upon such a unitary view when it meets the problem of evil. Is evil an element in the life of God? If so, it must cease to be real evil; and this is precisely Mr Caird's solution. He invokes the sanction of Christianity in favour of such a thoroughly optimistic interpretation of moral evil. The characteristic truth of the Christian religion he takes to be "the omnipotence of good." But, if goodness is to be perfectly

developed, evil must be struggled with, and overcome. Goodness is, in its very essence, deliverance from evil; and "with the increasing pressure of the conflict, and the growing consciousness of the evil with which he has to contend, there comes a deepening sense of the necessity for such a conflict with evil, and of all the suffering it brings with it, to the highest triumph of good."¹ Thus, in the supreme conflict of evil with goodness, "even the powers that opposed and persecuted the good were secretly its instruments, and even the malice and hatred of men were no real hindrances, but rather the opportunities required for its manifestation."² "Nay, even *sin itself*, as its utmost power is shown only under the Law—which produces a distinct *consciousness* of sin, and so prepares the way for the negation of it and for the reception of a new principle of life—even sin itself, from this point of view, is shown to form part of the divine order."³ "The intensification of sin, due to the consciousness of it awakened by the law," works out the greater triumph of the good. For while "sin is not sin in the deepest sense till it is conscious, the sin of one who knows the divine law he breaks; yet just this very consciousness, while in one way it deepens the sin, in another way prepares for its extinction."⁴

This solution of the problem of evil seems again too rapid and easy. I cannot see how, on the unitary theory, evil is a necessary phase of the process of the good; how, in such a universe as Mr Caird's, the evil which is an indubitable fact of moral experience should occur; how human sin can be a part or stage of the necessary process of the divine life; how this unreason should infect a universe which is rational through and through. The explanation offered may be satisfactory, as an explanation of how the knowledge of evil is instrumental to the life of goodness; but it is not satisfactory as an

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 138.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 207.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 165.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 208.

explanation of the existence of evil, it does not justify the occurrence of evil as a real fact in the universe. We can see how evil, once there, is utilised and converted into an instrument of goodness; but why evil should be there at all, we do not see. Even if we grant the necessity of evil as affording an opportunity for the choice of the good, still the existence of evil, that is, the fact that the good is not chosen, is left out of the explanation. In every case of moral evil we have such a misdirection of the will. To make evil only a necessary element in the life of goodness seems to me to imperil, if not to destroy, the reality of the moral life, both on its good and on its evil side. The earnestness of that life, whether in its bitterness or in its joy, finds no adequate interpretation in a theory which makes it, in all its parts and phases, absolutely and simply necessary.

The true Absolute must contain, instead of abolishing, relations; the true monism must include, instead of excluding, pluralism. A One which, like Spinoza's Substance or the Hegelian Absolute, does not enable us to think the Many, cannot be the true One, the unity of *the manifold*. The one Subject which negates all subjects is hardly better than the one Substance which negates all substances. The true unity must be ethical, as well as intellectual; and an ethical unity implies distinctness of being and of activity. To deify man is as illegitimate as to naturalise him. But morality is the medium of union, as well as of separation, between man and God; will unites, as well as separates, its possessors. "Barriers exist only for the world of bodies; it is the privilege of minds to penetrate each other, without confusion with one another. In communion with God, we are one with him, and yet we maintain our personality."¹ The very surrender of the finite will to the infinite is itself an act of will; neither morality nor ethical religion is self-less or impersonal.

¹ Ricardou, *De l'Idéal*, p. 143.

12. Intellectualism and moralism : reason and will. —Hegelianism, we have seen, finds it a necessary condition of the establishment of an intelligible theory of the universe, that God be conceived in terms of the subject, rather than in terms of the object; it is, to this extent, anthropomorphic. But if we are to find the key to the interpretation of the Absolute in the subject rather than in the object, with what right do we exclude the ethical and emotional elements of the subject's life, and retain only the intellectual? Intellectualism, gnosticism, or pure rationalism must always prove itself an inadequate exposition of a universe which includes the human subject, and must continue to call forth moralism or the philosophy of will and emotion, as its needed complement. A metaphysical scheme which invalidates our judgments of moral value by refusing to them objective significance is no less inadequate than a metaphysic which invalidates our intellectual or our æsthetic judgments. The Good must find its place, beside the True and the Beautiful, in our metaphysical system. And if, as an intellectual being, man *might* resolve himself into unity with God, and regard himself as a mere mode or aspect of the one Subject, a moral being must round itself to a separate whole. The reality of the moral life implies man's independence of God as well as of nature, and forces upon him, to that extent, a pluralistic rather than a monistic view of the universe.

And if a moral theology is no less legitimate than an intellectual theology, it follows that we may interpret God not merely as thought, but as will. It was with a true insight that Aristotle and the Schoolmen thought of God as 'pure activity.' *Im Anfang war die That* is as true as *Im Anfang war das Wort*. But we can no more separate will from intelligence than intelligence from will. Will, separated from intelligence, would not be will. What Schopenhauer calls 'will' is only blind brute force; its activity is necessarily disastrous, and

what it does has to be undone when intelligence is born. Aristotle's ultimate reality, on the other hand, is the unity of intelligence and will; the divine life is for him identical in its essence with the ideal life of man, rational activity.¹ Perfection of will implies perfection of intelligence, and perfection of intelligence and will implies also emotional perfection. In us, it is true, "feeling, thought, and volition have all defects which suggest something higher."² But the "something higher" which these defects suggest is something higher *in the same kind*, the perfection of these elements, their harmonious unity. To think of God as perfect Personality, to conceive the divine life as the harmonious activity of perfect will informed by perfect intelligence, and manifested in the feeling of this harmony, is to conceive God as like ourselves, but with our human limitations removed, and to conceive our relation to God as a moral and emotional, and not merely as an intellectual, relation.

If, therefore, we are to maintain a spiritual, and more particularly an ethical, view of the universe, we must be in earnest with the conception of personality. Hegelianism is altogether too vague in its utterances here. According to the latest exposition of this philosophy, that of Mr Bradley, God is to be conceived as "super-personal" rather than as "impersonal." "It is better to affirm personality than to call the Absolute impersonal. But neither mistake should be necessary. The Absolute stands above, and not below, its internal distinctions. It does not reject them, but it includes them as elements in its fulness. To speak in concrete language, it is not the indifference but the concrete identity of all extremes. But it is better in this connection to call it super-personal."³ Yet Mr Bradley closes his book with the statement that, according to "the essential message of Hegel, outside of spirit

¹ By Aristotle, of course, this activity is apt to be conceived as an activity of the pure intellect.

² F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 182.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 533.

there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real."¹ But is not spirit essentially personal, and must we not think of the infinite Spirit rather as complete personality than as super-personal?

It is objected that to conceive God as personality is to contradict his infinity. "The Deity which they want is of course finite,—a person much like themselves, with thoughts and feelings limited and mutable in the process of time. . . . Of course for us to ask seriously if the Absolute can be personal in such a way would be quite absurd."² "For me a person is finite or is meaningless."³ "Once give up your finite and mutable person, and you have parted with everything which, for you, makes personality important. . . . For me it is sufficient to know, on one side, that the Absolute is not a finite person. Whether, on the other side, personality in some eviscerated remnant of sense can be applied to it, is a question intellectually unimportant and practically trifling."⁴ Such statements as these—and they are typical of the criticism constantly made upon ethical Theism—seem to me to rest upon the ambiguity of the term 'personality.' When we think of personality as essentially finite, we are confounding personality with individuality. The individual is essentially finite, the person is essentially infinite. So far is personality from contradicting the infinite, that, as Lotze says,⁵ "only the Infinite is completely personal." If we think of God as *being* all that we *ought* to be, as the Reality of the moral ideal, must we not say that, as we gradually constitute our personality, we are tracing the divine image in ourselves, and learning more fully the very nature of God? "The Absolute is not a *finite* person;" but to say that personality is necessarily finite "with thoughts and feelings limited and mutable in the

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 552.

³ *Loc. cit.*

⁵ *Philosophy of Religion*, ch. iv. § 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 532.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 533.

process of time," is to beg the whole question at issue. The question is whether the 'infinite' and the 'personal' are, or are not, contradictory conceptions.

The essentially unethical character of an impersonal or supra-personal universe is finely suggested by Professor Royce in a little fable of his own invention: "And so at worst we are like a child who has come to the palace of the king on the day of his wedding, bearing roses as a gift to grace the feast. For the child, waiting innocently to see whether the king will not appear and praise the welcome flowers, grows at last weary with watching all day and with listening to harsh words outside the palace gate amid the jostling crowd. And so in the evening it falls asleep beneath the great dark walls, unseen and forgotten; and the withering roses by and by fall from its lap, and are scattered by the wind into the dusty highway, there to be trodden under foot and destroyed. Yet all that happens only because there are infinitely fairer treasures within the palace than the ignorant child could bring. The king knows of this—yes, and of ten thousand other proffered gifts of loyal subjects. But he needs them not. Rather are all things from eternity his own."¹ Nay, but to the very palace of the king every child of man can bring a gift and treasure which he will not despise—the priceless gift of a free and loving service, the treasure, more precious than all besides, of a will touched to goodness. We cannot believe that man's good and evil are indifferent to God; that evil is only "an element, and a necessary element, in the total goodness of the Universal Will;" that in God our "separateness is destroyed," and, with our separateness, our sin; that our goodness follows, like our sin, from the necessity of the divine nature. In our good, as in our evil, we feel that our life is our own, personal, separate from God as it is separate from nature, our own—to give to Him who gave it to us, or to withhold even from Him.

¹ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 483.

Instead of surrendering the idea of personality, we must, therefore, cherish it as the only key to the moral and religious life. It is the hard-won result of long experience and deep reflection. The depth and spirituality of the conception of God have grown with the growth of the idea of human personality. It is the presence and operation of this idea that distinguishes Christianity from other religions, that makes Hebraism a religion, while the lack of it makes Hellenism hardly more than a mythology. As man has learned to know himself, he has advanced in the knowledge of God. Our age is the age of science, its prevailing spirit is what we may call the intellectualism of the scientific mind. Its ambition is to understand, and to understand nature. As in the earliest age of Greek philosophy, the eye of thought is directed outward. The task is a great one; no wonder that the energies of the time are wellnigh exhausted by it. But, sooner or later, the view must be turned again inwards, and, when it is, the eternal spiritual realities will be found there still, and the lessons which were not written upon the face of nature will be found graven on the living tablets of the human heart. Man is not all intellect; and if intellect now thrives at the expense of the rest of his nature, as in the Middle Ages intellect was itself in large measure starved and sacrificed that morality and religion might develop, it only means that the education of the human race is conducted, like the education of the individual, bit by bit, step by step. But the education cannot stop until, in insight as in life, humanity has attained the measure of its divine perfection.

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CHAPTER III.

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.

1. **The alternatives of thought.**—The third postulate of morality, according to Kant, is the immortality of the moral being. If we have found it impossible to demonstrate the freedom of the will and the existence of God, as the term 'demonstration' is used in the exact sciences, we need not hope to succeed in demonstrating immortality. All that we need attempt is to understand the bearing of our view of man's nature and life upon the question of his destiny. For the problem of the ultimate issues of the moral life is as inevitable as the problems of its origin and of its relation to the universal Reality; nor can the first question be separated from the other two. And if, in a sense, morality may be said to depend upon immortality, in another sense and, in Aristotle's phrase, 'for us,' immortality must be said to depend upon morality. Our answer to the question, What is the destiny of man? must depend upon our answer to the previous questions, What is man? and, What is his proper life as man? Our answer to the question whether the moral life points to immortality as the destiny of the moral being, depends upon our interpretation of morality. And ultimately destiny, like life, must depend upon the nature of the being whose life and destiny we are considering. Hence it is that we do not generally find the problem of immortality discussed with anything like the

same fulness or explicitness as the other problems we have investigated. The answer to this question is contained in the answers to the others; the position taken here is a corollary or deduction from the positions already taken on the nature of the moral being and the consequent nature of the moral ideal. Two main lines divide philosophical opinion. The affirmation or denial of immortality follows in the first place from the acceptance, respectively, of an idealistic and transcendental, or of a merely naturalistic and empirical, interpretation of morality. If man is a merely natural being, nature's destiny must be his also; if the ideal of his life does not transcend his present experience, the present life must be his all-in-all. But, in the second place, the affirmation or denial of immortality follows from the acceptance or the rejection of personality as the key to the interpretation of man's nature and life. Pantheism has not, any more than Naturalism, a place for personal immortality, because it has no place for personality. In Spinozistic Pantheism and Hegelian Idealism, as truly as in Humian Sensationalism, there is no survival of the self, because there is no self to survive. Let us glance in turn at these alternatives of thought: our own position has been sufficiently foreshadowed in the preceding discussion.

2. Immortality as the implication of morality.—The implication of immortality in a transcendental view of the moral life is most explicitly stated by Kant. The 'thou shalt' of moral law implies 'thou canst,' and an infinite 'thou shalt' implies an infinite ability to fulfil it. But an infinite moral ideal cannot be realised in finite time; it follows that man, as the subject of such an ideal, must have infinite time for the task of its realisation. A man is immortal till his work is done, and the work of man as a moral being is never done.¹ It is true that Kant states this argument in the negative form re-

¹ Cf. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, bk. ii. ch. v.

quired by his ethical theory. The moral ideal is for him a life of pure reason, from which the surd of sensibility has been eliminated; and it is the eternal presence of this fatal surd that constitutes the Kantian argument for immortality. The moral task is not accomplished till the surd has disappeared, but it never disappears from the life of man, mixed as his nature is of reason and sensibility; therefore the task must always remain, and, with the task, the possibility of its accomplishment. The essence of the argument, however, is independent of this particular view of the ethical life; and Kant's own deeper argument for immortality we might consistently accept. Kant's real deduction of immortality is from the transcendental source and significance of the moral ideal. Faithfulness to the true self means that we live *as if* we were immortal; in the moral life we constitute ourselves heirs of immortality, by living the life of immortal or eternal beings. Man's true life is not, like the animal's, a life in time; its law issues from a world beyond "our bourne of Time and Place," from a sphere "where time and space are not." In every moral act, therefore, man transcends the limits of the present life, and becomes already a citizen of the eternal world. He has not to wait for his immortality; it broods over him even in the present, it is the very atmosphere of his life as a moral being.

This is an argument as old as Plato and Aristotle; it is the real argument for immortality. Man is, as such, an eternal being; he not only can, but must, transcend time in every act of his moral life. The law of his life comes from that higher sphere to which, in his essential being, he belongs. Is he called to an illusory task—to live as an immortal while in reality he is only mortal; to conduct himself as a citizen of eternity, while in reality he is only a denizen of time? The strenuous and idealistic moral temper is rooted in the conviction of the eternal meaning of this life in time, and is willing to

stake everything on this great Peradventure. Nay, it is not to it a Peradventure, but a silent certainty, under whose constraining power considerations of time are scorned as mere irrelevancies. Such a life Browning has pictured in his *Grammarians' Funeral*. He has chosen the scholar's devotion to his ideal; but that is only a type of what the good life always is—a life 'not for the day, but for the day to come,' a life that knows it has the leisure of eternity for the execution of its eternal task.¹

There is surely a great ethical truth, if only one side of the truth, in the Platonic and Mystic, the Mediæval and the Kantian, view of time as the antechamber to eternity, of this life as a pilgrimage, a place of tabernacling, an inn where we abide for a night, to go further on the morrow—nay, even as the prison-house of the eternal spirit, from which it must take its flight to its home in the unseen and eternal world whence it came and where its real interests and concerns are. Everything perishes with the using, everything but man, the spectator of the universal transition and decay, who feels, amid it all, that he is living a life which has no essential relation to change or death, a life which these things do not touch. For is he not building, in the eternal world of his own spirit, a 'house not made with hands,' that house of character which no storms of time can reach, or move from its foundation?

¹ "Others mistrust and say, 'But time escapes!
Live now or never!'

He said, 'What's time? Leave Now for dogs and apes,
Man has Forever!'

Was it not great? did not he throw on God
(He loves the burthen!)—

God's task to make the heavenly period
Perfect the earthen?"

It is noteworthy that the two great poets of our time, Tennyson and Browning, have been equally fascinated by this problem, and have dealt with it so philosophically that quotations might be multiplied almost indefinitely from their poems, especially those of Browning.

"Sweet spring, full of sweet days and roses,
A box whose sweets compacted lie,
My music shows ye have your closes,
And all must die.
Only a sweet and virtuous soul
Like seasoned timber never gives ;
But though the whole world turn to coal,
Then chiefly lives."

The refusal of man to accept time as the measure of his life's possibility manifests itself in the essentially prophetic nature of the moral consciousness. This is the meaning of progress, the distinctive attribute of human life. The present life, man feels to the end, is a probation, a school where his spirit is learning lessons which shall serve it after it has passed far beyond the limits of the school. "No end of learning," and no time here to put the lessons into execution. Can it be that just when we have learned our lesson best, just when we have mastered the "proper craft" of living, the tool is dashed from our hands, the activity for which we have been preparing is shut against us ; that just when, through the illumination of life's experience, the true meaning of life becomes most clearly visible, that insight shall prove futile ?

"We spend our lives in learning pilotage,
And grow good steersmen when the vessel's crank !"

Shall we not be promoted to a nobler craft, when at last we have mastered something of the currents of "that immortal sea" ? There is no fruition and fulfilment, no perfect realisation, in this life, of this life's purpose. Life is a preparation, a discipline, an education of the moral being. Is all this elaborate and painful work of moral education to be undone ? Is death the consummation of our life, its *dénouement* and catastrophe ? Were not this failure absolute and supreme, failure at the heart of things ? Were it not as if the universe could not support the moral life to which it had given birth, as if here it failed and could

not realise its own end? Against such a contradiction between man's being and his destiny, between the magnitude of his task and the narrow limits set to its execution, our moral nature rises in protest. The validity of our judgments of moral value implies the possibility of the fulfilment by the moral being of his moral task, the permanence of the results of moral achievement. If we regard man as a merely natural being, part and product of nature, we can well believe that for him too death is the end. But if we regard him as for ever nature's superior, as made in the divine likeness and 'but a little lower than God,' we cannot think of him as sharing nature's destiny. "Poor man, God made, and all for that!" Man's very greatness, his capacity for thought and action, and for ideals that always put his attainments to the blush, were then the grimmest of all ironies, contrived to mock him into despair. "What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and moving, how express and admirable! in action, how like an angel! in apprehension, how like a God! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?"¹ The shadow of that contradiction would lie across man's life in the present, and darken all its joy; the knowledge of that ultimate failure would make all success unreal. Well might we wish that we had never heard of "those ineffable things which, if they may not make man's happiness, must make man's woe,"² that we had never been "summoned out of nothingness into illusion, and evolved but to aspire and to decay!"³

¹ *Hamlet*, Act ii. sc. 2.

² Myers, *Science and a Future Life*, p. 70.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 75. Cf. Thomas Davidson, "Ethics of an Eternal Being" (*International Journal of Ethics*, vol. iii. pp. 343, 344): "Sense, as such, has a very limited range, and hence its correlate, instinct, can be satisfied with very finite things. Intellect, on the contrary, from its very nature, knows no limits; and hence its correlate, will, can be satisfied with nothing less

The question of immortality is the question of the reality or illusoriness of the moral life. It is only another aspect of the question discussed in last chapter, namely, whether "morality is the nature of things," whether the moral ideal has its correlate in universal Reality. Here, once more, the good man gives hostages to fortune, and casts on the universe the burden of completing his efforts after an end too great to be attainable in the present. He trusts that what he has done will not be undone by the Universal Power, since he believes it to be a Power that makes for righteousness. Were it not so, human life would lose its meaning, and, with the discovery of the hollowness of its make-believe, all earnestness of moral purpose would be exchanged, in an earnest nature, for cynicism and despair.

3. *Personal immortality.*—But it is denied that personal immortality is the necessary completion of the moral life. Our attitude to this question must depend upon our attitude to the previous question of the moral ideal. The nature of the ideal life, we have found, can be determined only by a consideration of the nature of the being whose life we are considering. Destiny and life, therefore, depend ultimately on nature. And the view which we have been led to adopt is that man is, in his deepest nature, a person, a self, whose total being, rational and sentient, is expressed in the activity of will. The moral ideal, therefore, we have inferred, is an ideal of character; the typical and characteristic activity of man is self-realisation, 'realisation of self by self.' Man's proper business is in the inner world of his own being, not in the outer world of material production. Producer and product are here one; the moral activity is an end-in-itself; or, if it has a further

than the infinite. If that infinite were unattainable, man's gifts of intelligence and will would be the cruellest of mockeries, and human life the saddest of tragedies."

end, it is only the acquisition of a higher capacity for such activity. What is really being accomplished in the moral life is, therefore, always an invisible and spiritual result: whatever the man seems to be doing or making, he is really always *making himself*, actualising the potentiality of his own nature. The moral ideal is an ideal of character, and this personal ideal implies a personal destiny.

The problem of immortality is thus the old Aristotelian problem of the opportunity of the moral life. We must repeat, though in a somewhat different sense, Aristotle's demand for 'length of days' as the condition of a complete moral life. No finite increase of time would suffice for the accomplishment of an infinite task. And the moral task is, we have concluded, an infinite one; the capacity of the self which we are called upon to realise is an infinite capacity. The reality of the moral life implies the possibility of attaining its ideal; a potentiality that cannot be actualised is a contradiction in terms. But the opportunity is not given in this life, however well and wisely this life is used, for the full activity of all man's powers, intellectual, æsthetic, and volitional. At the end of the best and fullest life, must we not "contrast the petty Done, the Undone vast"? And even if, in the eye of the world, the accomplishment seem great, and the life complete, shall not the worker himself inscribe upon it 'Unfinished'? He knows, if others know not, the unrealised potentiality that is in him, the character yet unexpressed and waiting for its more perfect expression, the capacity yet unfulfilled and waiting for its fulfilment. If we add to this consideration of the universal human lack of moral opportunity the consideration of the inequality of opportunity in the present, and the sacrifice which many make of the opportunity they have, that they may enlarge the opportunity of others; above all, if we realise that, without a future life, not only is the opportunity of further moral progress

suddenly and for ever foreclosed, but the work already so laboriously done is all undone, the fruits of moral experience, so carefully gathered and garnered, are all wasted, the character so hardly acquired is all dissolved, and, in a moment, is as though it had never been,—are we not compelled, in the interests of clear and coherent thought about the meaning of our life, to postulate the immortality of our moral being? Has not the moral individual, as such, a claim upon the universe? Is not this the axiom of his life? Would not annihilation mean moral contradiction?

But, it is said, the completion of the work of the individual is in the larger life of the race; the true immortality is not personal, but 'corporate.' The race lives on, though the individual passes away; and he ought to be content to work for the race, rather than for himself. Other battles will be fought, and other victories won. He has played his part, and it is time for him to make his exit; why should he linger on the stage? The individual falls, like a withered leaf, from the tree of life; but the tree itself will feel the renewing breath of spring. It is through the constant death of the individual that, to the race, there comes a continual resurrection. As for the individual, he ought to rest with satisfaction in the anticipation of that moral influence which he bequeaths to his successors, and to find in that influence his real immortality. This changed view of immortality, it is insisted, lends life a new meaning. "The good we strive for lives no longer in a world of dreams on the other side of the grave; it is brought down to earth and waits to be realised by human hands, through human labour. We are called on to forsake the finer egoism that centred all its care on self-salvation, for a love of our own kind that shall triumph over death, and leave its impress on the joy of generations to come."¹

¹ C. M. Williams, *A Review of Evolutional Ethics*, p. 580.

In answer to this, I would remark (1) that such an argument is strictly irrelevant to the question at issue. Can a life which, throughout its course, is personal, end by becoming impersonal, or by passing over to other persons? The question is whether the individual has, in these brief earthly years, lived out his life, and realised his total Good. Moral progress is progress in character, and character cannot be transferred. If, at death, the self ceases to exist, the task of its life is ended—and undone. (2) The good of others is, like my own, a personal and individual good; and, if there is no permanent good for me, neither is there for them. Thus the good of others to which we had wedded our souls is, like our own, destined to disintegration. Has the transition from the individual to the race accomplished what it promised, namely, the substitution of an abiding good for the perishing good of the individual life? The answer is, Yes; the permanence of the good of humanity is founded in the unity and solidarity of the race. We are not to work even for other individuals, at least not for any particular individual or group of individuals, but for the race. This forces us to ask (3) whether the race itself is permanent? The writer just quoted raises this question, and answers: "The question as to the final destruction of the human race, whether by sudden catastrophe or slow decay, can little affect happiness, at present, or for very many ages to come. . . . The pessimist is fond of making much of the final end of our planet; but the healthy and successful will be happy in spite of future ages, and the extent and degree of happiness will continue to increase for such an immense period of time that there is no reason for considering the destruction of our race as exerting any important influence on ethical theory."¹ But we must face this future, and think our way through

¹ C. M. Williams, *loc. cit.*

it, to the darkness and nothingness beyond. Would not that Beyond turn all the joy of the present to dust and ashes in our grasp? Or must we cease to think, as the writer seems to intimate that the healthy and successful will do? That we cannot do, without being false to our highest nature. Is this, then, the 'future of the species,' for which we are to work? All this progress, progress—towards nothing! Surely, if life is worth living, there must be something that does not suffer shock and change. But nowhere can that something be found save in the spiritual sphere, the sphere of personality; only character is permanent, and character is personal.

The Absolute Idealist will still refuse to entertain the plea for individual immortality, on the ground that eternity belongs to thought, not to the individual thinker; since, truly understood, the finite self is not a self at all, but must be resolved either into the universal Thinker or into universal Thought. This raises anew the questions which we have discussed in more than one connection already: (1) whether we can conceive of thought without a thinker; (2) whether, admitting the necessity of a subject of thought, we must not admit the reality of the finite subject; and (3) whether, in the moral life, if not in the intellectual, we must not assert the relative independence of the finite self—the active, if not the intellectual, independence of man. Our answers to these questions about the ultimate meaning of man's life in the present must determine our answer to the question about his future destiny. If a regard for moral reality forbids us to resolve the present life of man into the life of God, such a resolution in the future must be no less illegitimate.

The idealistic objection to the immortality of the individual seems to me to rest upon two misunderstandings: (1) that misinterpretation of individuality, and of

finitude in general, which finds expression in the principle, *Omnis determinatio negatio est*. Spinoza, subject as he is in large measure to this principle, suggests the deeper truth, namely, that the finite, instead of merely negating, realises the infinite, that the *perseverare in esse suo* of the finite is also the 'perseverance' of the infinite in its proper being. And we have found that, in the moral life as we know it, the finite principle of individuality does not contradict the infinite principle of personality. Why, in the future more than in the present, should the one contradict the other? (2) The objection rests upon a confusion of moral with intellectual unity and identity. The ethical unity, which consists in harmony of will, implies, we have seen, a real independence of will; apart from such independence, there could be no surrender of the finite will to the infinite. The maintenance of the ethical relation between God and man implies, therefore, the persistence of the human will or self, in the future as in the present. The dissolution of this would mean the dissolution of the ethical life itself, and the grounds on which we refuse to accept this conclusion have already been sufficiently indicated.

Our origin and our destiny are one; it is because we come from God that we must go to him, and can only rest in fellowship with him who is the Father of our spirits. That fellowship—the fellowship of will with Will—in the present is our best pledge of its continuance in the future. The fellowship with the Eternal cannot but be eternal, and such fellowship is of the very essence of the moral life. God is the Home of his children's spirits, and he would not be God if he banished any from his presence; nor would man be man if he could reconcile himself to the thought of such an exile.

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